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Abstract




My dissertation project, The Twilight of the Absolute: Russian Symbolism and the 
Romantic Project, scrutinizes and interrogates the premises of so called “influence studies” by 
examining one tangled instance of cultural interaction—the relation between early German 
Romanticism (the brothers Schlegel, Novalis, Ludwig Tieck, and Friedrich Schelling) and the 
second wave of Russian Symbolism (Andrei Belyi, Aleksandr Blok, and Viacheslav Ivanov). In 
the scarce secondary literature that touches upon this complex literary-historical problem, 
Russian Symbolists are often unproblematically represented as proud “neo-Romantics,” passive 
recipients of the Romantic intellectual legacy. The major claim I advance in my thesis is that Jena
Romanticism, far from being a revered and innocuous literary antecedent, presents an ever 
present challenge to the second generation of Russian Symbolists in both their artistic and 
metaphysical aspirations. This challenge consists in the Romantic assertion that the Absolute is 
unattainable, unknowable, and inexpressible because we as human beings live in and are defined 
by history and language. In this light, the relation of Symbolism to Romanticism is one of active 
re-imagining, resistance, and surmounting (“rewriting”) rather than of passive absorption, 
appropriation, and influence. 
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The dissertation traces all the stages of this uneasy relationship over the span of 
Symbolism's development as a movement. The first chapter deals with the “demon” of Romantic 
irony that shatters the Symbolist theurgic enterprise (the early stage of Russian Symbolism). The 
second chapter is concerned with the Symbolist failed attempt at conceptualizing the Absolute 
(the late, theoretical, stage of Russian Symbolism). In an effort to grasp the Absolute, Russian 
religious philosophy, including Symbolism, moves from the Idealist conception of “philosophy 
as science” to the Romantic notion of “philosophy as art” but, as the early German Romantics 
already cautioned, “philosophy as art” cannot deliver the Absolute either. One can escape neither 
history nor language. Since the Absolute proves uncognizable and unattainable, the Symbolists 
progressively move into the sphere of the tragic, which is the subject matter of the third chapter. 
In their search for the way to reintegrate the subjective (consciousness and art) and the objective 
(nature and life), the Symbolists come to view tragedy, an “objective” genre, as a counterweight 
to the solipsistic subjectivism of Romantic lyricism and therefore as the only viable way leading 
through cathartic cleansing to the Absolute conceived as a living mystery play. Unsuccessful 
attempts to realize their ambitious tragic program in practice, however, triggers a severe crisis in 
the movement and its eventual dissolution. This crisis is conceptualized by the Symbolists as a 
“tragedy of art”—the ultimate impossibility of producing a man-made synthesis of life and art. 
Thus, Russian Symbolism traces a full circle back to “the Romantic impasse,” for inability to 
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In Russian Symbolism and Literary Tradition, Michael Wachtel argues against Harold 
Bloom's conception of literary history, in which “no poet can understand himself—or be 
understood by others—outside the tension-ridden context of the larger literary tradition” (3). For 
Wachtel, Bloom's antagonistic model of literary creation, while suitable for understanding the 
complex dynamics of English Romanticism, is inapplicable for interpreting the vision of 
creativity as developed by the second generation of Russian Symbolists such as Andrei Belyi, 
Aleksandr Blok, and Viacheslav Ivanov: “If the English Romantics strove to escape the burden of
the past, the Russian Symbolists sought with equal fervor to integrate themselves with it. Rather 
than exemplifying Bloom's notorious ''anxiety of influence,'' the works of the Symbolists evince 
what might be termed an ''anxious desire to be influenced''” (4). Thus, influence “was not simply 
an aspect of Russian Symbolism; it was one of its guiding principles and lifelong pursuits” (5). 
Even though it is hardly possible to deny that “the Russian Symbolists operated with the 
fundamental concept of tenacious remembrance” (Ibid.) in their desire to construct an all-
embracing worldview, yet there is a striking exception to their welcoming attitude toward the 
past. Thus, contrary to Wachtel's assertions, early German Romanticism, also widely known as 
Jena Romanticism, far from being a revered and innocuous literary antecedent among others, 
presents an ever present challenge to the second generation of Russian Symbolists in both their 
artistic and metaphysical aspirations. The relation of Symbolism to Jena Romanticism (Novalis, 
the Schlegel brothers, Tieck, and the early Schelling) cannot be adequately construed within the 
theoretical framework of “influence” studies, for it is one of active re-imagining, resistance, and 
surmounting (“rewriting”) rather than of passive absorption, adaptation, and appropriation. 
The relationship between the Russian Symbolist movement and early German Romantic 
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thought has been addressed, mostly in passing, in light of the question of “influence” several 
times before.1 While most of the scholars of Russian Symbolism admit the possibility of some 
degree of connection, their views on the existence and the extent of the ties between the two 
literary movements vary substantially: from an unequivocal assertion of it (Davydova2) through a
tentative and non-committal acknowledgment, to an emphatic refutation (Pyman3) but very few 
have ultimately ventured beyond the bare declarations, and “indeed,” as voiced by J.D. West, “it 
proves difficult to do so” (“Neo-Romanticism” 413). Although both the aesthetic theories and the
poetry of the Russian Symbolist movement apparently reveal an unmistakable affinity with those 
of the Jena Romantics, the particular instances of this literary kinship, on a closer examination, 
turn out to be of a highly heterogeneous, “impure” nature, ranging from direct adaptations and 
unacknowledged borrowings to sheer coincidences and typological correspondences. Not 
infrequently, the striking likeness springs from the shared interest in a certain number of topics 
(the status of art as a higher form of cognition, the poet-theurgist, synaesthetic language, and 
1 On the relations between Russian Symbolism and German Romanticism, see E. V. Davydova, Goluboi tsvetok i 
russkii simvolizm: Tvorchestvo Novalisa v kontekste russkoi literatury v nachale 20 veka; Laura Lynn Goering, 
“Andrei Bely and the Humboldtian Tradition of Language Philosophy”; Maria Gyöngyösi, A. Blok i nemetskaia 
kul'tura: Novalis, Geine, Nitsshе, Vagner; V. V. Koroleva,“A. Blok i E.T.A. Gofman: traditsii romantizma v 
simvolistskoi poetike”; Michael Wachtel, Russian Symbolism and Literary Tradition: Goethe, Novalis, and the 
Poetics of Vyacheslav Ivanov; James West, “Neo-Romanticism in the Russian Symbolist Aesthetic”; Victor 
Zhrirmunskii, Nemetskii romantizm i sovremennaia mistika. 
2 E.V. Davydova studies the relationship between Jena Romanticism and Russian Symbolism by exploring the 
Russian Symbolists' enthusiasm for Novalis (as evidenced in their creative and theoretical works as well as by 
the translations from the German Romantic). The primary focus of her work is the older Symbolist I. Konevskoi 
(Oreus), and the younger Symbolists, A. Blok and V. Ivanov. 
3 In A History of Russian Symbolism, Avril Pyman refutes the existence of any direct impact of the early German 
Romantic thought on the development of the Russian Symbolist aesthetics and asserts the primacy of the 
influence of the 'older' generation of Symbolists (Merezhkovskii, Hippius, Konevskoi) over the 'younger' (Blok, 
Belyi, Ivanov): “It is often said that the first generation of Symbolists was influenced by the French, the second 
by German Romantic philosophy, particularly in aesthetics. [...] Block, it is true, was himself part German and 
loved the Jena Romantics and Heine. During his most impressionable years, however, he was more directly 
influenced by Merezhkovsky's ideas and by the poetry of Hippius, Briusov and Konevskoi than by any foreign 
reading. Bely was impressed by the same people in much the same way if, for Konevskoi, we substitute 
Bal'mont. He read Schopenhauer, Kant and Helmholtz as a schoolboy and the neo-Kantians, Marx and Kautsky 
after 1904 and used them extensively in his theoretical articles, but these can scarcely be called 'literary' 
influences” (226). 
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organicism) and, as a result, the independent use of the same or related sources (413-416). 
Furthermore, part of the “influence” proves to be of an indirect, highly mediated nature. For by 
the advent of the Symbolist era many of the ideas that originated with and/or were advocated by 
the Romantics have been absorbed into the European cultural heritage and became common 
intellectual property. Thus, some of the originally Romantic ideas (music as the highest form of 
art, philosophy as art, the synthesis of art and life, the poet as a co-creator with God, the tragic as 
an existential category, Apollonian sobriety and Dionysian ecstasy) were adopted by the 
Symbolists not directly from the early German Romantics but received via the mediation of 
Schopenhauer's, Nietzsche's, and Solov'ev's philosophies. Also, the works of the Russian 
Romantics, Gogol' and Tiutchev, served as a vehicle for dissemination of early German Romantic
thought in the Symbolist circles. In this light, the puzzling persistent link that undoubtedly exists 
between Jena Romanticism and Russian Symbolism can scarcely be explained away simply by 
the phenomenon of “literary influence.”
Due to the astounding degree of similarity of Russian Symbolism with early German 
Romanticism, the connection between the two movements, as I will seek to show, is more 
fundamental and as a result more perturbing in the Symbolists' eyes than “external influence” that
they welcomed in relation to all other predecessors. Jena Romanticism becomes a matter of 
enduring preoccupation for the second generation of Russian Symbolists because they perceive 
Romanticism as a failed “double” of Symbolism. Similar to Jena Romanticism, Russian 
Symbolism is not just another literary school but an aesthetic movement with grand metaphysical
aspirations for the transformation of the Universe by means of art. In other words, the Russian 
Symbolists, like their Romantic forebears, are striving to realize the Absolute, the definitive unity
of the finite and the infinite, the human and the divine, through human (artistic) effort alone. Yet, 
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while the ultimate goal of actualizing the Absolute is apparently shared by the two movements, 
Romanticism denies the possibility of such an attainment. For the Jena Romantics, the Absolute 
can only be striven for but never completely realized. It is to remain forever unattainable, 
unknowable, and inexpressible because we as human beings live in, and are defined, by history 
and language. 
This radical Romantic skepticism poses a major threat to the Symbolist theurgic 
enterprise of (re)uniting the earthly and the divine through the medium of art. The Russian 
Symbolists view the Romantic contention of the unattainability of the Absolute essentially as 
defeatist and Jena Romanticism itself as a “failed” movement, where matters of metaphysics are 
concerned. Thus, the relation of Symbolism to early German Romanticism is one of active 
struggle rather than of passive influence. Symbolism seeks to “overcome” Romanticism, for the 
very identity of Symbolism in light of its ambitious metaphysical task depends on its successful 
surmounting (“rewriting”) of its “failed” predecessor. This dissertation aims to explore three 
major areas of tension: Romantic irony, the dynamics between a philosophical system and a 
fragment, and the tragic idea and the genre of tragedy, through which the Russian Symbolists 
primarily engage and seek to overcome early German Romanticism. In order to understand why 
it is these three areas in particular that became the battleground between the Symbolists and the 
Romantics, it is necessary to make a brief foray into the intellectual history of both movements.   
Early German Romanticism
Early German Romanticism (“Frühromantik”) or Jena Romanticism (“Jenaer Romantik”) 
is an intellectual movement that flourished in Germany between approximately 1798 and 1804. 
Among its major representatives are the Schlegel brothers, Friedrich and August, Caroline  
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Schlegel, Dorothea Veit, Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg who is better known 
under his pen name “Novalis,” Ludwig Tieck, and Friedrich Schelling. “Frühromantik”  
constitutes the first phase of Romanticism and has a distinctive set of intellectual concerns that 
sets it apart from the movement's later manifestations. In particular, early German Romanticism 
arises as a response to the challenge posed by Immanuel Kant's Critical Idealism. The early 
Romantics are specifically concerned with pernicious dualisms such as a seemingly irreparable 
rupture between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the subject and the object, and necessity and 
freedom that Kant introduced in his critical project as a result of his quest to establish the 
boundaries of human knowledge. In their attempt to surmount Kant, the Romantics turn to the 
notion of the Absolute as an ultimate synthesis of all warring oppositions, which is also an 
obsessive preoccupation of post-Kantian Idealist philosophy (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel). Yet 
unlike the absolute Idealist Hegel, the early Romantics come to deny the possibility of the 
ultimate realization of the Absolute. Despite an intuition of the underlying ever-evolving unity of 
all things, for the Romantics, human consciousness, viewed as conditioned by time and sign, 
remains a tragic barrier that can only be eliminated with humanity itself. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason or First Critique (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781), Kant 
sets out to determine the a priori conditions of knowledge which make cognitive experience of 
the world possible and remain true notwithstanding the variability of experience. The world that 
exists independently of consciousness is, according to Kant, inaccessible to the cognizing 
subject, as his knowledge is inescapably circumscribed by “appearances.” The subject cannot 
know the world “as it is in itself,” dissociated from all perspective supplied by the human mind. 
In other words, the objects of experience are real but their true or “noumenal” nature cannot be 
reached by the knowing subject, as it would transcend the limits of cognitive powers. The 
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character of the external objects is given to the subject exclusively via the point of view produced
by the combinatory workings of the faculty of the understanding that supplies categories (cause 
and effect, etc.) and the faculty of sensibility that provides forms of intuition such as time and 
space. Ultimately, as Kant holds, one can know only the “appearances” of things but 
emphatically not the “things-in-themselves” because one cannot escape the universal and 
necessary rules that underlie and make one's experience of reality possible. Knowledge of the 
noumenal realm, a world beyond that revealed by the senses, may have been possible by means 
of what the German philosopher calls “intellectual intuition.” Yet it is denied to human beings 
who are endowed only with “sensible intuition,” that is, an intuition of what is given to them 
through their senses. As a consequence, the knowing subject is locked in within his perceptions 
and his knowledge is limited solely to his empirical experience. 
In his attempt to demonstrate the possibility of objective knowledge that would provide a 
firm foundation for modern science, Kant, however, introduced a number of problematic 
dualisms in his critical project, the quest for the solution for which would drive the whole 
Romantic enterprise. The most pernicious dualism against which early German Romantic thought
would be struggling is a division between the knowing subject (consciousness) and the object 
(the external world as distinct from consciousness) or, in other words, between the phenomenal 
and noumenal spheres of existence. The subject finds himself separated from the external world 
“as it is in itself” without any hope of ever reaching beyond the cognitive forms that 
simultaneously allow and severely delimit his experience of the world of nature. The 
transcendental forms themselves that make knowledge possible are not free from the problem of 
dualism either. In his exposition of the workings of the supposedly complimentary faculties of  
understanding and sensibility, Kant encounters difficulty in explaining how concepts can be 
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applied to sensible intuitions. The two faculties are so dissimilar in their nature4 that the German 
philosopher had to introduce the notion of the mediating “schema,” an almost miraculous 
adapter, that most subsequent philosophers found extremely problematic and yet indispensable.  
Furthermore, by rejecting philosophy's metaphysical aspirations to absolute knowing, 
Kant had to fragment the sphere of knowledge into the theoretical (philosophy of knowledge of 
nature) and the practical (philosophy of morals). Since the theoretical part of Kant's critical 
project largely concerns itself with the possibility of empirical experience, it falls to his practical 
philosophy, as explicated in the Critique of Practical Reason or Second Critique (Kritik der 
praktischen Vernunft, 1788) and elsewhere, to grapple with such transcendent objects as God, the
soul, the world-whole, and freedom that the Idealist philosopher inherited from rationalist 
metaphysics. For Kant, cognition of these supersensible entities can only be partial because 
cognition takes place not by means of concepts but solely by way of Ideas for which, as 
postulates of pure practical reason, no corresponding sensible intuitions can be found. This is the 
closest that the German philosopher comes to metaphysics whose validity he interrogates in his 
First Critique: “Kant insists on the finitude of human theoretical knowledge, which has to do 
only with the sensible given object, but he also recognizes that a trespassing of the phenomenal 
limits takes place in the practical domain where the 'object' is not given but has to be realized by 
practical reason” (Dastur 79). As a result, in the wake of the Kantian critical enterprise, in the 
words of de Bestegui and Sparks, “the balance of metaphysics tilts in favor of practical 
philosophy which recoups the speculative content of such metaphysics, but at the cost of a 
4 Solomon Maimon was the first to raise the question of the possibility of interchange between the two so 
drastically heterogeneous faculties. In Beiser's summary of Maimon's objection to Kant: “If the understanding 
and sensibility are such heterogeneous faculties—if the understanding is an active, purely intellectual faculty, 
which is beyond space and time, and if sensibility is a passive, purely empirical faculty, which is within space 
and time—then how do they interact with one another to produce knowledge?” (The Romantic Imperative 166)
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transformation: under the guise of freedom […] it is now morality which forms the 'cornerstone' 
of the metaphysical edifice” (Introduction 2).     
In the Second Critique Kant reinforces the dualism between the phenomenal and the 
noumenal spheres as elaborated in the Critique of Pure Reason by recasting  the two as 
heterogeneous and conflicting orders of existence, known as the order of necessity (the realm of 
nature) and the order of freedom. The faculty of the understanding presides over the general laws 
of nature, for its categories that order our sensory data constitute the basis for all of our a priori 
knowledge about the structure of nature. This a priori framework that makes our knowledge of 
nature possible leaves, however, no room for freedom in the realm of nature governed by 
determinism, i.e. by an endless chain of cause and effect. Given how the world is, there arises a 
question as to how human beings can be considered free agents who act rightly or wrongly and 
hold moral responsibility for their actions that they have the power to control. 
Kant seeks to resolve the problem by coming up with the notion of “free causality.” For 
the German philosopher, the cause of one's actions can be within one's control only if it is not 
situated in time or, in other words, if it is altogether outside the empirical sphere constructed by 
necessary a priori laws. Thus, Kant can make room for freedom only in the noumenal realm, for 
it is only one's noumenal self that can function as “an uncaused cause” outside time as opposed to
the phenomenal self that finds itself in the world of nature governed by mechanistic causality. As 
a result there occurs a rupture in Kantian concept of the self (consciousness) that finds itself 
irreparably divided between the free noumenal self and the conditioned phenomenal self—a rift 
which is accompanied by a set of unanswered questions as to how the two selves are related and 
how they interact with each other. 
The only way the order of freedom makes itself known to the phenomenal self is through 
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the unconditional command of the categorical imperative. While we do not have theoretical 
knowledge of our freedom because it would transcend the limits of possible experience, 
nevertheless, one has a practical a priori knowledge of freedom, exclusively for moral purposes: 
“Among all the ideas of speculative reason freedom is also the only one the possibility of which 
we know a priori, though without having any insight into it, because it is the condition of the 
moral law, which we do know” (Practical Philosophy 5:4). To put it otherwise, our knowledge of
freedom is based on our awareness of the moral law which, in Kant's view, each of us does 
encounter a priori: “Were there no freedom, the moral law would not be encountered at all in 
ourselves” (5:4n). Thus, for the German philosopher, freedom and morality are inextricably 
intertwined, for the only way to fully exercise one's freedom in the deterministic world of nature 
is to act morally. In order to act morally, however, one has to follow a set of strictly formal 
principles united under “the categorical imperative.” In other words, the categorical imperative 
through which freedom ultimately manifests itself is a moral law that applies to each and 
everyone unconditionally and in the same way, regardless of the empirical subject's individual 
inclinations or desires. 
Yet, despite the introduction of the categorical imperative as a manifestation of moral 
freedom in mankind, the passage from the theoretical to the practical or in other words from the 
domain of nature (“necessity”) to that of freedom was not provided in Kant's critical philosophy. 
The German philosopher thought that the philosophical construction of such a 'bridge' is out of 
the question considering the profound limitations of human knowledge, for it is a metaphysical 
problem proper whose ultimate solution remains beyond the cognizing subject's reach. Despite 
Kant's categorical refusal to supply the ultimate solution to the metaphysical rupture between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal ushered in by his epistemology, he nevertheless tentatively 
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approached the question of the possibility of such a transition in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790). 
In his Third Critique Kant suggested that the concept of an organism can be used to 
mediate between the noumenal and the phenomenal, freedom and nature. For him, an organism 
appears to be the only entity that possesses a “natural purpose” or, in other words, an inherent 
teleology. “Something is a natural purpose,” as Beiser explicates Kantian argument, “only if it 
satisfies two essential conditions. First, it must have organic unity, where each part is inseparable 
from the whole, and where the very idea of the whole determines the place of each part within it. 
Second, it must be self-generating and self-organizing, so that all its parts are reciprocally the 
cause and effect of one another, and so that it has no external cause” (The Romantic Imperative 
157). Thus, unlike a mechanism that always has an external cause and thereby is conditioned, an 
organism produces itself by being “a free cause” of its own self. This idea of an organism, 
particularly if extended to the whole of nature, as was later done by the Romantics, suggested a 
way out of the impasse of the dualisms, but Kant refused to affirm the constitutive validity of the 
concept of a natural purpose (i.e., that something is indeed an organism). For him, due to intrinsic
limitations of our knowledge there is actually no way to prove that such entities as animals and 
vegetables are really purposive organisms rather than simply complex machines. Furthermore, he
vigorously denied that physical nature is infused with the living spirit and can be viewed as an 
organism in its own right. For Kant matter is lifeless, so the view of the whole of the Universe, 
including its inorganic parts, as a living organism is “at best speculative and at worst 
anthropomorphic” (160). In the end, he concludes that the concept of an organism can be 
assigned only a regulative validity (i.e., we can think of and approach something animate as if it 
were an organism), for given the limits of our cognitive powers one can neither affirm nor deny 
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with any certainty the existence of such purposive natures. 
In their quest to surmount Kant's problematic dualisms, the early Romantics appropriated 
his tentative solution by attributing to it a fully constitutive status. Whereas Kant repeatedly 
insisted on the regulative status of the concept of an organism, the Romantics not only affirmed 
the existence of such purposive natures but they went much further by extending the 
controversial concept of an organism to the whole of nature, which is turned into a cosmic 
Absolute that seeks to realize its own essence. While each of the Romantics had his own 
philosophy of the organic Absolute, Novalis's theory of “magical idealism” can be considered 
illustrative of the Romantic position on the issue as a whole.    
Thus, in his theory, Novalis, like the other Romantics (Fr. Schlegel, the early Schelling, 
etc.), seeks to repair the pernicious dualisms between the subject and the object, the phenomenal 
and the noumenal that haunt the Kantian project. Unlike the critical Idealists, Kant and Fichte, 
whose starting point of philosophy is the autonomous and self-sufficient subject (human 
consciousness), Novalis takes as his point of departure the Universe itself, which, in his case, is 
invariably identified with God, or divine Logos. The Universe in its entirety is construed as a 
single undivided reality, a living totality, which dissolves the Kantian opposition between the 
subjective and the objective, for the intellectual and the sensible, the phenomenal and the 
noumenal spheres are now only interdependent parts of the organic whole of Nature. 
This whole of Nature, however, is still in the process of development and reintegration, 
and human consciousness occupies a privileged position within the hierarchy of nature. For the 
human mind represents “the highest degree of organization and development of all the living 
powers of nature, so that the Absolute will come to its final realization and manifestation only 
through them [finite minds or individual human consciousnesses]” (Beiser, German Idealism 
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357). As it appears, the Absolute can completely realize itself only through the mediation of the 
subject whose task, therefore, is to transform or, in Novalis' terms, “translate” the inchoate and 
indeterminate realm of raw experience (objectivity) into organized, determinate, and developed 
products of human activity such as works of art. Thus, the ultimate goal, according to Novalis, is 
to actualize the Absolute by spiritualizing physical nature (matter) or, in other words, by making 
(“raising” or “translating”) the whole world into a perfect work of art. 
The subject, in Novalis' vision, can magically transform the objective world only by 
making it conform to his own will. In order to gain such divine control over the world of nature, 
the subject has to learn to direct the will itself by mastering his external senses (the body) the 
way he has already mastered his internal ones (the mind). By obtaining the power to control his 
own body, the subject, by extension, will obtain the power over the empirical world and 
“translate” it into a work of art. The ideal envisioned by Novalis is a complete control of our 
world and the attainment of divine status by humans. However, this absolute control over the 
sensible world does not presuppose the elimination of the realm of sensibility by the subject. For 
Novalis, as for the other Romantics, the final goal is the realization of the Absolute as the unity of
subjectivity and objectivity, “where our inner and outer sense enjoy an interplay with one 
another, so that they work in perfect harmony” (424). 
The magical control over material nature is nothing else but a complete understanding of 
the world of sensibility. To truly understand, for Novalis, is to gain knowledge about the Universe
not through the powers of the intellect but via an act of inspired insight. The intellect, or, in other 
words, the Kantian faculty of understanding, views the noumenal and the phenomenal or, in 
Romantic terms, infinite and finite as irreparably separate and it is only the gift of intellectual or 
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aesthetic intuition5 that allows one to grasp, if only for a brief moment, the underlying unity of all
being. Therefore, the subject must approach his object, nature, synthetically rather than 
analytically. To get such a holistic apprehension of nature, the subject must (re)learn to read its 
language. The Universe speaks, for every single object is nothing but an uttered word of God. 
However, reading this “book of nature” proves an infinite task because its text is composed in 
hieroglyphs to which man has all but forfeited the key. The subject is deprived of his ability to 
decipher since he seeks in the cipher script only what he already possesses: the material 
physicality, or, as Novalis, puts it, the “objectness” of the object rather than its spiritual essence. 
Devoid of their divine significance, natural objects turn into “dead repetitions” and human 
language in its estrangement from divine Logos mutates into an ironic play of signifiers. 
This dramatic divorce between the object and the human word, the signified and the 
signifier, leads to the Romantic preoccupation with irony. The word that lost its immediate 
connection with the object which it designates turns into an unreliable intermediary between the 
mind and the Universe. As a result, the insight into the beyond granted by aesthetic intuition 
cannot be conveyed in human communication in its uncompromised, unmediated, purity. The 
content of consciousness, even of the superior artistic one, can be reached only through semiotic 
externalization. While the whole of human consciousness cannot be completely equated with that
of linguistic consciousness, human processes of comprehension and communication are 
inextricably bound up with language and, consequently, its immanent limitations. As Novalis 
puts it: “We know something only insofar as we can express it,6 or, in other words, make it”7 
5 The early Romantics reframed Kantian intellectual intuition as aesthetic, for, according to them, it is the power of
artistic genius that allows one to penetrate beyond the confines of the intellect and see the nature of things as they
really are. 
6 The emphasis is Novalis'.
7 “Wir wissen etwas nur—insofern wir es ausdrücken—i.e. machen.” 
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(Novalis Schriften II: 589, no. 267). In order to apprehend the discoveries of the aesthetic 
intuition, one has to fragment the feeling of eternity in a temporal sequence of words that would 
attempt to (re)capture the spiritual ideal in a material medium of sound. Furthermore, like 
thought, with which it is closely interwoven or perhaps even identical, language, including that of
art, is representational: “Something becomes comprehensible8 only through representation”9 
(Novalis, Das Allgemeine Brouillon 246, no. 49). The meaning that arises, even though in the 
dazzling garb of a symbolic image (rather than in that of a discursive concept as in philosophy), 
is deficient and invalid because it is by necessity conditioned. This representation embedded in 
the material side of semiotic systems always stands between consciousness and the Universe, 
preventing the subject from expressing the immediacy of his insight into the nature of things.   
Since due to its dualistic nature, all language (even symbolic or, as Fr. Schlegel calls it, 
“allegorical”) has to offer is an indirect and partial communication of the spiritual, irony becomes
necessary to counteract the excesses of unbounded enthusiasm that may easily mislead an artist 
into believing that he has captured the whole truth in his work. Irony is envisaged by the early 
Romantics as an indispensable corrective, as a means of transcendence and self-transcendence, 
that propels an artist ever forward in his infinite approximation toward the Absolute. Irony, in Fr. 
Schlegel's words, is an artist's duty: “Irony is duty”10 (Literary Notebooks 62, no. 481). It gives 
him an invaluable power of self-restriction necessary to produce meaning which is a temporary 
joining of the two extremes, “self-creation” and “self-destruction”: “Meaning is self-restriction, 
[and] therefore a result of self-creation and self-destruction”11 (38, no. 207). Since this emergent 
“meaning” (“Sinn”) or an individual work of art is always a fragment defective in its expression 
8 The emphasis is Novalis'.
9 “Deutlich wird etwas nur durch Repraesentation.” 
10 “Ironie ist Pflicht.” 
11 “Sinn ist Selbstbeschraenkung also ein Resultat von Selbstschoepfung und Selbstvernichtung.”
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of the Absolute that represents an unbroken totality of meaning, it is to be symbolically 
annihilated in an ironic gesture of recognition of its empirical relativity and temporality. Fr. 
Schlegel advocated the willed self-destruction of the work (a fragmentary “Sinn”) through irony, 
as “what does not annihilate itself, is worth nothing”12 (39, no. 226). The refusal of a work of art 
to annihilate/ironize itself in a humble acknowledgment of its own contingency attests to a lack 
of freedom and genius13 in its creator. 
Yet, as many modern scholars of early German Romanticism (Behler, Beiser, Frank, and 
Furst among others) have convincingly shown, Romantic irony cannot be viewed as a purely 
aesthetic phenomenon. As Fr. Schlegel insisted, the phenomenon of Romantic irony is not a 
literary device but is endowed with “philosophical capacity” [“philosophishes Vermögen”] 
(KFSA 18: 668) and its proper domain lies within the whole realm of philosophy rather than 
merely within the sphere of aesthetics: “Philosophy is the true homeland of irony”14 (KFSA 2: 
152, no. 42).
Romantic irony, or “transcendental irony,”15 as a philosophical concept with profound 
epistemological implications can be considered the center of Fr. Schlegel's critical philosophy. 
The term “transcendental” is borrowed by Schlegel from Kant's First Critique in order to 
12 “... was sich nicht selbst annihilirt, ist nichts werth.”  
13 Irony is one of the constitutive categories of genius, according to Fr. Schlegel: “Ironie, Energie, Enthusiasmus, 
Originalitaet, Universalitaet, Harmonie offenbar nur die Kategorien der Genialitaet” [“Irony, energy, enthusiasm, 
originality, universality, [and] harmony seem to be only the categories of genius”] (Literary Notebooks 193, no. 
1949).
14 “Die Philosophie ist die eigentliche Heimat der Ironie.”
15 For detailed discussion of Schlegel's groundbreaking notion of irony, see such works by Ernst Behler as German 
Romantic Literary Theory; Irony and the Discourse of Modernity; Klassische Ironie, Romantische Ironie, 
Tragische Ironie, and “The Theory of Irony in German Romanticism” in Frederick Garber, ed. Romantic Irony 
(43-81);  Also, refer to Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism. The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 
(435-461); Walter Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism,” in Selected Writings, 1913-
1926; Lilian Furst, “The Metamorphosis of Irony” in her Fictions of Romantic Irony (23-48); Paul de Man, “The 
Concept of Irony,” in Aesthetic Ideology; Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German 
Romanticism (201-219); Søren Kierkegaard, “Irony after Fichter,” in The Concept of Irony (272-323); Elizabeth 
Millán-Zaibert, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy.
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emphasize that the phenomenon of Romantic irony functions not as an ordinary rhetorical trope 
but as a groundbreaking philosophical notion that designates a mode of subjectivity conditioned 
by its own forms of cognition. Since all human knowledge, according to Kant, is a product of the 
workings of transcendental forms that make cognition possible but at the same time limited to the
empirical sphere, the realm of the noumenal remains out of reach for the human mind that cannot
go beyond the transcendental. In this light, “transcendental irony” stands in opposition to the 
notion of “the transcendent” or, in other words, the concept of the Absolute itself: “The 
transcendental sunders the infinite and the finite—the Absolute, on the other hand, is both at the 
same time”16 (KFSA 18: 113, no. 1009). Thus, the epithet “transcendental” stresses that Romantic
irony operates in the space of metaphysical rupture ceaselessly hovering between the finite and 
the infinite and at the same time establishes its critical authority over all human knowledge.
Irony turns into an epistemological stance par excellence in Romantic philosophy. In 
Beiser's words, “Schlegel had indeed called irony the capstone of his new epistemology, ''the 
highest, purest skepticism''” (German Idealism 451). This close alignment of irony with 
skepticism as an epistemological approach originates in the early Romantics' position that the 
Absolute as an actuated unity of the finite and the infinite, as a reestablished fullness of being is 
in the end only an empty concept ungraspable by the limited human consciousness. As Schlegel 
puts it, “Nothing is absolutely transcendent; everything has its sphere. What is thought of as 
absolute transcendent cannot exist”17 (Literary Notebooks 82, no. 634). Novalis makes a similar 
point regarding the Absolute: “The Absolute can only be recognized [by the human mind] 
negatively, insofar as we act and find that it cannot be reached through any act. […] This 
16 “Das Transcendentale trennt das Unendliche und das Endliche—das Absolute is beides zugleich.”
17 “Nichts is absolut transcendent; alles hat seine Sphäre. Was absolute transcendent wäre, kann nicht existiren.”   
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Absolute which we can only recognize negatively, realizes itself through an eternal absence […] 
So eternity becomes realized through time, even though time contradicts eternity” (qtd. in Frank 
215). This “purity” of the Absolute makes it unintelligible and uncognizable. As a result, the 
drive to philosophize becomes an infinite activity. In Fr. Schlegel's words, “All serious 
philosophy without irony is only half ” (KFSA 18: 112, no. 999). In this light, irony becomes 
indispensable as a corrective to the entire philosophical enterprise,18 for the idea of the Absolute 
transcends all single positions, as articulated in totalizing Idealist systems claiming to represent 
absolute truth. 
 Without abandoning the notion of systematicity as such, which they deemed essential to 
the infinite progress of human knowledge, the early German Romantics nevertheless repudiated 
the ideal of a complete and self-enclosed system pursued by the post-Kantian transcendental 
Idealists, Fichte and the young Schelling as Fichte's disciple, in particular. The Romantic 
fundamental critique of the deductive Idealist system is grounded in Friedrich Jacobi's challenge 
to the validity of a self-evident first principle around which such a philosophical system is 
organized. Jacobi laid bare the innate contradiction that lies at the heart of the Idealist deductive 
methodology which proceeds exclusively by way of proofs whereas “every proof already 
presupposes something proven”19 (KFSA 2: 72). As a result, as Nassar puts it, “by proceeding 
from a proof to its presupposition, philosophy results in infinite regress, which cannot ultimately 
arrive at a self-evident truth or certain knowledge [the unconditioned ground or, in other words, 
the Absolute]” (90). In other words, the unconditioned ground that by virtue of its very nature 
resides outside the domain of conditions cannot serve as a foundation for the system that consists 
18  “Alle nur enrnsthafte Philosophie ohne Ironie ist halb.”
19 “[Was Jacobi dafür anführt:] ''daß jeder Erweis schon etwas Erwiesenes voraussetze''.”
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of nothing but conditions. The Idealist system built around a first, unconditioned principle is 
therefore inherently unfounded and cannot lay claim to the adequate conceptualization of the 
Absolute. 
Fr. Schlegel, who elaborated Jacobi's fundamental insight, traced the failure of the Idealist
deductive system to its excessive dependence on science, mathematics in particular, as a model 
for generating an absolute system of knowledge. In their search for the unconditioned ground, the
Absolute, which would resolve the outstanding Kantian dualities, Fichte and Schelling effectively
resuscitated the role of mathematics in philosophical system-building (Nassar 93-94). The 
solution to the epistemological predicament posed by Kant was seen by the two Idealist 
philosophers in a postulate, an indemonstrable original intuition, employed in 
mathematical/geometrical constructions: “Thus, just as a geometer begins with a postulate, an 
indemonstrable intuition, so too must the philosopher. This intuition provides the ''evidence'' 
upon which the system is constructed” (94). However, apart from the “unconditioned principle” 
problem that inevitably arises out of the adoption of mathematics as a model for philosophizing, 
the mathematical, for Fr. Schlegel, represents the very idea of the antisystematic: “Once 
philosophy becomes science, then there is history. Everything systematic is historical and vice 
versa. The mathematical method is exactly the antisystematic”20 (KFSA 18: 85, no. 671). The 
mathematical is inherently ahistorical and atemporal while, for the early Romantics, the truly 
systematic (equated with the universal) presupposes the unceasing process of growth and 
transformation. Therefore philosophy, in their understanding, is more akin to poetry and history 
than to exact science: “A philosophical system has a greater affinity with a poetic and historical 
20 “Sobald die Philosophie Wissenschaft wird, giebts Historie. Alles System ist Historisch und umgekehrt. – Die 
mathetmatische Methode ist grade die antisystematische.” 
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system than with a mathematical one which is always considered exclusively systematic”21 
(KFSA 18: 84, no. 650).  
Thus, in contrast to the transcendental Idealists striving to elaborate a complete system 
built around a first, unconditioned principle, the early Romantics envisioned the construction of 
the absolute system which would unify the multitude of diverse elements as an endless process. 
Fr. Schlegel famously proclaimed that “it is equally deadly for the spirit to have a system, and to 
have none. It therefore must decide to unite both”22 (KFSA 2: 173, no. 53). In Behler's 
interpretation, the early Romantics sought to embrace “a subtle double gesture” that balances 
“both skepticism towards any achievable final goal and belief in the pursuit of such a goal. One 
way of describing this position is through Schlegel's frequent use of formulas such as 'as long as' 
or 'not yet'. In this sense, Schlegel justifies fragmentary writing 'as long as' we have not yet 
established the completed system of knowledge […] the words 'as long as' and 'not yet' do not 
designate a temporary deficiency or a transitoriness to be overcome by fulfilled knowledge, but 
are ironic expressions of the actual state of our knowledge, its permanent form” (German 
Romantic Literary Theory 71). Since only the absolute system of knowledge is a complete work, 
the attainment of which is infinitely deferred, all the other systems are inevitably provisional and,
regardless of their magnitude and ambition, are just mere “fragments” to be treated with irony. In 
Fr. Schlegel's words: “Even the biggest system is only a fragment”23 (Literary Notebooks 103, no.
921). These fragments only gesture toward and occupy a place ex negativo within the all-
encompassing framework of that as yet incomplete absolute system which functions only as a 
21 “Ein philosophisches System hat mehr Aenlichkeit mit einem poetischen und Historischen System, als mit einem 
mathematischen, was man immer ausschließend für systematisch hielt.”  
22 “... es ist gleich tödlich für den Geist, ein System zu haben, und keins zu haben. Er wird sich also wohl 
entschließen müssen, beides zu verbinden.” 
23 “Auch das gröste System is doch nur Fragment.”  
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regulative ideal to be striven for. 
Furthermore, for the early Romantics, philosophy as science which is dependent 
exclusively on the workings of discursive reason is also incomplete because the activity of the 
intelligence, notwithstanding its claims to the contrary, is helplessly blind without the guidance 
of aesthetic intuition and poetic imagination. In its isolation from poetry, philosophy becomes 
finite, barren, and ossified, driven by its narrow-minded determination to discover the absolute 
ground (“first principle”24), which, for the Romantics, appears like an attempt to find “the 
squaring of the circle,” “the perpetuum mobile,” or “the philosopher's stone”25 (Novalis Schriften,
II: 270, no. 566). Therefore, in their striving for the Absolute, the early Romantics insisted on the 
need to infuse philosophy with poetry. For them, the present-day sundering of the realms of 
poetry and philosophy is, in Novalis's words, “only apparent—and to the disadvantage of both—
it is a sign of sickness—and of a sickly constitution”26 (Novalis Schriften, III: 406, no. 717). 
Thus, in order to overcome this ailing condition of the human epistemological project, the 
Romantics called for the union of philosophy with, and its ultimate fulfillment as, poetry 
(“Romantische Poesie”). This fusion of art and philosophy becomes one of the major Romantic 
imperatives. In Fr. Schlegel's articulation, “The whole history of modern poetry is a running 
commentary on the short text of philosophy: all art should become science and all science should 
become art; poetry and philosophy should be made one”27 (KFSA II: 161, no. 115). Even though a
definitive synthesis will never be accomplished, for the Romantics, however, it is the lively and 
24 “Einem Princip”
25 “Ein Versuch die Quadratur des Zirkels,” “Perpetuum mobile,” “Stein der Weisen.”
26 “[Die Trennung von Poët und Denker ist] nur scheinbar—und zum Nachtheil beyder—Es ist ein Zeichen einer 
Kranckhaften Constitution.”
27 “Die ganze Geschichte der modernen Poesie ist ein fortlaufender Kommentar zu dem kurzen Text der 
Philosophie: Alle Kunst soll Wissenschaft, und alle Wissenschaft soll Kunst werden; Poesie und Philosophie 
sollen vereinigt sein.” 
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productive interaction between poetry and philosophy which is of primary interest and 
importance. In Behler's words, “[They] conceived of the union or fusion of philosophy and 
poetry not in terms of subjugating one to the other, but as a full maintenance of the mutual 
tension between the two poles” (German Romantic Literary Theory 193). This perpetual tension 
animates human thought and propels the progress of human knowledge and creativity without, 
however, dissolving itself into the certainty of the Absolute. Since philosophy as art, while being 
apparently less one-sided than philosophy as science, nevertheless, does not lead to the 
attainment of the Absolute either, it also requires the presence of irony as a necessary corrective 
of its fragmentary and incomplete insights. Thus, instead of seeking to construct a totalizing 
system, philosophy as art employs such open-ended, self-reflexive forms subject to ironization as
a fragment, a Platonic dialogue, and an essay. 
In this light, dizzying perspectivism and historical relativism are inevitable consequences 
of the workings of Romantic irony in the sphere of epistemology. Since transcendental irony 
debunks all claims of the finite mind to absolute truth, all human knowledge is necessarily 
incomplete and biased, reflecting an infinite variety of conflicting interpretations and 
perspectives. None of these perspectives can be singled out and elevated over the others as more 
objective or true(r), for all of them are only fragments in contrast to the wholeness and unity of 
the Absolute which exists only as an idea to be pursued but never to be realized. All particular 
positions, both aesthetic and philosophical, each by itself and all of them together as the sum 
total, are, in Frank's words, “the failed expression of the Absolute, which as such, remains 
incomprehensible” (214). As human beings bound by the limitations of semiotic consciousness 
and living in the flux of history, we are confined to earthly relativity and finitude.   
This unattainability and unknowability of the Absolute as a definitive union of the finite 
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and the infinite or, in Kantian terms, between the phenomenal and noumenal evokes an 
ambivalent response among the Romantics themselves. The young Fr. Schlegel, for example, 
hails what appears as the ultimate inescapability of the human condition, its grounding in 
language and history, for he believes in the idea of historical progress and the infinite 
perfectibility of mankind. While mankind cannot realize the Absolute, it can always strive 
towards the ideal, continuously improving itself and the world along the way. Schlegel's youthful 
optimism, however, is not universally shared. The predominant attitude among the Romantics in 
general and in late Romanticism in particular is neither pessimistic nor optimistic but rather 
increasingly tragic. Focus on the seemingly unbridgeable metaphysical rupture between the finite
and the infinite as it is encountered by limited human consciousness leads to the resurgence of 
interest in the genre of tragedy and the genesis of the concept of the tragic. 
Where Antiquity understood tragedy in terms of genre, German Romantic thinkers 
approached tragedy primarily as a metaphysical question.28 While concern with tragic poetics still
remained strong, it is the idea of the tragic as an irremediable schism between the finite and the 
infinite that comes to dominate the agenda of German philosophy. The development of a 
metaphysical theory of tragedy starts with Schelling and Hölderlin who came to read Greek 
tragedy concerned with human limitations in light of the problematics of Kant's critical 
philosophy. Thus, they viewed tragedy as simultaneously a reenactment of and the only possible 
solution to the problem of the rift(s) between human consciousness and nature (in theoretical 
terms) and freedom and necessity (in practical terms) inherited from Kant. In the words of 
28 For a comprehensive overview of the early German Romantic and Idealist approaches to tragedy and the idea of 
the tragic, see Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks (eds.), Philosophy and Tragedy; David F. Krell, The Tragic
Absolute: German Idealism and the Languishing of God; Vassilis Lambropoulos, The Tragic Idea; Dennis J. 
Schmidt, On Germans & Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life; Peter Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic; Julian 
Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek. 
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Bestegui and Sparks, “Tragedy itself was envisaged as passage, as a bridge thrown over the abyss
opened by the critical philosophy” (Introduction 1), for it was “nothing other than the 
presentation, the exposition, precisely, of the conflict between immutable orders co-existing in 
man: the order of nature or of necessity, on the one hand, and the order of freedom, on the other, 
the order of sensible finitude, and the order of practical infinity” (6). By driving these two orders 
to their ultimate expression, tragedy presents each of them “in their own demand and according 
to their own logic. And it is precisely in the holding together of each moment in its most extreme 
contingency that the tragic takes place” (Ibid.). It is the aesthetic sphere in which tragedy 
operates that brings the two metaphysical orders together by staging their irresolvable conflict.
The interpretation of the fundamental conflict of the ancient Greek tragedy in Kantian 
terms as a tension between freedom (the undivided human will) and necessity (the causally 
determined sequence of events in the world) originates with Schelling. The essence of tragedy, in 
his view, resides in “an actual and objective conflict between freedom in the subject on the one 
hand and necessity on the other, a conflict that does not end such that one or the other succumbs, 
but rather such that both are manifested in perfect indifference as simultaneously victorious and 
vanquished” (The Philosophy of Art 251). In his fight against fate, the tragic hero “raises himself 
above” the forces of necessity by proving his “moral greatness of soul.” In other words, in his 
revolt against the laws of necessity which is doomed to defeat, the tragic hero (re)affirms rather 
than forfeits his individual freedom. The force of the tragic consists precisely in the willed fall, 
because the tragic is nothing else but “a confirmation of a defiant will” (Lambropoulos 38). The 
hero asserts his freedom only by losing it. Thus, in Schelling's mind, “It was a great idea 
[conceived by the Greeks] to have man willingly accept punishment even for an inevitable crime;
in this way he was able to demonstrate his freedom precisely through the loss of this freedom” 
23
(“Tenth Letter” 86). Thus, freedom (the subject) is compatible with necessity (the object) only in 
the realm of tragedy, which is the highest form of art, art in its “highest” potency. 
Furthermore, in contradistinction to Kant's epistemology, tragedy, as the Romantics come 
to apprehend it, represents and offers a different type of knowledge. Rather than Kantian 
theoretical knowledge that neatly separates the two realms limiting human experience 
exclusively to the empirical, tragic or “suffered,” knowledge is acquired by man who is acutely 
aware of his radical “in-betweenness,” of his precarious position on the borderline between the 
two conflicting orders of being: finitude (temporality) and infinity (eternity). For the Romantics, 
the tragic does not have an existence in and of itself, but it exists exclusively for human 
consciousness destined to inhabit the irreparable divide. A human spirit yearning for its reunion 
with the infinite finds itself confined within the domain of temporality that it can escape only 
through death. Death or dissolution becomes a representation of human tragedy par excellence, 
for, as Hölderlin comes to realize, “the tragedy of appearance is nothing but the tragedy of time 
itself, which does not allow a final rest, but goes on endlessly in an infinite series of always new 
dissolutions and structurations” (Dastur 83-84). The final reconciliation of opposites (such as 
nature and consciousness, freedom and necessity) that would culminate in the realization of the 
Absolute is impossible because a reconciliation that takes place is invariably contingent or, in 
other words, is nothing but an appearance which is doomed to dissolution. No definitive 
reconciliations are possible within the sphere of the human, which is identified by the Romantics 
as and with the tragic. Thus, the tragic rift separating the finite and the infinite can be overcome 
neither conceptually nor practically but can only be lived through and “known” in suffering 
whose highest expression is the moment of death.                                                                            
Early German Romanticism embodies a yearning for the actualization of the Absolute as 
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a synthesis of the finite and the infinite and simultaneously a realization that such a union will 
ever remain beyond the bounds of humanity. In their struggle to surmount outstanding Kantian 
dualities, the Romantics search for the underlying unity of all things that would bridge the gaping
abyss between the subject (consciousness) and the object (nature), freedom and necessity opened 
up by Critical philosophy. Even though the Romantics posit the unity of the whole of the 
Universe, thereby connecting the subject and the object as the highest and lowest manifestations 
of its development, they cannot help but acknowledge after Kant the fact of the human mind's 
inherent limitations. While this underlying unity of all things can be grasped, if only for a fleeting
moment, by intellectual or aesthetic intuition, it can never be adequately cognized, systematized 
or artistically represented. Thus, whereas consciousness makes a human being human, it 
necessarily drives a wedge into the nature of things, dividing Being irreparably against itself. The
tragic split between the finite and the infinite that exists only for human consciousness cannot be 
surmounted, for it incarnates the essence of humanity itself. One can try like the young Fr. 
Schlegel to maintain an optimistic attitude in one's belief in the infinite perfectibility of humanity
driven by restless irony, but the predominant position among the Romantics toward the 
unattainability of the all-reconciling unity is tragic. The ultimate insight of Romanticism is that 
the human is the tragic and the tragic is the human.  
Friedrich Nietzsche
The discussion of early German Romanticism in the Russian Symbolist context is 
impossible without considering the philosophical legacy of Friedrich Nietzsche, who, 
notwithstanding his own highly ambivalent attitude toward Romanticism, served as one of the 
major channels through which Romantic thought (preoccupation with tragedy and the tragic, the 
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Apollonian and Dionysian elements, aesthetic individualism, fusion of art and life, and the 
creation of values) penetrated into Symbolist aesthetics. Nietzsche's development as a 
philosopher is extremely complex. Despite some quarrels as to the number and dating of stages, 
into which his writings can be subdivided, most of the scholars distinguish three major periods: 
1) an early period “of romantic metaphysics and enthusiasm for a Hellenic-German renaissance 
under the aegis of Schopenhauer and Wagner” that includes the publication of The Birth of 
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music (Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, 1872) 
(Morgan 13); 2), a middle period of the aggressive backlash against Romantic aesthetics and turn
toward the critique of the foundations of the “decadent” western civilization (dogmatic 
metaphysics, Christianity, science, etc.) that dates approximately from Human, All to Human 
(Menschliches, Allzumenschliches: Ein Buch für freie Geister, 1878) to The Gay Science (Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft, 1882); and 3) a later, “affirmative,” period that lasts from the writing of 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen, written 
between 1883 and 1885; published in 1883 and 1891) until Nietzsche's mental collapse in 1889. 
What follows below is a brief overview of some significant ideas (the Apollo-Dionysian 
dynamics, the Übermensch, and eternal recurrence) from Nietzsche's two most “Romantic” 
works, The Birth of Tragedy and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, belonging to his early and late periods 
respectively, that exerted the most impact on the second generation of Russian Symbolists. 
In his first book The Birth of Tragedy, the young Nietzsche looks into the origin of 
Ancient Greek tragedy. In his interpretation, Greek tragedy is born of music; however, in Smith's 
words, “this apparently single origin is in fact a double origin,” for it turns out that tragedy is a 
product of the two competing and complementary “artistic drives” of nature, the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian (xvi). Nietzsche constructs his metaphysical Apollonian-Dionysian polarity on the 
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basis of the two Greek gods, Apollo and Dionysus, perceived by him as “unsympathetic” 
opposites. The Apollonian force, as comprehended by Nietzsche, embodies the principium 
individuationis (“principle of individuation”) and as such encompasses everything which 
constitutes the unique individuality of a man or thing. Therefore, all types of form or structure as 
well as rational thought are Apollonian, as form serves to define, delimit, and individualize that 
which comes into being, while rational thought is structured and employed to draw distinctions. 
It is the principle that incarnates clarity and form. The Dionysian force, on its part, is conceived 
by Nietzsche as the impulse that appeals to man's chaotic emotions and, emphatically, not to his 
reason. The Dionysian embraces drunkenness, madness, as well as all forms of enthusiasm and 
ecstasy, for in such states man sheds his individuality and dissolves himself in a greater whole. It 
is the drive that epitomizes mystical self-abandonment and unity, and thus the annihilation of the 
principle of individuation. 
Though the two forces are apparently opposed, they are, according to the German 
philosopher, intimately and inextricably interdependent, being involved in a relationship of 
reciprocal stimulation and intensification. Without the effective counterbalance of its opposite, 
each force would tend to the sterile extreme, while a harmonious marriage of the two gives birth 
to the highest achievement of Western culture—Attic tragic drama which is understood by 
Nietzsche “as the Dionysian chorus which again and again discharges itself in an Apollonian 
world of images” (The Birth of Tragedy 50), as “the concrete Apollonian representation of 
Dionysian insights and effects” (51). This Dionysian chorus, in whose song tragedy originates, 
acts as a barrier between the stage and real life and embodies, in Smith's words, “[what Nietzsche
viewed as] ''the metaphysical consolation'' of tragedy, the reassuring insight that life itself 
remains fundamentally indestructible and pleasurable in spite of the suffering and death implied 
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in individual existence” (xvii). 
The greatest enemy of myth and tragedy that ultimately led to their destruction, according
to Nietzsche, is the culture of excessive rationalism inaugurated by Socrates. The rationalist 
impulse first manifests itself in art in the dramatic works of Euripides, Socrates' contemporary, 
who pursued the principle of aesthetic intelligibility or, as Nietzsche calls it, “aesthetic 
Socratism”: “In order to be beautiful, everything must be intelligible” (The Birth of Tragedy 70). 
This practice of “aesthetic Socratism” stems from Euripides' inability to appreciate the Dionysian
spirit of tragedy that he seeks to abolish by grounding the art of tragedy solely in the Apollonian 
element of form. Thus, in Euripides, tragedy, as Nietzsche argues, becomes a purely intellectual 
construct, lucid, logically arranged, and highly realistic in plot. This dramatic shift in the 
approach towards tragedy that privileges the rational over the mythical leads to the elimination of
the primary function originally performed by tragedy—the delivery of metaphysical consolation 
in the face of human suffering. Instead of meaningful metaphysical response elicited by the 
works of Aeschylus and Sophocles, Euripides' tragedies offer a form of entertainment through 
intellectual paradoxes, stylistic embellishments, and emotional extravagances. By embracing the 
principle of aesthetic Socratism, Euripides, in Nietzsche's view, effectively brings about the end 
of tragedy, thereby preparing the onset of another phase of decline in Greek culture—the 
Alexandrian age marked by the pursuit of dead knowledge and the demise of creative spirit.  
While in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche champions Dionysian mysticism and myth as a 
replacement for Socratic rationalism (“reason”) and the obsession with history that came to 
dominate and corrupt western civilization, it is not until Thus Spoke Zarathustra that he comes to 
put his vision of myth and tragedy in practice. In Brogan's words, “Zarathustra is not essentially 
about the experience of nihilism but about a new possibility, a new beginning; not about the 
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death of God [as it is commonly and mistakenly believed] but about the rebirth of tragedy after 
the death of God” (153). That Zarathustra is deliberately modeled on ancient Greek tragedy is 
explicitly acknowledged by Nietzsche himself. In one of the passages in The Gay Science, he 
states in relation to his character Zarathustra: “It is perhaps only with him that great seriousness 
really begins, that the real question mark is posed for the first time, that the destiny of the soul 
changes, the hand moves forward, the tragedy begins” (347). In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche goes even
as far as identifying what he calls “the type” of Zarathustra with “the concept of Dionysus 
himself” that constitutes the essence of tragedy (73). In this light, the prophet Zarathustra shown 
as “going under” (“untergehen”) from the heights of the mountain back to the valley, to the 
people, in order to disseminate the teaching of the Übermensch (traditionally translated as 
“overman” or “superman”) is cast as a larger-than-life tragic hero, who is, in Higgins' words, 
“portrayed as undergoing failure,” which is “the paradigmatic situation of the tragic hero and the 
vehicle that produces our sense that the hero's predicament is relevant to our own” (66). As a 
result of his tragic “undergoing” experience, Zarathustra lives through a significant evolution as a
philosopher by beginning as the teacher of the Übermensch and ending as the teacher of eternal 
return. 
Zarathustra descends from the mountain after ten years of solitude in order to bring 
humankind a message about the Übermensch as a new meaning of the earth. In the words of 
Lampert, “''The superman [Übermensch] is the meaning of the earth'' because he is the goal 
toward which the evolutionary process tends, the goal that must now be willed by the species 
mankind. The earth has no meaning apart from the future superman; at present it is only 
potentially meaningful” (19). The Übermensch is Zarathustra's gift to humankind that has 
forfeited its faith in God, for even if humanity can have no God since “God is dead,” it can still 
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have a future. The Übermensch incarnates Zarathustra's injunction “Be faithful to the earth,” 
because, unlike for a human being, whom he is to overcome, for the Übermensch, life is 
meaningful apart from any otherwordly transcendence of actuality. In contrast to mankind 
clinging to the consolation of metaphysics that promises a better higher world as a compensation 
for existential suffering, the Übermensch affirms this world, “the earth,” by fashioning life-
enabling and life-enhancing values of his own. Thus, humanity, according to Nietzsche, is only a 
transitional form, a life-form, as Davey puts it, “which also has risen beyond inarticulate 
animality and has not yet attained the power of full-existential determination,” whereas “the 
notion of Übermensch refers to a life-form yet to come, a life-form free from anxiety and guilt, 
and reliant upon the values it has created for itself” (xi). In other words, the Übermensch is 
Nietzsche's life-affirming, creative response to the vital questions of meaning and purpose that 
arose before humankind in the face of the death of God, the collapse of all “highest” values, and 
the imminent threat of nihilism. 
  In the process of growing as a philosopher throughout the book, however, Zarathustra 
develops another doctrine known as “will to power,” in conjunction with that of “eternal 
recurrence” (or “eternal return”), which is considered the core teaching of Nietzsche's 
“affirmative” stage. Will to power is “the primal life-force out of which all special organic and 
psychological functions have evolved and whose generic traits they retain” (Morgan 60). By 
nature this primal force of life or, in other words, life itself is indefatigably active and brutally 
aggressive. As Nietzsche puts it in Beyond Good and Evil, another book in which the concept of 
“will to power” is elaborated: “Life itself in its essence29 means appropriating, injuring, 
overpowering those who are foreign and weaker; oppression, harshness, forcing one's own forms 
29 The emphasis is Nietzsche's. 
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on others, incorporation, and at the very least, at the very mildest, exploitation […] 'Exploitation' 
[…] is part of the fundamental nature of living things, as its fundamental organic function; it is a 
consequence of the true will to power, which is simply the will to life” (152-153). The concept of
“will to power,” however, cannot be limited to its aggressive aspect only, for the character of life,
according to Nietzsche, involves more than a mere desire to “appropriate, injure, and 
overpower.” Beyond all, life is a creative process that endlessly selects and shapes, “organizes 
and administers what it acquires” (Morgan 62) and, what is more important, constantly 
overcomes itself. These two aspects, destructive and creative, are mutually interdependent, since 
there can be no creation without destruction. The on-going creative process which is the essence 
of all universal vitality necessarily demands the annihilation of the exhausted forms of life, 
thereby giving way to new vibrant ones. A period of growth is inevitably followed by a period of 
decline because in order to sustain itself life must always overflow itself: “And this secret spake 
Life herself unto me: 'Behold,' said she, 'I am that which must ever surpass itself”30(Thus Spake 
Zarathustra 112).   
This doctrine of will to power as a voracious life force that fulfills itself by endlessly 
expending and overcoming itself is accompanied by the vision of eternal return. In Lampert's 
words, “Will to power requires the affirmation of eternal return, the affirmation that lets beings 
be what they are” (255). Zarathustra's teaching of eternal return, an idea that with infinite time 
and with a finite number of events, these events will infinitely repeat themselves, is advanced by 
Nietzsche in opposition to the linear conception of time (such as one can find in Christianity or 
the modern notion of progress) that justifies the workings of temporality through its ultimate 
annulment in eternity or, in other words, in some future eschatological consummation of time. As
30 The emphasis is Nietzsche's. 
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Zarathustra makes it clear, however, time does not stand in need of redemption by eternity, for 
“the weight of things resides in things and not in some future to which they may or may not 
contribute” (Lampert 258). The highest good, according to Nietzsche, is earthly life governed by 
the ontological principle of will to power and the highest affirmation of earthly existence marked 
by endless creation, strife, and annihilation is the willing of its eternal return. There is no sense of
resigned submission to the ceaseless cyclical repetition in Nietzsche's creed. Eternal recurrence 
of the same is strongly linked with the life-affirmative religion of Dionysus, a deity of all things 
earthly, whose triumphant return is anticipated in Zarathustra's final songs. Thus, as Lambert 
convincingly showed, the teaching of eternal return supersedes that of the Übermensch in 
Zarathustra, for human species have no vindicating culmination and human history has no end. 
Russian Symbolism
Russian Symbolism is an intellectual and artistic movement that emerged in Russia in the 
1890-s and disbanded at about 1910, even though the individual artists that belonged to its ranks 
never stopped practicing Symbolism in either their lives or art. The literary branch of the 
movement is traditionally subdivided into the first and second generations. The first or older 
generation of Russian Symbolists (“starshie simvolisty”) that dominated the last decade of the 
19th century includes such representatives as Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, Zinaida Gippius, Valerii 
Briusov, Nikolai Minskii (Vilenkin), Fyodor Sologub (Teternikov), Mirra (Mariia) Lokhvitskaia, 
and Konstantin Bal'mont. The older generation is also widely known under such appellations as 
“the Impressionists” and “the Decadents.” Thus, rather than seeking to create a system of 
symbols proper as the younger Symbolists would do later, most members of the first generation 
are largely concerned with conveying all possible nuances of variegated moods, emotions, and 
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impressions available to human experience. Not infrequently their focus is on morbid, 
“decadent,” themes such as aestheticism, amoralism, extreme solipsism, eroticism, hopelessness, 
sickness, rejection of life, demonism, and death. The younger, or second, generation of 
Symbolists, Andrei Belyi (Boris Bugaev), Aleksandr Blok, and Viacheslav Ivanov, who are the 
subject of this dissertation project, came onto the literary scene at the onset of the 20th century. In 
contrast to the Decadents who confined themselves mostly to the sphere of the empirical, the 
younger Symbolists (“mladshie simvolisty” or “mladosimvolisty”), the Symbolists proper are 
more mystically oriented and in possession of grand metaphysical ambitions for the 
transformation of the Universe by means of art. 
In order to understand the younger Symbolists' metaphysical project of the transfiguration
of the whole of the Universe via human (artistic) effort, one has to consider it in relation to 
Nikolai Gogol''s artistic legacy and Vladimir Solov'ev's religious philosophy of “All-in-oneness” 
(“vseedinstvo”), for the basic tenets of the Symbolist worldview present in many ways a 
continuation, extension, and modification of their metaphysical projects. 
In fact, Gogol' serves as a major conduit through which some early German Romantic 
ideas, as refracted through his highly idiosyncratic lens, penetrate into Russian Symbolism. 
While the extent and depth of Gogol''s engagement with German Idealist and Romantic thought 
remains not fully clarified,31 it is beyond doubt that its undercurrent strongly informs his work 
throughout his creative career. One early German Romantic idea that produced a momentous 
31 Most of the present day research that deals with the relation between Gogol' and German Romanticism largely 
limits itself to the typological/analogical study of Gogol''s oeuvre and Romantic intellectual legacy rather than 
claims the existence of any direct influence (See, for example, Rosemarie K. Jenness, Gogol''s Aesthetics 
Compared to Major Elements of German Romanticism; Melissa Frazier, Frames of the Imagination. Gogol''s 
Arabesques and the Romantic Question of Genre). That some degree of “influence”—whether direct or mediated 
or, what is more likely, a mixture of both—shaped Gogol''s aesthetic vision can hardly be doubted. In Jeness's 
words, “... given the general intellectual climate of his formative years, Gogol' could not avoid being exposed to 
idealist thought and German Romantic aesthetics” (5). 
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impact on the Russian writer's life and art (and subsequently through Gogol' on Solov'ev and the 
second generation of Russian Symbolists) concerns the exalted role of the artist in the 
transformation of the Universe. 
In his appropriation of the Romantic vision of the artist as God's co-creator, Gogol' gives 
it a characteristically “Russian” twist by literalizing it. While the early Romantics (Novalis and 
Fr. Schlegel) postulate the spiritual “raising” of the world and subsequent attainment of godhood 
by the artist as an infinite task that can never be completed, the Russian writer seeks to bring 
about this “magic” transformation through the power of his word in the present moment. 
Progressively throughout the second half of the 1830-s and 1840-s, Gogol' cultivates his own 
Romantic self-image as a prophetic poet endowed with the sacred mission of redeeming Russia 
and the entire Universe through Russia. Thus, his claim to the role of the universal poet of 
genius, an inspired seer, who deciphers the “hieroglyphs” of history in order to uncover its 
providential purpose and to transform its bewildering contingencies into the Absolute embodied 
as the eternal edifice of the Gothic Cathedral is already in evidence in his early collection of 
essays and novellas, Arabesques (Arabeski, 1835).
Gogol''s Romantic conception of the artist as a supreme interpreter and transformer of the 
Universe is further intensified by his renewed sense of divine election experienced in the 
aftermath of his 1840 crisis.32 As a result of the near-death experience, the Russian writer comes 
to believe that his miraculous “resurrection” is intimately tied with his creative work: he is 
granted a reprieve by God so that he could guide all of Russia by virtue of his edifying word 
toward a triumphant moral and religious regeneration by making it summarily repent of its 
32 During his stay in Vienna in June 1840, Gogol' experienced a profound spiritual and physical crisis. In literary 
criticism, this crisis is known as the first and terrible illness that struck Gogol'. What was the exact cause behind 
the crisis is still open to speculation. Mann suggests that it might have been a nervous breakdown due to the 
emotional strain of writing (Gogol': Trudy i dni, 582-583).                                                                                        
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ungodly ways. The presence of a forceful Romantic streak in Gogol''s self-appointed messianic 
mission is stressed by Mochul'skii:
But the mercy of God revealed to Gogol' in the fact of his miraculous recovery turned for 
him into a source of temptations and inexpressible sufferings. […] Gogol' grew up in an 
atmosphere of Romanticism, with its cult of the strong personality and ego-centrism. In 
art as well as in philosophy, Romanticism was nothing but mangodhood. Gogol' is an 
extreme intense individualist. That is the reason why the divine revelation gives rise not 
to humility but to pride in him. Even earlier he felt he was God's elect, marked by the 
special care of Providence and now he utterly gives in to temptation: it seems to him that 
he is a prophet, a saint, almost the Messiah.33 (55)  
Almost until his tragic end, Gogol' retained a strong belief in his messianic mission to 
spiritually awaken all of Russia that was wallowing in sin through the sheer power of his Logos-
like word. At first he attempted to lead Russia to a moral and religious rebirth through the 
edifying message of The Selected Passages (Izbrannye mesta iz perepiski s druz'iami, 1847). 
These “passages” that Gogol' extracted from his “educational” letters to Russian friends outlined 
his prophetic vision how to bring Russia back to God through a series of sweeping social, 
political, and religious reforms of a highly conservative nature. The reading public's 
uncomprehending and hostile response to his teaching—a teaching widely perceived, even by his
close friends, as sanctimonious, complacent, and ludicrous—plunged the aspiring prophet and 
reformer into a profound religious crisis that at times bordered on nihilism. After a prolonged 
33 “Но милость Божия, открывшаяся Гоголю в чуде его исцеления, оказалась для него источником соблазна и
невообразимых страданий. […] Гоголь вырос в атмосфере романтизма, с его культом сильной личности и 
эгоцентризмом. И в искусстве, и в философии романтизм был человекобожием. Гоголь — крайний 
напряженный индивидуалист […] Поэтому посланное ему откровение вызывает у него не смирение, а 
гордыню. Он и раньше чувствовал себя избранником, отмеченным особой заботой Промысла, а теперь 
впадает в явный соблазн: ему кажется, что он пророк, святой, почти мессия.”   
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spell of self-doubt, however, Gogol' emerged out of the depth of spiritual despair with a firmer 
belief in the sacredness of his mission. 
Gogol' came to attribute his lack of success (the failure of his word) with The Selected 
Passages not to the falsity of his Romantic role as second Messiah but rather to the abandonment
of his native element, the creative word. By switching from the creative to the purely moralistic, 
Gogol', in his own eyes, betrayed his divine calling as a poet. Therefore he resumed his work on 
the continuation of Dead Souls (Mertvye dushi, vol. 1, 1842), a novel that was supposed to have 
consisted of three parts depicting, like Dante's Divine Comedy, the journey through hell, 
purgatory, and paradise. The aim of the novel was to deliver the same message as in The Selected
Passages but through the irresistible immediacy and intuitive appeal of aesthetic representation. 
Despite strenuous efforts at fashioning a work that would bring the whole of Russia to their knees
in repentance, Gogol' could not create such a “living” word. The harder he tried, the “deader,” 
“emptier,” and more “nonsensical” the language would become, crumbling under the weight of 
the inflated meaning forcefully imposed on it. 
The Russian writer's inability to complete the second volume of Dead Souls (“the 
purgatory”) that tormented him till his last days testified to his human impotence to attain the 
Logos-like power needed for the fulfillment of his Christ-like mission. As Epshtein summarizes 
Gogol''s tragedy as a creative artist who sought at his own peril to transcend the limitations and 
ambiguities of the linguistic sign:   
The tragedy of Gogol the writer began […] when at the end of the first volume and 
in the second volume of Dead Souls he set out to describe ''holiness'' and found the 
very roots of his language to be rotten. Against his will occurred exactly that which 
Gogol himself feared most of all, what he warned his contemporaries about, namely that 
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one can ''disgrace that which one strives to elevate,'' since ''our language betrays us 
at every step'' (PSS VIII, 232). (70)
Viewed in this context, the act of burning the second volume of Dead Souls by Gogol', followed 
by his tragic death which is still surrounded by a swirl of historical controversy and speculations 
(was his death a suicide in the form of self-starvation?), may be interpreted as his ultimate 
acknowledgment of the defeat of the human word and renunciation of his, in essence, Romantic 
mission. 
Gogol''s vision of the artist as (a rival of) the Messiah derived from early German 
Romanticism became part and parcel of the Russian cultural heritage and continued to impact the
development of Russian thought long after his tragic demise. Thus, Gogol''s messianic stance was
later taken up by the religious philosopher Vladimir Solov'ev34 who also hoped to transform the 
whole of the Universe with the power of his prophetic word.   
Throughout most of his lifetime, Solov'ev sought to construct a comprehensive 
philosophical system built around the idea of the actualized Absolute as a positive All-in-Oneness
(“ideia polozhitel'nogo vseedinstva”) in life, science, and art.35 The “great synthesis” (“velikii 
sintez”) is supposed to reunite plurality (the motley manifold) within unity (the One) by 
reintegrating back together all conflicting dualities such as faith and reason, matter and spirit, 
body and soul, temporal and eternal, human and divine, etc. For Solov'ev, all that exists 
necessarily exists in God and the fallen particular should become one with the divine from which 
34 The influence of Gogol''s intellectual legacy on Vladimir Solov'ev has not been explored yet in any depth. The 
similarities between the teachings of the two (the role of the Church, the hierarchical structure of the ideal 
society, the role of love, etc.) are really striking. 
35 For a comprehensive discussion of Solov'ev's philosophy, see Samuel D. Cioran, Vladimir Soloviev and the 
Knighthood of the Divine Sophia;  P. P. Gaidenko, Vladimir Solov'ev and filosofiia Serebrianogo veka; K. 
Mochulskii, Vladimir Solov'ev. Zhizn' i uchenie; S. M. Solov'ev, Vladimir Solovyov: His Life and Creative 
Evolution; Jonathan Sutton, The Religious Philosophy of Vl. Solovyov: Towards a Reassessment; E.N. Trubetskoi,
Mirosozertsanie Vl. S. Solov'eva; V. V. Zenkovskii, Istoriia Russkoi Philosophii, vol. 2.
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it distanced itself, for God is nothing else than “all” and “one” at the same time or, in other 
words, “the eternal All-in-Oneness.” The realization of the Absolute as a unity of the finite and 
the infinite would lead among other things, according to Solov'ev, to the transformation of 
mankind into Divine Humanity (“bogochelovechestvo”). 
This ideal of Divine Humanity or Godmanhood is inextricably linked in Solov'ev's system
with another concept or, rather, an enigmatic metaphysical entity, Sophia the Divine Wisdom 
(“Sofiia Premudrost' Bozhiia”), who performed the vital role as a mediator in the cosmological 
and historical dialectics of the (re)unification of the divine and the human. Solov'ev's vision of 
the Divine Sophia and her function in actualizing the Absolute, however, changed significantly 
over time. Thus, in the earlier version of his philosophy of “All-in-Oneness,” as expounded in his
Lectures on Divine Humanity (Chteniia o bogochelovechestve, 1878), Sophia is identified with 
the dual World Soul who in a defiant assertion of her free will falls away from God but yearns to 
return and works her way back, often blindly, through her ever increasing unity with Logos to 
finally merge into Christ. In her final reunion with Christ through the aid of Logos, Sophia or the 
World Soul, who represented the un-spiritualized matter in her alienation from the divine, comes 
to incarnate the Divine Humanity in Christ. 
In the later version, Russia and the Universal Church (Rossiia i vselenskaia tserkov', 
1889), Solov'ev, in his attempt to resolve the dilemma of the genesis of the world as a sinful act 
(that is as a result of the defiant Sophia's downfall), comes to separate the Divine Sophia as a 
helper of God from her evil counterpart, the World Soul. If earlier the origin of physical matter is 
conceived as a result of the outright act of rebellion against God, in the later variant, God 
Himself wills the existence of chaos as He wishes this antagonistic chaos manifested as the 
World Soul to gradually merge with and become Him. In her ultimate unity with God enacted 
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through the mediation of Logos, the spiritualized World Soul becomes One with Sophia who 
represents Divine Humanity. Thus, in both narratives, Sophia incarnates perfect humanity 
fulfilled in and as Christ. This ideal humanity reunited with God through Christ is nothing else, 
for Solov'ev, but the reunited Church that embraces all of spiritualized Nature within itself. 
Godmanhood that establishes itself as the Universal Church is the culmination of the 
cosmological and historical processes of development, or, in other words, of the self-realization 
of the Absolute as “All-in-Oneness.”
From 1898 until his death in 1900, however, Solov'ev, disappointed and frustrated in his 
efforts to expedite the realization of his philosophical project in real life, increasingly departs 
from his originally optimistic vision of humankind's inevitable evolution toward Godmanhood. 
Humankind, in his opinion, is too weak to battle the power of evil (death, in the first place) all by
itself and, if left to its own devices, will not make progress toward fulfilling the ideal of perfect 
humanity. The Absolute as “All-in-Oneness” cannot realize itself without divine interference. The
sole chance for salvation and a new eternal life lies in the Resurrection or, in other words, the 
Second Coming of Christ, the only and true Godman, who could deliver humanity from suffering
by defeating evil once and for all. Thus, for the late Solov'ev, the eschatological understanding of 
history supplants the evolutionary one. The meaning of history resides in its end—the 
Apocalypse as the only possible way toward the ultimate redemption of the human race. In this 
eschatological context, the image of Sophia the Divine Wisdom is reinterpreted by Solov'ev as 
the Woman of the Apocalypse, “a woman clothed with the sun” [“zhena oblachennaia v 
solntse”]36 (The Book of Revelation 12:1), who is a “great sign” appearing in the sky that heralds 
36 The identity of the Woman of the Apocalypse is subject to debate. The two dominant interpretations of the image 
identify “a woman clothed with the sun” either with Mary Mother of God or the Church. 
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the arrival of Christ and the ensuing establishment of God's Kingdom in a New Heaven and New 
Earth.
These two Russian antecedents significantly shaped the younger Symbolists approach 
toward their understanding of the Absolute and the means of actualizing it. Thus, the Romantic 
Absolute as a synthesis of the finite and the infinite or, in other words, of the earthly and the 
divine is invariably embodied for them as an attainment of Solov'ev's ideal of Godmanhood or 
Divine Humanity (“bogochelovechestvo”).37 Yet in their adoption of Solov'ev's conception of 
Godmanhood, the Symbolists discarded most of its associations with the reunified Church that 
were so important for the religious philosopher. For the Symbolists, the idea of Godmanhood is 
largely associated with aspirations for personal Christhood. Man, in their vision, should become a
“Godman” like Christ who is the only living embodiment in human history of the sought-for 
synthesis of the human and the divine. Unlike for Solov'ev, the ultimate transfiguration of man 
into Christ should happen, according to the younger Symbolists, not so much as a result of the 
evolution of the Universe spurred on by the World Soul's gradual redemption via its union with 
divine Logos but rather, in the Gogolian spirit, as an outcome of the personal efforts of the 
Symbolist artist who finds himself at the forefront of humanity. This yearned-for fusion of the 
human and the divine via the exertion of man's effort alone can be possibly attained, in the eyes 
of the Symbolists, in two ways—either by means of theurgic art or by means of erotic love.  
The Symbolist conception of theurgic art is grounded not only in Gogol''s vision of the 
human word as divine Logos but also in Solov'ev's aesthetic theories that introduce and explicate 
37 Whereas the Symbolist conception of Godmanhood derives most directly from Solov'ev's philosophy, there were 
also other seminal influences such as Nietzsche's notion of the Übermensch, Nikolai Fedorov's project of 
resurrecting the dead ancestors (that influenced Solov'ev's theurgic vision), and Nikolai Chernyshevskii's social 
ideal of “new man and women.” For a more detailed discussion of the importance of these sources for the 
Symbolist conception, see Olga Matich, “The Symbolist Meaning of Love: Theory and Practice”; Irina Paperno, 
“The Meaning of Art: Symbolist Theories.”
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the idea of theurgy in Russian culture. For Solov'ev, the medium of art that unites the spiritual 
and the material is capable of serving as a vehicle of the cosmic synthesis of the fundamental 
opposites such as the finite and the infinite or, in other words, the human and the divine. Thus, 
instead of being merely a part of culture, art is endowed with the potential of becoming a divine 
action that the Russian philosopher calls “theurgy”38 (“teurgiia,” from Ancient Greek θεός (theós,
“god”) + ἔργον (érgon, “work”)). In this view, human art as a mere production of the works of art
must be transformed into a life-creating force, for the task of theurgic art is no less than the 
transfiguration of the entirety of the physical world (inanimate matter) into its spiritual 
counterpart (spiritualized matter). In Solov'ev's words, the goal of “free theurgy” lies in “the 
realization of the divine principle by man in all empirical reality, the actualization of the divine 
power by man in the sphere of nature itself”39 (II: 352). Thus, as a result of the creative evolution 
in which the aesthetic as a mutual interpenetration of the spiritual and material operates “in the 
image and likeness of Christ,” man as a practicing artist-theurgist will eventually attain to the 
level of God and become his co-creator. After bringing about the transfiguration of man and the 
world, art as a mediating force between the human and the divine will cease to exist because it 
will no longer be distinguishable from the realm of life itself.                                                          
The younger Symbolists turn Gogol's vision of human word as Logos and Solov'ev's 
notion of art as theurgy into the cardinal principle of their artistic practice and personal life. 
Following their predecessors, they come to view art in a religious light—not as a mere 
38 For an overview of the concept of theurgy in Solov'ev's philosophy and Symbolist theories, see V. V. Bychkov, 
“Vladimir Solov'ev. Osnovy teurgicheskoi estetiki” (56-94) and “Simvolizm v poiskakh teurgii” (479-575), in 
Russkaia teurgicheskaia estetika; Konstantin Mochulskii, Vladimir Solov'ev. Zhizn' i uchenie; Irina Paperno, 
“The Meaning of Art: Symbolist Theories” (13-23), Aleksander Lavrov, “Andrei Bely and the Argonauts' 
Mythmaking” (83-121), and Michael Wachtel, “Viacheslav Ivanov: From Aesthetic Theory to Biographical 
Practice” (151-166), in Irina Paperno and Joan Delaney Grossman, ed. Creating Life: the Aesthetic Utopia of 
Russian Modernism.
39 “Реализации человеком божественного начала во всей эмпирической, природной действительности, 
осуществление человеком божественных сил в самом реальном бытии природы.”
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production of cultural artifacts (“works of art”) but as a powerful ontological force in its own 
right, possessing the capacity for, and even destined for, the transformation of life as it is found 
on earth. They apply the same Christological paradigm (“the Word become flesh”) to the 
aesthetic sphere, for their final goal, like that of Gogol' and Solov'ev, is “self-creation in imitation
of Christ” in conjunction with “the total reorganization and divinization [that is spiritualization] 
of the world” by means of art (Paperno, Introduction 7). 
Yet while, for Solov'ev, theurgic art is associated mostly with the distant future, the 
Symbolists, in the Gogolian, literalizing, spirit, take it as an urgent practical task and strive to 
realize it in the immediate present:
Symbolism did not want to be only an artistic school, a literary movement. It 
relentlessly strove to become a life-creating method, and in this was its most profound, 
perhaps unembodiable truth. Its entire history was essentially spent in longing after that 
truth. It was a series of attempts, at times truly heroic attempts, to find a synthesis of life 
and art, а kind of philosopher's stone of art.40 (Khodasevich 8)
That art should be turned into real life and real life should be turned into art becomes the 
Symbolist imperative. This principle of merging art and life is known in the Symbolist parlance 
as “zhiznetvorchestvo” or “life-creation.” “Zhiznetvorchestvo” is one of the so called 
untranslatables, for in the original, in Paperno's words, “it leaves room for multiple 
interpretations: tvorchestvo refers to artistic creation; when combined with the word zhizn' 
(“life”), it suggests both the creation of life and a synthesis of the two elements—creation and 
40 “Символизм не хотел быть только художественной школой, литературным течением. Все время он 
порывался стать жизненно-творческим методом, и в этом была его глубочайшая, быть может, 
невоплотимая правда, но в постоянном стремлении к этой правде протекала, в сущности, вся его история. 
Это был ряд попыток, порой истинно героических, — найти сплав жизни и творчества, своего рода 
философский камень искусства.”
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life” (Introduction 2).  
The Symbolists seek to implement this notion of art as transfiguration of reality by fusing 
art (the word) and life in their artistic practice. Similar to Gogol''s prior efforts, they attempt to 
convert the human word shackled by limitations into the all-powerful word of God. In particular, 
in their theories and practice, they focus on the nature of the poetic word that for them is 
radically different from any other sign because it is a “symbol.” Unlike an ordinary or, in the 
Symbolist vocabulary, “dead” word, in which a signifier and a signified are alienated from each 
other, the symbol aims to be “a total, mystical equivalent of the ''reality'' that it signifies” 
(Paperno, “The Meaning of Art” 21). Thus, the symbol as a “living” word that merges the 
signifier and the signified, the material and the spiritual aspires to “act” like the divine Logos on 
which it is clearly modeled. In Ivanov's terms, the poetic word is “the Word striving to become 
flesh.” Belyi, who is preoccupied with Gogol''s Romantic legacy to the point of obsession, goes 
even further than Ivanov in his direct equation of the symbol with Logos. For him, the poetic 
word is unambiguously theurgic, and as such has a direct, unmediated impact on the physical 
world by bringing things into existence:
Every living word is the magic of conjuration. [...] In naming unknown things with 
words we are creating ourselves and the world. A word is a conjuration of things. It is a 
summoning, an invocation of God. When I say “I,” I create a sound symbol. I assert this 
symbol as something that exists. And only at that moment I become conscious of 
myself.41 (Simvolizm 439-440)
In other words, Belyi asserts that symbols as “living words” possess the same degree of 
41 “Всякое живое слово есть магия заклятия. […] Именуя неизвестности словами, мы творим себя и мир; 
слово есть заклятие вещей; слово есть призыв и вызывание бога. Когда я говорю ''я'', я создаю звуковой 
символ; я утверждаю этот символ, как существующий; только в эту минуту я сознаю себя.”
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ontological reality (“The living word creates the world,”42 434) as the objects they designate and 
as such are identical with and consequently interchangeable with them. In this light, Symbolist 
poetry as a production of life-creating symbols aims to fuse the word and the realm of existence 
by becoming reality itself. 
The Symbolists sought to practice the principle of “life-creation” or “zhiznetvorchestvo” 
in their personal lives as well. For, according to Belyi, “The artist should become his own artistic 
form: his natural 'I' should merge with his art; his life should become artistic. He himself is ''the 
word made flesh''”43 (Lug Zelenyi 28). This Symbolist position in relation to the artist's private 
life as a work of art not infrequently led to what Paperno calls “a deliberate aesthetic organization
of behavior” in the public domain: “The artist's life was treated as a text, constructed and ''read'' 
by a method similar to that used in art” (Introduction 2). This intentional aestheticization of life 
more often than not involved the erotic sphere. The Merezhkovskiis' celibate marriage, 
Viacheslav Ivanov's “open” marriage with Zinov'eva-Annibal, the tumultuous love relations of 
Andrei Belyi, Valerii Briusov, and Nina Petrovskaia as well as the complex love triangle that 
included Andrei Belyi, Aleksandr Blok, and Liubov' Mendeleeva could be used as examples of 
such a highly self-conscious, stylized behavior.44 
It is not by chance that most of the experimentation (that sometimes led to tragic 
consequences) with the principle of “life-creation” or “zhiznetvorchestvo” happened among the 
Symbolists in the sphere of the erotic. For, according to Solov'ev's mythology of love as 
42 “Творческое слово созидает мир.”
43 “Художник должен стать собственной формой: его природное ''я'' должно слиться с творчеством; его 
жизнь — должна стать художественной. Он сам ''слово, ставшее плотью''.”
44 For a detailed analysis of the Symbolists' attempts to exercise the principles of life-creation in their personal 
lives, see Lavrov, Aleksandr, “Andrei Bely and the Argonauts' Mythmaking”; Joan Delaney Grossman, “Valery 
Brisuov and Nina Petrovskaia: Clashing Models of Life in Art”; Olga Matich, “The Symbolist Meaning of Love: 
Theory and Practice”; Michael Wachtel, “Viacheslav Ivanov: From Aesthetic Theory to Biographical Practice.”
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explicated in his series of essays titled “The Meaning of Love” (“Smysl liubvi,” 1892-1894), 
erotic love that (like art) fuses the spiritual and the material is another vehicle of the “great 
synthesis.” Even more than art, love is endowed, in the eyes of the Russian philosopher, with the 
potential to transfigure and immortalize humanity because it is the only manifestation of divinity 
left in the fallen material world yearning for redemption. The meaning of erotic love lies for 
Solov'ev emphatically not in procreation, which is nothing else than the nonsensical perpetuation 
of death and disintegration, but in the transformation of the human being into a new, 
androgynous, man. Thus, Solov'ev envisions the sacred task of love as a (re)creation of the divine
androgyne through the free reunion of the hitherto estranged female and masculine principles. It 
is through erotic love free of physical passion that man can become whole again, “in the image 
and likeness of God,” for it is only by means of the spiritual union with the beloved that he can 
deliver himself from his egoism (that is, his particularity) that stands between him and God. 
Love, according to Solov'ev, is an ethical task (“delo liubvi”) that lies before the whole of 
humanity because only love can conquer death by transfiguring matter. The individual triumph of
love, however, will not save the world, for, in Solov'ev's teaching, salvation can be achieved only
by the entire mankind rather than by disparate individuals.   
Like Solov'ev, the Symbolists view erotic love as a metaphysical bridge (or, as the 
philosopher calls it “a pontifex”) between the material and the spiritual that leads to the 
realization of the Absolute as the ultimate union of the finite and the infinite. Not infrequently, 
the Symbolist artist casts himself in the role of the Savior destined to deliver the fallen or 
enchanted beloved from the clutches of the demonic (associated with matter and therefore with 
earthly desires, sexual passion, in particular). For, according to Solov'ev, it is man who is 
supposed to take an active position in relation to the passive feminine principle. In this light, man
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is expected to create his wife as God created the Universe. By loving a woman, man affirms her 
“idea” in God which is nothing else than the image of the Divine Sophia: “The heavenly object 
of our love is always one, always one and the same for everyone—the Divine Eternal 
Feminine”45 (SS VII: 47). Thus, man is to elevate the earthly beloved as an instantiation of the 
fallen World Soul to the level of her heavenly counterpart, Sophia, through the purity of his love. 
In the later period (from about 1907 onward), the image of the captive beloved as an 
incarnation of the Solov'evian World Soul imperceptibly merges in the younger Symbolists' work
with Gogol''s personified image of Russia as a lover, as it arises, in particular, in the lyrical 
digressions in the first volume of The Dead Souls. In one of these digressions, he famously 
portrays Russia as a woman who gazes at the author in mute appeal for salvation as if he were 
Christ the Redeemer. Gogol''s inability to save Russia is interpreted by the Symbolists as 
indicative of his lack of “perfect” love for her—a deficiency that eventually led to his  
succumbing to the demonic element and tragic demise. In order to construct a bridge over the 
abyss of non-being into which the Romantic Gogol' fell headlong, they seek to take over his 
abandoned mission of delivering Russia from her earthly tribulations. But by assuming this task 
of salvation of Russia through Solov'evian “erotic” love, which is supposedly to culminate in the 
redemption of the whole of Cosmos, the Symbolist artist, like Gogol', inevitably turns himself 
into a rival of Christ. Viewed in this context, the Symbolist's major ambition that underlies all his
effort is to become Christ or, to be more precise, to supplant Christ of the New Testament in his 
function as the Redeemer. 
Yet, as the Symbolists in both their art and real-life love experiences came to find out, 
45 “Небесный предмет нашей любви только один, всегда и для всех один и тот же — Вечная Женственность 
Божия.”
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such Christological posturing, as in the case of Gogol', only led to tragedy. Instead of bridging 
the divide between the material and the spiritual, thereby performing the role ascribed to Christ 
as a mediator, the Symbolist artist invariably found himself falling short of his ambitious 
metaphysical task. Rather than saving his beloved caught up in the demonic by purifying her 
through his spiritual love, the Symbolist lover proved himself unworthy of his self-appointed 
mission by succumbing to the earthly temptations of physical love (“demonic passion”). Thus, 
the “demonic” inversion of erotic love exposed the Symbolist artist as a pseudo-Christ incapable 
of attaining the living union of the finite and the infinite of which the Godman was the only true 
embodiment. As one may well have expected, Symbolism did not succeed in fulfilling its 
theurgic task of reuniting the earthly and the divine through human effort alone. Both art and love
turned out to be too unreliable, too much of the earth, to serve as vehicles of the envisioned 
universal synthesis while the artist himself was human, all too human to become (like) Christ. 
The Structure of the Dissertation Project 
Given the extent of the metaphysical ambitions pursued by the second generation of the 
Russian Symbolists, their tense and at times obsessive relations with their more skeptical 
Romantic predecessors become less surprising. The Symbolists, who were bent on the practical 
realization of the Absolute through their own strength, found it difficult to accept the Romantic 
position concerning its ultimate unattainability. The degree of similarity that the two movements 
shared (the notion of the Absolute as a unity of the infinite and the finite, the artist as a co-creator
with God, art as the highest form of cognition, art as a vehicle for the transformation of life, the 
great synthesis of philosophy, religion, and art, etc.)46 made the Symbolists extremely uneasy as 
46 All these points of similarity as well as many others, together with their potential sources, will be discussed in 
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to the chances for success awaiting their theurgic enterprise of reuniting heaven and earth, in 
light of the Romantic pronouncement of the impossibility of such an endeavor. Russian 
Symbolism saw in early German Romanticism its “failed” other and sought to overcome its 
unsuccessful antecedent by subsuming it under a totalizing Symbolist worldview. In order to 
surmount Romanticism, whose prior “failure” presented a formidable stumbling block to the 
Symbolists, they had to disprove the Romantic stance in relation to ironic perspectivism and 
relativity, the impossibility of constructing a system of absolute knowledge, and their view of the 
human condition as inescapably tragic.  
The first chapter of this dissertation project, “Between the Mystical and the Skeptical, or
the Symbolist battle with the Demon of Romantic Irony,” examines the attempt to overcome 
Romantic irony that, in the eyes of the Russian Symbolists, becomes a manifestation of the 
demonic. Irony's skeptical stance and destructive action in relation to all “absolute truths” 
attained via human effort represents a major metaphysical threat to the Symbolist theurgic 
ambitions of bringing about the Absolute by merging life and art, the Universe and the man-made
text. In Romantic irony's refusal to recognize any objective authority over itself, the Symbolists 
sense not so much a healthy doubt, a necessary corrective of the poet's excessive enthusiasm, but 
rather an imminent danger of unrestrained nihilism that forebodes the onset of non-being. 
Thus, Vladimir Solov'ev, who is the first to encounter the challenge of Romantic irony, 
seeks to defuse its subversive dialectics by synthesizing its two poles: “the enthusiastic” (i.e., the 
mystical) and “the skeptical,” between which Romantic irony eternally oscillates, refusing to rest.
detail in the body of the dissertation in due place. As mentioned earlier, this degree of commonality cannot be 
explained exclusively by so called “direct influence” of early German Romanticism on the second generation of 
the Russian Symbolists. Occasionally, the Symbolists indeed imbibed some of the ideas directly from the German
Romantic sources. More often, however, the impact was mediated by other literary and philosophical sources. 
Gogol', Tiutchev, Solov'ev, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche served as the most important channels of the early 
German Romantic ideas in the case of Russian Symbolism.  
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For Solov'ev, these two poles of irony are associated with the fundamental conflict between 
“faith” and “reason” that he unsuccessfully strives to reconcile in his philosophical project of All-
in-Oneness. In his poetic work this conflict takes the form of tension between two contrary 
aesthetic modes or “moods”—“the lyrical,” which is expressive of Solov'ev's mystical 
experiences of the Divine Sophia, and “the ironic” (or “the skeptical”) that reveals his corrosive 
doubt as to the reality of his mystical visions and the feasibility of his hopes for the final union 
between earth and heaven. Since in Solov'ev's theurgic vision, the textual (word) and the 
ontological (Being) are interdependent, the synthesis between the two aesthetic modes is bound 
to have profound ontological reverberations. Yet, as in his philosophical enterprise, Solov'ev is 
unable to strike a harmonious union between the two in his poetry. The ironic mode, if left to run 
its negative course, tends to prevail over the lyrical thereby profaning and undermining it, as it 
happens in the first, unpublished, version of his play The White Lily (Belaia liliia, ili son v noch 
na Pokrova, 1878-1880). Since the synthesis remains out of reach, the only solution the Russian 
poet comes up with in his work (“Three Encounters” [“Tri svidaniia,” 1898], in particular) for 
reining in the devious irony that assails, ridicules, and inverts the sacred is to subjugate the ironic
in the service of the lyrical.
 The Russian Symbolists inherit Solov'ev's battle with Romantic irony, whose 
uncontrollable workings they increasingly perceive as demonic. Thus, Aleksandr Blok, who 
pursues the Solov'evian ideal of Godmanhood through the union with the Eternal Feminine 
(“Vechnaia Zhenstvennost'”) as chronicled in his Verses to the Beautiful Lady (Stikhi o 
Prekrasnoi Dame, 1904), probes the depths of negativity concealed under the optimistic veneer 
of Romantic irony. Incapable of fulfilling the role of a unifier of the relative and the transcendent 
traditionally assigned to Christ, the Symbolist poet plunges into the whirlpool of metaphysical 
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irony that progressively turns nihilistic. In his ironic self-analysis that leads him to the critique of 
excessive Romantic subjectivity in his play The Puppet Show (Balaganchik, 1906), Blok exposes 
the ironic as an integral part of the lyrical element. Unlike Solov'ev who conceives of the lyrical 
as a manifestation of the divine, he denounces the lyrical as demonic, showing that the nihilism 
of Romantic irony nestles at the very heart of the lyrical itself. In his struggle against lyrical  
subjectivity, Blok condemns Romanticism as otherwordly and petrified and elevates the 
“earthiness” of the Russian people as a counter-ideal. To bridge the abyss of incomprehension 
between the people who represent the immediacy of life and the Russian intelligentsia stricken 
with ironic (“Romantic”) consciousness, god-like perfect love (“sovershennaia liubov'”) is 
needed. But, as in the case of the Eternal Feminine, a member of the Russian intelligentsia, 
Blok's alter ego, proves incapable of Christ-like self-abnegation. Romantic irony, in the end, as 
Blok comes to realize, cannot be brought under restraint, as suggested by Solov'ev, but can be 
only eliminated with the death of the Romantic subject, whose demise he envisions in the 
upcoming tragic collision between the Russian intelligentsia and the people.
In contrast to Blok for whom the ultimates, the lyrical and the ironic, become 
indistinguishable, Andrei Belyi strives to implement Solov'ev's solution in his combat with the 
demon of Romantic irony in his theurgic Symphonies (Second Symphony [Simfoniia (2-ia, 
dramaticheskaia), 1902]; Third Symphony or Return [Vozvrat, 1905], and Fourth Symphony or 
The Goblet of Blizzards [Kubok Metelei, 1908]). By establishing a firm control over the ironic, he
in fact seeks to turn Romantic irony from a potential enemy that perpetually jeopardizes the 
lyrical into its most faithful ally. The key to the command of Romantic irony resides, according 
to Belyi, in the knowledge of absolute truth which is accessible only to the one equipped with the
supreme— “Symbolist”—mode of cognition. He attempts to institute such a comprehensive 
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control through the authoritative figure of the god-like narrator hovering over the textual universe
(which is, in Belyi's theurgical vision, identical with the actual cosmos) and imposing definitive 
resolutions in all cases of ironic ambiguity that might threaten the authorially intended meaning. 
Yet, unlike God, whose word is Logos, the Russian Symbolist finds that human language, which, 
according to the early Romantics, constitutes the very source of irony, generates endless 
ambiguities, disturbances, and paradoxes that are impossible to subdue. In the end, the lyrical, 
despite Belyi's best efforts, is destabilized and inverted by the ironic as his theurgic enterprise is 
derailed by the irony of the sign. 
 In order to override the Romantic ironic vision of the Universe as one replete with 
unsettling contingencies, “open ends,” irremediable contradictions, and ceaselessly proliferating 
relativities, the younger Symbolists aspire to construct an all-embracing worldview that would be
able to mend the rift between the finite and the infinite in which Romantic irony thrives. Thus, 
the second chapter, “A Vicious Circle: From Philosophy as Science to Philosophy as Art,” 
explores the Symbolist efforts to disprove the Romantic stance on the ultimate unknowability of 
the Absolute, including their denial of the possibility of constructing an absolute system of 
knowledge that would encompass the ontological Absolute itself. To stave off epistemic 
relativism instigated by the workings of transcendental irony that jeopardizes the “objectivity” of 
all values, the pre-Symbolist Solov'ev and later the younger Symbolist Belyi seek to develop 
new, “synthetic,” types of philosophical systems that would recuperate the compromised notion 
of the Absolute. In his philosophy of All-in-Oneness, Solov'ev strives to synthesize systematic, 
that is, Idealist, philosophy grounded in “reason” with religion (“faith”), whereas in his ambitious
theory of Symbolism as explicated in his three volume collection Symbolism, Arabesques, and 
The Green Meadow (Simvolizm, 1910; Arabeski, 1911; Lug zelenyi, 1910), Belyi attempts to 
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reunite the conflicting poles of “science” and “art.” Both synthetic systems aimed at introducing 
an all-encompassing, ontologically anchored worldview break down, however, unable to fuse the 
discordant elements within the framework of an Idealist system. 
This early collapse of Russian “synthetic” philosophy dependent on the Idealist ideal of 
the totalizing system prompts Russian philosophers to repudiate “reason” and turn to alternative, 
less rationalist, methods of philosophizing such as the Romantic vision of “philosophy as art” in 
their hopes of capturing the elusive Absolute. This aesthetic turn is already evident in the late 
Solov'ev, who after the failure of his project of All-in-Oneness steered by “reason” hails art in his
last work, Three Conversations (Tri Razgovora, 1899), as the most appropriate medium for 
conveying the immutable truth of Revelation. Yet, as it turns out, the Romantic conception of 
philosophy as art presents another insurmountable setback in the Russian religio-philosophical 
quest for the Absolute. While the early German Romantics admit that one can transcend the 
boundaries of the empirical by means of the ethereal flights of aesthetic intuition, its otherwordly 
revelations, however, can be communicated only by means of the semiotic sign that severely 
compromises them. As the early Romantics insist, a human being exists in time and language and
therefore the Absolute both as a fullness of Being (in the realm of metaphysics) and a totality of 
knowledge (in the sphere of epistemology) can never be actualized, for it is forever bound to 
remain a purely regulative ideal.      
Thus, Belyi who is determined to align the human word with Logos finds to his 
disappointment that man's creative act, unlike that of God, is inevitably conditioned by the 
linguistic and the historical (Arabesques and The Green Meadow). In this light, the pole of art 
turns out to be as unrewarding as the pole of science (i.e., systematic philosophy) which is 
circumscribed by the limitations of the intellect (Symbolism). In his efforts to surmount the 
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metaphysical “failure” of Romanticism, Belyi as an aspiring theurgist has to confront the tragic 
legacy of Nikolai Gogol'. In an attempt to “rewrite” and thereby to “overcome” Gogol's 
impotence that personifies the tragic fate of Romanticism as such, Belyi casts himself, alongside 
his fellow Symbolists, into the same role chosen by the Romantic Gogol'—a Christ-like Savior of
Russia, the beloved who is languishing in the grip of the demonic. Yet, similar to Gogol', Belyi is 
forced to face the fact that art, as of now, fails to live up to its religious (“theurgic”) task and the 
artist to his messianic role. In his incapacity to transcend his flawed humanity, the artist, instead 
of rescuing his captive beloved, is caught in the web of the demonic himself, thereby being 
exposed as a pseudo-Christ.  
The limitations of philosophy as art in light of the task of cognizing and realizing the 
Absolute become even more evident in the religio-philosophical projects of two other Russian 
thinkers, Nikolai Berdiaev and Lev Shestov (Yeguda Leib Shvartsman). While Berdiaev and 
Shestov cannot be counted among the Symbolist ranks proper, both were closely associated with 
the Symbolist circles and defined their thought in relation to (as Berdiaev) or against (as Shestov)
Solov'ev's ideal of All-in-Oneness. Thus, Berdiaev who is as inspired by Solov'ev's vision of 
theurgy as are the younger Symbolists is also faced with the humbling realization in The 
Meaning of the Creative Act (Smysl tvorchestva, 1916) that man's creative act lacks Logos-like 
transformative power and is only capable of producing an endless series of artifacts that fall short
of “the perfect work of art” which the realized Absolute is meant to be. Like Gogol' and Belyi, 
Berdiaev is unable to dismantle the ironic negative dialectics between the sign (a man-made 
cultural product) and the totality of meaning (the Absolute), having to struggle against the same 
linguistic predicament articulated by German Romanticism. 
The insurmountability of that Romantic challenge comes to the surface in Shestov's 
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philosophical enterprise that takes the idea of “philosophy as art” to its ultimate limits. For 
Shestov, absolute truth is not verifiable and demonstrable, as was believed by Solov'ev as a 
philosopher of All-in-Oneness, but is well beyond the reach of reason and therefore of systematic
(i.e., Idealist) philosophy. Truth is fragmentary, contradictory, unintelligible, acquired in the 
abyss of wordless interiority and as such cannot be disseminated, for once it is verbalized and 
turned into a common property, it immediately becomes irreparably falsified. Since absolute truth
can only be negatively defined, it leads to the paradox of Shestov's philosophical practice. In the 
name of the ultimately unknowable and unutterable truth, he assaults reason with its ideal of the 
cognizable, universal, and totalizing truth, but because the battle against reason can only be 
waged by means of language, through which reason, as the early German Romantics already 
pointed out, operates and expresses itself, Shestov finds himself perpetually entangled in a 
vicious circle, in which the devious reason is reinstated at the very moment of its alleged defeat. 
Viewed in this light, the Russian religio-philosophical project finds itself in an impasse, 
for neither philosophy as science nor philosophy as art can deliver the desired Absolute. Since 
ultimate truth proves in the end uncognizable, indemonstrable, and/or inexpressible, the 
unsettling limits of the entire philosophical enterprise conceived at its origin as a quest for 
absolute knowledge become too painfully apparent. In the absence of the all-reconciling 
theoretical-cum-existential totality, the negative dialectics of Romantic irony that flourishes 
amidst dualities, incongruities, and contradictions resists closure, assailing the sacred and 
undermining the revered hierarchies of values. The sobering realization that the gaping abyss 
between the finite and the infinite cannot be bridged within the framework of philosophy makes 
the Russian Symbolists confront Romantic tragic vision (“the tragic idea”) that exposes and yet 
affirms the metaphysical disjuncture, viewing it as constitutive of the very experience of being 
54
human. 
Thus, the third chapter, “The Symbolist ''Romantic Debacle'': Between Tragedy and the 
Tragic Idea,” traces the Symbolist efforts to transcend the tragic vision born of Romanticism 
through the resurrection of the genre of tragedy that would pave the way to the actualization of 
Godmanhood. Whereas Solov'ev, in the wake of the failure of his ambitious philosophical project
of All-in-Oneness, explicitly admits in “The Drama of Plato's Life” (“Zhiznennaia drama 
Platona,” 1898) that the rift between theory and life, the finite and the infinite cannot be remedied
via human effort no matter how Titanic, but would require divine interference, the younger 
Symbolists, Viacheslav Ivanov, Andrei Belyi, and Aleksandr Blok, all initially seek to historicize 
man's tragic incapacity to repair the metaphysical divide by linking that failure with the Romantic
movement itself. In their opinion, the Romantics, while diagnosing the metaphysical sickness, 
failed to act on their tragic insight, abandoning themselves instead to the infinite play of ironic 
solipsistic subjectivity. In order to heal the gaping wound in the fabric of the Universe, cathartic 
cleansing is in order. For the triumph of Solov'evian Godmanhood, conceived by the Symbolists 
in aesthetico-metaphysical terms as an enactment of the grand mystery play (“misteriia”), to take 
place, a new redistribution of forces, both physical and spiritual, is necessary and can be achieved
only through the restoration of tragedy as an aesthetic genre and as a mode of being in the world. 
Ivanov attempts to overcome Romanticism that he identifies with solipsistic subjectivity 
by means of resuscitating tragedy as an objective genre. In its religious objectivity, tragedy, in 
Ivanov's theurgic vision, would reunify excessive Romantic subjectivity embodied by the 
individualistic figure of the tragic hero with the collective element represented by the chorus in 
the ideal of Solov'evian Godmanhood that the Russian Symbolist construes as the Slavophile 
ideal of communality or sobornost': that is a spiritual community of people based on free 
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commitment, harmony, and unity in love. Thus, the solitary hero suffering from solipsistic 
individualism is to be reintegrated into the organic state of religious community, without losing 
his individual freedom. Only through the ultimate reconciliation of the warring oppositions can 
the grand mystery play of the Universe uniting all living people in spirit and love take place. Yet, 
in his theatrical practice (Tantalus [Tantal, 1905] and Prometheus [Prometei, 1915, 1919]), 
Ivanov, who attempts to fuse the conventions of the Ancient Greek tragedy representing 
objectivity and Romantic tragedy expressive of exaggerated subjectivity in order to create a 
synthetic genre reuniting the two, invariably elevates the self-individuating hero at the expense of
the chorus. Even more significantly, none of the dramatis personae possesses independent, 
“objective,” existence, for all of them are nothing but multicolored masks donned by the 
controlling authorial consciousness. In other words, instead of establishing a viable synthesis, 
Ivanov creates a Symbolist version of the Romantic lyrical (“subjective”) drama. 
While Belyi, like Ivanov, views the path toward the actualization of the ideal of 
Solov'evian Godmanhood as lying through the domain of the tragic, he is less interested in the 
revival of tragedy as an aesthetic genre, being intent instead on the transplanting of the tragic 
conflict between the hero and the force of Fate into the sphere of existence itself. The grand 
mystery play must be acted out in life, not just staged in the theater. For a new, theurgic, order of 
things to emerge, the Symbolist artist who is cast in the role of the tragic hero must confront his 
Fate that can take either the form of “Romanticism,” identified with the unformed content (chaos 
from within), or “Classicism”/ “Rationalism” that represents the pure form (deterministic order 
from without). In the modern world, it is Fate as the rule of Kantian (“Classicist”) Necessity that 
presents the utmost challenge to the transformative task of theurgy. 
Thus, in his theory Belyi envisions the ideal development of human history in line with 
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the Romantic notion of the heroic romance, where the realization of the cosmic synthesis comes 
into being solely as a result of the Titanic effort of the heroic individual who triumphs over Fate  
through the sheer exercise of free will. When, however, he seeks to act out this heroic 
(“theurgic”) scenario in his first novel, The Silver Dove (Serebrianyi Golub', 1909), his “tragic 
hero” Dar'ial'skii finds himself placed in a mercilessly mechanistic and deterministic universe 
that does not recognize the existence of free will at all, thereby eliminating the very possibility of
the genuine tragic conflict. With the valiant tragic hero turning in the end into a passive 
sacrificial victim, Belyi descends into the ironic mode that leads him to deride and invert in his 
second novel, Petersburg (Peterburg, 1916) the very tragic emplotment that he sought to 
implement both in life and in art. Nevertheless, even though Belyi comes to admit the 
impossibility of overcoming the tragic rift between the finite and the infinite via human strength 
alone, he refuses to succumb to nihilistic irony and, like the late Solov'ev, professes a belief that 
the severance is not eternal and the tragic human condition will be overcome by the Second 
Coming of Christ. 
Blok, who found himself in the grip of nihilistic irony as a result of his human impotence 
to live up to the expectations of his transcendent beloved, the Eternal Feminine, also views 
tragedy as the only viable way to the realization of the grand mystery play of Godmanhood. The 
creative subject can be purged of the excesses of Romantic irony only through the experience of 
tragic catharsis. The ironic Romantic subjectivity that forfeited all its moral bearings in the 
infinite play of aesthetic imagination must be reintegrated with the greater cosmic whole from 
which it fell away in its demonic pride. To find his way back to the world of objectivity, the 
alienated Romantic consciousness, whom Blok in the context of Russian history identifies with a 
member of intelligentsia, must travel the path of “incarnation” (“vochelovechivanie”). By 
57
assuming the tragic role and selflessly sacrificing himself for the sake of Russia, whom Blok, like
Belyi, personifies as a fallen beloved yearning for redemption, a member of the Russian 
intelligentsia, even though doomed to destruction, might be able to rescue the beloved as well as 
to escape meaningless annihilation under the hooves of the fiercely galloping Troyka—the image
from Nikolai Gogol''s novel Dead Souls (Mertvye Dushi, 1842) that Blok uses to refer to the 
people of Russia (“narod”). Thus, Blok envisions his theurgic task as awakening the intelligentsia
that represents solipsistic Romantic subjectivity to its tragic duty before Russia by creating a 
model of the tragic conduct.
Viewed in this context, Blok's evolution as a dramatist is entirely defined by his quest for 
a viable model of the tragic hero that could be acted out by the intelligentsia in real life. Yet, in 
his pursuit of the tragic solution to the rupture between the realm of subjectivity (a member of the
intelligentsia) and the domain of objectivity (Russia), Blok is unable to find any other “bridge” 
between the two than that of sexual love, as it transpires in his most successful tragic dramas, 
The Song of Destiny (Pesnia Sud'by, 1907-1908) and The Rose and the Cross (Roza i Krest, 
1912-1913). In his life-long rivalry with Christ, Blok cannot accept the notion of Christian love 
and seeks to replace it with the Solov'evian conception of erotic love as an element that would 
fuse the opposites together. Erotic love, however, unlike Christian love, which is directed at other
people, does not allow the subject to transcend his Romantic individualism, for he remains a 
strangely solitary figure even at the moment of his alleged (re)union with the greater universal 
whole (The Rose and the Cross). The tragic self-sacrifice by the hero for the sake of erotic love 
neither culminates in the salvation of the beloved nor in the reconciliation of the tragic hero with 
the broader community. 
Furthermore, Blok's tragic solution was made altogether redundant by history whose 
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course he struggled to change. For, as the Russian Symbolist feared, instead of taking an active 
stance and dying a tragic (“purifying”) death, the intelligentsia perished as a passive victim 
crushed by the galloping Troyka of revolutionary Russia. While Blok at first enthusiastically 
accepted the October Revolution of 1917, still hoping for a cathartic cleansing of Russia, he later 
became convinced that it had been taken over by the lowest, demonic, element of the people, “the
rabble” (golyt'ba). With the aesthetic vision coming into a irreconcilable conflict with the 
murderous reality, Blok succumbed to the fatalistic vision, as reflected in his last play Ramesses 
(Ramzes, 1919) that stages the unmitigated futility of human existence. The nonsensical savagery
of life cannot be transformed into a perfect work of art through the effort of the poet-theurgist 
who proves too weak, too human for that task. Thus, like his fellow Symbolists, Blok in the end 
comes to the painful recognition of the Romantic insight that the rift between the finite and the 
infinite, art and life cannot be mended solely by human strength. Unlike the other Symbolists, 
however, he remains defiant and refuses to be consoled by the promise of the Second Coming of 
Christ. For him, the severance is eternal, for the tragic is the homeland of humanity. 
Throughout its span of existence (c. 1899-1910), Russian Symbolism defined itself 
through its combative engagement with early German Romanticism both explicitly and 
implicitly. In their pursuit of the impossible metaphysical dream of Solov'evian Godmanhood, the
younger Symbolists found it difficult to reconcile themselves with what they perceived as the 
defeatist position of their Romantic antecedents concerning the possibility of realizing the 
Absolute as a unity of the finite and the infinite. In their youthful enthusiasm they ardently 
believed that they would be able to succeed where their apparently less determined predecessors 
miserably “failed.” To overcome that “failure,” the second generation of Russian Symbolists 
sought to “rewrite” Romanticism, its shadowy “double.” This “rewriting” was to take place not 
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only in the domain of art but most importantly in the sphere of life itself. After a series of often 
tragic attempts to merge life and art, however, the younger Symbolists eventually had to 
acknowledge that the divide between the finite and the infinite, art and life cannot be repaired 
through human effort alone, for, as the Romantics admonished earlier, humanity inhabits that 
tragic rift and is ultimately defined by it. Mankind is doomed to being limited, but it is in his 
effort to transcend those tragic limitations that man comes into his own both as an artist and as a 
human being. And it is through grappling with such “limitations” as the irony of language, the 
bounds of cognition, and the inescapability of history (temporality) that Russian Symbolism 
tested its strength and became what it is. 
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Chapter I
Between the Mystical and the Skeptical, or the Symbolist battle with the Demon of
Romantic Irony
I. Introduction
“Irony is a phenomenon intimately related to the Romantic movement in all of its phases 
and in all its various national manifestations. More than in any other period of Western literature 
the ironic attitude appears as the distinctive hallmark of the Romantic generation” (Behler, “The 
Theory of Irony” 43). A revolutionary theory of irony that had such dramatic philosophical 
repercussions was originally elaborated and practiced by German Romantics (Fr. Schlegel, 
Novalis, Ludwig Tieck, Jean Paul, and Solger among others). The Jena Romantic Fr. Schlegel, in 
particular, is known as “the father of irony” (“Vater der Ironie”) and “the most prominent ironic 
personality” (“die ausgezeichneste ironische Persönlichkeit”)47 who redefined the very notion of 
irony. Until Fr. Schlegel's reinvention of the concept and well into the 18th century, the word 
irony was employed, as Behler's shows in his analysis, in accordance with “its strict and 
consistent connotation which could be reduced to the simple formula: ''a figure of speech by 
which one indicates the opposite of what one says''” (48). Thus, irony was on par with other 
rhetorical tropes or indirect modes of speech such as metaphor, allegory, metalepsis, and 
hyperbaton. Fr. Schlegel's new understanding of irony, however, extended its use beyond the 
aesthetic sphere proper by turning it into a philosophical notion, a worldview, with profound 
metaphysical implications.   
  Romantic irony or “transcendental irony,” according to Fr. Schlegel, constitutes no less 
47 The “father of irony” and the “most prominent ironic personality” are the famous appellations applied by Hegel 
in reference to Fr. Schlegel. These attributes are by no means compliments on the part of Hegel, for Fr. Schlegel's
Romantic reformulation of irony from the innocuous literary trope to the metaphysical concept suggestive of 
radical skepticism was anathema in his eyes due to its disconcerting epistemological consequences that 
threatened to overturn the German Idealist's aspirations for the absolute system of knowledge. 
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than “the highest good and humanity's center of gravity”48 (KFSA 18.II: 668). Such a superior 
position accorded by Fr. Schlegel to irony is due to its vital epistemological and ontological 
functions. For the early German Romantic, irony is endowed with a “philosophical capacity” 
(“philosophische Vermögen”) and while it has aesthetic manifestations, its proper domain is 
philosophy. The pursuit of the philosophical enterprise is absolute truth. Yet, the whole truth, in 
Fr. Schlegel's view, can only be the metaphysical Absolute as an all-embracing cosmic totality or,
in epistemological terms, “the Unconditioned” that generates but lies itself outside an infinite 
empirical chain of causality (“conditions”). Thus, any attempt to know the transcendent Absolute 
by a human mind makes it inevitably determined and therefore, by default, untrue or rather, only 
partially true. In light of the limited and inescapably conditioned nature of human knowledge, 
irony, for Schlegel, figures as the only appropriate epistemological attitude. 
Since immutable truth is unattainable, the philosopher is left with the eternal striving 
toward the Absolute which is simultaneously restrained and driven by irony that consists in “the 
constant alternation from self-creation to self-destruction”49 (KFSA 2: 172, no. 51). This 
pendulum-like movement of irony that endlessly oscillates between “enthusiasm” and 
“skepticism” is what makes the progress of finite knowledge possible but it also makes it infinite.
In Beiser's words, “The ironist creates forever anew because he always puts forward a new 
perspective, a richer concept, a clearer formulation; but also destroys himself because he is 
forever critical of his own efforts. It is only through this interchange between self-creation and 
self-destruction that he moves forward in the eternal search for the truth” (German Idealism 448).
The finite world is contradictory, heterogeneous, and chaotic and it is an ironic consciousness as 
48 Irony is “das höchste Gut und der Mittelpunkt der Menschheit.” 
49 “Stete Wechsel von Selbstschöpfung und Selbstvernichtung.” 
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“a clear consciousness of eternal agility, of the infinite fullness of chaos”50 (KFSA 2: 263, no. 69) 
that can most successfully embrace and navigate it. 
Furthermore, Schlegel's irony exposed the philosophical project as grounded in and 
defined by the workings of language rather than of autonomous reason, as Kant, for example, 
insisted. For the early Romantics, human consciousness is intimately linked with the sign and 
therefore necessarily linguistic (or, using a somewhat broader term, “semiotic”). It is language 
which is the real homeland of irony, for it is a source of all communication as well as 
miscommunication, or, using the Schlegelian language, of “comprehension” (“Verständlichkeit”) 
and “incomprehension” (“Unverständlichkeit”). Thus, while philosophy, art, and science are all 
preoccupied with the cognition and communication of absolute truth, as Fr. Schlegel ironically 
notes, “the purest and most genuine incomprehension ensues precisely from science and art—
which by their very nature aim at comprehension and at making comprehensible—and from 
philosophy and philology”51 (KFSA 2: 364). One of the greatest blunders that man can commit is 
by thinking that he is in control of language, failing to recognize the simple fact that language is 
a self-sufficient entity, “a world in itself.” In Novalis' words, “One cannot help but wonder at the 
absurd error people make when they imagine they are speaking for the sake of things; no one 
knows that the essential thing about language is that it is concerned only with itself”52 (Novalis 
Schriften II: 672). 
Thus, language has a will of its own, independent of that of the speaker or writer. Any 
attempt to exercise control over language on the part of man leads only to him being fooled by 
50 “[Ironie ist] klares Bewusstsein der ewigen Agilität, des unendlich vollen Chaos.”
51 “... die reinste und gediegenste Unverständlichkeit gerade aus der Wissenschaft und as der Kunst erhält, die ganz 
eigentlich aufs Verständigen und Verständlichmachen ausgehn, aus der Philosophie und Philologie.”  
52 “Der lächerliche Irrthum ist nur zu bewundernn, daß die Leute meinen—sie sprächen um der Dinge willen. 
Gerade das Eigenthümliche der Sprache, daß sie sich blos um sich selbst bekümmert, weiß keiner.”  
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the unruly language. It defies the speaker's or writer's best intentions and subverts all efforts to 
communicate something “definite”: “That is why it is such an exciting and fruitful mystery: if 
someone speaks only for the sake of speaking, he pronounces the most splendid, original truths. 
But if he wants to speak of something definite, the whimsical language makes him say the most 
ridiculous and perverting stuff”53 (Ibid.). Serious people (“ernsthafte Leute”) like systematic 
philosophers hate language because of its vexing arbitrariness and waywardness, failing to grasp 
its splendid paradoxical nature—“that the contemptible chatter that they despise is the infinitely 
serious side of language.”54 Seriousness of language lies precisely in its lack of seriousness, its 
sparkling playfulness, and its perpetual irony(ies). 
For the early Romantics, there is no escape from this irony of language or, even broader, 
the irony(ies) of all human communication. Like it or not, it is the human condition: “Perhaps on 
this Earth we are condemned to gold and words for eternity”55 (Schlegel, Literary Notebooks 192,
no. 1944). Human consciousness in all its manifest activities, from cognition to creativity, has a 
distinctly semiotic nature and is therefore perpetually exposed to irony(ies) due to the 
metaphysical duality of the sign, its division into the signifier and the signified. “What gods 
could save us from all these ironies?”56 (KFSA 2: 369) playfully asks Fr. Schlegel, being aware 
that there is no solution to being human:
The only solution is if there were such irony that might be able to swallow up all these big
and little ironies so that no trace would be left of them at all. I must confess that at this 
particular moment I feel that mine has a real inclination to do just that. But even this 
53 “Darum ist sie ein so wunderbares und fruchtbares Geheimniß,—daß wenn einer blos spricht, um zu sprechen, er 
gerade die herrlichsten, originellsten Wahrheiten auspricht. Will er aber von etwas Bestimmten sprechen, so läßt 
ihn die launige Sprache das lächerlichste und verkehrste Zeug sagen.”  
54 “ … daß das verächtliche Schwatzen die unendliche ernsthafte Seite der Sprache ist.”
55  “Vielleicht sind wir auf der Erde ewig zu Gold und Worten verdammt.”  
56  “Welche Götter werden uns von allen diesen Ironien errtetten können?” 
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would be a temporary solution. I fear that if I understand correctly what fate seems to be 
hinting at, then soon will emerge a new generation of little ironies: for indeed the stars 
portend the fantastic. And even if it should happen that everything were to remain 
peaceful for a long period of time, one still would not be able to trust this seeming calm. 
Irony is something one simply cannot fool around with. It lingers on for an incredibly 
long time.57 (369-370)
Fr. Schlegel hails the phenomenon of Romantic irony originated in the workings of 
language as salutary, for, in his eyes, it is associated not so much with limits and failures of 
human quest for the Absolute but rather with “optimistic messianism with its futuristic belief in 
infinite perfectibility” (Behler, “Theory of Irony” 44).
Yet Schlegel's belief in the wholesomeness of Romantic irony as a worldview was not 
universally shared. There is a long line of thinkers, including Georg Hegel, Søren Kierkegaard, 
and Carl Schmitt, who came to be highly critical of what they viewed as the nihilistic 
implications of the Schlegelian irony. Hegel, who initiated the critique, resented Romantic irony 
for its irresponsible arbitrariness: “Irony knows itself to be the master of every possible content; 
it is serious about nothing, but plays with all forms” (Lectures on the History of Philosophy III: 
507). While the movement of Romantic irony that consists in constant alternation of self-creation
(affirmation) and self-destruction (negation) is broadly reminiscent of Hegel's dialectics, the 
Schlegelian irony, as Kierkegaard pointed out, is, in actuality, the latter's inversion, for it is “not 
57 “Das einzige wäre, wenn sich eine Ironie fände, welche die Eigenschaft hätte, alle jene großen und kleinen 
Ironien zu verschlucken und zu verschlingen, daß nichts mehr davon zu sehen wäre, und ich muß gestehen, daß 
ich eben dazu in der meiningen eine merkliche Disposition fühle. Aber auch das würde nur auf kurye Yeit helfen 
können. Ich fürchte, wenn ich anders, was das Schicksal in Winken yu sagen scheint, richtig verstehe, es würde 
bald eine neue Generation von kleinen Ironien entstehen: denn wahrlich die Gestirne deuten auf fantastisch. Und 
gesetzt es blieb auch wärend eines langen Zeitraums alles ruhig, so wäre doch nicht trauen. Mit der Ironie ist 
durchaus nicht zu scherzen. Sie kann unglaublich lange nachwirken.”
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in the service of the world spirit” (The Concept of Irony 275). In other words, Romantic irony is 
not a goal-oriented teleological process, as in Hegel's philosophy, that culminates in the 
resolution of all oppositions. On the contrary, it resists closure and rather than seeking to dissolve
itself in the Absolute, irony assails it. As Frank explains, “[Romantic] irony plays in both 
directions. Irony is a derisive gesture toward the finite, because it is denied by another finite and 
by the notion of the Absolute is altogether shamed; but irony can also laugh at the Absolute 
because, as Novalis said, pure identity [as a synthesis of Kantian subject and object] does not 
even exist” (214-215). Thus, in the eyes of those thinkers who believe in the positive attainability
of the Absolute, Romantic irony, unguided and uncontrolled, moored in the workings of 
deviously unreliable language, is highly treacherous. It is regarded as purposeless, meaningless, 
and arbitrary, for while interrogating and subverting all established hierarchies of values and 
systems of knowledge, it does not offer a new 'truer' hierarchy or system of knowledge in their 
stead. It instills a dizzying sense of relativism bordering on nihilism.             
 Like Hegel and Kierkegaard before them, the second generation of Russian Symbolists,  
who strive for the fulfillment of the Absolute envisioned as the realization of Solov'ev's ideal of 
Godmanhood, confront the phenomenon of Romantic irony as a metaphysical problem. 
Transcendental irony that engenders a disconcerting sense of insecurity of all things through its 
shifting uncertainties and multiplying relativities threatens to derail the Symbolist enterprise of 
life creation. The Symbolists who seek to fuse art and life, text and cosmos encounter “the 
linguistic predicament” anchored in the innate duality of the sign that stands in the way of 
converting human word into all-powerful Logos and an aesthetic representation into reality. 
Transcendental irony that emerges from the metaphysical split between the signifier and the 
signified, a limited human sign and the totality of meaning, undermines all Symbolists' efforts at 
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the grand synthesis. This deviousness of irony that assails and undermines all enthusiastic, 
“lyrical,”58 visions of the Absolute is viewed by Russian Symbolists as unambiguously demonic. 
Thus, in the realm of aesthetics (which is to be dissolved into the ontological) the Symbolist 
effort, particularly in the early years of the movement's existence, is focused on mastering, or, 
better, “transcending,” the deviant Romantic irony by bringing it under control.  
The ironic predicament faced by Russian Symbolists in their aspirations for the Absolute 
already arises with Vladimir Solov'ev who spent his life searching in vain for the metaphysical 
synthesis of the mystical (faith) and the skeptical (reason) in his philosophical project of All-in-
Oneness59 (“vseedinstvo”) and for the unity of the lyrical and the ironic modes in his poetic work.
The aesthetic union of the lyrical expressive of Solov'ev's personal mystical experiences and the 
ironic reflective of his skeptical doubt regarding the validity of those experiences was deemed no
less important than the metaphysical fusion of faith and reason, for, in the Russian philosopher's 
theurgic vision, the textual (human word) and the ontological (the Universe) dimensions are 
intimately interconnected. The word of the artist is eventually to become one with divine Logos; 
therefore art is not simply a part of man-made culture but essentially a life-creating method 
aimed at transfiguring man and the world. In this light, success in defusing the nihilistic potential 
of Romantic irony by harmoniously uniting it with prophetic lyricism in the aesthetic sphere 
acquires high ontological stakes. Despite a number of attempts, however, Solov'ev does not 
succeed in creating a viable synthesis of the two warring aesthetico-metaphysical modes, 
58 It is necessary to stress that for Solov'ev as well as for the second generation of Russian Symbolists, “the lyrical” 
went well beyond the sphere of art proper because, in their view, the lyrical was intimately linked with the realm 
of the transcendent ideal. Furthermore, the lyrical mode was not limited to lyrical poetry only but was employed 
by the Symbolists as means of expressing their personal mystical experiences, prophetic visions, and theurgic 
aspirations in a variety of other genres (symphonies, short stories, novels, essays, journals, etc.). Thus, the lyrical 
mood in the Symbolist conception can be aligned with the Romantic notion of “enthusiasm” that Fr. Schlegel 
linked with the mystical (Literary Notebooks 121, no. 1143), the divinatory and the prophetic (KFSA 18: 112, no. 
1001). 
59 See chapter 2 for a detailed analysis of Solov'ev's religio-philosophical project of All-in-Oneness.  
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bequeathing his Symbolist disciples only a tentative solution for dealing with the ironic that coils 
at the heart of the language—its complete subjugation to the lyrical. 
After Solov'ev, an effort to curb the disruptive workings of Romantic irony in the 
ontological and textual dimensions comes to constitute an integral part of Russian Symbolists' 
quest for the Absolute. Thus, in his combat with Romantic irony Aleksandr Blok confronts its 
nihilistic implications, following his unsuccessful attempt to supplant Christ by (re)uniting the 
finite and the infinite in his own strength. With his Solov'evian ideal of the Divine Feminine 
lying devastated, Blok comes to view the lyrical and the ironic as being of the same demonic 
origin. In light of this insight, the subjugation of the ironic to mystical lyricism becomes 
impossible, for nihilistic irony is a disease of insane laughter inherent in excessive Romantic 
(lyrical) subjectivity itself. Ultimately, for Blok, irony cannot be brought under control; it can 
only be eliminated from Being with the death of the afflicted Romantic subject. 
Unlike Blok, Andrei Belyi seeks to faithfully follow Solov'ev's original solution in his 
battle with the ironic that, in its unrestrained form, jeopardizes his theurgic project. Similar to his 
predecessor, Belyi attempts to separate the lyrical and the ironic and subdue “the demon” of 
Romantic irony in the service of the lyrical. In Symphonies, his most ambitious exercise in 
theurgy, he establishes the godlike narrator at the center of the textual universe which is equated 
with the ontological cosmos. Endowed with the privileged mode of perception, the narrator is 
granted access to absolute truth that allegedly lends him control over transcendental irony. In 
other words, Belyi seeks to convert Romantic irony into “narratorial irony” whose workings 
originate in and controlled by the authoritative voice of the omniscient narrator. As opposed to 
God, however, whose creative word is Logos, Belyi, together with his textual alter ego, the 
narrator, finds himself a victim of the irony of language, which, for the early Romantics, 
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constituted the very foundation and essence of irony. Thus, Belyi's theurgical project of reuniting 
life and art is in the end defeated by the linguistic predicament. 
   
II. In the Service of the Lyrical: Vladimir Solov'ev's Quest to Subjugate Romantic Irony
On January 14, 1875 Vladimir Solov'ev opened his survey course on the history of Greek 
philosophy at The Higher Education Courses for Women in St. Petersburg with the following 
words: 
I define a human being as a laughing animal... A person considers a fact and if this fact 
does not correspond to his ideal, he laughs. The root of poetry and metaphysics lies in the 
same characteristic feature... Poetry is by no means an imitation of reality; it is a mockery 
of reality [nasmeshka nad deistvitel'nost'iu]. Animals accept the world as it is; for a 
human being, on the other hand, every phenomenon is only a mask behind which he 
searches for an invisible goddess... And I will tell you more: it is better to be a sick person
than a healthy beast [zdorovaia skotina].60 (qtd. in Mochul'skii, Vladimir Solov'ev 94)
As it transpires from this statement, the young Solov'ev defines his notion of “laughter” from 
within the framework of Romantic irony. For him, good-natured, healthy laughter, like the early 
optimism of transcendental irony for Fr. Schlegel, is an amicable response evoked by the 
metaphysical disjuncture between the ideal and the real. The perception of the relativity of all 
things is only an illusion, “a veil of Isis,” which awaits to be thrown off to reveal the goddess 
herself. Yet despite the young Solov'ev's buoyant pronouncements concerning the congenial 
60 “Я определяю человека как животное смеющееся... Человек рассматривает факт, а если этот факт не 
соответствует его идеальным представлениям, он смеется. В этой же характеристической особенности 
лежит корень поэзии и метафизики... Поэзия вовсе не есть воспроизведение действительности, — она 
есть насмешка над действительностью... Животные принимают мир таким, каков он есть, для человека 
же, напротив, всякое явление есть только маска, за которой он ищет невидимую богиню... А я скажу 
больше: лучше быть больным человеком, чем здоровой скотиной.” 
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nature of “laughter,” the late Solov'ev plumbs the depth of the “vexatious” processes of Romantic
irony, discovering its “absolute infinite negativity,” to use Hegel's formulation, that threatens his 
project of Godmanhood. The Russian philosopher's provisional solution to the problem that he 
seems to have reached only in his poem “Three Encounters” is the total subjugation of the ironic 
to the lyrical and of skepticism to faith. That this is a solution bound to failure is already visible 
in Solov'ev's work itself and would become fully evident in Belyi's attempt to adopt it in his 
struggle against Blok's nihilistic irony. 
That Solov'ev's personal practice of laughter was often far from unambiguously good-
humored is attested to by numerous accounts left by his contemporaries. In their reminiscences 
about the philosopher most of them emphasize his highly ambivalent, often unsettling, laughter 
(“smekh,” “khokhot”),61 whose significance went well beyond a sheer physical idiosyncrasy. 
While some comment on the childishness, heartiness, and contagiousness of his resounding 
laughter, others detect a dark, sinister, note in it. Thus, the most common impression produced by
his laughter was that of disturbing equivocation that was frequently interpreted as an outward 
expression of some complex unresolved inner struggle. One such incident involving Solov'ev's 
laughter when it took an eerie, highly ironic tone and the profound unease effected by it is 
recounted by Amphiteatrov, a Russian writer and historian:    
Solov'ev surprised us all yesterday.—one of the Moscow literary figures told me.— He 
was very talkative. He displayed an enormous erudition. His intellectual brilliance was 
simply incredible. He himself looked like an apostle incarnate. His face was inspired and 
61 More information on the topic of Vladimir Solov'ev's laughter and irony can be found in Samson Broitman, “Iz 
slovaria ''Russkii Simvolizm'': Simvol. Ironiia”; I. N. Ivanova, Ironiia v poezii russkogo modernizma (1890-1910 
gody); I. N. Ivanova, “''Tonkii khlad'' plamennogo proroka: ironiia v poezii Vladimira Solov'eva”; Z. Mints, “K 
genezisu komicheskogo u Bloka (Vl. Solov'ev i A. Blok)”; S. M. Solov'ev, Vladimir Solovyov: His Life and 
Creative Evolution. 
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his eyes were shining bright. He enchanted all of us... But... At first he was seeking to 
prove that two times two is four. Succeeded. We came to believe in him as if he were 
God. And all of a sudden something snapped. He became sullen and mocking while his 
eyes turned dull and angry.— You know what?—he declared—two times two is not four 
but five?—For God's sake, Vladimir Sergeevich! You have only just proven that...—What
do I care if I “proved.” Just listen to this...—And he went on talking. He was giving 
“contra” arguments as well as when he was giving “pro,” perhaps, even better. We all 
felt that it was only a joke but it was still somehow frightening. His logic was razor-sharp,
cutting, and inexorable and the sarcasms were horrifying... He fell silent. And we, at a 
loss for words, only looked at each other: yes, true, two times two is not four but five. 
And he—he was either laughing or looked as if he were to be buried alive at that 
moment.62 (256-267)        
In consequence, Solov'ev's idiosyncratic laughter (as a spontaneous physical reaction) that could 
be either disamingly childish and good-natured or devilish, derisive, and highly subversive 
became a metaphor, already popularized by his contemporaries, to refer to his dualitistic mindset 
in all its dazzling complexity or, more narrowly, to the darker, ironic, side of his personality. The 
latter tendency can be seen, for example, in the characterization of Solov'ev's duality made by 
one of his first biographers, Velichko: “[In Solov'ev] there coexisted two completely opposite 
62 “Удивил нас Соловьев,  — говорил мне один московский литератор. — Разговорился вчера. Ума — 
палата. Блеск невероятный. Сам — апостол апостолом. Лицо вдохновенное, глаза сияют. Очаровал нас 
всех… Но… доказывал он, положим, что дважды два четыре. Доказал. Поверили в него, как в бога. И 
вдруг — словно что-то его защелкнуло. Стал угрюмый, насмешливый, глаза унылые, злые. — А знаете 
ли, — говорит, — ведь дважды два не четыре, а пять? — Бог с вами, Владимир Сергеевич! Да вы же сами 
нам сейчас доказали… — Мало ли что — “доказал”. Вот послушайте-ка… — И опять пошел говорить. 
Режет contra как только что резал pro, пожалуй, еще талантливее. Чувствуем, что это шутка, а жутко 
как-то. Логика острая, резкая, неумолимая, сарказмы страшные… Умолк, — мы только руками развели: 
видим, действительно, дважды два — не четыре, а пять. А он — то смеется, то — словно его сейчас 
живым в гроб класть станут.”
71
systems of thought that would interrupt each other at times […] The first system of thought can 
be compared with an inspired singing of sacred hymns soaring heavenward. The second, on the 
other hand, with a malicious laughter [ekhidnyi smekh], in which one could detect unkind 
[nedobrye] notes, as if the second person were jeering at the first one”63 (176). Later the younger 
Symbolists (Blok and Belyi, in particular) appropriated the term and extended its use to refer 
broadly to the dangerous equivocations and relativities of Romantic irony. 
 Solov'ev's duality as it is registered in the ambivalence of his “laughter” is reflected in 
his poetic output. Thus, his poetry falls into two opposite, hardly ever crisscrossing, types: 
philosophical (which is also intensely personal and therefore lyrical) and the so-called jocular 
with a strong vein of irony. In his lyrical poems, Solov'ev reflects on the workings of the 
Universe from within the framework of his metaphysics of Godmanhood and expresses his 
mystical love for the Eternal Feminine (as he refers to Sophia the Divine Wisdom in his poetry)64 
and, on occasion, his idealized love for one of its earthly incarnations. In his jocular poetry, on 
the other hand, he gives vent to his impish, ironic, side. Unlike the lyrical, however, the ironic in 
Solov'ev's poetry is not homogeneous. According to Mints, the function of irony undergoes a 
substantial evolution in his poetic oeuvre—from a “supplement” to “the antithesis” (“Vladimir 
Solov'ev — poet” 36-42). Regardless of its evolving role, nevertheless, it is always defined by its
63 “[В Соловьеве] уживались рядом и порою прерывали друг друга два совершенно противоположные строя 
мысли. […] Первый можно сравнить с вдохновенным пением священных гимнов, воспаряющих к небу. 
Второй — с ехидным смехом, в котором слышались иногда недобрые нотки, точно второй человек 
смеется над первым.”
64 Starting with Solov'ev, there is a progressive identification of the religio-philosophical idea of the Divine Sophia, 
the feminine essence of God, with the poetic image of the Eternal Feminine (“Ewig-Weibliche“) originally used 
by Goethe in the second part of Faust: “The Eternal Feminine draws us heavenward” [“Das Ewig-Weibliche 
zieht uns hinan”] (364).While the religious philosophy of Solov'ev is primarily centered on the metaphysical 
notion of Sophia, the Wisdom of God, his lyrical poetry based on his mystical experiences revolves around the 
image of the Eternal Feminine who is a concrete embodiment of the abstract philosophical idea. For a detailed 
discussion of the concept of Sophia the Divine Wisdom, her different appellations in Solov'ev's work as well as 
the relations among these designations, see Samuel D. Cioran, Vladimir Soloviev and the Knighthood of the 
Divine Sophia. 
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uneasy relation to its progenitor, early German Romantic irony.     
Between the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s, Solov'ev's jocular poems serve as a 
roguish supplement to his mystical works. Irony employed by the Russian poet at this time shows
a close kinship with the transcendental irony of the Jena Romantics conceived as a playful mood 
soaring freely and infinitely above the confines of finitude: 
At this stage of his life he [Solov'ev] does not perceive the dichotomy between the ideal 
world and the real world in a tragic light. Evil is only a mask, a grimace, more absurd 
than terrifying; a wise man is not afraid of phantoms, no matter how ominous they are, 
because he knows that this is a play of shadows. And he responds to this play with 
laughter. Solov'ev remembers the Romantic theory of ''the divine play,'' the philosophical 
irony; he is closer to Fr. Schlegel, Tieck, and Novalis, rather than to Plato. (Mochul'skii, 
Vladimir Solov'ev 94)65 
The young Solov'ev's frolicsome tone echoes the benign irony of the early German Romantics at 
the imperfections of earthly reality as viewed from the heights of the Absolute. Contrasted with 
the infinite, the finite loses its pretensions and exhibits its chaotic, extremely ludicrous side. It is 
the absurdity of the un-elevated human existence, with all its contingencies and incongruities, 
that Solov'ev, like his early Romantic antecedents, good-naturedly mocks from the position of 
mystical knowledge of the eternal unity (see, for example, his poems “A Mysterious Guest” 
(“Tainstvennyi gost',” the end of the 1870s—the beginning of the 1880s) and “A Female Reader 
and Pansies” (“Chtitatel'nitsa i aniutiny glazki,” the end of the 1870s—the beginning of the 
65 “Раздвоение между миром идеальным и миром реальным он [Solov'ev] еще не воспринимает трагически. 
Зло — только маска, гримаса, скорее смешная, чем страшная; мудрец не боится призраков, как бы 
зловещи они ни были, ибо он знает, что это — игра теней. И на игру он отвечает смехом. Соловьев 
помнит романтическую теорию о ''божественной игре,'' о философской иронии; он ближе к Фр. Шлегелю,
Тику и Новалису, чем к Платону.”
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1880s)). Solov'ev's lighthearted irony reflects his messianic optimism about the perfectibility of 
the Universe that he shares with his Romantic predecessors. 
From the second half of the 1880s to the beginning of the 1890s, however, transcendental 
irony begins to encroach on and erode Solov'ev's mystical ideals themselves. From a playful 
“supplement,” jocular poems turn into the “antithesis” to the “thesis” of his lyrical verses. 
Solov'ev's Romantic irony sheds its garb of inoffensive good humor and reveals its darker, 
demonic, side. It often turns into a bitter laughter, striking derisive notes akin to that of the 
“defrocked Romantic,” Heine. Thus, it revels in obscenities and profanities, assaulting the 
philosopher's hitherto sacred messianic aspirations—the salvation of humankind through love. 
While the Divine Sophia in her transcendence is never, at least directly, an object of irony in the 
jocular verses of this period, everything else, including the philosopher himself, his teaching, and
his earthly beloved Sophia-s (his last love, Sophia Martynova, in particular) become susceptible 
to the devastating play of irony. The power that negative irony gains over Solov'ev and his work 
is attested to by the sheer number of jocular poems that he produced during this period alone. It 
equals if not surpasses that of his lyrical verses. In Mints' words, “Examining Solov'ev's poetry of
the end of the 1880s – the beginning of the 1890s as a whole, we occasionally find it difficult to 
determine what is the poet's true essence: the mystical pro or the ironic contra”66 (41).   
The shift in Solov'ev's irony from the playful toward the self-destructive and iconoclastic 
is especially evident in his self-parodies in which the prophet of the Divine Sophia is relentlessly 
exposed as a pretender, a false messiah, whose teaching is of a demonic nature. Devastating 
ironic demolition reigns unrestrained here. Solov'ev the ironist goes so far as to play with the 
66 “Изучая поэзию Соловьева конца 1880-х—начала 1890-х годов в целом, мы порой не можем определить, в
чем же подлинная сущность поэта: в мистическом pro или в ироническом contra.”   
74
renunciation of faith and acceptance of demonism. In “Epitaph” (“Epitafiia,” 1892) that he wrote 
for himself, irony is explicitly directed against his conception of holy love that could elevate 
mankind to the divine status. Ironically, instead of finding salvation, the prophet of love himself 
loses his soul to the Devil as a result of his quest: “While he was liked by some, / He was also an 
enemy of many; / But having been madly in love, he plunged into a ditch. / He lost his soul, / not 
to mention his body: / The devil took his soul, / And the dogs devoured his body”67 (Izbrannoe 
153). Through the use of self-irony, Solov'ev betrays his lingering doubt that his philosophy of 
love may not be of God but actually of the Devil, with love leading not to salvation but to 
perdition: “A passerby! Learn by this example, / How fatal love is and how wholesome faith 
is.”68 (154). In “Confession” (“Priznanie,” 1894), the Russian poet not only relinquishes his 
affiliation with true belief (“pravoverie”) but also claims that religious faith and atheism have the 
same root: “The same milk fed both true belief and unbelief”69 (91). Having literally equated 
belief and unbelief, Solov'ev half-jokingly half-seriously (as befits the ironic mode) demands 
forgiveness for and acknowledgment of the Devil. In light of skeptical irony that does not 
recognize established hierarchies and levels the sacred and the profane, there is no reason why 
the Devil and evil should not be accepted on equal grounds with God and good. The dissolution 
of the religious framework, with its secure hierarchy of values, effected by irony, ushers in moral 
relativism that imperils Solov'ev's entire metaphysical project of Godmanhood. 
Solov'ev's recognition of the threat posed by Romantic irony that can easily get out of 
control and assault the sacred manifests itself in his life-long reluctance to bring the lyrical (“the 
enthusiastic”) and the ironic  (“the skeptical”) together within the boundaries of one work. The 
67 “Иным любезен быв, / Он многим был и враг; / Но, без ума любив, / Сам ввергнулся в овраг. / Он душу 
потерял, / Не говоря о теле: / Ее диавол взял, / Его ж собаки съели.” 
68 “Прохожий! Научись из этого примера, / Сколь пагубна любовь и сколь полезна вера.”   
69 “Правоверие с безверием / вспоило тоже молоко.”  
75
only way by means of which he is apparently able to fully contain his wayward irony is by 
keeping it isolated from his lyrical poetry. There are two exceptions, however, in which the poet 
ventures to join the two antagonistic elements—in his play The White Lily (Belaia liliia, ili son v 
noch na Pokrova, 1878-1880) and in his poem “Three Encounters” (“Tri svidaniia,” 1898), 
written at the beginning and the end of his writing career respectively. According to Broitman, 
irony subdued by the lyrical is deprived of its elementary force in these two works and plays a 
strictly subservient role: “In such works as the poem “Three Encounters” and the play The White 
Lily, where these elements [the lyrical and the ironic] converge, irony loses its autonomy and 
becomes a subordinate force, called upon only to soften the one-sided seriousness of mystical 
enthusiasm”70 (240). While this is clearly Solov'ev's apparent intention, the complex interrelation 
between the ironic and the lyrical that emerges as a result of their encounter in these writings, in 
The White Lily in particular, cannot be unproblematically reduced to the servant-master 
relationship. Romantic irony, whose negativity the Russian poet seeks to temper, often tests and 
transcends the limits of its assigned role and subverts the lyrical. The disruptive tension that 
arises between the two modes shows why Solov'ev resisted the union of the lyrical and the ironic,
advocated by the early German Romantics, preferring to keep the two apart.
The White Lily exists in two versions, both of which display Solov'ev's grappling with 
Romantic irony and its intrinsic negative potentiality. The play whose genre the author defines as 
a jocular mystery play (“misteriia-shutka”) presents a complex multicolored tapestry woven out 
of tongue-in-the-cheek parodies of the renowned cultural texts (The Bible, Goethe's Faust, 
Novalis' Heinrich von Ofterdingen and The Disciples at Sais, Tieck's plays and fairytales, 
70 “Там же, где эти начала [the lyrical and the ironic] сходятся, как в поэме ''Три Свидания'' и пьесе ''Белая 
Лилия,'' ирония теряет свою самостоятельность и становится служебной силой, призванной лишь 
смягчить одностороннюю серьезность мистического пафоса.”
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Aksakov's fairytale The Little Scarlet Flower, Gogol's The Government Inspector and Russian 
Romantic poetry among many others) as well as of Solov'ev's own work. In the first draft 
Solov'ev includes an unfinished prologue that he later altogether discards in the second version. 
This prelude is an unambiguous parody of the “Prologue in Heaven” in Goethe's Faust, Part I and
irreverently pokes fun at God, the Devil (or Mephistopheles) and the angels by portraying them 
as the ludicrously looking and nearly senile master (“barin”) Geodemon, his abrasive and foul-
mouthed overseer Kitovras, and a throng of grovelling lackeys respectively. 
The basic plot of the play shared by the two variants revolves around the chevalier de 
Mortemir (or de Mortamir, as the name is spelled in the first draft), “a rich but a completely 
disenchanted landowner,” who, after becoming jaded with the earthly love of Galakteia, sets out 
on a journey in quest of the White Lily, his otherwordly love. In the course of the play Mortemir 
is joined by Khaldei, Instrument, and Sorval who also run away from their “terrible” female 
lovers, Galakteia (Mortemir's former lover), Terebinda, and Al'konda respectively. In his chance 
encounter with the character by the name Ne-pliui-na-stol (“don't spit on the table”) Mortemir 
gets hold of a manuscript in which he learns the prophecy about the bear (“medved'”) as a key to 
the mystery of the White Lily who is to bring about universal peace and harmony upon the earth. 
Eventually, Mortimer discovers the bear but, as misfortune would have it, the bear dies, and 
while in grief over the deceased bear, Mortimer is about to commit suicide by stabbing himself, 
the White Lily miraculously appears over the bear's grave. Thus, Mortimer is (re)united with the 
White Lily, while his companions, Khaldei, Instrument, and Sorval are joined by Galakteia, 
Terebinda, and Al'konda, who hide themselves in the cave to be later discovered by their lovers.  
A close scrutiny of the two drafts shows Solov'ev's search for an effective strategy to 
bring Romantic irony under control by defusing its destructive capacity. The most dramatic 
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divergence between the two variants lies precisely in the alignment of the lyrical and ironic 
forces. It is in the rough, unpublished, draft that, as Sergey Solov'ev perspicaciously observed, 
“The famous irony of the German Romantics is taken to the nec plus ultra”71 (qtd. in Gaidenko 
401). In the first version, the lyrical ostensibly plays a secondary role to the ironic that dominates
the whole text. The presence of irony is so heavy that the rare lyrical passages (“I saw a 
dream...”72 and “[We are joining in marriage] the white lily with the rose...”73) inserted into the 
text lose their original lyrical intensity and mystical meaning and acquire overtly sacrilegious 
overtones. Strikingly, it is the lyrical, sabotaged within the ironic context, that in the end comes 
to sound more profane and disconcerting than the blatantly irreverent passages. The sweep of 
irony in the first draft is also more far-reaching than in the final, tamer, version. Nothing in the 
first version is beyond the reach of irony. Solov'ev attacks and ridicules not only the blemished 
world of finitude as in the jocular poems of this period but the realm of transcendence as well. 
The Creator (Geodemon), the Devil (Kitovras), and the Divine Sophia Herself (who appears as a 
bear and the White Lily) are subject to the ruthless play of irony. The mysterious union of the 
knight Mortamir, a travestied Romantic hero (as well as a parody of Solov'ev himself), and the 
White Lily staged at the end of the play is treated with unconcealed derision. All the sacred ideals
cherished by Solov'ev at this time are interrogated and probed with irony in this draft, with the 
lyrical being either destroyed or compromised as a result.  
In the final draft, Solov'ev attempts to curb the negative play of Romantic irony that 
ravaged his ideals in the previous version. He rewrites the play with the aim to (re)affirm the 
primacy of the lyrical by harnessing the ironic in the service of the mystical. His efforts are 
71 “Доведена до nec plus ultra известная ''ирония'' немецких романтиков.”  
72 “Мне снился сон...”
73 “Белую лилию с розой...”
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primarily directed against diminishing the intensity of the ironic assault against the transcendent 
sphere and the ideals tied to it. In pursuit of this restraining purpose, Solov'ev entirely cuts out 
the opening scene (the prologue) that takes place in Heaven and ridicules the Creator and his 
angels. He also slightly ennobles the character of the chevalier de Mortimer who looks and 
sounds less ridiculous in comparison with his earlier counterpart. But the most effective way that 
the poet finds to rein in the Romantic irony that ran wild in the first draft is a new ending to the 
play. Instead of finishing the play on the destructive, ironic note as in the previous version, he 
breaks it off on the affirmative, lyrical one (“[We are joining in marriage] the white lily with the 
rose...”74). This is a dogmatic move against the unruly spirit of Romantic irony that defies any 
positive closure. This imposed lyrical end aims to shed retrospectively a new light on the whole 
play as well as to change the reader's initial perception of the function of irony within that text. In
light of the lyrical end that forcefully reinstates the seemingly deflated ideals, Romantic irony is 
supposed to lose its negative edge and turn into a corrective tool, whose apparent goal is to set off
and in part soften the excesses of mystical enthusiasm. It appears to be the 'intention' of the 
author and this is also the way the use of irony in this play is interpreted by later literary critics. 
Yet while the lyrical finale suppresses (though does not dissolve) the play of Romantic 
irony, the ironic in the play as a whole resists its retrospective relegation to a subsidiary, purely 
corrective role. Within the whole play, it is the ironic that rules supreme until the outburst of the 
lyrical. Even though Solov'ev attempts to tame Romantic irony by delimiting its sphere of assault
primarily to the finite, the transcendent does not escape totally unscathed. Having removed the 
“Heaven” scene, the Russian poet, nevertheless, does not spare the White Lily who serves as a 
rather unkind parody of the Divine Feminine as well as its earlier Romantic embodiment, 
74 “Белую лилию с розой...”
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Novalis's blue flower. His irony acquires even a sharper focus as, with the deletion of the ironic 
scenes extraneous to the major plot line (such as the prologue and Act I, 3), it trains its lens 
exclusively on his ideals of the salvation of humankind through holy love. The character of 
Mortimer who is given more lyrical lines and appears somewhat ennobled at the beginning of the
play becomes more and more ridiculous as the play progresses, reaching the peak of absurdity 
during the culminating scene of the mysterious union (Act III, 1.3-2.1-2). While this scene of the 
sacred union is, admittedly, less tinged with profanity than it appears in its sketched form in the 
first draft, it is still presented in a derisive light that diminishes in its ironic force only when 
viewed from the perspective of the affirmative end. There is a clear sense that the ironic is 
gaining momentum toward the end, when it is abruptly terminated by the lyrical. The emergence 
of the lyrical streak, while extremely powerful in its unexpectedness, is not entirely motivated by 
the progression of the comic plot and the predominance of the ironic mood that becomes 
increasingly acerbic. Irony in this second version cannot, therefore, be viewed as a purely 
defensive mechanism employed as a foil for the lyrical. While it is significantly subdued, it still 
retains a degree of critical autonomy that allows it to subtly undermine the lyrical even when it is 
revealed in all its unadulterated glory.
Solov'ev seems to be acutely conscious of the unresolved and potentially explosive 
tension between the two elements within his play as he avoided bringing the two modes together 
for another twenty years until the composition of “Three Encounters,” an autobiographical 
narrative poem that looks back on the philosopher's personal mystical experiences of the Eternal 
Feminine in 1862, 1875, and 1876 in Moscow, London, and in the desert nor far from Cairo 
respectively. The poem consists of the lyrical prologue, three “jocular” parts that constitute the 
tale of the poet's three encounters with his transcendent beloved, and the lyrical epilogue. The 
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first revelation of the Eternal Feminine, as described in the first part, takes place in Solov'ev's 
childhood when at the age of 9 he was suffering the pangs of unrequited love. The second part 
recounts the visitation of Sophia to Solov'ev who, as a junior faculty member at the Department 
of Philosophy of Moscow University, was engaged in scholarly research at the British Museum. 
During that brief manifestation, Sophia commanded him to await her in Egypt (“Go to Egypt”75). 
Their third and most important encounter, which is the subject-matter of the third and longest 
part, occurs at night in the desert near Cairo: 
And in the purple of heavenly brilliance
With eyes, full of azure fire,
You looked like the first radiance 
Of the day of the universal creation. 
What is, what was, what is to come forever—
Everything was embraced here by one immobile gaze...
The seas and rivers look blue below me
And the remote forest and the peaks of the snow-covered mountains.
I saw all and all was only one—
Only one image of female beauty...
The infinite was part of its magnitude  
Before me, inside me—only you.76 (Izbrannoe 121-122)
75 “В Египте будь!” 
76 “И в пурпуре небесного блистанья
Очами, полными лазурного огня,
Глядела ты, как первое сиянье
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Unlike in The White Lily, where Romantic irony breaks loose and attacks not only the 
profane but also impinges upon and violates the sacred, in “Three Encounters” the role of 
transcendental irony is severely restricted and tightly controlled. The ironic personal narrative is 
inserted within the secure lyrical framework, with the prologue and epilogue addressed directly 
to the deity and devoid of all traces of irony. This positive frame apparently serves as a protective
barrier against the ironic negativity that might potentially spill over from the enclosed jocular 
tale. Within the narrative itself, Solov'ev also limits irony to the finite sphere exclusively. Irony is
used to recount his personal circumstances (involving his needs as a human being who does not 
only possess a spark of spirit but is also made of flesh which is weak) that precede and follow his
mystical encounters with the divine. The manifestations of Sophia to the narrator, on the other 
hand, are entirely free of the ironic touch. The glory of the divine ideal is reasserted against the 
backdrop of the ironic annihilation of the imperfect finite, and the visitations of the Eternal 
Feminine are shielded behind the irony unleashed against its undeserving recipient. 
In its firmly controlled form, Romantic irony allows the poet to reveal the “sancta 
sanctorum” of his spiritual experience and simultaneously to hide it from the anticipated ridicule 
of the reading public that at that time included in large numbers the militant intelligentsia of a 
materialist and positivist orientation. By deprecating and mocking himself through the use of 
irony, Solov'ev preempts at least some potential taunts concerning his overall state of sanity and 
Всемирного и творческого дня.
Что есть, что было, что грядет вовеки —
Все обнял тут один недвижный взор…
Синеют подо мной моря и реки,
И дальний лес, и выси снежных гор.
Всё видел я, и всё одно лишь было —
Один лишь образ женской красоты…
Безмерное в его размер входило, —
Передо мной, во мне — одна лишь ты.”
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the validity of his visions but, more importantly, by deriding his feeble earthly self, he draws 
most of the criticism away from the holy object of his visions, his transcendent beloved. The 
initiated will comprehend his experiences of the sacred concealed behind the ironic veil while the
uninitiated will be prevented from sullying it through their explicit abuse or mocking 
indifference. In other words, Solov'ev aims at exploiting the positive potential of Romantic irony 
that in its subdued form can be employed to effectively mask and yet reveal the holy.    
Thus, in “Three Encounters,” Solov'ev seeks to turn the free-spirited Romantic irony into 
a docile ally by curbing its latent nihilistic potential through tight authorial control. Instead of 
allowing it to run its negative course and play havoc with the sacred, the Russian poet forces 
irony into the service of the lyrical. Solov'ev's life-long quest for the solution to the problem of 
reconciling the lyrical representative of faith and the ironic expressive of lurking skepticism 
appears to lie in the total subjection of the ironic to the lyrical. The ironic is to be used 
exclusively for protective (“dissimulating”) purposes, for in its controlled play of revelation and 
concealment irony can shield the sacred against the uninitiated. The affirmation of faith should 
soar over the negation of skepticism and the lyrical should come to prevail over the ironic. This is
the tentative remedy to the vexed question of Romantic irony (as “absolute infinite negativity” in 
potentia) that Solov'ev bequeaths to his Symbolist disciples. Belyi, in particular, would adopt it as
a counterweight to Blok's Romantic nihilism. That this is not an entirely satisfactory solution, as 
will become clear later in Belyi's case, is already apparent in the negative response from 
Solov'ev's mystically-minded friends (including Sophia Khitrovo, one of the poet's earthly 
incarnations of the Divine Sophia) who came to strongly dislike the poem, perceiving it as an 
outright blasphemy (Solov'ev, Stikhotvoreniia 309). There is something in the nature of the ironic
so that even when it is rigorously controlled, it still manages to throw a shadow of doubt upon the
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lyrical.
Plumbing the Depths of Nihilism: Aleksandr Blok's Ironic Suicide
Like Solov'ev, Blok had an intensely personal, mystical experience of the Eternal 
Feminine or the Divine Sophia, the feminine essence of God, who appears in his early poetry in 
the garb of the Beautiful Lady. The mystical streak, however, similar to Solov'ev, was 
counterbalanced by the presence of corrosive skepticism as to the true nature of his love for the 
personification of the feminine essence of the Universe and his ability to rise to her expectations. 
This uneasy co-existence of mysticism and skepticism in Blok's personality predisposes him to 
an ironic outlook that was bitterly resented and deemed sacrilegious by his less skeptical fellow 
Symbolists who ardently believed in Solov'ev's project of Godmanhood.“That Blok identifies 
irony with a grave sin, that he was an ''ironist'' himself goes without question [...] But to build on 
irony—''not only''... poetry?”77 fumed Andrei Belyi as late as 1933 in his memoir Nachalo veka 
(339-340). In contrast to Solov'ev and Belyi who optimistically believe in the possibility of 
subjecting Romantic irony to the lyrical, Blok comes to see the ironic as the very crux of the 
lyrical element itself. The discovery that the lyrical, like the ironic, has essentially a demonic 
origin makes it impossible for him to yield to the certainties of affirmation. Instead, he throws 
himself into the abyss of nihilism by committing a de facto ironic suicide in his first lyrical 
drama, The Puppet Show. For Blok, as it emerges from his critique of early German 
Romanticism, there appears to be ultimately no escape from “the disease” of nihilistic irony other
than the death of the Romantic subject. 
77 “Что Блок соотносит иронию с тяжким грехом, что он сам был ''ироник'' нет спору […] Но на иронии 
строить — ''не только''... поэзию?” 
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The irreconcilable split between the mystical and the skeptical that plagued Blok from 
early on is particularly striking in his ambivalent attitude toward the Eternal Feminine's empirical
visitations. This growing equivocation in relation to his mystical experiences makes itself 
manifest already in his early correspondence with Belyi. Thus, in the letter dated June 18/July 1, 
1903, Blok confides in his new friend: “The two dominant moods (perhaps you also have them 
like me?)—mystical and skeptical (indifferent)”78 (Belyi, Perepiska 68). According to the Russian
Symbolist, one can know that a terrestrial manifestation belongs to the Eternal Feminine (“Her”) 
rather than to Astarte, her evil counterpart “''entwining'' around Her” (69), only in a state of 
intense mystical rapture. Skepticism, however, succeeds in insinuating itself into the mystical 
mood even at the moment of the highest spiritual ecstasy. In his letter to Belyi dated August 1, 
1903, Blok further elaborates on his concern that mystical enthusiasm is never free of debilitating
doubt: “''They'' overtake you on the journey, surprise you in rapture. ''She'' is the only One who 
confers regality, ''they''—only stigma”79 (88). A reference to “the[m]” (demons) that Blok 
opposes to “her” implies that the origin of plaguing doubt is not just a personal but a 
metaphysical problem.  
This doubt that invariably accompanies the mystic even at the heights of divine 
enthusiasm is a manifestation of demonic skepticism which is, for Blok, nothing else than an 
ontological element. Skepticism is embedded in human nature as the intellect or rationality: 
“Skepticism (a property of the intellect) lies like a stone on the road and one cannot go round it. 
That's why non-prophets are compelled to adulterate the wine of mysticism with its (skepticism's)
water”80 (68). A tense ambivalence prevails in the relation between these two fundamental 
78 “Два преобладающие настроения (может быть и у Вас, как у меня?) — мистическое и скептическое 
(равнодушное).” 
79 “''Они'' застигают в пути, застигают в восторге. ''Она'' — Одна приносит царственность, ''они''—клеймо.”
80 “Скептицизм (принадлежность рассудка) лежит камнем на дороге и объехать его нельзя. Потому 
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elements because, paradoxically, it is the skeptical that, in the Russian Symbolist's view, 
constitutes the very foundation of the mystical: “It [skepticism] lies at the basis of mysticism not 
built on sand and constitutes that ''fear,'' that ''perfect love'' casteth out”81 (70). Demonic 
skepticism haunts the sphere of the mystical as its shadowy double and the only remedy to this 
ironic duality, both personal and ontological, lies in perfect love.
While the Russian Symbolist seeks salvation from the demon of skepticism in perfect 
love, the meaning that he attaches to this phenomenon is an ironic inversion of its original 
religious sense. In The First Epistle, from which Blok appropriated the term, John unequivocally 
speaks of perfect love as an expression of divine love, for God is love itself: “And we have 
known and believed the love that God hath to us. God is love; and he that dwelleth in love 
dwelleth in God, and God in him” (KJB 1.4.16). Blok's notion of perfect love, on the other hand, 
is highly individualistic and devoted to the Divine Feminine alone. It has a recognizable 
Solov'evian tinge but unlike its prototype, it is devoid of the messianic role and is unambiguously
erotic. Thus, in one of his letters to Belyi, Blok argues the necessity for skepticism precisely on 
the grounds of his idiosyncratic relationship with “Her.” Whereas for Belyi, who closely follows 
Solov'ev the philosopher, “She” as the Divine Sophia represents the embodied Christ or Divine 
Humankind, Blok, inspired by Solov'ev's lyrics and Novalis' Romantic mythology, denies 
participation of other people in the Eternal Feminine: “I'm suffering (?)82 from radical 
individualism […] I don't feel the people's and society's partaking of her grace”83 (89). 
Furthermore, in violation of the Solov'evian spirit, he completely dissociates the figure of Christ 
непророкам приходится разбавить вино мистицизма его (скептицизма) водой.”   
81 “Он [скептицизм] лежит в основе мистицизма, построенного не на песке, и составляет тот ''страх,'' 
который ''изгоняет совершенная любовь''.”
82 The question mark belongs to Blok.
83 “Страдаю (?) крайним индивидуализмом […] Не чувствую участия народа и общества в Ее Благодати.”  
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from “Her.” In the Russian Symbolist's erotic vision, the Divine Sophia is not to become one 
with Christ through her redemptive union with Logos but instead to unite in love exclusively with
her earthly lover (that is, Blok himself). Blok admits to Belyi that he is a victim of “a victim of 
agonizing, ancient mental temptation that often torments me: ''eternal masculinity''”84 (90). In this
light, Blok's conception of perfect love presents a variation on the Romantic yearning for the 
redemptive union with the transcendent female substance, “Ewig Weibliche,” symbolized by 
Novalis as a longing for the blue flower in his novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen. 
Blok's appropriation of the divine attribute of perfect love for himself betrays his 
Romantic aesthetic individualism that puts him at loggerheads with religion. In contrast to Belyi, 
Blok, who, in his own words, “has non-(anti?)Christian outlook”85 (153) and “suffers (?) from 
extreme individualism” (89) seeks to disengage art from religion as the two are incompatible, if 
not antagonistic, in his opinion. The demands of religion are too absolute and involve 
renunciation of all the earthly, including the creative self. Art, on the other hand, reaffirms and 
celebrates pure subjectivity, for it serves as a vehicle for expressing and validating the entire 
range of emotional experiences. Thus, the Russian Symbolist's invariable thought (“svoe 
vsegdashnee”) on the dichotomy of art and religion is that “in art there is infinity, we know not 
what, transcending all things, but empty, leading perhaps to perdition, whereas in religion there is
the end, we know what, plenitude, salvation”86 (SS v 8-mi tt., 7: 162-163). He rejects the religious
narrative of redemption personified by Christ and, like the early German Romantics before him, 
seeks to traverse the empty infinity of art in search of salvation (the Absolute) all by himself. As 
the later Blok observes, “as a foundation for life and faith there can only be God—and ''I''” (qtd. 
84 “мучительного, древнего, терзающего меня часто, мысленного соблазна: ''вечной мужественности''.”
85 “Знаешь ли — у меня не (анти?) христианское сознание...”
86 “В искусстве — бесконечность, неведомо ''о чем,'' по ту сторону всего, но пустое, гибельное, может быть, 
то в религии — конец, ведомо о чем, полнота, спасение.”
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in Pyman 2: 343), and it is Romantic lyrical subjectivity that the early Blok attempts to use as a 
“foundation” on which to build his “life and faith.” 
Yet, having rejected “the crutches” of religion in favor of Romantic aesthetic 
individualism (or, in Kierkegaard's terms, “exaggerated Romantic subjectivity”), Blok, ironically,
lets loose the demon of skepticism that he strives to contain. Unlike perfect love of God, love of a
worldly male for the transcendent female, even if it is pure and devotional, is a situation 
inherently vulnerable to abrupt ironic reversal(s). That holy love is susceptible to corruption 
becomes fully evident already in Blok's first poetry collection, Verses about the Beautiful Lady87 
(Stikhi o Prekrasnoi Dame, 1904). As it transpires, notwithstanding his aspirations for godhood, 
the lyrical persona, the devotee of the Beautiful Lady, proves himself flawed and unworthy of his
transcendent beloved because of his human, corporeal, and fallible nature. The ineradicable 
presence of skepticism (the corrosive intellect) and carnal desires contaminates and erodes his 
worshipful love for the Beautiful Lady, dragging it down to the level of mundane sexual passion.
 Furthermore, it is not only the earthly lover, Blok's alter ego, who is ensnared by the 
ironic duality of his human corruptible nature but the image of the transcendent beloved herself is
subject to demonic distortion in her terrestrial manifestations. In the Russian Symbolist's vision, 
the Eternal Feminine is the Ultimate encompassing all Being and Non-Being and therefore, 
unlike Christ who personifies the force of good, she transcends all ethical divisions: “It is Christ 
who is good but not She88 because She is Ultimate”89 (Belyi, Perepiska 70). Since in her 
absoluteness the Divine Feminine is beyond good and evil, she can potentially reveal herself to 
87 On Blok's early poetry, see, for example, T. V. Igosheva, Ranniaia lirika A. A. Bloka (1898—1904); V. M. 
Zhirmunskii, Poeziia Aleksandra Bloka; D. M. Magomedova, Avtobiograficheskii mif v tvorchestve A. Bloka; D. 
E. Maksimov, Poeziia i proza Al. Bloka; Z. G. Mints, Lirika Aleksandra Bloka. Vypusk 1: 1898-1906. 
88 The emphasis is Blok's.
89 “Добр Христос, но не Она, потому что Она — Окончательна.” 
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her lover by assuming an image of either substance. This possibility of demonic metamorphosis 
of the Beautiful Lady into the Harlot provokes intense fear in Blok's lyrical persona who is 
disconcerted that his beloved might dramatically change her heavenly image (“I anticipate Your 
arrival. The years go by...” (“Predchuvstvuiu Tebia. Goda prokhodiat mimo,” 1901)). That this 
fear is not groundless and that the transformation of the celestial beloved into her evil double, 
Astarte, is inevitable due to the very nature of love that binds the two can be traced in such 
poems as “The old year sweeps the dreams away...” (“Staryi god unosit sny...,” 1901), “The day 
will arrive and the great events will take place” (“Budet den'—i svershitsia velikoe,” 1901), “The
battle makes my heart merry” (“Mne bitva serdtse veselit,” 1901), “They were having a party 
steeped in yellow light...” (“Pri zheltom svete veselilis'...,” 1902). Only the power of perfect love 
can reverse the ironic degeneration of the Beautiful Lady into the Whore of Babylon. Yet Blok's 
lyrical hero, increasingly besieged by skeptical doubt and irony, proves himself wanting, for he is
no longer capable of such devout feeling (“You are passionately waiting. You are being 
summoned” (“Ty strastno zhdesh. Tebia zovut,” 1901). With the devotee's faith in the holiness of 
his transcendent beloved being entirely eroded, the two lovers collapse into their demonic 
doubles. 
Blok's irony reaches its highest peak by taking an overtly nihilistic turn in his 
“blasphemous” play The Puppet Show (Balaganchik, 1906). In this drama the Russian Symbolist 
impiously derides all his most sacred dreams and visions concerning the Eternal Feminine that he
so reverently celebrated in his early poetry. By using the most radical kind of irony he lampoons 
the Symbolist enterprise of life-creation as a whole and the ideal of erotic love as a path to 
salvation in particular. Under the guise of Commedia dell'Arte puppets (Pierrot, Columbine, and 
Harlequin), Blok most mercilessly ridicules himself, his wife, Liubov' Mendeleeva, and, his 
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friend, Andrei Belyi, who became involved in a highly complex love triangle at that time. Liubov'
Mendeleeva, who in her maidenhood was reverentially perceived by the young Blok as an earthly
embodiment of the Divine Sophia, came to be worshiped as such by the other Solov'evians as 
well. Eventually, Belyi fell in love with Blok's wife who flirted with him but in the end refused to
leave her husband. Disappointed in the people he trusted most, with his transcendent ideals lying 
in ruins, Blok presents in his lyrical drama a nihilistic metaphysical vision, in which destructive 
irony reigns unchallenged.     
The Puppet Show opens with a scene showing a group of mystics awaiting the arrival of 
Death. Among the mystics there is a figure of Pierrot who is expecting instead the coming of his 
beloved, Columbine. When a pale looking woman clothed in white and with a long pleated braid 
(kosa) finally appears, the mystics take her for the incarnation of Death while Pierrot assures 
everyone that it is not Death but his bride, Columbine. There is an argument between the mystics 
and Pierrot about the nature of the “apparition.” Yielding ground, the confused Pierrot is about to 
leave but rather than staying with the victorious mystics, Columbine decides to follow Pierrot. 
Suddenly Harlequin, Pierrot's arch-rival, springs forward; he quickly knocks his opponent down 
and leads the smiling Columbine away with him. At this point, the upset author (a character) 
bursts onto the stage telling the audience that the play which is being performed is not the one he 
actually wrote. He composed a play with a happy ending in which the lovers, after overcoming a 
set of obstacles, successfully unite in marriage.
Meanwhile, the sad Pierrot makes his monologue about how Harlequin and Columbine 
were having a sleigh ride at night, during which Columbine ungracefully tumbled off into a snow
drift, thereby revealing the unseemly fact that she is made of cardboard. After the monologue the 
scene abruptly shifts to three couples shown consecutively as illustrations of different types of 
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love. Harlequin succeeds the couples of lovers on the stage. In his desire to break through into 
the real world, he throws himself through the window that turns out to be not real but painted. 
Thus, instead of reaching the world, he falls headlong into emptiness. In the rupture of that 
window there appears Death that gradually takes the shape of Columbine. Pierrot approaches his 
beloved but the moment he reaches out to take her hand, the triumphant author, eager to celebrate
the reunion of lovers, thrusts his head between the two, thereby separating them. The author 
intends to join the hands of Columbine and Pierrot but all decorations are suddenly blown away 
and Pierrot is left on the stage all alone. 
It is in The Puppet Show, in which ironic demolition knows no bounds, that Blok's affinity
with early German Romanticism manifests itself most explicitly and in the most negative way. 
Belyi, who could never forgive Blok for what he perceived as the betrayal of their Solov'evian 
ideals, indignantly points to this, in his view, pernicious, influence in his memoirs: 
… and coffee was smelling so nice when Metner, having taken the cup and sipping coffee,
was attacking mysticism, whose property is to degenerate into dubious tall tales; nothing 
but such a tall tale, is, according to Metner, Tieck the playwright; twenty months later I 
simply gasped when I remembered Metner's words while listening to ''The Puppet Show'' 
for the first time in Blok's apartment: a Roman-tic with “a roman-chik [a novelette]”; I 
could barely forgive this “chik” (or “Tieck”) to Blok.90 (Nachalo Veka 307) 
Blok's irony, however, is more radical than that of the early Romantics because the Russian 
Symbolist turns transcendental irony against Romantic lyrical subjectivity itself by staging an 
90 “ ... а кофе так вкусно попахивало, когда Метнер, взяв чашку, прихлебывал кофе, подкопы ведя против 
мистики, свойство которой — прокиснуть в сомнительные анекдотики; сплошь анекдотик, по мнению 
Метнера, — Тик-драматург; через двадцать же месяцев я прямо ахнул, припомнив до слова Метнера, — в 
квартире Блоков, когда прослушивал в первый раз ''Балаганчик'': роман-тик с ''роман-чиком''; этого ''-чика''
(или ''Тика'') на Блоке — я Блоку едва мог простить.”
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ironic suicide. He exposes lyrical subjectivity as self-destructive and its products (the sacred 
love, in the first place) as fiction. The extent of Blok's nihilistic demolition of his ideals that 
spreads to Romantic subjectivity itself becomes particularly noticeable when one compares The 
Puppet Show with Solov'ev's The White Lily that, alongside Tieck's antiplays, served as a model 
for Blok's work.91 
While both The Puppet Show and The White Lily center on and play with the Romantic 
quest for the Divine Feminine, the outcome of the pursuit is strikingly different, registering the 
authors' divergent attitudes toward the ironized Romantic ideal. The major thrust of Blok's irony 
is directed against the sacred love itself that Solov'ev never completely renounced. Despite 
Solov'ev's at times caustic irony in relation to the chevalier de Mortimer and, even, to the object 
of his quest, the White Lily herself, the philosopher in the end opts for the union of the lovers. 
And even though this sacred wedding of the earthly and the transcendent is depicted in a 
somewhat ridiculous light, the lyrical note forcefully struck at the end of the play is supposed to 
redeem all the excesses of irony and reassert the interrogated beliefs. Blok, on the other hand, 
denies his lovers even the ironically staged (re)union. The bride, Columbine, is made of 
cardboard and the lover, Pierrot, stricken with skepticism, can't bring about her resurrection. The 
union is not possible as perfect love turns out to be nothing but a theatrical make-belief that Blok 
indefatigably exposes in his play. The travestied ideal of sacred love is also reflected in the ironic
portrayal of the three couples during the masquerade. Each couple displays one of the three 
91 Blok read Solov'ev's The White Lily as early as 1902 (Blok, Zapisnye knizhki 23). In all likelihood, Blok was 
familiar only with the published version of the play, which is much milder in the force of its ironic assault against
the sacred ideals than the earlier draft that revels in unbounded mockery and derision. For more information on 
the relation between Solov'ev's jocular poetry and Blok's practices of irony, see Z. Mints, “K genezisu 
komicheskogo u Bloka (Vl. Solov'ev i A. Blok).”
On the impact of Solov'ev's work on Blok in general, refer to D. Maksimov, “Materialy iz biblioteki Al. Bloka: 
(K voprosu ob Al. Bloke i Vl. Solov'eve) and A. Slonimskii, “Blok i Vladimir Solov'ev.”
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dominant modes that love takes on in Blok's earlier and contemporaneous lyrics: love as a semi-
religious devotion, love as a demonic passion, and love as a knightly service. All couples are in 
masks and are masks donned by nobody else but the poet himself. Blok emphasizes the brazen 
theatricality of all the love scenes and the literariness of the love discourse itself. The ideal of 
sacred love is cardboard, theatrical, inspired by literature that can be (re)animated only at times 
by the imagination of the Romantic poet. In contrast to Solov'ev who doubts himself rather than 
the transcendent ideal, Blok comes to negate the ideal itself as a product of the (over)literary 
Romantic imagination.  
 The theatricality of the quest for sacred love is accentuated by means of the Romantic 
ironic device, parabasis or Illusionstörung, that Blok might have borrowed from Tieck's theatrical
jests.92 While Tieck's antiplays, Puss in Boots (Der gestiefelte Kater, 1797) and The Land of 
Upside Down (Der verkehrte Welt, 1797) that abound in parabasis also undoubtedly served as a 
model for Solov'ev's The White Lily, the latter conspicuously shunned this Romantic technique 
for embodying irony. For the early German Romantics, Illusionstörung represented one of the 
deepest meanings of irony, “namely a recognition of the necessity for the artifact not only to 
criticize itself, the author, or the reader, but also to 'destroy' itself in a certain sense” (Wheeler, 
“Introduction” 20). In other words, parabasis symbolizes the necessary self-destruction and self-
nullification of the limited and finite representation (a work of art as a whole) in its recognition 
of being a false representation of the infinite and unconditional. In Fr. Schlegel's words, “All that 
doesn't annihilate itself is not free and of no worth”93 (KFSA 18: 82, no. 628). Parabasis is that 
92 It is not clear when Blok became familiarized with and/or how well he was familiar with Tieck's dramatic 
experiments. Apart from Tieck's anti-plays, another possible Romantic source behind Blok's use of the device of 
parabasis in The Puppet Show may have been E.T.A. Hoffmann's novella, Princess Brambilla (Prinzessin 
Brambilla, 1820). For more information on the late Romantic Hoffmann's impact on Blok's work, refer to V. V. 
Koroleva's dissertation, “A. Blok i E.T.A. Gofman: traditsii romantizma v simvolistskoi poetike.”                          
93 “Alles was sich nicht selbst annihilirt, ist nicht frei und nichts werth.”  
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drive behind Romantic irony's “absolute infinite negativity” as it annuls all positivity and defies 
all closures. It is the essence of Romantic irony itself: “Irony is a permanent parabasis”94 (KFSA 
18: 85, no. 668). In Blok's play, parabasis takes the shape of the fictive author who punctually 
disturbs the theatrical illusion by his vociferous protestations and disrupts the final reunion of 
lovers bringing about the total collapse at the end of the play. The play literally annihilates itself 
at the very end as the whole theatrical universe crumbles, leaving only the lonely figure of Pierrot
on the stage. This continuous gesture of self-annihilation built into the structure of Blok's play as 
Illusionstörung attests to his growing suspicion (that sets him apart from Belyi) that art and 
language are ultimately about art and language.
Blok's variety of transcendental irony takes the destructive potential coiled at the heart of 
Romantic irony to its logical end—nihilism.95 In the early Romantics' theory and practice, irony 
is salutary. It is celebrated as a means of liberation against the reassuring but obsolete forms, 
artistic and otherwise: “To enjoy wares such as jests, nonsense and madness, one must leave too 
ticklish a conscience at home; for the whole idea is to overthrow boundaries which rightfully 
surround us in everyday life” (Tieck, The Land of Upside Down 14). This unprecedented freedom
granted by irony to the Romantic artist, however, allows him to play with everything and 
anything, including ethics and religion. As a result of this endless play with deflated values, the 
Romantic ironist not infrequently finds himself nothing to believe in apart from art itself or, in 
Tieck's terms, “the life of the imagination.” Blok turns transcendental irony precisely against this 
94 “Die Ironie ist eine permanente Parekbase.”  
95 Thus, Safranski remarks that the early German Romantics were fully conscious of the ominous abyss of nihilism 
underlying their strivings, which is already evident in Tieck's early novel William Lovell (Die Geschichte des 
Herrn William Lovell, 1795-1796): “The I-excesses of [Tieck's] William Lovell were therefore much ado about 
nothing. The novel has nightmarish, riddling aspects: the horror vacui, the dread of tedium, the suspicion that we 
only invent what we think we discover, the disappearance of faith and trust, metaphysical homelessness—all this 
plays into it and is played with in it. Thus the problem of Romantic nihilism as the shadow side of the I-euphoria 
is revealed already at the beginning of the Romantic movement” (56). 
94
last value, Romantic “life of the imagination,” exemplified for him as lyrical subjectivity. He 
exposes the product of this imagination, which is nothing less than the whole world (see his essay
“About Lyrical Poetry”), as art(ificial), theatrical, make-belief, and therefore dead. This is the 
masquerade of consciousness, the world of Nothing. Symbolically, in the wake of total 
destruction, there remains on the stage at the end of the play only the lonely figure of Pierrot, the 
lyrical persona closest to Blok, who represents the (self-)destructive circle of authorial lyrical 
consciousness. He is an embodiment of the emptiness and solitariness of alienated Romantic 
subjectivity that constructs and annihilates the worlds of its own free will. 
There is no counter ideal suggested in the play. “Life” embodied in the image of the 
Divine Feminine is exposed as “Death.” It is a cardboard ideal, a figment of the diseased literary 
imagination that having created the ideal fails to bring it to life. Romantic subjectivity prone to 
the disease of nihilistic irony is associated with death, but there seems to be no life outside its 
magic circle either. Harlequin, who is another lyrical mask concealing the author, attempts to 
break through the walls of the masquerade world into the wider universe but falls headlong into 
emptiness: “He jumps out the window. The distance visible in the window turns out to be drawn 
on paper. The paper has burst. Harlequin flies upside down into the void”96 (Maloe sobranie 562).
The outward (which is Nothing) does not seem to offer an alternative (Life) to the inward (which 
is Nothing). There seems to be no exit out of the confines of Romantic lyrical subjectivity that 
annihilates itself through its own irony. 
Blok continues the critique of exaggerated Romantic subjectivity in his essays written 
between 1906 and 1908, searching for a new ideal and a more positive cure to the disease of 
96 “Прыгает в окно. Даль, видимая в окне, оказывается нарисованной на бумаге. Бумага лопнула. Арлекин 
полетел вверх ногами в пустоту.” 
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nihilistic irony than the self-staged ironic suicide of The Puppet Show. In “The Girl of the Rose 
Gate and the Ant Tsar” (“Devushka rozovoi kalitki i murav'inyi tsar',” 1906), the Russian 
Symbolist overtly attacks early German Romanticism and covertly his own Romantic self: “I 
castigate myself by myself,97 that is primarily the essence of my essays”98 (Belyi, Perepiska 344). 
The published essay is a caustic parody of the earlier lyrical fragment “The Girl of the Rose 
Door” (from Germany)” (“Devushka rozovoi dveri (iz Germanii),” 1903), an enthusiastic 
homage to his German Romantic predecessors. The fragment, reminiscent in its enchanted 
medieval atmosphere of a Romantic fairytale, sketches a story of death and resurrection with a 
hopeful end that death will be conquered through love, for the love-sick page, according to the 
earlier Blok's optimistic vision, will eventually find his long-lost mistress, an incarnation of 
Romantic Ewig Weibliche, who is still alive (“The Mistress is alive”99) and is аwaiting her 
rescuer (“That who will be... my rescuer”100). In the later ironic self-parody, however, Blok 
portrays the mistress as a promiscuous woman who spends each night with a different page while
the page searching for his lady is depicted as a page from the opera. If earlier there was a near 
identification between the page and the observing narrator, in the later version there is a stark 
ironic distance between the two. As in The Puppet Show, Blok mocks the page, his alter ego, by 
emphasizing the theatricality and artificiality of the whole quest. A lady will come but, ironically,
not the one the page was looking for: “Search for the distant one, but she will not come nearer. 
Only a slender pretty daughter of the door-keeper will come to you. … and you will take her for 
the distant one, and you will kiss her, and you will open a bakery on Bürgerstrasse”101 (SS v 6-ti 
97 The emphasis is Blok's. 
98  “Я бью сам себя, таков по преимуществу смысл моих статей.”
99 “Госпожа жива.”
100 “Тот, кто будет... мой избавитель...”
101 “Далекую ищи, но далекая не приблизится. Придет к тебе — тонкая, хорошенькая дочь привратника. … и 
ты примешь ее за далекую, и будешь целовать ее, и откроешь булочную на Bürgerstrasse.” 
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tt, 5: 80-81). The ironic substitute is the inevitable result of this literary Romantic quest.  
If in the earlier fragment Blok was keen on emphasizing his kinship with German 
Romanticism,102 in the later essay he is no less keen on distancing himself from it. Blok castigates
Romanticism and indirectly himself as a Romantic for its obsession with the unattainable, perfect
beauty (the Absolute). The tragedy of the West lies in the perpetuation of duality between the 
transcendent and the phenomenal: “All is disparate, remote, ''unknowable,'' starting with the 
sought-for Helen that progressively withdraws and at last enters the frame of the Catholic icon; 
[and] ending with ''the thing-in-itself,'' a noumenon, on which it is written: ''Unknowable, 
untouchable. Go by''”103 (81). It is this insurmountable rift between the ideal and the real that has 
enervated the West and led to its death. There is no future for the West that has its roots in 
Platonism as it lives for the sake of the transcendent ideal that will never come to pass: “The 
motionless knight—the West—has forgotten everything, having been lost in contemplation of the
heavenly roses from under the visor... He is searching with his deadly gaze on the varied plain for
something which is not there and will never be there... His dreams will come to naught. [They] 
will not come true”104 (82).
Blok identifies this petrified Romantic subjectivity as the source of demonic irony in his 
essay “On Lyrical Poetry” (“O liricheski poezii,” 1907). In contrast to the early German 
102 See, for example, one of the entries in Blok's notebooks: “Why is it that I, a Russian, who is alien to the German 
heritage, with the eyes accustomed to his native plain, with the pain of renunciation of the endemic Romanticism,
which is nothing but literary Romanticism to me, can't, nevertheless, renounce it? I am among the strangers but 
am I not home?” [“Отчего я, русский, чужой германскому наследью, с взглядом, привыкшим к своей 
равнине, с болью отрешенья от здешнего, для меня только книжного романтизма, не могу отрешиться от 
него? Я — у чужих, но — не у себя ли?”] (Zapisnye Knizhki 50).
103 “Все отдельно, далеко, ''непознаваемо,'' начиная с искомой Елены, все удаляющейся и наконец 
вступившей в раму католической иконы; кончая ''вещью в себе,'' ноуменом, на котором написано: 
''Непознаваем, неприкосновенен. Проходите''.”
104 “Неподвижный рыцарь — Запад — все забыл, заглядевшись из-под забрала на небесные розы. … Он 
ищет мертвым взором на многообразной равнине то, чего нет на ней и не будет. … И мечты его ничем не 
кончатся. Не воплотятся.” 
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Romantics who viewed enthusiasm (lyricism) as divine, the Russian Symbolist exposes the 
lyrical as demonic, tracing its origin back to “the first lyricist”—the fallen Angel-Demon. 
Lyricism that brings the curse of uncontrolled irony originates, according to Blok, in the demonic
desire of being like the Divine Creator. This desire still haunts the fallen angel's descendants, 
lyrical poets: “So I will. If a lyric poet loses this slogan and replaces it by any other, he will cease 
being a lyric poet. This slogan is his curse, immaculate and light”105 (120). In other words, Blok 
equates lyricism with the assertion of absolute subjectivity (aesthetic individualism) as the world 
of a lyrical poet is created and entirely circumscribed by his way of perception: “Lyrical poetry is
the ''I,'' a macrocosm, and a lyrical poet's whole world lies in his way of perception. This is a 
vicious, magic circle.”106 A lyrical poet abides by nothing but the dictates of his own creative will.
He does not recognize the authority of traditional systems of value extraneous to his will (such as
religion and ethics) because they attempt to limit his freedom. In the name of freedom, a lyricist 
reserves the right to be anything he chooses: “At any moment he can become a fiery inspirer—
and a parasite sucking blood.”107 It is in this practice of absolute freedom that the lyrical collapses
into the ironic, with enthusiasm turning into debauchery and drunkenness.
In his essay “Irony” (“Ironiia,” 1908), Blok examines this darker, ironic, side of the 
demonic gift of (pseudo)absolute freedom. He defines irony as a “disease of insane laughter” that
usually begins with a diabolically mocking, provoking smile and ends with a riotous conduct and 
outright blasphemy. This is an exposing and disintegrating laughter that begets an unsettling 
sense of insecurity and the relativity of all things: “All is indifferent to them in the presence of 
105 “Так я хочу. Если лирик потеряет этот лозунг и заменит его любым другим, — он перестанет быть 
лириком. Этот лозунг — его проклятие — непорочное и светлое.”  
106 “Лирика есть ''я,'' макрокосм, и весь мир поэта лирического лежит в его способе восприятия. Это —
заколдованный, магический круг.” 
107 “В любой миг он может стать огненным вдохновителем — и паразитом сосущим кровь.” 
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this cursed irony: good and evil, a clear sky and a cesspool, Dante's Beatrice and Sologub's 
Nedotykomka”108 (270). This terrifying relativism of irony is the outcome of the exercise of 
absolute freedom (“So I will”109) that Blok associates with Romantic lyrical subjectivity. Since in 
the world of arbitrariness created by a lyrical poet, there is no revered hierarchy of values, with 
its clear delineation of good and evil, all values become degraded and interchangeable. There are 
no secure objective points of reference by which high and low, sacred and profane as well as evil 
and good can be differentiated from each other. All oppositions lose their meaning as all values 
become indifferent: 
… I am drunk; ergo—if I will—I will ''accept'' the world in its entirety, I will kneel before
the Nedotykomka, [and] seduce Beatrice; wallowing in a gutter, I will imagine I am 
soaring in the clouds; if I will—I will not ''accept'' the world: I will prove that the 
Nedotykomka and Beatrice are the same. So I will, because I am drunk.110 (270) 
Irony not only cheapens and desecrates all values, but it also eats away at the laughing 
ironist himself until it devours him completely. It brings him down from his mystical heights. An 
all-powerful lyrical poet of “On Lyrical Poetry,” ironically, turns into a philosophizing drunkard 
inebriated with wine and irony. Unlike the early German Romantics who optimistically viewed 
the ironist as a playful nothing, fullness in potential, Blok, similar to Kierkegaard, shows that the 
lyrical ironist is literally Nothing, having been consumed by his own nihilistic laughter. The 
defining characteristic of the ironist, according to the Russian Symbolist, is his very absence: “I 
want to shake him by his shoulders, catch him by his hands, scream that he should stop laughing 
108 “Перед лицом проклятой иронии — все равно для них: добро и зло, ясное небо и вонючая яма, Беатриче 
Данте и Недотыкомка Сологуба.” 
109 “Так я хочу” (emphasis is Blok's).
110 “... я пьян; ergo — захочу — ''приму'' мир весь целиком, упаду на колени перед Недотыкомкой, соблазню 
Беатриче; барахтаясь в канаве, буду полагать, что парю в небесах; захочу — ''не приму'' мира: докажу, что 
Беатриче и Недотыкомка одно и то же. Так мне угодно, ибо я пьян.”
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at that which is dearer to him than his own life,—and I can't. I am myself being ravaged with the 
demon of laughter; and I am myself no more.111 We are both no more”112(269). Having dissolved 
into laughter, he becomes nothing but “an insolently laughing mouth.” Irony, a product of 
Romantic lyrical subjectivity, lays waste not only outward but also inward, leaving nothing but a 
derisive laughter in its wake. This is nihilistic irony that knows no bounds in the sweep of its 
negation. It is total and uncontrollable. 
Furthermore, unlike Solov'ev, for whom the problem of skeptical irony was always 
personal, Blok comes to see the problem of excessive Romantic subjectivity not only as his 
“poetic” ailment but as that of the whole of the educated class in Russia: “… even though I am 
myself unconsciously infected with decadence, literature, and irony (I have just talked about it in 
print the other day), I am not the only one who is sick with it”113 (Zapisnye knizhki 126). The 
entire Russian intelligentsia is stricken with nihilistic irony and the only cure for that Western-
bred alienated subjectivity lies in the intelligentsia’s union with the people (“narod” or the 
peasant part of the population of the Imperial Russia) who represent healthy objectivity of Life. 
Already in his first overt critique of early German Romanticism, “The Girl of the Rose Gate and 
the Ant Tsar,” Blok offers the world of the Russian folk as a life-giving alternative to the petrified
West. In contrast to the unattainable Romantic ideal of the “Ewig-Weibliche,” the Russian ideal 
symbolized as the magic root belongs to the earth itself. While being crude, naïve, and clumsy, it 
is also tangible, within reach, and bursting with life: “All is distinct, near, as if it had already been
found […] All is real, there is no place for dreams, and the sky is out of sight”114 (SS v 6-ti tt, 5: 
111 The emphasis is Blok's. 
112 “Я хочу потрясти его за плечи, схватить за руки, закричать, чтобы он перестал смеяться над тем, что ему 
дороже жизни, — и не могу. Самого меня ломает бес смеха; и меня самого уже нет. Нас обоих нет.” 
113 “... пусть я сам даже бессознательно заражен декадентством, словесностью, иронией (только на днях я 
говорил об этом в печати), — не я один этим болен.” 
114 “Все различимо, близко, будто уж найдено […] Все реально, мечтам нет места, и неба не видно.” 
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84). There is neither Western duality nor abstraction, for the Russian folk magic springs from the 
very thing-ness and earthiness of things. The source of vitality is in the hearts of the common 
Russian folk (“The heart of the ordinary Russian people is also a legend; it itself creates life”115 
(85)) and, for Blok, the intelligentsia's (and his own) only chance of salvation from the Romantic 
“disease of individualism” lies in breaking through to the people. 
Yet Blok's solution to the problem of nihilistic irony rooted in exaggerated subjectivity 
reflects his Romantic mindset that he cannot escape. While he condemns Western duality, his 
own way of thinking is inherently dualistic. This propensity to dualism is already evident in the 
title of the essay itself—“The Girl of the Rose Gate and the Ant Tsar.” Similar to the Romantics, 
the Russian Symbolist invariably thinks in terms of oppositions (“high” and “low,” “life” and 
“death,” “transcendent” and “earthly”). Having been disappointed in the unattainable Romantic 
ideal of the “Ewig-Weibliche,” Blok devalues his former source of Life as “dead” and “literary” 
and replaces it with a new one. According to the logic of ironic reversal, it is the earthiness and 
concreteness of a crude simple life as opposed to the loftiness and abstraction of a refined dream 
that become elevated to the status of the ideal (“Life”). Moreover, Blok's counter-ideal of the 
people itself has a Romantic origin. It is also a product of literary subjectivity that the Russian 
Symbolist seeks to transcend. Like the Romantics before him, he admires in the folk life the 
direct, unmediated, relationship between man and the things of the outer world and shares in the 
lament of “the last Romantic” Heine (who couldn't break away from “literature” either) about the
exchange of “the pure gold of observation [typical of the folk] for the paper currency of book 
definitions [characteristic of the learned]” (Pictures of Travel 63). Blok's counter-ideal is, in other
words, the Romantic yearning for the immediacy of life conceived as a restored unity of the 
115 “Сердце простых русских людей — тоже легенда, оно само творит жизнь.”
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subject (consciousness) and the object (nature). Similar to his Romantic antecedents, for Blok, it 
is the burden of the reflective subjectivity of the man of culture that stands in the way of the 
direct relation to things possessed by the people. 
As in the case of the relinquished Romantic ideal of the “Ewig-Weibliche,” Blok 
encounters the insuperable barrier separating the intelligentsia contaminated with “the demon of 
laughter” and the healthy people of Russia. In the essay “The People and the Intelligentsia” 
(“Narod i intelligentsiia,” 1908), he defines this barrier as a growing chasm of mutual 
incomprehension that threatens to engulf the intelligentsia. Characteristically, it is to Nikolai 
Gogol',116 a frustrated Romantic prophet who spent his unhappy life in quest for the elusive 
Romantic Absolute, that Blok turns to in search for the recipe of salvation: 
If the Russian comes to love Russia, then he will come to love everything in Russia. God 
Himself leads us to this love. Without sickness and suffering... no one would have felt 
compassion for it [Russia]. And compassion is already “the beginning of love”... Russia is
our monastery! Clothe yourself mentally into a cassock and having murdered yourself for 
yourself but not for Russia go and work in it.117 (qtd. in Blok, SS v 6-ti tt, 5: 266)
Thus, it is only through self-renouncing love that, according to Gogol', one can mend the 
fragmented state of being into the Whole embodied by reunified Russia. Gogol''s conception of 
sacrificial love that the Russian Symbolist poses as a potential solution to the tragic division 
between the intelligentsia and the people118 is, however, nothing else but the same type of god-
116 Nikolai Gogol''s connection with early German Romanticism and his significance for Russian Symbolism in this 
regard are discussed in detail in chapter 2 of the present dissertation project. 
More on Gogol' and Blok, refer to Andrei Belyi, Masterstvo Gogolia (294-297); I. Kruk, “Blok i Gogol'”; Z. G. 
Mints, “Blok i Gogol'”; I. Zolotusskii, “Gogol' i Blok.”
117 “Если только возлюбит русский Россию, — возлюбит и все, что ни есть в России. К этой любви нас ведет 
сам бог. Без болезней и страданий... не почувствовал бы никто из нас к ней сострадания. А сострадание 
есть уже ''начало любви''... Монастырь наш — Россия! Облеките же себя умственно рясой чернеца и, 
всего себя умертвивши для себя, но не для нее, ступайте подвизаться в ней.” 
118 Blok's multiple attempts to overcome the tragic division between the Russian intelligentsia and the people are 
102
like perfect love that was required of Blok's lyrical persona in order to overcome the rupture 
between the relative and the transcendent. As a result, it comes as no surprise that, similar to the 
previously failed devotee of the Divine Feminine, a member of the Russian intelligentsia afflicted
with “the disease of individualism” (ironic consciousness) proves incapable of such self-
abnegating love and faith: 
In fact, we cannot comprehend the words about compassion as the beginning of love, 
about the way to love lying through god, about Russia being a monastery, for which one 
should ''mortify oneself for oneself.'' [These words are] incomprehensible because we do 
not know love born out of compassion, because the question about god appears, as 
Merezhkovskii wrote, to be ''the most uninteresting question in our days,'' and because in 
order to ''mortify oneself,'' to renounce the dearest and the most personal, one must know 
for what purpose [one must do this sacrifice].119 (266-267) 
In contrast to God who is love, the alienated, self-absorbed “I” of a member of the Russian 
intelligentsia can engender only a demonic replica of perfect love— “vliublennost',” a morbid 
self-infatuation masquerading as love. Self-love entrenched in Romantic individualism creates “a
magic circle” of solipsistic consciousness permeated with irony that a member of the Russian 
intelligentsia, a disguised Romantic, cannot break through. With self-sacrificing love being 
impossible, the ironic suspension of the two opposites, the Russian intelligentsia and the people, 
is bound to culminate in their tragic collision. 
While defying religion, Blok seems to be unable to conceive of the idea of salvation from 
discussed in chapter 3 of the present dissertation project. 
119 “В самом деле, нам непонятны слова о сострадании как начале любви, о том, что к любви ведет бог, о том,
что Россия — монастырь, для которого нужно ''умертвить всего себя для себя.'' Непонятны, потому что 
мы уже не знаем той любви, которая рождается из сострадания, потому что вопрос о боге — кажется, 
''самый нелюбопытный вопрос в наши дни'' как писал Мережковский, и потому что, для того чтобы 
''умертвить себя,'' отречься от самого дорогого и личного, нужно знать во имя чего это сделать.”  
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the ruptures ripped by irony in the fabric of Being other than in religious terms. Again and again, 
Blok comes back to the Christian idea of love—God as perfect love that “casts out fear” and 
unifies the disparate and antagonistic elements through boundless love. The Russian Symbolist 
is, however, unwilling to accept Christ as a mediator between the earthly and divine realms. In 
his Romantic pride, Blok seeks to supplant Christ in his mission of bringing about the 
reconciliation of the relative and the transcendent. Yet, despite his superhuman ambitions, a 
Romantic artist cannot fulfill the conciliating function of Christ, since human love, as Blok 
becomes painfully aware, falls short of the divine, being its degraded copy—demonic self-love. 
But rather than putting faith, like Belyi, in the Second Coming of Christ and accepting delivery 
from nihilistic irony as a gesture of mercy, Blok, in his Romantic defiance, prefers annihilation in
the imminent tragic collision between the Russian intelligentsia and the people that, he hopes, 
would usher in in its wake a new cosmic order relieved of the curse of irony. Thus, the ultimate 
solution to the problem of nihilistic irony envisioned by Blok is the tragic death of the Romantic 
subject. 
IV. Turning Irony into an Ally: 
Andrei Belyi's Battle against Romantic Ironic Perspectivism
Andrei Belyi perceives uncontrolled nihilistic irony of the Blokian type as a threat to his 
Solov'evian enterprise of theurgy. In his later reflection on Blok's Romantic irony, Belyi hints at 
the solution he took in order to bring it under control: “Not suffering from irony or, rather, 
suffering from it much less, I strove to turn this irony into a tendency so that I could at least 
combat the irony of Heine, whom Blok quotes there and then: ''I can't understand where irony 
ends and heaven begins''; I demanded the strictly defined division of the spheres”120 (Nachalo 
120 “Я не страдавший иронией, или страдавший ей менее, эту иронию силился сделать тенденцией, чтобы 
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veka 296). Following in the footsteps of the late Solov'ev, Belyi seeks to delimit irony's sphere of 
destructive action and to subjugate it in the service of the lyrical. By controlling the ironic, he 
attempts to turn irony from a potential enemy that perpetually threatens to subvert the lyrical into 
its most faithful ally. The key to the command of irony lies, according to Belyi, in the knowledge 
of absolute truth, accessible to the one endowed with the Symbolist mode of perception. This is 
the solution that he applies most rigorously in his Symphonies,121 the most ambitious project of 
his theurgical period.    
 In Symphonies, Belyi establishes the base of definitive knowledge in the figure of the 
narrator (almost indistinguishable from the implied author) who, as the sole carrier of truth, can 
authoritatively pronounce conclusions and impose resolutions in all cases of internal ironic 
tensions and ambivalences. But despite these forceful closures, Belyi fails to defeat 
transcendental irony that, as the early German Romantics perceived, devolves and resides in the 
very instability of the medium of human thought and communication—language. His attempt at 
textual control is resisted by the ironic duality of the semiotic sign itself that breeds ambiguities, 
disturbances, and paradoxes. The authoritative truth communicated by the narrator is, as a result, 
never stable, always on the brink of collapsing into its opposite as it is constantly interrogated 
and undermined by the semiotic sign, its very carrier, whose ironic play of meaning this truth was
to arrest in the first place. Thus, the lyrical in Belyi's Symphonies is invariably subverted and 
бороться с хотя бы Гейне, которого тут же цитирует Блок: ''Я не могу понять, где оканчивается ирония и 
начинается небо''; я требовал строго осознанного разделения сфер.” 
121 For а detailed discussion of Bely's Symphonies from other perspectives, see Avramenko A. P. “''Simfonii'' Andreia
Belogo”; Vladimir E. Alexandrov, Andrei Bely. The Major Symbolist Fiction (5-67); Roger Keys, “Bely's 
Symphonies”; Anton Kovač, Andrej Belyj: The Symphonies (1899-1908); Lena Silard, “O vliianii ritmiki prozy F.
Nitsshe na ritmiku prozy A. Belogo. ''Tak govoril Zaratustra'' i Simfonii.” Also, specifically on the Second 
Symphony, see Lena Silard, “O strukture Vtoroi simfonii A. Belogo.” On the Third Symphony, see Oleg A. 
Maslenikov, “Andrej Belyj's Third ''Symphony''”; Z. Mints and E. Mel'nikova, “Simmetriia i asimmetriia v 
kompozitsii ''Tret'ei simfonii” A. Belogo.” And on The Goblet of Blizzards, refer to Olia Tilkes, “Poeziia prozy 
Chetvertoi simfonii A. Belogo.”
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inverted by the ironic as his theurgy is thwarted by the irony of the sign. 
For Belyi, the temporal is a distorted mirror reflection of the eternal. This distortion is a 
product of the workings of human consciousness as theorized by Kant that imposes spatio-
temporal restrictions upon the world of noumena. Kantian consciousness is, in Belyi's 
interpretation, that convex mirror that reflects and simultaneously misrepresents the infinite by 
making it conform to the laws (or, in other words, limitations) of the finite mind. It yields only 
semblances of things, leaving the things-as-they-are-in-themselves (“essences”) out of reach. 
This world of Kantian consciousness limited to the empirical is, according to Belyi, a potential 
breeding ground of irony of the Romantic type. The Kantian subject that ventures in pursuit of 
hidden truth is liable to fall prey to the negativity of uncontrolled irony that would plunge its 
victim in an infinite mental spiral of oscillation between the rival 'truths.' Since the subject cannot
transcend the limits of its cognitive powers, it can never attain complete closure and the 
downward negative spiral can only be interrupted with the subject's death or insanity.
In his attempt to avoid the vexing uncertainties of ironic negativity linked with the 
Kantian conception of subjectivity, Belyi reverts to the Platonic tradition of mystical cognition.122 
According to Belyi's theory of cognition that he explicates in his essay “Criticism and 
Symbolism” (“Krititsizm i simvolizm,” 1904), there is not one but several hierarchically arranged
modes of cognition. In addition to the rational, lower, form of cognition valorized by Kant, there 
is a higher mode, which Belyi calls “cognition of genius” (“genial'noe poznanie”) or “irrational 
or insane cognition” (“bezumnoe poznanie”). This superior mode of knowledge is nothing else 
but an intuitive capacity of the mind (called by Kant “intellectual intuition” and by the Romantics
122 For an in-depth analysis of Symbolism as a form of cognition that defines the relation between the individual, the
material world, and the otherworldly realm in Belyi's works, including his early Symphonies, see Vladimir E. 
Aleksandrov, Andrei Bely. The Major Symbolist Fiction. 
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“aesthetic”) that arises as a result of the organic synthesis of the understanding (rational thought) 
and sensibility (irrational feeling). This power to penetrate beyond the particular, into the world 
of universals is granted only to seers, prophets, and artists. 
In Belyi's view, it is the Symbolist artist who, having united in himself all three roles, can 
perceive the Platonic world of ideas behind the distortions of the worldly and reshape the 
empirical reality in accordance with his vision of the divine order. This reshaping of reality is of 
particular importance, since, for Belyi, Symbolism is not just another literary practice rigidly 
circumscribed by the aesthetic realm but a life-creating method—the theurgy as conceived by 
Solov'ev—capable of transforming the whole of reality. The ultimate purpose of the Symbolist 
artist is, in this light, the transposition of art into the sphere of life activity which would lead to 
the wholesale spiritual and corporeal transfiguration of man and universe. In stark contrast to 
Blok, Belyi does not see art as a self-sufficient entity, divorced from religion and valuable in and 
for itself, but only as a necessary stage of transition and a tool of achieving this transition toward 
the Absolute that he conceives of as the realization of the Solov'evian ideal of Godmanhood: 
“When this future becomes the present, art, having prepared humankind for what must follow, 
will disappear. New art is less of an art. It is an omen, a precursor”123 (Arabeski 227). Art, in 
Belyi's vision, must be elevated into the religion of life-creation. 
Such a mode of perception that claims the privilege of access to the higher realm of ideas 
is, in Belyi's view, beyond the reach of the “absolute infinite negativity” of Romantic irony 
because the intuitive knowledge of truth makes the Symbolist stance irony-proof. The Symbolist 
can control and use transcendental irony as a weapon in his battle against the falsehood of 
123 “Когда это будущее станет настоящим, искусство, приготовив человечество к тому, что за ним, должно 
исчезнуть. Новое искусство менее искусство. Оно — знамение, предтеча.”  
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appearances but irony cannot, on this assumption, assault the Symbolist himself since the 
immediate possession of truth makes him invulnerable to its contradictions and uncertainties. The
distinction between appearance and reality, between illusion and truth is, therefore, well defined 
to the penetrating gaze of the Symbolist narrator, a skillful manipulator, who is effectively pulling
strings behind the simulated chaos of his fictive universe. His superior perceptive powers raise 
him over the ceaseless change of appearances and the perpetual ironic play of mirrors assailing 
the Kantian subject. This immediate knowledge of the underlying eternal archetypes should allow
the narrator, in Belyi's design, not only to position himself above Romantic irony but also to 
appropriate it for his own corrective ends, in the service of the triumph of the lyrical. 
Controlled irony emanating from the perspective of the discriminating observer-narrator 
whose steady gaze differentiates between appearance and reality emerges in full force in the 
Second Symphony (Simfoniia (2-ia, dramaticheskaia), 1902) that shows a handful of Muscovites 
(the Fairytale, the Democrat, the Kantian Philosopher, Dormidont Ivanovich, Popovskii, etc.) 
submerged in the flux of the empirical, with some of them yearning on occasion for the 
otherwordly. Its loosely constructed “plot” that can be extracted from its fragmentary form 
revolves primarily around the figure of Sergei Musatov, a mystic and a would-be-prophet, who is 
preoccupied to the point of obsession with searching for the sacred signs heralding the onset of 
the Apocalypse. In his eagerness to expedite the Second Coming of Christ, he persistently 
misinterprets ordinary people and mundane events in the apocalyptic key. Thus, he “misreads” a 
high society woman, the Fairytale (“Skazka”), for whom he feels a rather earthly attraction, as 
the biblical “Woman Clothed in the Sun” and her daughter wearing boy's clothes as the future 
Savior of mankind. Devastated by his abject failure, Musatov becomes heavily inebriated at a 
restaurant and later finds himself in a room conversing with two strange beings, apparently 
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devils, who seek to further confuse him. In search of spiritual enlightenment, Musatov turns to 
Father Ioann who consoles him and sends him to his brother's estate for recuperation. The 
Symphony ends with a silent encounter at a cemetery between a young nun and the Fairytale who 
has experienced some sort of revelation. 
The problem of sight and subjective perception is already introduced in the opening 
fragment of the Second Symphony which depicts the chaotic, meaningless and ceaseless motion 
of the phenomenal world generated by the restless city-dwellers: “Everyone was running, not 
knowing where and why, afraid of facing the truth [literally: looking the truth in the eyes]”124 
(Kubok metelei 86). This perpetual motion appears to be produced by the people of Moscow 
exclusively out of a desire to escape from “truth,” whose existence the narrator immediately and 
forcefully posits.“Тruth” is equipped with “eyes,” it can “see” through the pretenses of the 
relative and it is the encounter with its devaluing gaze that the passers-by attempt to avoid at all 
costs. Caught up in the ever-accelerating swirl of the quotidian, the Muscovites refuse to “see” 
beyond the mundane, being afflicted with self-willed mental blindness. The characters' capacity 
or incapacity to “see” and to be able or unable to distinguish between the true and the illusory 
defines the varying degree of narratorial irony in relation to them.  
There are two conflicting models of perception at work in the Second Symphony: the 
privileged (Platonic-Symbolist) belonging to the narrator and a few privileged characters and the 
epistemologically limited (Kantian) belonging to the majority of the characters populating its 
fictional world. The juxtaposition of these two perspectives, the privileged (at times bordering on
omniscient) and the circumscribed, produces a striking ironic effect. These perspectives are 
hierarchically ordered. It is the narratorial stance which is invested with validity and against 
124 “Всякий бежал неизвестно куда и зачем, боясь смотреть в глаза правде.”  
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which all the other perspectives are measured and, if found wanting, are ironized or openly 
satirized. The spectrum of the narrator's attitude towards his characters ranges from the lyrical to 
the various shades of ironic to the ironic bordering on satirical. Such characters as Father Ioann 
and the Young Nun, who are endowed with superior sensibilities like the narrator, are 
accompanied by lyrical leitmotifs throughout the symphony and are not vulnerable to irony. They
are unequivocally aligned with the positive pole of the symphony—truth (the Absolute). The 
characters that are devoid of the privileged perceptions differ in their sensitivity to the presence 
of the eternal and the narrator's irony varies reflecting the extent of the character's deviation from
the pole of truth.                                                                                                                                 
Most of Belyi's characters in the Second Symphony are captives languishing in the prisons
of their Kantian minds, and their partial or total blindness to the otherworldly turns them into 
targets of the narrator's irony. This entrapment within the spatio-temporal limits of Kantian 
consciousness is externalized by Belyi as a confinement of characters within the claustrophobic 
space of their rooms that further extends into the space of the city, which is no less 
constricted(ing) than that of a room. As an enclosed space, limiting and limited, a room (as well 
as, by extension, the urban space as a whole) grows into a potent symbol of the human mind that,
by reducing the world to a condition of knowability, precludes access to the noumenal. Walled in 
within their (mental) rooms, the characters' only opening onto the outside world lies through a 
window (“eyes”): “The poet was writing a poem about love, but he had trouble selecting the 
rhymes, but he made a blot, but, turning his eyes toward the sky, he got frightened by the celestial
boredom”125 (86). The disconcerting encounter with Eternity invariably happens when a character
125 “Поэт писал стихотворение о любви, но затруднялся в выборе рифм, но посадил чернильную кляксу, но, 
обратив очи к окну, испугался небесной скуки.”  
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happens to be looking out a window: “One was sitting at the table, with his elbows leaning on it. 
He raised his eyes to the window. Saw. Broke off all threads of the conversation. Caught the 
smile of the celestial boredom”126 (86). However, like eyes (a mind's “window” onto the world), 
windows while providing Belyi's characters with a glimpse of the beyond, also frame this 
glimpse by severely limiting the opening into the vast expanse of the unknown. Similar to the 
eyes which simultaneously mark a meeting and dividing point between the subject and the object,
windows in Belyi's world serve as an insuperable boundary between the two realms as much as 
an opening onto the otherworldly. Belyi's characters (the “Fairytale,” the dreamy Democrat, the 
deranged Kantian Philosopher, etc.) who are endowed with a vague presentiment of the infinite 
are often depicted stationed by windows, looking into the sky, in their yearning to escape from 
the ordinary and familiar into the mysterious beyond. 
While being victims of the epistemologically limited perspective, Belyi's characters 
significantly differ from each other in their capacity as well as willingness to “see” beyond the 
confines of the world of finitude. A greater degree of vision, which could be manifested as a 
vague feeling of dissatisfaction with one's stifling surroundings, makes a character closer to the 
narrator's privileged mode of perception. Such characters as the light-minded “Fairytale,” the 
dreamy Democrat, and the deranged Kantian philosopher, though butts of the narrator's good-
natured irony, are nevertheless graced with a longing for the infinite and therefore at least with 
some degree of awareness of the existence of something higher beyond the contingent. The 
leitmotif of “it is not that, not that at all,”127 expressive of the character's inner discontent and 
restlessness, accompanies them throughout the symphony (for example, the insane philosopher 
126 “Один сидел, облокотившись на стол. Он поднял глаза к окну. Увидел. Оборвал все нити разговора. 
Поймал улыбку вечной скуки.”  
127 “Не то, совсем не то.” 
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100; the democrat 102, 109; the Fairytale 109). They are still devoid of true vision, but their 
awakened yearning (either through love as in the case of the Democrat and Fairytale or through 
the failed search for truth as in the case of the Kantian philosopher) sets them apart from the 
sightless crowd. 
 Moreover, some of these half-awakened characters have a potential of developing a 
higher level of perception and joining the ranks of the positive (lyrical) characters who can see 
aright. The Fairytale is an example of such a successful conversion from the Kantian mode of 
sensibility to the Platonic-Symbolist. Through her unfulfilled love for the Democrat (or rather 
through his for her), the Fairytale comes to the realization of the emptiness of her earthly 
existence: 
“I am bored... This life does not satisfy me...
I smile like a doll but the soul yearns for something that does not exist but could have 
happened but didn't”128 (195).
 Аnd in accordance with her transformation the key in which she is presented (dutifully) 
shifts from the ironic to the lyrical:
And again, and again a young beauty in a spring dress was walking among the graves...
This was the Fairytale...
And again, and again, they, she and a nun, looked at each other and smiled as if they knew
each other. 
They conveyed to each other without words that all is not lost, that there is still a lot of 
sacred joy left to the people...
128 “ Мне скучно... Эта жизнь меня не удовлетворяет...
Я улыбаюсь, как кукла, а душа просит того, чего нет, но что могло бы быть, да не вышло.” 
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That the dear, impossible, sad-pensive is approaching, that it is coming...
And, as if enchanted, the Fairytale was standing among the graves, listening to the rustle 
of the metal wreaths, swayed by the wind.    
The future revealed itself to her, and she was beaming with joy...
She knew.129 (199)
The other character who undergoes an evolution, though an incomplete one, is the 
Kantian philosopher. The philosopher who is preoccupied with synthesizing the philosophies of 
Plato and Kant and finding the loopholes in the unassailable Kantian theory of cognition finally 
loses his mind from this mental exertion. In other words, he finds himself progressing from the 
rational to the irrational mode of cognition, since insanity, for Belyi, is superior to rationality as it
gives access to truth(s) that lie beyond the reach of the rational mind of a Kantian. That insanity 
is the mental capacity allowing one to “see” aright (or at the very least beyond the contingent) 
becomes evident in cases of all madmen confined to a mental asylum by the well-meaning, 
rational, public:
It was only yesterday that he [the physician at the city hospital] sent one consumptive to a
lunatic asylum because that consumptive revealed the abyss to all in the hospital.  
The lunatic was whispering quietly: “I know you, Eternity!”
Having heard what had been concealed hitherto, everyone got terrified, the hunchbacked 
129 “И опять, и опять между могил ходила молодая красавица в весеннем туалете...
Это была сказка...
И опять, и опять они глядели друг на друга, она и монашка, улыбались, как знакомые друг другу.
Без слов передавали друг другу, что еще не все потеряно, что еще много святых радостей осталось для 
людей...
Что приближается, что идет, милое, невозможное, грустно-задумчивое...
И сказка, как очарованная, стояла среди могил, слушая шелест металлических венков, колыхаемых 
ветром.
Перед ней раскрылось грядущее, и загоралась она радостью...
Она знала.” 
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physician was called, and the bold spirit was dispatched to the place where one shouldn't 
be.130 (88) 
The Kantian philosopher whose rationality gets shattered by his attempts to break through the 
boundaries of empirical consciousness is also confined to a mental asylum. However, he fails to 
reach eternal truth, for his entrenched rationality apparently prevents him from fully succumbing 
to clairvoyant insanity and acquiring a higher vision. He emerges out of the mental asylum 
unenlightened and, having renounced Kant, turns to (pseudo)mysticism in his search for truth:
There was another acquaintance here, frozen in an affected pose; he listened a lot but  
spoke little.  
Radiating happiness and rubbing his hands, the host was walking among his guests, and 
the mystics were gathering around him and asking: “Who is sitting in that affected pose?”
And the host answered this question, with his hand covering his mouth: “This is a former 
disciple of Kant who got disappointed with his ideals... A seeker of truth, who was 
confined in a lunatic asylum but who couldn't find it [the truth] even there...
He has been discharged lately, and he came here to get familiarized with our views. Let's 
try to catch him in our nets...131 (176)
The mystics were throwing glances at the seeker of truth, and he at them.
130 “Еще вчера он [врач городской больницы] отправил в сумасшедший дом одного чахоточного, который в 
больнице внезапно открыл перед всеми бездну.
Сумасшедший тихо шептал при этом: ''Я знаю тебя, Вечность!''
Все ужаснулись, услышав о скрываемом, призвали горбатого врача и отправили смельчака куда не 
следовало.”   
131 “Был тут и другой знакомый, застывший в деланной позе; он много слушал, мало говорил.
Сиявший хозяин ходил между гостями, потирая белые руки, а его окружали мистики кольцом вопрошая: 
''Кто сидит в той деланной позе?''
На что тихо отвечал хозяин, приложив руку к устам: ''Это бывший кантианец, разочарованный в своих 
идеалах... Искатель истины, побывавший в желтом доме, но и там ее не нашедший...
Недавно его отпустили на свободу, и он пришел познакомиться с нашими взглядами. Будемте уловлять 
его в наши сети...''
Мистики посматривали на искателя истины, а он на них.”
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Whether the Kantian philosopher turned or about to turn (pseudo)mystic will ever be able to 
attain truth is unclear because he completely disappears from view after this episode. That he is 
currently on the wrong path and has not lost his mental blindness is apparent from narratorial 
irony towards him that remains unabated. What matters, however, for Belyi, is that the 
philosopher is aware of the existence of truth and continues searching for it, even though his 
quest is misguided. 
Some of the characters, however, are permanently afflicted with mental blindness that 
prevents them from catching even a fleeting glimpse of the infinite. Dormidont Ivanovich is a 
representative example of the long row of secondary characters (the hunchback doctor, ...) mired 
in the quotidian and totally destitute of the higher vision and aspirations. His innate inability to 
“see,” his entrapment within the empirical and illusory, is stressed by Belyi by means of the fact 
that even when Dormidont Ivanovich happens to look out his window (which usually signifies a 
moment of the encounter with the eternal for other characters), his gaze is not directed at the sky, 
an ambivalent symbol of Nothingness and Fullness in the symphony, but is riveted to the window
of a neighboring apartment. The vertical dimension of being is closed for Dormidont, whose 
existence is exclusively confined to the horizontal plane of the profane:  
Having come back home from work, the fat Dormidont Ivanovich was looking out the 
window from the opposite side into his [the philosopher's] window. 
Dormidont Ivanovich was drinking tea from a saucer and was thinking, while looking into
his window: “I wonder how high the rent is for this apartment.”132 (101) 
It is not for Dormidont, however, that the narrator reserves his most caustic irony. While 
132 “С противоположной стороны к нему в окно из окна смотрел толстый Дормидонт Иванович, 
возвратившись со службы.
Дормидонт Иванович пил чай с блюдечка и, глядя к нему в окно, думал: ''Интересно бы знать, сколько 
платят за эту квартиру.''”  
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being totally blind, Dormidont is also, in Belyi's judgment, totally harmless. The Russian 
Symbolist directs the spearhead of his irony against the distortions of misguided fellow-mystics 
like Sergei Musatov, whose misreading of the eternal presents a more powerful threat to the 
Symbolist enterprise than the obtuseness of Dormidonts. Musatov's want of genuine visionary 
power is encoded by the author in his physical short-sightedness: “Cold clouded the glasses of 
his pince-nez; and he began to wipe them, looking around with his shortsighted black eyes”133; 
“He was looking around himself and at the fields with his shortsighted black eyes”134 (148). The 
prophet who claims to “see” far into the future of humankind, ironically, fails to see literally 
under his very nose. Musatov's lack of (in)sight reveals itself in his relationships with women 
(including the Eternal Feminine itself). In his love for Eternity, the mystic is completely 
insensitive to his niece Varia's devotional love for him. More ironically, however, Musatov fails 
to discern that his love for Eternity is nothing but a (half?) sublimated erotic passion for the 
earthly woman, the Fairytale. In his eagerness to identify the Fairytale with the impatiently 
awaited biblical “woman clothed with the sun,” the unfortunate mystic mistakes her daughter 
dressed like a boy for the male world Savior. Through the ironic play on Musatov's short-
sightedness, the narrator exposes and mocks the pretensions of the false prophet.
The Third Symphony, or The Return (Vozvrat, 1905), is also preoccupied with the ironic 
duality of vision that, in Belyi's mind, needs to be tightly controlled through the univocal 
authority of the narrative voice. The Symphony consists of three parts that have a clearly outlined 
plot. The first part depicts a transcendent realm located on the outskirts of the sealed-off garden 
of Eden and inhabited by odd sorts of creatures. In that domain lives an innocent child protected 
133 “Холодок затуманил стекла его пенсне; и вот он снял протирать его, поглядывая по сторонам черными, 
подслеповатыми очами....”   
134 “Вот он поглядывал вокруг себя и на нивы подслеповатыми, черными очами....” 
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by the Old Man, a powerful wizard, who can also assume other forms (such as that of an eagle 
[orel]). Evil in the shape of a huge snake penetrates into the realm and brings anxiety and 
nightmares to the child in its wake. The Old Man takes this disturbance of peace as a bad omen. 
Unable to break what appears to be the curse of “eternal return,” the wizard leads the child to the 
snake's associate, wolfish looking Tzar-Wind, who tells him a strange tale about a certain 
Khandrikov. The disconcerted child at first refuses to believe the Tzar-Wind, but when later he 
falls asleep, he wakes up as that same Khandrikov in the second part. 
Thus, the second part takes the reader to the empirical sphere in which the child drags out 
his existence as Evgenii Khandrikov, a poor university lab assistant with a master's degree, who 
is married to Sof'ia Chizhikovna and has a small child. At the university Khandrikov is being 
constantly persecuted by the Assistant Professor, Tsenkh, who appears to be none else but an 
earthly incarnation of the Tsar-Wind. Khandrikov's wife, Sof'ia, suddenly falls gravely ill and is 
being treated by doctor Orlov (derived from “orel” [eagle]), a quotidian version of the Old Man. 
Orlov does not succeed in curing Khandrikov's wife and she dies shortly. A year after his wife's 
death Khandrikov, still badly shaken, defends his dissertation. At the dinner in his honor he 
challenges Tsenkh, who subsequently sends a message about Khandrikov's rebellion to 
Drakonov, a character apparently representing the otherworldly snake. Khandrikov who starts 
“seeing” things and people more and more in their transcendent “essences” is shown as gradually
losing his mind in the empirical sphere. He is sent by doctor Orlov to the sanatorium, ostensibly 
for treatment but, if viewed from the otherwordly standpoint, for protection. 
The third part shows the mentally deranged Khandrikov at the sanatorium. At one point 
Orlov has to leave, thereby depriving Khandrikov of his supervision and protection. Evil forces 
seek to take advantage of this opportunity and the snake taking the form of a train rushes to the 
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sanatorium to capture the rebellious child. Tsenkh also tries to make his way into the sanatorium 
hiding behind an excuse of visiting a mentally ill colleague. Khandrikov in the meantime is more 
and more haunted by visions from the beyond. He has also taken to riding on a boat on the 
nearby lake and on one such ride he decides to “turn over” (“oprokinut'sia”), thereby 
transcending the border between heaven and its reflection in the water. The Symphony ends with 
a scene that reveals to the reader the child's successful return to his transcendent home and his 
reunion with the Old Man.   
To facilitate this incessant interplay between the two realms, the transcendent and the 
empirical, Belyi employs a form of Romantic irony but seeks to hold it under firm control 
through the authority of the knowing narrator by disciplining it into narratorial irony. By means 
of irony stemming solely from the narrating voice, Belyi seeks to establish a well-ordered 
ontological reality, in which good can be easily differentiated from evil. Thus, in the Third 
Symphony narratorial irony, which is, as in the Second, rooted in the dichotomy between 
appearance and reality, makes its way into the text together with the intrusion of evil, an 
embodiment of the empirical and the relative, in the transcendental realm. The narrator's irony is 
aimed at the demonic characters (the Tzar-Wind, the Snake) that strive to perpetuate the vicious 
circle of the child's (Khandrikov's) eternal return. It is employed to expose and simultaneously to 
diminish the agents of evil. By ironically lowering the emissaries of the evil spirit, Belyi attempts
to make evil as an ontological entity less terrifying and even outright ridiculous.  
The diminished, ironic image of the demonic is usually created as a result of the stark 
juxtaposition of the lowly, mundane (associated with evil) and the lofty, spiritual (associated with
good). Against the backdrop of the transcendent realm, the Tzar-Wind, with his earthly attributes 
of long ears, crooked legs, and long felt (fool's?) cap, looks absurd and out of place:
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Someone in a long felt cap was running above the cave, tossing his brown rags and perky 
beard, stretched his hairy arms into the blue distance of the lagoon. 
In one hand he was holding a large yellow shell and at one moment he would put his 
blood-red lips to the opening in the shell, forcing sounds and knitting his brow, at another 
he would press it close to his ear in order to listen, and yet at another he would make ugly 
jumps with his crooked legs. 
He was celebrating the storm with grimaces. Wolf-like blood thirst tinged his sallow face 
from time to time.  
This was the Tsar-Wind, suffering from mental illness.135 (214)  
Thus, evil is connected with the lowest manifestations of the material: the corporeal and the 
beastly. Belyi accentuates the physical deformities (long ears, crooked legs) and animality of the 
Tzar-Wind (his wolfish nature and a stormy petrel's cry). His remoteness from the realm of spirit 
is also underscored by his madness (in a bad way). The image is further lowered through the 
repelling physiological processes and bodily needs exhibited by the fiendish character in the 
realm of spirit: his continual sneezing and his addiction to strong snuff. Belyi also spends a great 
deal of time and space describing the vulgarity and undue familiarity of the Tzar-Wind's conduct 
who brings in with himself the uncouth habits from the material into the transcendent (“he 
walked into the grotto with a jaunty step”; “he crossed his legs, making a rotational movement 
with the toe of his right foot”; “he was fiercely sucking his pipe”; etc.136). Evil, therefore, is not a 
135 “Кто-то бегал над гротом в длинном, войлочном колпаке, потрясал коричневым рваньем и задорной 
бородкой, протягивал в синеющую даль залива свои мохнатые руки.
В одной руке он держал большую желтую раковину и то прикладывал к отверстию раковины свои 
кровавые уста, выводя звуки и морща лоб, то прижимал ее к длинному уху, чтобы слушать, то выделывал 
кривыми ногами поганые скачки.
Он с ужимками славил бурю. Волчья кровожадность от времени до времени заливала его землистое лицо.
Это был Царь-Ветер — душевно-больной.”  
136 “развязно вошел в грот”; “положил ногу на ногу, производя носком правой ноги вращательное движение”;
“свирепо затянулся.”
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terrifying monster but, as viewed through the lens of irony, an epitome of the lowly corporeal, the
beastly, and the coarse. 
With the (re)emergence of evil, irony progressively gains in strength toward the closure of
the first part (the transcendent realm). Еvil, representing the material, produces a schism in the 
realm of the spiritual. It no longer has the appearance of unequivocal loftiness and seriousness 
but is permeated with ironic duality. A tense ambivalence prevails in the closing section that 
precedes the child's awakening as Khandrikov in the empirical world of the second part. Irony 
encroaches on the transcendent realm itself as its inhabitants begin to display the signs of corrupt 
corporeality, at least, as seen through the eyes of the child, whose return to the world of 
appearances is already decided. He sees “the sea citizen” exhibiting all the evil features of the 
grotesque body: “bald” (“lysyi”), “with green beard” (“zelenoborodyi”), “snub-nosed” 
(“kurnosyi”), “a fiery face” (“plamennoe litso”), “bloated stomach” (“vzdutyi zhivot”), “fat-
bellied” (“tolstopuzyi”). The “sea citizen” who is reminiscent of a seal is teaching his no less 
grotesque sons how to swim. That the child acquires second sight and can detect the presence of 
the material (the body) in the transcendent marks the beginning of his descent into the relative.   
Narratorial irony reaches its peak in the second part of the symphony that portrays the 
evil world of temporality. This is the most explicitly ironic part in the whole symphony. Irony is 
generated as a result of the dichotomy between appearance and reality as embodied in the 
empirical masks donned by the characters (the child, the old man, the Tzar-Wind, the snake, the 
crab, the starfish, etc.) and their true transcendent essences. The child who is reincarnated in the 
material realm as Khandrikov turns into the target of  irony as well, for having acquired an 
embodied form, he becomes a part of the degraded empirical world. The narrator pokes fun at the
material side of Khandrikov's life: his diminutive physical appearance, his daily routine full of 
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triviality, his bird-like wife and his child with a flabby, aged face. As in the case with the agents 
of evil in the transcendent sphere, it is the corporeality and animality of the child's earthly life 
that comes under the narrator's ironic assault. 
Controlled narratorial irony against the monstrosities of the physical significantly 
subsides toward the close of the second part and is only sporadically used in the third part (for 
example, Khandrikov's vision of centaurs-academicians). It entirely dissolves by the end of the 
symphony that takes the reader back to the realm of the spirit (unadulterated lyricism), 
supposedly liberated from the presence of evil (ironic duality) after Khandrikov's suicide. 
Belyi also seeks to concentrate Romantic irony on a single narratorial axis in his fourth 
and last symphony, The Goblet of Blizzards (Kubok metelei, 1908). A firm control of 
transcendental irony in this symphony is of primary importance as it attempts to theurgically 
enact the Solov'evian mystery of transfigurative sacred love. The symphony traces the 
vicissitudes of erotic romance between Adam Petrovich, a close associate of the Petersburg 
Symbolist circle (Blok, Ivanov, Chulkov, etc.), and Svetlova, a socialite unhappily married to an 
old engineer. Adam Petrovich who at first falls in love with Svetlova by seeing in her an earthly 
embodiment of the Eternal Feminine succumbs to passion during his and Svetlova's first intimate 
encounter. Svetlova who initiated the tryst is, nevertheless, the first to come to her senses; she  
repudiates Adam Petrovich's sexual advances and forbids him to see her. Pursued by colonel 
Svetozarov and imposed upon by her husband, Svetlova decides to escape the demands of 
impure, sexual love altogether by devoting herself to God. She takes the veil and later becomes a 
prioress of the convent. In the meantime Adam Petrovich is challenged by Svetlova's husband to 
a duel, receives a severe head injury and apparently loses his sanity as a result of the brain 
inflammation. The prioress visits Adam Petrovich known now as “the Stranger,” and they 
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become reunited in a purer, more spiritual type of love. At the time of the reunion, however, a 
bishop arrives at the convent to dislodge the prioress for her highly suspect “sectarian” 
tendencies. After waging a successful battle against the intruder, Svetlova and Adam Petrovich 
escape into the blizzard. A church elder declares that the two lovers did not commit suicide, as it 
might appear, but instead ascended to Heaven to partake of eternal life. At the closure of the 
symphony, the images of Adam Petrovich and Svetlova as Christ and Sophia miraculously 
emerge on the royal doors of the church iconostasis. 
As in the prior two symphonies, in The Goblet of Blizzards Belyi resorts to controlled 
narratorial irony (that at times verges on satire) in order to separate demonic semblance from 
truth. Irony is called upon to counter what Belyi perceives as the demonic strain within the 
Symbolist movement itself. In the first part of the symphony, Belyi attacks his fellow Symbolists 
from St. Petersburg (Ivanov, Chulkov, and Blok, in particular) who were led astray by the 
pseudo-theory of mystical anarchism.137 This debunking irony targets not so much the erroneous 
theory itself as the demonic personalities of its advocates. Belyi taunts Georgii Chulkov, the 
much castigated originator of mystical anarchism, as a plagiarist and intellectual nonentity 
calling him “Nulkov” (from Russian “nul'”—zero, nullity): 
Nulkov sprung out [from somewhere]. Put his ear to the keyhole, listening to the mystic-
anarchist's prophecy.
[He] Jotted down [the mystic's prophecy] quickly into his notebook, he was gripped by 
terror and his hair, standing on  end, was moving: “I will write a newspaper article about 
137 Mystical anarchism is a highly eclectic and derivative teaching of no lasting philosophical importance developed 
by Georgii Chulkov, a minor Symbolist writer and theoretician. Despite its glaring lack of substance, it was the 
cause of the dramatic split within the Symbolist movement, leading to a lengthy and at times extremely bitter 
feud between the Petersburg (Blok, Ivanov, Chulkov, etc.) and Moscow (Briusov, Belyi, Ellis, etc.) circles. 
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it!”138 (278-279)    
There is a palpable aura of demonism surrounding the otherwise pitiful figure of Nulkov. Belyi 
associates him with a “goat,” a demonic animal: Nulkov as “a goat-breeder” (“kozlovod”). He 
has a “sly mustache” (“lukavyi us”). In Russian “lukavyi” (cunning, sly) is an attribute attached 
to the devil. When used as a noun, it unequivocally means “the evil one.” Being literally a 
nobody, Nulkov is demonic as through his hastily concocted “mystical soup” he, in Belyi's 
opinion, poses a threat to the true Symbolist task. He drags Symbolism into the demonic 
emptiness, non-being into which he is falling himself:
The goat-breeder George Nulkov was spinning mystical yarn in the drawing-rooms.
He was laughing to himself [literally: into his sly moustache]: ''Who can speak with more 
intoxication than me? Who else can collect all the daring ideas like honey into a jar and 
concoct a mystical soup out of them?''
The blizzard played a trick on him: ''Of course, no one!''
Took him into its arms and threw him up—and threw him up into emptiness.139 (280)
Viacheslav Ivanov, “a mystical anarchist,” is exposed and ridiculed by Belyi as a false 
Christ. He has all the external attributes associated with Christ: “purple lips” (“purpur ust”), 
“blue eyes” (“lazur' ochei”), and “golden hair” (“zoloto volos”) reminiscent of the sublime image
of Christ in Correggio's paintings but this (pseudo-)Christ is ridden with duality which is 
externalized by his “forked beard” (“razdvoennaia borodka”). He is also a changeling as his eyes 
138 “Выскочил Нулков. Приложился ухом к замочной скважине, слушал пророчество мистика-анархиста.
Наскоро записывал в карманную книжечку, охваченный ужасом, и волоса его, вставшие дыбом, 
волновались: ''Об этом теперь напишу фельетон я!''”  
139 “Козловод Жеоржий Нулков крутил в гостиных мистические крутни.
Смеялся в лукавый ус: ''Кто может сказать упоеннее меня? Кто может, как мед, снять в баночку все 
дерзновения и сварить из них мистический суп?''
Над ним подшутила метель: ''Ну, конечно, никто!''
Схватила в охапку: схватила и подбросила — и подбросила в пустоту.” 
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constantly alter their color from the heavenly blue to the cat-like green: “His eyes were burning 
green like a chrysolite.”140 This is an experienced seducer of men's souls who, while hiding 
behind the Christ-like facade, worms himself into other people's confidence: “The more tenderly 
he was fondling his guests, the more persistently and searchingly his eyes, blue, with a greenish 
tinge, were fixed [on them]”141  (277); “From the ceaseless search for the secret, his eyes from 
under the flaxen hair... make one fall in love [with him] softly, cunningly, and insistently”142 
(278). Using his exposing irony, Belyi throws the mask of godliness off Ivanov's cat-like, 
demonic nature.  
Blok, against whom the whole symphony is implicitly directed, is also overtly satirized 
by Belyi in the first part. Belyi mocks Blok's pseudo-martyrdom. Like Ivanov, Blok is a false 
Christ and, similar to Chulkov(-Nulkov), Blok has also something goat-like, demonic about him. 
For example, he skips onto the sacrificial bonfire like a goat: 
The great Blok came out and proposed to make a snow bonfire out of the icicles.
The great Blok leaped and leaped onto the bonfire: he was astonished that he was not 
burning. He went back home and modestly told everyone: “I was burning on the snow 
bonfire.”
The following day, Voloshin was paying visits all over the city, celebrating “the miracle of
St. Blok.”143 (282)
The ironic impact is further intensified through the stark juxtaposition of pseudo-Christs 
140 “Глаза зеленью горели, как хризолит.” 
141 “Чем нежнее ластился он к гостям, тем настойчивей, пытливей впивались глаза его, синие, с зеленоватым 
отливом.”  
142 “От непрестанных исканий тайны глаза из-под льняных волос … влюбляли мягко, ловко, настойчиво.”  
143 “Вышел великий Блок и предложил сложить из ледяных сосулек снежный костер.
Скок да скок на костер великий Блок: удивился, что не сгорает. Вернулся домой и скромно рассказывал: 
''Я сгорал на снежном костре.''
На другой день всех объездил Волошин, воспевая ''чудо св. Блока.''”
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engaged in profanation of mysteries with the sufferings and death of the crucified Christ himself. 
The ironic observations about the demonic impostors and the thoughts and presentiments of the 
biblical Christ are alternated and given to the reader as the perceptions of Adam Petrovich, the 
protagonist of the symphony, whose perceptions are not infrequently identical with those of the 
implied author. Through this sharp contrast between sacrilege and the greatest of mysteries 
(Christ's death and resurrection), irony and intense lyricism, Belyi seeks to emphasize that his 
fellow Symbolists are apostates who have betrayed Christ and their original mission. The 
resurrection of Christ and in Christ is tied by Belyi to the fulfillment of sacred love which is to 
develop between Svetlova and Adam Petrovich in the rest of the symphony.   
The use of narratorial irony is limited to the first part of The Goblet of Blizzards only. It is
never employed in the remaining three parts, which are purely lyrical, even to unmask the 
demonic characters as in the earlier symphonies. The message seems to be that it is in the ranks 
of the Symbolists themselves that the evil one has found his agents and most faithful associates. 
It is the Symbolists' home-bred demonism (variously manifesting itself as mystical anarchism, 
nihilism, and irony) that jeopardizes their Solov'evian mission: the transformation of humanity 
into Godmanhood. Belyi sees apostasy in the hearts and actions of those who were supposed to 
be in the avant-garde of the movement toward salvation. It is the demonic streak inside the 
school of Symbolism itself that Belyi seeks to expose by means of his controlled irony in the first
part of his last symphony. 
Belyi's controlled irony, grounded in the narratorial voice as “a unitary source of 
cognitive authority” (Keys, “Bely's Symphonies” 43) is aimed as an antidote to Romantic irony 
perceived by the Russian Symbolist as a demonic invention. Like Hegel and Kierkegaard before 
him, Belyi is deeply resentful of the nihilistic implications of uncontrolled Romantic irony that 
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he sees resurfacing in Blok's work: “It is among the [early] Romantics that we encounter a strong
inclination to laugh at their own images; and he who sought to penetrate into the essence of 
Romantic irony, cannot help but detect in it cynical mockery rather than divine inspiring 
lightness”144 (Simvolizm 550). Through its shifting perspectivism, Romantic irony throws doubt 
upon the attainability and objectivity of truth, threatening to overturn Belyi's carefully 
constructed system of values and to suck him into the whirlpool of uncertainty. To counter the 
disorienting effects of ironic relativity, the Russian Symbolist attempts to arrest ironic 
perspectivism and dissolve it into the univocality of meaning.
In his last three Symphonies, Belyi compulsively reproduces one and the same scenario: 
he stages the perspective multiplicity characteristic of the Romantic ironist's perception of the 
world by bringing together the two mutually exclusive truths (the eternal return of the relative 
and the triumph of the transcendent). Yet instead of leaving the two in their perpetual tension in 
the Romantic ironist's fashion, he imposes definitive closure through the knowing narrator's 
direct interference. By recreating this perspectivism, Belyi seeks to show that this multiplicity of 
truths innate to Romantic ironic vision is only an illusory veil cast by demonic forces over the 
eyes of humanity. Despite the seeming arbitrariness and proliferating perspectivism, the divine 
will, for Belyi, is indefatigably working in the world of empirical finitude toward the realization 
of one truth, of which the narrator is always a harbinger. It is faith (lyricism) rather than the 
corrosive doubt (irony) that, according to the Russian Symbolist, should reign supreme in the 
final accords of his Symphonies. This compulsive repetition, however, betrays Belyi's growing 
anxiety about his inability to restrain the play of meaning that resists narratorial control and 
144 “Именно у романтиков мы встречаемся с сильной склонностью расхохотаться над собственными 
образами; а кто вникал в смысл романтической иронии, тот не может не слышать в ней циническую 
насмешку, а вовсе не божественную, всеокрыляющую легкость.”
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surreptitiously subverts the lyrical, even to the point of turning it into its opposite, as can be seen,
for example, in The Goblet of Blizzards. Thus, instead of bringing Romantic irony under control, 
Belyi, ironically, finds himself its very victim, for the knowing narrator, despite his privileged 
Symbolist perceptions, cannot transcend the limitations of his medium of communication—
language, revealed by the early Romantics as the original source of transcendental irony. Belyi's 
theurgic enterprise runs up against the linguistic predicament.
Belyi, who views Romantic irony as a danger to the Symbolist enterprise, sets out to 
defeat its shifting perspectivism, believing he can control textual meaning and ensure the triumph
of the lyrical through the authority of the knowing fictive narrator. Thus, in the Second 
Symphony, he attempts to expose the dangers of Romantic irony that brings in relativity by using 
the example of the sorry prophet Musatov who finds himself a victim of its negative dialectics. 
Like his literary prototype Ivan Karamazov, Musatov is faced with the epistemological 
predicament he is unable to resolve by himself to his satisfaction. He is simultaneously 
confronted with and suspended between the two conflicting visions of the Universe: a Universe 
at the mercy of contingency that Belyi associates with Nietzsche's eternal return by reinterpreting
it in the negative key, and a Universe in harmony with the Divine plan that the Russian Symbolist
links with Solov'ev's eschatological vision. That the self-proclaimed prophet of the Apocalypse is
in the grip of ironic doubt is already evident during his brief stay at his brother's estate. Musatov 
is assailed by the 'revelations' made by Eternity about the true nature of the Universe:
The Eternity was whispering to her favorite: “Everything returns... Everything returns... 
The same... The same... in all dimensions...
If you go to the west, you will come to the east... All essence is in appearance. The reality 
is in dreams.
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A great wise man... A great fool... All the same.”
And the trees joined in this secret dream: it is coming back again... And a new gust of the 
flying-by times was going back to the past...
This was the way the Eternity was joking with her favorite, embraced him with her dark 
contours, placed her pale otherworldly face on his heart. 
She closed the ascetic's eyes with her slim fingers, and he wasn't Musatov, but just 
something....145 (Kubok metelei 157-158) 
Paradoxically, Eternity discloses to her beloved, the devoted Solov'evian, that there is no 
transcendence and the Universe is the eternal recurrence of appearances. The narrator makes it 
clear (at least to the perceptive reader), however, that these so-called revelations are nothing but 
delusions by means of the gesture that betrays Eternity's duplicity and malevolent intentions: she 
blindfolds Musatov by wrapping her fingers around his eyes. Rather than opening his eyes so that
he could see, Eternity (or, rather, its demonic counterpart) closes them in an attempt to obscure 
truth by providing a competing scenario of the workings of the Universe.
While taunting Musatov's painful ironic condition, Belyi, nevertheless, seeks to diminish 
the mystic's personal responsibility for being a victim of metaphysical irony. Musatov's doubt 
appears to be a product of the play of malevolent forces that make every effort to subvert the 
grand Symbolist project of the reunification of Earth and Heaven. The sinister role of these 
demonic forces in instilling doubt becomes evident in the episode of Musatov's (supposed) 
145 “Вечность шептала своему баловнику: ''Все возвращается... Все возвращается... Одно... одно... во всех 
измерениях...
Пойдешь на запад, а придешь на восток... Вся сущность в видимости. Действительность в снах.
Великий мудрец... Великий глупец... Все одно...''
И дерева подхватывали эту затаенную грезу: опять возвращается... И новый порыв пролетающих времен
уносился в прошлое...
Так шутила Вечность с баловником своим, обнимала темными очертаниями, клала ему на сердце свое 
бледное, безмирное лицо. 
Закрывала тонкими пальцами очи аскета, и он был уже не Мусатов, а так что-то....”
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delirium. Crushed by his disappointments (such as the sudden death of the alleged Apocalyptic 
Anti-Christ from a stomach disorder, the exposure of the male savior as a girl dressed in boy's 
clothes), Musatov gets drunk in a restaurant and, following “their” bidding, finds himself in a 
room with two apparently supernatural beings, one of whom even claims that he is a “thing in 
itself.” Hopeful to resolve some of the questions about the nature of being that torment him, 
Musatov finds his worst fears confirmed by his two interlocutors: there is no transcendence, for 
transitoriness is infinite. 
The absurdity of the whole interview between Musatov and the two supernatural entities 
seems to indicate that the scene might be nothing else but a figment of the mystic's disordered 
mind intoxicated with alcohol. The uncertainty as to how to interpret this episode makes it highly
ironic. Like Musatov, the reader finds himself suspended and oscillating between the two 
conflicting interpretations: either what is happening is a projection of Musatov's delirious 
imagination that gives flesh to his suppressed doubts, or it is real. And if it is real, and this is 
another twist of irony, then a series of disconcerting questions arise as to the true nature of these 
garrulous supernatural beings: Are they demonic or divine? Is what these creatures are revealing 
to Musatov truth or falsehood? The reader is caught in an infinite mental spiral in which he 
hovers, not unlike the unfortunate mystic, between irreconcilables. 
The narrator, however, does not allow this spiral to get out of his control for too long. He 
disrupts the reciprocal play between affirmation and negation by imposing a definitive closure on
the negative dialectics of transcendental irony at the end of the episode:
And after Musatov's departure the bare-footed cranks were peacefully sitting at the table. 
Each was slowly stirring his tea with a spoon.
An odd peculiarity manifested itself right above their heads: this was a pair of horns that 
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sprang out God knows why and from where... (191)
The fat was saying to the thin: “You are such a con artist, you are such a trickster, you are 
such a liar, Peten'ka?”
He was giggling.
But Petr, who was grumbling, didn't share his joy: “He might guess the truth... Because 
they are sly....”146 (192)
While the narratorial voice that unexpectedly emerges at this critical juncture is jocular, it is also 
forceful in its imposition of the closure. This enforced closure enables Belyi to preclude any 
further precarious equivocations of meaning that threatened to engulf his fictive world in 
relativity. Through the direct intervention of the knowing narrator, Belyi lets the disoriented 
reader know that these otherworldly creatures are of demonic origin (as signaled by their horns) 
and, consequently, their mission is to mislead. The so-called “truth” about the absence of 
transcendence (the eternal return of appearances) that they thrust on Musatov is, therefore, an 
outright falsehood. Belyi refuses to tolerate a tense ambivalence generated by Romantic irony. He
seeks to terminate what is perceived by him as its infinite negativity, its eternal dual movement of
affirmation and negation, by establishing clear distinctions between truth and Falsehood. For the 
perplexed reader it is ultimately the voice of the narrator that provides a firm anchor at the time 
when transcendental irony threatens to submerge him, along with Musatov, in relativity of 
multiple truths. 
146 “А босоногие чудаки после ухода Мусатова мирно сидели за столом. Каждый помешивал ложечкой в 
стакане с чаем.
Над их головами образовалась странная особенность: это была пара настоящих рожек, выросших Бог 
весть почему и откуда.... (191) 
Толстый говорил худому: ''А ты искусник, а ты обманщик, а ты лгун, Петенька?''
При этом он хихикал.
Но его веселья не раделял Петр, ворча: ''Пожалуй, он догадается, в чем сила... Ведь они—хитрые....''”
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Even though for the reader enlightened by the narrator about the true nature of the two 
supernatural beings it is ultimately clear where truth lies, it is not entirely so for Musatov whose 
psyche is profoundly shattered by the traumatic experience. The author, however, seeks to 
alleviate Musatov's painful ironic condition as well, since Musatov's doubt is not entirely his fault
but to a larger degree instigated by the external demonic forces. In despair, Musatov turns to 
Father Ioann, one of the few unambiguously positive characters, who assures him that was he 
saw was not a product of his deranged imagination but a real-life encounter with the devils who 
purport to derail the Symbolist efforts at the transformation of the world:
Later Father Ivan seated Sergey Musatov and talked to him about their common secrets;
“Now when you are in distress, and your soul is burning with love, they are circling 
around you as an invisible cloud, as a terrible black cloud, driving you to despair, 
unrolling the scroll of horror...
Love and pray: the universal love conquers all!”147 (195)
According to the author's intention, Musatov's doubt should be resolved by Father Ioann, like that
of the reader by the narrator. By confirming the demonic origin of his doubt, Father Ioann 
supposedly brings to a stop Musatov's constant mental oscillation between the two “truths” and, 
therefore, saves the sorry prophet from sliding into an abyss of insanity (in a bad sense). Yet it is 
not entirely clear if Musatov has been fully cured of his ironic doubt, even through Father Ioann's
authoritative assurances. Musatov's future is hidden from the reader's eyes, as the author 
hurriedly dispenses with his unfortunate character by shipping him off to his brother's estate: 
“The Father went to celebrate vespers, and Musatov took a cab and went home in order to get 
147 “Потом усадил отец Иван Сергея Мусатова и тихонько вел речь об общих тайнах:
''Теперь, когда ты в несчастье, а душа твоя сгорает от любви, они кружатся над тобой невидимым 
облаком, ужасною тучею, вгоняя в отчаяние, развертывая свиток ужаса...
Люби и молись: все побеждает вселенская любовь!''” 
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packed and go to visit his brother, Pavel, who was drinking hard in the countryside”148 (195).
Having resolved Musatov's ironic predicament through the direct interference of the 
narrator, Belyi switches modes seeking to dissolve the last vestiges of ironic uncertainty in the 
affirmative lyrical ending. Surprisingly, however, the lyrical is ambiguous, betraying the ironic 
tension it aims to suppress. While the explicit purpose is to reassert hope in the future annulment 
of temporality and death, it is the temporal that seeks to perpetuate itself in and through the 
lyrical. The lyrical ending opens with “And again there came the young spring”149 (198). Even 
though the appearance of the spring (“vesna”) connotes the regeneration of Nature and is full of 
promise of Resurrection, the word “again” (“opiat'”) dwindles that hope as it gives a sense that 
there have been many springs that came and went without bringing about the desired change. 
This return of “opiat'” besets and disturbs what was supposed to be a positive ending: 
And again, like a year ago, the young apple tree by the red house was blooming with 
fragrant white flowers.
These were the flowers of oblivion and sorrows; these were the flowers of the new day...
And again, and again the nun was sitting under the tree and squeezing the rosary 
convulsively.
And again, and again the red dawn was laughing, blowing the wind on the apple tree...
And again, and again the apple tree was sprinkling the nun with the flowers of oblivion.150
(199)
148 “Батюшка отправился служить вечерню, а Мусатов нанял извозчика и поехал домой, намереваясь 
уложиться и сегодня же вечером укатить к брату, Павлу, сгорающему от пьянства в деревне.” 
149 “И опять была юная весна.”  
150 “И опять, как и год тому назад, у красного домика цвела молодая яблоня белыми, душистыми цветами.
Это были цветы забвения и печалей, это были цветы нового дня...
И опять, и опять под яблоней сидела монашка, судорожно сжимая четки.
И опять, и опять хохотала красная зорька, посылая ветерок на яблоньку...
И опять обсыпала яблоня монашку белыми цветами забвения....” 
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This disconcerting repetition of “again” (“opiat'”) is reinforced by the narrator's remark 
that “the nun was aimlessly burning in the radiance of the sunset....”151 Whereas “aimlessly” 
(“bestsel'no”) can be construed as “without any definite goal” (that sets the nun apart from the 
busy urban folk pursuing their petty goals), in light of the incessant drum of “again” (“opiat'”), it 
immediately acquires a more ominous meaning: “uselessly.” No matter how long the nun waits 
for the miracle, her “burning” vigils in the sunset are futile, for the change which is “again” and 
“again” promised by the spring will not arrive. 
It is, ironically, temporality, in its most ghastly incarnation, death, that literally has the 
final word in the Second Symphony. Even though the narrator, through his privileged characters, 
the nun and the Fairytale, optimistically assert: “That the dear, impossible, [and] sad-pensive is 
approaching, that it is coming...,”152 the final accord is, nevertheless, that of death:
The wind was rustling among the metal wreaths and the clock was beating time slowly.
The dew fell on the chapel made of grey stone; the following words were inscribed on it: 
“Anna, my wife, rest in peace!”153 
In the Third Symphony, the battle between evil (duality and irony) and good (wholeness 
and unmediated lyricism) is reenacted in the structure of the symphony itself. The structure of 
Belyi's Return is reminiscent of the so-called ironic structures employed by the early and late 
German Romantics, Tieck in “Eckbert the Fair” (“Der blonde Eckbert,” 1796) and E.T.A. 
Hoffmann in “The Sandman” (“Der Sandmann,” 1816), in particular. The reader of these 
Romantic tales is caught up in ambiguity that does not allow him to decide, even at the end of the
narrative, whether the unfolding supernatural events really take place in the fictive world or if 
151 “... монашка бесцельно сгорала в закатном блеске.”  
152 “Что приближается, что идет, милое, невозможное, грустно-задумчивое....” 
153 “Ветер шумел металлическими венками, да часы медленно отбивали время.
Роса пала на часовню серого камня, там были высечены слова: ''Мир тебе, Анна, супруга моя!''”
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they are a product of the protagonist's deranged mind. The ironic hovering between the two levels
(reality/objectivity and madness/subjective perception) is sustained throughout the narrative, 
leaving the reader perpetually fluctuating between the two equally valid but mutually exclusive 
interpretations. This endless oscillation can never be positively settled as the Romantic author 
does not warrant the validation of one definitive explication (tantamount to truth). This refusal to 
commit to one scenario is related to the German Romantic idea of the multiplicity of human 
truths as each of those scenarios (“truths”), being a product of man's limited mind, is deficient by 
default and should be supplemented with its very opposite.
Belyi appears to resort to a similar ironic structure as it is well suited to the subject of 
duality (appearance and reality, eternal return of transience and definitive cessation of 
temporality) that he explores in the symphony. The interpretation of the supernatural events that 
take place in the fictive world of the symphony can, as it seems at first sight, be sustained on two 
levels as easily as in one of the German Romantic tales mentioned above. While the existence of 
the supernatural realm as well as the manifestations of that realm in the material world can be 
taken as objective, Belyi also plants a sufficient number of clues that allows viewing the 
supernatural as nothing but a figment of Khandrikov's troubled mind that gradually deteriorates 
into madness. This explication can be supported by the fact that most of the events are given 
from Khandrikov's perspective. Thus, the first part that takes place in the transcendent world 
closes with the child falling asleep and the second part opens with Khandrikov waking up from 
the dream about him being a child in the otherworldly. The transcendent realm seen in this light 
is nothing but a recurrent dream that haunts Khandrikov every night. The battle between Orlov 
and Tsenkh as the supernatural agents of good and evil respectively is, upon this interpretation, 
only a product of Khandrikov's speedily declining mind. And the definitive return of Khandrikov 
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as a child to his transcendental home can be viewed as a dying vision of the deranged hero.   
In defiance of ironic perspectivism, however, Belyi purposefully disrupts this play of the 
objective and subjective modes by introducing “hints” that nudge the reader toward the only 
correct interpretation of events as viewed from the perspective of the knowing narrator. While 
most of the supernatural occurrences are given from Khandrikov's point of view whose 
soundness of mind can be unproblematically questioned by the reader, there are also some 
instances of the manifestation of the otherworldly in the symphony which can be attributed 
neither to Khandrikov nor to any other character for that matter. These communicated lyrical 
perceptions concerning the presence of the supernatural in modern world belong to the narrator 
himself. For example:
The embittered pale man, with a bristling wolfish beard, wearing a cap and with his coat 
collar up, was walking along the sidewalk covered with melting snow. 
The passers-by stood aside involuntarily [to let him by], and he, having come to the 
telegraph office, sent a telegram of the following content: “Samar Region. The den of the 
Snake. To Vladislav Denisovich Drakonov [Dragon]. Come immediately. Khandrikov has
rebelled. Tsenkh.” 
An enormous black snake with the fiery eyes was rushing along the endless tracks with an
unimaginable rumble.
He raised his trunk toward the sky and started wailing, letting out billowing clouds of 
smoke.
Aware of the approaching last battle, he was rushing from Samar Region, from “The Den 
of the Snake.”
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Many from the near-by villages heard these ominous groans, but they thought it was a 
train.154 (243)
In this brief episode the narrator divulges to the reader that Tsenkh is really nobody else 
than the Tzar-Wind who in his service to the Snake entrapped the child (Khandrikov) into the 
world of appearances. This communication of the narratorial lyrical perceptions which have a 
weight of unquestionable authority unlike those of the possibly disturbed Khandrikov tips the 
scales in favor of the objectivity of the supernatural. Therefore, the apparent hovering between 
the two modes (subjective and objective) is decidedly interrupted as the interpretation endorsed 
by the knowing narrator himself is offered as the only possible truth that does not tolerate an 
alternative: what is happening to Khandrikov is not a product of his seemingly diseased 
imagination but a result of the real battle between good and evil taking place in the empirical 
world. As the implied author (through the narrator) makes it unambiguously known to the reader, 
he is in possession of truth that allows him to end the ironic hovering between the antagonistic 
visions of the Universe (the certainty of transcendence and the infinity of temporality).155 Belyi 
enforces closure upon the equivocations of textual meaning by embracing Khandrikov's 
154 “Вдоль тающей мостовой шагал бледный, озлобленный колпачник с поднятым воротником пальто и с 
волчьей бородкой торчком.
Прохожие невольно сторонились от него, а он, придя в телеграф, отправил телеграмму следующего 
содержания: ''Самарская губерния. Змеево Логовище. Владиславу Денисовичу Драконову. Приезжайте. 
Хандриков бунтует. Ценх.''
Вдоль бесконечных рельсов с невообразимым грохотом несся огромный, черный змей с огненными 
глазами.
Приподнял хобот свой небу и протяжно ревел, выпуская бездну дыма.
Это он мчался из Самарской губернии, из ''Змеевого Логовища,'' сознавая, что близится последняя борьба.
В соседних деревнях многие сквозь сон слышали эти зловещие стоны, но думали, что это — поезд.” 
155 In Key's opinion, this attempt by the implied author to impose his lyrical perceptions on the reader outside the 
limited perspectives of his characters not only perplexes the reader but nearly ruins the symphony as a work of 
art: “... didacticism is usually the obverse of lyricism in Bely's early art, and all too often the prophetic stance that
he adopts actually fractures the aesthetic integrity of his chosen genre, especially when the supernatural is 
asserted as a universal datum of experience in the contemporary world. The Northern Symphony [Belyi's First 
Symphony] generally avoids this dilemma, but The Return (the Third Symphony) is all but ruined by it. For all its 
apparent epic qualities, unmediated lyricism returns here with a vengeance” (“Bely's Symphonies” 40). 
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perceptions as the true ones. 
Despite Belyi's authoritative imposition of closure, the equivocation, though subdued, is 
not entirely eradicated. The ironic play of meaning in the symphony proves resistant to the 
author's intentions of arresting it. The meaning of the “return” does not totally lose its ambiguity 
as the finality of Khandrikov's return, so desired by Belyi, is ironically interrogated and subverted
by the text itself. To start with, the transcendent realm the child departs from and returns to in his 
subjection to the vicious cycle of eternal reincarnations is an ambiguous space in itself. It is by no
means identical with the realm of pure spirit. It is not even Paradise (humankind's true “home”) 
as it is the space outside its enclosure sealed off and guarded by the angel: “A stern man, 
guarding the Eden, was walking up and down there at night. He was holding a flaming sword 
flashing in his hands”156 (206). This is the space accessible to and inhabited by evil forces (the 
Snake and the Tzar-wind) which cannot be driven out by the Old Man who is repeatedly 
compelled to relinquish the child to his earthly travails. In his dying vision, Khandrikov comes 
back to the same space and, in spite of the Old Man's assurances that this return is ultimately 
final, the doubt still lingers, for the area is no less vulnerable to the penetration of evil than it was
hitherto. The agents of evil are not defeated either, because the supposed battle between good and
evil has not achieved its definitive resolution, or rather it has never taken place in earnest. Having
threatened Tsenkh with a stick, Orlov departs for his destination, leaving Khandrikov to his fate. 
Khandrikov supposedly escapes Tsenkh through suicide but only, as it appears, to encounter him 
again as the Tzar-Wind in his transcendent “home.” With evil not being conquered, the definitive 
closure to the bad infinity of temporality cannot be asserted. These loose ends in the narrative 
interrogate the authorial assertions of the finality of the return and the stability of meaning rooted
156 “По вечерам там расхаживал строгий муж, охранявший Эдем. В его руках сверкал огненный меч.”  
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in absolute truth. 
The text defies the enforced closure, as meaning eludes Belyi's attempt at narratorial 
control. Duality and irony, associated with evil, continue to bedevil Belyi as the author of the 
symphony. With the finality of the return being thrown into doubt, the text does not stop at its 
designated end but immediately leaps back to the beginning (the imminence of another earthly 
reincarnation). It makes a circle, returns to itself and repeats itself and so on ad infinitum despite 
the author's will. Instead of closing the cycle for good, Belyi ironically perpetuates it. This 
circularity of structure, with the end sending the reader back to the beginning, is a symbol of the 
snake biting its tail. In other words, the structure of the symphony embodies that very snake 
against which the implied author, together with his character Old Man/Orlov, combats: the 
eternal return of temporality and... irony. The symphony literally enacts the negative infinity that 
it  aimed to disrupt. 
Belyi finds it even harder to control ironic perspectivism, grounded in the play of signs, in
his last and most ambitious symphony, The Goblet of Blizzards. Despite the heralded positivity, a 
deep substratum of ironic uncertainty underlies this theurgic work. The symphony is clearly 
intended to be the triumph of unmediated lyricism, but the lyrical finds itself persistently plagued
with and undermined by the ironic that flies in the face of narratorial control. 
Irony haunts Belyi's symphony already in its conception. In the preface to the symphony, 
Belyi beset by doubt about its value and audience, allows the reader into the laboratory of its 
creation:
I have been working on it for a long time and tried to convey as precisely as possible 
some of the feelings that underlie, so to say, the background of ordinary life and that, in 
their essence, cannot be embodied in images. […] I have encountered two types of 
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perplexity here. Shall I be guided by the beauty of an image or the exactness of an image 
(so that an image could contain a maximum of feelings) while selecting an image for a 
feeling which, in its essence, cannot be embodied in an image? Moreover, how shall one 
reconcile the inner connection of feelings (I would say, mystical) that cannot be rendered 
in images with the logic of images? I saw two ways out: the way of art and the way of the 
analysis of feelings themselves, their dismemberment into constituent parts. I have taken 
the second way.157 (264)
It is really ironic that Belyi's work, perceived by a number of critics as Belyi's most 
ambitious attempt at theurgy, does not even follow the path of art. As it becomes increasingly 
evident throughout the preface, the whole symphony is a mechanistic assemblage of parts. Unlike
the preceding symphonies, the last one was written as a study of the nuts and bolts of the 
symphonic form as transplanted in literature: “I was interested in the construction mechanism of 
that vaguely apprehended form which all my previous ''Symphonies'' possessed: the construction 
suggested itself there... In the present ''Symphony'' I was trying most of all to be exact in the 
exposition of the themes, their counterpoint, [and] combination, etc.”158 (265). The image is put in
bondage to the mechanistic structure which is calculated with the utmost mathematical precision:
“I was fully aware that, in the first place, the exactness of the structure subjects the plot to 
technique (often I had to lengthen the ''Symphony'' exclusively for the sake of its structure) and 
157 “Я работал над ней долго, и старался по возможности точнее обрисовать некоторые переживания, 
подстилающие, так сказать фон обыденной жизни и, по существу, невоплотимые в образах. […] Тут я 
встретился с двумя родами недоумений. Следует ли при выборе образа переживанию, по существу 
невоплотимому в образ, руководствоваться красотой самого образа или точностью его (т. е. чтобы образ 
вмещал возможный максимум переживания)? Вместе с тем как совместить внутреннюю связь 
невоплотимых в образ переживаний (я бы сказал, мистических) со связью образов? Передо мною 
обозначились два пути: путь искусства и путь анализа самих переживаний, разложения их на составные 
части. Я избрал второй путь.”  
158 “Меня интересовал конструктивный механизм той смутно сознаваемой формы, которой были написаны 
предыдущие мои ''Симфонии'': там конструкция сама собой напрашивалась... В предлагаемой 
''Симфонии'' я более всего старался быть точным в экспозиции тем, в их контрапункте, соединении и т.д.” 
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that the beauty of its image is frequently in tension with the conformity to its structure”159 (Ibid.). 
The exactness of the image and the rigor of the structure, to which the image is subjugated, 
govern the theurgic symphony. 
Belyi's sacrifice of “the beauty of the image” to its “precision,” however, does not yield 
the sought-for result. In his pursuit of precision, the Russian Symbolist not infrequently achieves 
the opposite effect: his created images lack all clarity and intelligibility. From the quest for 
preciseness ensues incomprehensibility and, one should add, unreadability. In an attempt to 
communicate his mystical experiences, Belyi makes an excessive use of metaphors and similes 
that obfuscate rather than illuminate the image for the reader. The attributes ascribed by Belyi to 
the portrayed object are so excessive that the tenor, over-encumbered by these newly acquired 
properties, gets almost lost. Take for example, the following description:
From under the water crystals, lacy, lacy, and limpid, a sad white head was swimming, 
stopping occasionally, above the spray of the marble block.
From under the laughter, water laughter, laughter, he rose with a mad face like fate. 
The white loosely falling tunic, embroidered with fountain pearls, seemed to be flowing 
on the old man. From under the pearly water stream he would reappear with his big head, 
white in a burst of bitterness, like the immutable time that ascended as the laughter of the 
instantaneous streams: the water moments flown upward.  
Up front he seemed a marble emperor crowned with a silver laurel wreath.160
159 “Я сознавал, что точность структуры, во-первых, подчиняет фабулу технике (часто приходилось удлинять 
''Симфонию'' исключительно ради его структурного интереса) и что красота образа не всегда совпадает с 
закономерностью его структурной формы.” 
160 “Из-под водных хрусталей, кружевных, кружевных, сквозных, белая грустная голова, замирая, плыла над 
брызгами мраморной глыбой.
Из-под хохота, водного хохота, хохота он восстал, точно рок, обезумевшим лицом.
Белый ниспавший хитон, расшитый фонарными перлами, точно струился на старом. Из-за перлового 
водного тока он выплывал большой головой, белой в горьком порыве, как неизменное время, восшедшее 
смехом мгновенных потоков: водяных, вверх взлетевших, мгновений. 
140
[…] [the description runs for pages] (314)
It is not entirely clear who or what the tenor is. It is buried under a stream of metaphors 
and similes. It might be interpreted as the symbolic description of the fountain and its statue 
(apparently in the shape of a warrior or an emperor) or as colonel Svetozarov whose position is 
later described as standing by the fountain. The effect is the blurring of the images, the fountain, 
its statue, and Svetozarov, into one. This might well have been intended but the reconstruction of 
the tenor(s) makes for a frustrating experience. 
Apparently to make an image more precise and expressive, Belyi resorts to the (over)use 
of repetitions. But instead of making a represented image more evocative, these incessant 
repetitions almost ruin it: “His hands, his water lilies, having flashed the diamond ring 
insidiously, stretched outward insidiously, as if they were threatening the rival insidiously”161 
(317); “Having been stung with a foreboding, she was throwing her arms into the air toward her 
darling, toward her darling in supplication, she was stretching her arms to him, asking for help. 
She was stretching her arms, tearing a bee off her finger—was walking, and sighing”162 (331); 
“She caressed her with a chicken hand, like that of a bird, and was burning her with the purple of 
her breath”163 (307). The repetitions do not add to the precision of the image, but on the contrary, 
overburden it, at times making it almost meaningless. 
According to his confession in the preface (quoted above), Belyi had to dissect his 
mystical feelings in order to clothe them into comprehensible images. Like his anatomized lyrical
moods, however, the images that emerge in the symphony as their symbolic representations are 
Спереди казался мраморным императором, увенчанным серебряным венцом лавров.”   
161 “Руки его, ненюфоры его, протянулись коварно вперед, коварно блеснув бриллиантовым перстнем, как бы
коварно грозя сопенику.”  
162 “К милому в воздух, к милому с мольбой свои руки бросала, руки ему простирала, у него помощи 
просила, ужаленная предчувствием. Ручки простирала, от пальца пчелку отрывала — гуляла, вздыхала.”  
163 “Цыплячей рукой, точно птичьей лапой, тихонько погладила ее, тихонько пурпуром дыхания жгла.”  
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also dismembered. Under the weight of metaphors, similes, and repetitions, whose purpose is to 
render the imagery as close to the feeling as possible, a symbolic image breaks down into 
fragments. These fragments are not always easy to reassemble as the splinters of the shattered 
image refuse to cohere (as, for example, in the first passage quoted below). This fragmentation of
images is mirrored on the sentence level as well. The movement of sentences is constantly 
interrupted by commas and occasionally by dashes, introducing ever new comparisons and 
similes. As irony would have it, sentences stumble and stammer rather than musically flow, as 
one would legitimately expect from a symphony:
When the fat white dolphin was agitated, and the indignant frock-coat seemed to be 
bursting away from him with rustling transparent scales, first rolling with silk, then 
unrolling with silk, and the puffy face of the engineer, who was leaning with his breast 
against the table, was running in the direction of the colonel along the table's malachite 
surface, and, as if in supplication, his [colonel's] fingers, covered with the lights of 
diamonds, rose—then, Svetozarov's face—a crescent filled with the money brilliance of 
the moon,—fell on the carved chair's back with pride and the white locks of his hair, 
disturbed by the wind, streamed down; then the engineer's words flew upon the colonel, 
flew past him.164 (330) 
With an involuntary inclination, she came to him in a white cascade-like dressing gown, 
as if made of air, and wiped the sweat of mortal anguish off his forehead with the 
164 “Когда белый толстый дельфин волновался, и возмущенный сюртук сквозными шуршащими чешуями 
точно рвался от него, то свеиваясь шелком, то развеиваясь, и вдоль малахитовой доски стола бежал на 
полковника одутловатый лик инженера, припадшего грудью к столу, и, точно умоляя, приподнялись 
пальцы его, испещренные огнями бриллиантов, — тогда лицо Светозарова — месяц, наполненный 
денежным блеском серебра, — гордо опрокинулось на спинку резного стула и пролились белые пряди 
волос, волнуемые ветром; тогда слова инженера налетали на полковника, пролетали мимо его ушей.”   
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plaintive waves of her sunset-like falling hair; and her face, still wet, wet from tears, 
drank the sadness of his velvety sobbing voice, she was repeating words after him with 
her mouth, tearing her wet handkerchief at her breast when he, like a sleepy roaring lion, 
was dropping his aching, aching head with closed eyelids, with an extinguishing gaze, 
into his hands.165 (381)
This overabundance of metaphors, similes, and repetitions resulting in stylistic 
monstrosities points to Belyi's conscious struggle with language, less visible in his earlier 
symphonies. Through exaggeration, repetition, and amplification, Belyi seeks to make symbolic 
images as vivid for the reader as the original mystical mood he experienced and strives to 
communicate. But language fails as a vehicle of synthesis between the feeling and the image. 
Under the strain of communicating the incommunicable, the verbal image crumbles. To convey 
his mystical experience, Belyi has to resort to the excesses of metaphorical language but 
ironically the harder he strives for precision (i.e., correspondence between the feeling and the 
image), the less precise and comprehensible the image is and the further it is from the ideal. The 
result is the over-inflation and over-stretching of language that leads to ambiguities, absurdities, 
and, in extreme cases, complete disintegration of meaning. Belyi 'kills' the word in pursuit of the 
lyrical feeling (the spirit) but the word avenges itself as attested to by the whole symphony which
is over-saturated with mutilated, equivocating signs. The empirical language proves itself 
resistant to the tyranny of the mystical (the unmediated lyrical feeling), undermining it with 
ironic dislocations and inversions. 
165 “К нему пришла она с невольным влечением в водопадном, белом пеньюаре, словно из воздуха, и 
жалобными волнами своих закатных, упавших волос отерла пот смертного томления с его чела; и личико, 
еще сырое, сырое от слез, испивало грусть его бархатом рыдающего голоса, устами повторяла за ним 
слова, мокрый платочек терзала на груди, когда, как сонный рыкающий лев, он ронял на руки больную, 
больную голову с закрытыми веками, потухающим взором.”
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  Belyi aims not only for the exact reproduction of the mystical feeling but also for the 
complete apprehension of that feeling by the reader, or, in other words, for what Fr. Schlegel 
called “perfect communication.” Belyi believes that such a perfect communion between the 
author and the reader is possible, granted the reader is diligent enough to read the symphony an 
n-number of times necessary for such a comprehension: 
At last, there is one more difficulty for a complete comprehension of my “Symphony.” 
The comprehension of its structure makes the meaning of its symbols more transparent. In
order to fully examine the feeling that shines through in an image, one must understand in
which theme this image is unfolding, how many times the theme of this image has been 
repeated and what images have accompanied it. And if a superficial reading allows the 
reader to grasp the meaning of the conveyed feeling with precision of 1/2, following all of
the above by the reader will allow him to understand it with precision of 0,01.166 (266)
To attain the degree of penetration suggested by Belyi, the reader must retrace steps made
by the author, or, in other words, become the author in reverse, extracting the mechanism of its 
production from the symphony. In Fr. Schlegel's words:
In order to understand someone, one must be, in the first place, smarter than he, that is 
exactly as smart and exactly as dumb [as that writer]. It is not enough that one 
understands the meaning of a confusing work better than the author  understood it. One 
must also know this confusion up to its principles, be able to characterize and construct it 
166 “Наконец, еще одна трудность для полного понимания ''Симфонии.'' Смысл символов ее становится 
прозрачней от понимания структуры ее. Для того, чтобы вполне рассмотреть переживание, сквозящее в 
любом образе, надо понимать, в какой теме этот образ проходит, сколько раз уже повторялась тема образа 
и какие образы ее сопровождали. И если при поверхностном чтении смысл переживания передается с 
точностью до 1/2, то при соблюдении всего сказанного со стороны читателя смысл переживания 
уясняется с точностью до 0,01.”   
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by himself. <The idea of a pure and applied characteristic>.167 (KFSA 18: 63, no. 434)
To achieve a perfect understanding, the reader must fuse with the author, become one with his 
creative mind. But even then, were such a miracle possible, a complete comprehension of the 
represented mood would prove elusive, as the creator of the symphony himself is far from having
a profound grasp of his own work. The symphony has an ironic life of its own that runs counter 
to its author's lyrical intentions and eludes the narrator's attempt at imposing control over its 
meaning. 
Belyi conceives his theurgic work as a counter-statement to Blok's unapologetic 
celebration of demonic love in his lyrical poetry of that time (the cycle “The Snow Mask” 
[“Snezhnaia Maska,” 1907], in particular). Blok, in Belyi's eyes, betrayed the Solov'evian ideal 
of spiritual love, having succumbed to the dark temptations of passion, and Belyi sees his 
mission as redeeming and reinstating their common ideal sullied by his friend's apostasy. To 
controvert Blok's story of (self-)destruction through demonic love, Belyi offers a restorative 
vision of salvation that comes through the rejection of demonic sexual love in favor of the 
spiritual. Yet the development of the salvation-through-sacred-love narrative does not proceed as 
smoothly as apparently intended by the author. Like Solov'ev and Blok, Belyi has to confront the 
innate duality of love, its erotic and spiritual dimensions. This irreconcilable duality of love 
forms the epicenter of transcendental irony in the symphony. Belyi finds himself unable to 
satisfactorily resolve the indeterminacy into which the narrative is moved (against the author's 
will) by the ironic fluctuations that threaten the textual and ontological stability of his fictive 
universe. As in the previous two symphonies, the ironic dialectic is not resolved but interrupted 
167 “Um jemand zu verstehen muss man erstl[ich] klueger seyn als er, dann eben so klug und dann auch eben so 
dumm. Es ist nicht genug dass man d[en] eigent[lichen] Sinn eines confusen Werks besser versteht, als d[er] 
Autor es verstanden hat. Man muss auch die Confusion selbst bis auf d[ie] Principien kennen, charakterisiren 
und selbst construiren koennen. <Idee einer reinen und angewandten Char[akteristik]>.”
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and the definitive closure is enforced through a number of ruses such as the interference of the 
authoritative character, who is a mouthpiece for the implied author, and the episode depicting the 
alleged miracle of the couple's transfiguration. Despite this termination of the tense ironic 
ambivalence, however, the irony embedded in the narrative continues to question and undermine 
the contrived univocal ending enforced by the narrator. The final definiteness of meaning cannot 
help but be fractured by the underlying irony of uncertainty which can be subdued but not 
eradicated.        
The duality is exhibited by the two protagonists, Adam Petrovich and Svetlova, from the 
very opening of their love story. The degree of the demonic (linked with the erotic sphere) to 
which each of them is subject varies in the course of the symphony but it is always present. At 
the opening of the symphony, it is Svetlova who is the weakest of the two in spirit. Upon their 
first meeting, Adam Petrovich who catches an aura of the Divine Feminine around her, cannot 
fail to notice that Svetlova is not (yet) “she”: “It was she... No, it was not she”168 (275). She is in 
the grip of the material and the erotic, the presence of which is betrayed by her striking, feline 
appearance:
A winter jacket was sitting on the orange dress that looked like a lynx skin. 
A hat like a tray was pressing onto the face. 
The lips—slices of a crimson peach—were touched with a tiger-like smile—a little bit 
terrifying. 
She got out of the carriage. Looked at him with a dreamy heartlessness. 
A fluffy female cat would stroke one like this with its velvety paw: would stroke and 
168 “Это была она... нет, не она.” 
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scratch.169 (275-276) 
Her predatory, demonic nature is conveyed through the cluster of similes and metaphors 
emphasizing her affinity with feline creatures (a tiger, a lynx, and a gentle but still dangerous 
cat). This link is further strengthened by the symbolic colors of Svetlova's outfit, yellow and 
orange, suggestive of a tiger's and lynx's hides (as well as of fire and therefore of burning erotic 
desire). These are all the attributes, as perceived by Adam Petrovich, characteristic of the intrinsic
predisposition toward evil erotic passion and he views himself as a liberator of Wagnerian 
Brünnhilde: “I am on the quest, and she is Brünnhilde, encircled by fire! Brünnhilde out of 
fire”170 (286).
However, Adam Petrovich also suffers from the dark erotic element ingrained in his 
human nature. He fails as a liberator of “Brünnhilde” at his first attempt because being tempted 
by Svetlova he eventually succumbs to the pull of sexual desire: “Darling, give me happiness... 
give”171 (395). It is, ironically, the seductress Svetlova who recollects herself on the brink and 
rebuffs Adam Petrovich's sexual advances: “When he lay by her side and embraced her, she tore 
herself from his embrace, scratched him, turned away in anger, pushed him away with her leg, 
lowered one leg onto the floor, and was standing naked, with her head tilted back, hiding her face
in her hands, sobbing, and unwilling to partake of love”172 (Ibid). Svetlova saves the two of them 
from their ultimate “fall” (sexual intercourse) from which, for Belyi, there is apparently no 
169 “На оранжевом платье, точно шкура рыси, сидела зимняя кофточка.
Шляпа подносом теснила лицо.
Губы — доли багряного персика — змеились тигровой улыбкой — чуть-чуть страшной.
Вышла из экипажа. С мечтательным бессердечием взглянула на него.
Мягкая кошка так бархатной лапой погладит: погладит и оцарапает.”
170 “Я — ищущий, а она — Брунгильда, окруженная поясом огня!
Брунгильда из огня.”
171 “Милая, дай счастья... дай.” 
172 “Когда лег рядом с ней, обхватив, она вырвалась, царапала его, отвернулась со злобой, оттолкнула ногой, 
а другую ногу спустила на пол и стояла, нагая, с закинутой головой, закрывая лицо руками, плача и не 
желая испить любви.” 
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redemption. Adam Petrovich falls short of his mission and Svetlova even accuses him of not 
being the one: “I called you shamelessly, and you responded shamelessly. No, you are not the one
I saw in my dreams”173 (396). Having almost transgressed, the protagonists have to separate as 
they proved undeserving of salvation through holy love. Adam Petrovich challenged by 
Svetlova's husband is seriously injured in the duel and loses his mind as a result of the brain 
inflammation following the wound. Svetlova takes the veil and becomes the prioress of a 
(sectarian?) convent. 
Divine madness and devout faith should, according to Belyi, expiate the sins of the flesh 
and bring the two together in a purely spiritual union. Ironically, however, it is at this critical 
juncture that the narrative starts dangerously equivocating, threatening to collapse entirely into 
the demonic, with the whole story of salvation being easily read as a story of perdition. As in the 
third symphony The Return, Belyi resorts to the device of sacred madness because it allows him 
to communicate the symbolic perceptions unknown to people with sound minds. Thus, Adam 
Petrovich, who goes insane, believes that he defeats death in his battle with Time embodied as 
the evil dragon, Svetozarov, while for a person with a sound mind the scene presents itself in a 
different light: the delirious Adam Petrovich chases colonel Svetozarov out of the room with red 
hot fire-tongs. Having allegedly conquered death and time, he comes to view himself as 
resurrected. While the fact of Adam Petrovich's madness is at first necessary for Belyi to provide 
a bridge between the empirical world and the transcendent one, it then becomes a liability due to 
the ironic duality it immediately introduces, and Adam Petrovich's perceptions are offered more 
and more to the reader as objective. The borderlines between the character's perceptions and 
those of the implied author get progressively blurred toward the end, making it increasingly 
173 “Я позвала вас бесстыдно, Вы бесстыдно ответили на зов. Нет, вы не тот, кто мне снился.”  
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difficult for the reader to discriminate between the two. Belyi attempts to dissolve the ironic 
duality in the univocality of unmediated lyricism. Yet, in spite of Belyi's wish to de-emphasize 
the actuality of Adam Petrovich's insanity at the end, this fact stubbornly persists, casting doubt 
upon the story of salvation.
The portrayal of Svetlova, the prioress, is beset with even more ironic ambiguity than that
of the insane Adam Petrovich. While Belyi sends her to the convent, a supposedly holy place, to 
recuperate from her sinful libidinous desires, she still retains the infernal features of a seductress. 
Her image as a nun is highly sexualized: “When the snow swelled from under her, and embraced 
her waist, she placed her small foot onto the church porch:174 so was she standing in her chasuble
disarranged by the wind, with her blue eyes lifted high, and crossing herself with sweeping arm 
gestures” 175 (420); “The red icon-lamp was throwing light on her small klobuk, twined with 
flowers, and transparent cambric that was winding round her steamy bosom. […] Preparing 
herself for the meeting with him, the prioress unplaited the silk fabrics of her locks, put on the 
silvery klobuk, [and] wrapped herself into a lily-white satin”176 (438). Svetlova in Belyi's 
description reminds one less of a nun than of a prostitute. More ironically, Svetlova in her role as 
a prioress turns into something of a lascivious fiend who transgresses all moral boundaries. If in 
her secular life, she was vulnerable to the temptations of carnal lust, confined to the convent, she 
engages in the wildest spiritual orgies. Thus, at one point Belyi portrays a scene of Svetlova 
being visited by the holy spirit upon the completion of the church service: “The spirit descended 
174 The emphasis is mine. 
175 “Когда вздулся из-под нее снег, охватил ее стан, ножку она поставила на папереть: так стояла в 
развеянных ризах с синими, высоко закинутыми очами, размашисто покрывая себя крестными 
знамениями.” 
176 “Красная лампадочка озаряла клобучок, оплетенный цветами, сквозной батист, окуривший ее знойную 
грудь. […] Игуменья расплела шелковые ткани кудрей, одела серебристый клобук, обвила себя атласом 
лилейным, собираясь к нему на встречу.”  
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upon the prioress”177 (421). The spiritual intoxication that follows the descent of the spirit, 
however, is highly equivocal, to say the least, with the account of resulting union between the 
spirit and Svetlova strongly suggestive of sexual intercourse:  
… and she bent at her satin waist, and in a rattle of the dancing rosary, her chiseled 
fingers splashed, as if the wings whistling in the sky, with a back wave of moire mantel: 
so was she coming to a standstill, drinking ecstasy; her eyes were burning greedily, 
greedily from under her silk eyelashes; she seemed to be pulling about the bright bunches
of roses and the chained cross on her firm bosom, and a cry flew from her half-parted 
tenderly crimson and sweet lips. […] from under the pointed klobuk, from under the dark 
and low kerchiefs, the prioress was pressing the dew-covered bunches of flowers to her 
lips, smiling to the flowers, and passionately covering them with countless kisses.178 
(Ibid.)
In her state of spiritual drunkenness, Svetlova seduces other nuns to join her in her frenzied 
rapture: “And like big wild swifts who tiredly flap their wings before taking off, the sisters 
seduced by her call joined in the dance, sister to sister, in their deathly chasubles, adorned with 
fiery roses”179 (422). The vehement dance seems to lead to something resembling a bacchanalia, 
as all of the nuns greedily drink the holy wine: “The more helplessly and madly, the sisters drunk
in spirit were flying in the dance, the more greedily they were bending over the victuals”180 and 
177 “Дух озарил мать-игуменью.”  
178 “… и она изогнулась атласным станом, а ее точеные пальцы в стрекотанье пляшущих четок плеснули 
черной волной муаровой мантии, точно засвиставшими в небо крыльями: так она замирала, испивая 
восторг; из-под шелковых ресниц жадно горели ее глаза, жадно; руками точно терзала и яркие гроздья 
роз, и цепной свой крест на упругой груди, а зов с полуоткрытух слетал ее губ, нежно-алых и сладких. 
[…] а из-под вострого клобука, из-под темных и низких платов, к губам прижимая росистые горсти 
цветов, в цветы усмехалась игуменья-матушка и лобзала их страстно, несчетно.”  
179 “Вот сестры, зовом ее пленясь, как дикие большие стрижи, пред полетом устало махнувшие крыльями, 
сестренка с сестренкой, в пляс пошли в мертвых ризах, в розах ярых.”  
180 “Чем безвластней, безумней пьяные духом сестры летали в пляске, тем жаднее к яствам они склонялись.” 
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engage in erotic(ized) caresses: “… and the pork-marked old woman, huddling at the prioress's 
feet, was soaking her bitter roses in wine, showering her [prioress's] hands with raw purple, 
kissing her fingers with withered lips, and tearing the mischievous black silk on her bosom”181 
(Ibid.). These wildly dancing nuns drunk on spirit and wine are more evocative of witches than of
those who have experienced a visitation of the holy spirit. 
This “witch” association is even further intensified through Svetlova's night visit to the 
graveyard. The text equivocates as to whether the graveyard scene is what has really happened or
is just a macabre dream seen by the (insane?) prioress (“The prioress woke up on somebody's 
unknown grave, covered with ice crystals”182 (430)). However, the fact that the prioress wakes up
on the grave tips the scale in favor of the fictive actuality of the related events. To complicate 
matters further, Belyi at one point calls the prioress “insane.” Whether in her madness or dream, 
Svetlova comes to the graveyard before the dawn and disturbs one of the graves, apparently 
taking it for the one in which Adam Petrovich is presumably buried (“With one hand the mad 
prioress tore off the gravestone”183(428)). Having unearthed the coffin, the prioress does not find 
her “darling” there but instead she sees the white crescent moon in the depth of that grave. She 
leaps into the grave and saddles the crescent (a corpse lying there?). The prioress's saddling and 
riding the crescent (penis?) is again redolent of a sexual act: 
… and the back beauty, lifting her cassock, jumped in there with her white feet: she fell 
down, with her clothes flung upward, in there, in there. 
[…]
… when she straddled the crescent with her hot white legs and the silks, with a long black
181 “... и щербатая старица, ютясь у ее [the prioress’s] ног, мочила в вине свои горькие розы, осыпала ей руки 
сырым пурпуром, увядшими лобзала губами ее пальцы, черный лукавый шелк у нее терзала на груди.” 
182 “Игуменья проснулась на чьей-то безвестной, ледком охрусталенной могилке.”  
183 “Одной рукой сумасшедшая игуменья сорвала плиту гробовую.” 
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mantel train rustling like a snake, were tossed upward,—her long chasuble was coiling 
right and left;
[...] 
… when she bent toward the tenderly white, mockingly jingling horn with her bosom and 
it was ripping her bosom open with acid, wild, and long singing ecstasy.184 (428-429)
The portrait of the prioress riding the crescent (engaged in lovemaking?) is that of a 
witch:
… then her white dead head with the crimson lip bitten by her sharp teeth, and the ginger 
fire of her loose hair from under the kerchief, and the rosary rattling in the air, like a 
resonant whip, showering the odd mocking horse with lashes, the heart was wrung with a 
delightful fascination; then the curves of her satin waist, and the black stockings with red 
garters, and the milky color of the witch's leg above the stockings, and the velvet klobuk, 
like a dark horn protruding forward, and her evil voluptuous look staring from under her 
arched eyebrows—all, all was burning with the old ancient charms.185 (429)
The crescent is soon metamorphosed into none other than the naked colonel Svetozarov 
who symbolizes Time. He carries the witch Svetlova away on his back: “It was time staring at her
184 “… и черная красавица, подобрав рясу, — скок да скок туда белыми ножками: оборвалась с вверх 
взметенными одеждами — туда, туда. 
[…]
… когда оседлала серп своими горячими, белыми ножками и вверх метнувшиеся шелка с длинным, как 
змей, шушукавшим, черным ее мантийным хвостом, — длинные ризы извивались вправо и влево; 
[…]
… когда грудкой склонилась она к нежно-белому, насмешливо дребезжащему рогу и он вспарывал грудку 
терпким, диким, давно запевавшим восторгом.” 
185 “… тогда белая, мертвая ее головка с алой, закушенной острыми зубами губкой, и рыжий пламень из-под 
платов распущенных кос, и стрекотавшие по воздуху четки, как звонкая плетка, награждавшая ударами 
странного, насмешливого коня, дивною прелестью сердце сжимало; тогда изгибы ее атласного стана, и 
черные чулочки в красных подвязках, и над чулочками молочный цвет колдуньиной ножки, и бархатный 
клобук, как темный рог, уставленный вперед, и злой, сладострастный ее взор из-под дугой сошедшихся 
бровок — все, все старыми чарами сожигало старинными.”  
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—a naked old man galloping in the skies: ''You have descended to us to find your darling but you
have found me: I am flying,186 fly, let's fly—letey with leteya—lethean''”187 (Ibid.). Svetozarov, or 
Time, is struck down by “the snow-cloudy man” (“snegooblachnyi muzh”) who seems to be 
Adam Petrovich in the role of Christ, though his identity is never clarified. The cast down witch 
turns into the snow-cloudy man's shadow: “And she was a shadow of the snow-cloudy man. […] 
He was followed by his shadow which looked like an overturned prioress, with her klobuk 
pointing down”188 (430).
This whole episode, in which the fictive reality is blended with insanity and/or dream, 
appears to be a somewhat muddled allegory of Svetlova's past (prior to her taking the veil?) and 
her supposed liberation from that past by Adam Petrovich, who enters the picture in the garb of 
the snow-cloudy man. Like the scene in its entirety, however, its end is highly equivocal and if  
salvation was intended, it is undermined by the ambiguity of the imagery. While being saved 
from the clutches of Time (and therefore mortality), the witch is not reformed but turns into a 
dark shadow: “The witch remained on the cloud [the snow-cloudy man] like a back airy 
shadow”189 (Ibid.). She attaches herself to the snow-cloudy man and follows him like a dark 
double. The prophetic dream, if it were one, is ironic in its equivocations and casts a shadow over
the actual scene of salvation.     
The final battle of the prioress (Svetlova) and the Stranger (Adam Petrovich) with the 
dragon of Time (Orthodox Bishop) before their escape into the snowy fields is also equivocal. 
186 Belyi plays on words here: Russian “letat'” (“to fly”) sounds similar to the Russian name for the Ancient Greek 
river of oblivion “Leta” (“Lethe”) and therefore the flight is nothing else but a synonym for death.
187 “То время уставилось на нее — голый старик, скачущий по поднебесью: ''Сошла к нам за милым, а меня 
повстречала: лечу, лети, летим — летей с летеей — летейские''.”
188 “И она была тенью снегооблачного мужа. […] За ним влеклась его тень, словно клобуком опрокинутая 
игуменья.”  
189 “Так колдунья осталась на облаке черной воздушной тенью.”  
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Taken by itself, outside of the context of the symphony, this section can be read as possessing 
symbolic and even sacred significance, as it was apparently intended by Belyi. But viewed within
the context, the episode loses its indubitable seriousness and univocality and turns into an ironic 
construct. The reader who has been earlier informed by the author of Adam Petrovich's and 
Svetlova's insanity (though in Svetlova's case it looks more like demonic possession) cannot help
but doubt the solemnity of the unfolding events. In this light, the battle's aura of sacredness is 
shattered, for it appears to be waged not by “a woman clothed with the sun” and Christ against 
Anti-Christ but by two deranged people impersonating these biblical characters against the 
bishop who arrived at the convent to dislodge the prioress of dubious morals and piety. 
Furthermore, what casts even more doubt on the sanctity of the “last” battle with the Dragon of 
Time is that it has already been waged and supposedly won before by Adam Petrovich. At that 
time Belyi cast the episode in a mildly ironic light exposing the dichotomy between the 
perceptions of the mentally ill and reality. In the case of the last battle, however, he attempts to 
eliminate this inconvenient polarity, offering the characters' perceptions as the only reality, but 
the stability of meaning eludes him. The sacred rests on the certainty of meaning and once this 
determinacy is lost, the sacred turns into its own travesty. Despite his best efforts to control 
meaning, Belyi's narrative precariously dangles between the sacred and the sacrilegious. Belyi 
seeks to dissolve irony in unmediated lyricism but the ironic duality comes back to haunt him. 
The escape of the two lovers into the fields and their ultimate elevation to Heaven by the 
blizzard can be interpreted not exactly in the light Belyi would like it to be. The whole story can 
be read as a story of perdition of two insane (possessed?) people in the blizzard rather than the 
one of salvation and ascent to Heaven of the two holy lovers who overcame their erotic impulses.
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Belyi seems to be aware of some dangerous volatility of meaning present in the text,190 for he 
seeks to arrest it by imposing an authoritative closure. He does not end the symphony with the 
ascent of the lovers but closes it with the chapter “Miracle” (“Chudo”) whose apparent purpose is
to remove the remaining doubts still harbored by the skeptical reader. He makes use of his 
favorite device of an authoritative character who gives a definitive interpretation of events aimed 
to stop any precarious equivocations of meaning. The elder monk, who was taking care of the 
demented Adam Petrovich, appears in the church and makes an announcement of the couple's 
Ascension:
The more anxiously the sisters drunken in spirit were searching for the fugitives—and the 
bishop, and the stooping old women, and the beauties, young women, girls, black 
widows, all pale-faced, with rosy lips, the more powerfully the elder climbed onto the 
ambo and pointed toward the holy gates:
“About what happened here from the beginning, about what we heard, about what we saw
with our own eyes, what we felt—about the word of life.
“About this I tell you. 
“Don't search for the dead: you will not find the resurrected and ascended. 
“Like them who has ascended today, we will also ascend, because we are—children 
too.”191 (447)
190 In the preface to The Goblet of Blizzards, Belyi registers this duality of meaning attached to the theme of the 
blizzard: “The theme of blizzards is a vague impulse... where to? To life or to death? To madness or to wisdom? 
And the souls of the lovers dissolve in the blizzard” [“Тема метелей — это смутно зовущий порыв... куда? К 
жизни или смерти? К безумию или мудрости? И души любящих растворяются в метели”] (267).
191 “Чем тревожней пьяные духом сестры искали беглецов — и епископ, и сутулые старицы, и красавицы, 
юницы, отроковицы, вдовы черные, бледноликие, розовоустые, тем властнее встал на амвон старец, 
указуя на царские врата:
''О том, что было от начала, что мы слышали, что видели своими очами, что осязали — о слове жизни.
''О том возвещаю вам.
''Не ищите вы мертвых: не найдете воскресших и вознесенных.
''Как ныне вознеслись они, будем и мы возноситься, потому что и мы — дети.''” 
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To make the closure on the ironic play of meaning even more forceful, Belyi introduces the 
moment of miracle as the images of Adam Petrovich (fused with Christ) and Svetlova (fused with
“a woman clothed with the sun”) get imprinted on the glass-pane of the royal doors:
Henceforward the silvery image of the bent woman was engraved on the glass-pane; 
bending, the woman was pouring anointing oil over his [Christ's] pearl-colored feet, and 
wiping them with the amber gold of her hair.192 (Ibid.)
Through these contrivances, Belyi seeks to impose univocality upon the text haunted by 
ironic inconsistencies and instabilities. But despite this forceful suppression of the multiplicity of 
meaning, disturbances and dislocation effected by irony earlier in the text continue to interrogate 
and subvert the clear-cut lyrical ending.
Like his teacher Solov'ev, Belyi does not succeed in reining in the demon of Romantic 
irony. In contrast to Solov'ev and Blok, however, he would never fully lose his optimistic belief 
in the ultimate possibility of vanquishing “the ironic tendency.” Control over irony lies in 
complete mastery of language, in turning a corrupt human word into the all-powerful Logos, a 
creative word of God, because only God is above irony. For the whole of his literary career Belyi 
would be preoccupied with finding a way to overcome the ironic duality of language that stands 
in the way of expressing the true, lyrical, nature of things disclosed to the artist through aesthetic 
intuition. Despite his repeated failures, Belyi would never abandon his efforts at reviving the 
degenerate word of man. As late as 1917, already in his anthroposophist period, he would 
produce Glossalolia (Glossalolia, 1922), which in the spirit of his earlier theurgic Symphonies, 
appears to be an attempt at recovering the original Logos conceived by him as the Primordial 
192 “Отныне серебряный лик склоненной жены впаялся в стекло; склонясь, проливала жена елей на его 
[Christ's] жемчуговые ноги, утирала их янтарным златом волос.” 
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Sound. Belyi never reconciled himself with the irony of the human condition rooted in its 
linguistic predicament, believing against all odds and failures that the second coming of the Word
—human word turned divine—will inevitably take place.   
VI. Conclusion
As an epitome of the ontological rupture between the finite and the infinite, Romantic 
irony remained a major problem for Russian Symbolism until the time of its dissolution as a 
movement and well beyond for its individual representatives. Andrei Belyi, in particular, would 
be concerned with the unsettling epistemic consequences stemming from the perspectival 
multiplicity inherent in the Romantic ironist's stance. In order to override the ironic vision of the 
Universe as being fraught with ineradicable contingencies, irreconcilable contradictions, and 
multiplying relativities, the Russian Symbolist seeks to create an absolute system of knowledge 
in an effort to remedy the tragic metaphysical split represented for him in the empirical domain 
by conflicting and increasingly divergent systems of values—the poles of science and art. Belyi's 
ingenious, albeit not entirely successful, attempt to construct a discontinuous system of 
Symbolism as an all-encompassing worldview by reconciling the opposites of a totalizing Idealist
system and a Romantic fragment is explored in chapter 2, “A Vicious Circle: From Philosophy as
Science to Philosophy as Art.” 
The other approach taken by the second generation of Russian Symbolists in their quest to
defuse the nihilistic implications of Romantic irony as an ontological vision lies in the revival of 
tragedy, not only as an aesthetic genre but also as a mode of being in the world. Thus, Aleksandr 
Blok and Viacheslav Ivanov seek to move from the subjective type of tragedy (the so-called 
lyrical drama) inaugurated by the Romantics to the objective type which would reunify the 
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shattered cohesion between the alienated individual(ist) and the community, thereby paving the 
way for the triumph of the theurgic ideal as a living mystery play. Apart from aesthetic 
experiments, Blok and Belyi also make an effort to transpose the tragic mode of existence from 
the sphere of art proper into the realm of life itself. The Symbolists' engagement with the genre of
tragedy, together with their theurgic task of eradicating Romantic irony as an ontological sickness
through cathartic cleansing, will be examined in chapter 3, “The Symbolist ''Romantic Debacle'': 
Between Tragedy and the Tragic Idea.”  
158
Chapter II
A Vicious Circle: From Philosophy as Science to Philosophy as Art
I. Introduction
Russian religious philosophy, including its Symbolist branch, emerges as a response to 
what is perceived as a profound epistemological failure of 19th-century continental philosophy. 
Western thought, in both its “rationalist” (Idealist) and “empiricist” (positivist) manifestations, is 
increasingly seen by Russian philosophers as being unable to conceptualize absolute truth, 
leading to empty formalism, relativity, and, ultimately, nihilism. This incapacity of continental 
philosophy to construct a viable worldview built around the objectivity of immutable truth is 
deemed a dire threat to the ontological status of values. The collapse of the Absolute (the highest 
truth in epistemology) presages the crumbling of all systems of values, thereby opening the door 
to ironic relativity and social anarchy. To salvage the objectivity and knowability of absolute 
truth, the metaphysical anchor of universal values, Vladimir Solov'ev and his disciple, Andrei 
Belyi, seek to work out new types of philosophy incorporating western philosophical heritage (an
Idealist system as a method of cognition) into a variety of synthetic, hybrid, philosophical forms. 
Russian Symbolism therefore marks the last-ditch attempt to construct a full-fledged 
worldview founded on absolute truth before the onset of modernist and postmodernist epochs 
that progressively reject not only the knowability (modernism) but also the very existence 
(postmodernism) of objective truth. To counter the rapid descent of continental thought into 
ironic relativism and nihilism spurred by the hegemony of reason, Solov'ev attempts to reinvest 
“the empty shell” of western philosophy (reason) with positive content (religion) in his 
metaphysical philosophy of All-in-Oneness, while Belyi elaborates a system of Symbolism 
seeking to unify the conflicting and increasingly divergent systems of values represented by the 
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poles of “science” and “art” in the all-encompassing Absolute. Both synthetic attempts at 
establishing ontologically grounded worldviews prove unsuccessful, however, since the hybrid 
systems invariably break down, undermined from within by the inherent negativity of “western 
reason” that those systems incorporate. The deeply troubling paradox laid bare by the failed 
synthetic forms showed that the systematic form itself, a product of reason, undermines absolute 
truth that it is supposed to cognize and establish in the first place. 
The collapse of systematic metaphysical philosophy in Russia highlights the impotence of
philosophy steered by reason to resolve the critical problem of the ontological nature of objective
truth. This inability to secure universal truth by conceptual means leads to the profound loss of 
faith in reason, condemnation of system as a mode of conceptualization of the Absolute, and to 
the quest for alternative forms of philosophizing. The turn away from reason (“philosophy as 
science”) results in the resurgence of “philosophy as art” originally pioneered by the early 
German Romantics (Fr. Schlegel and Novalis, in particular). This dramatic shift toward the 
aesthetic as the most adequate form of cognition and expression of absolute truth is already 
discernible in the late work of Vladimir Solov'ev, who, after the definitive collapse of his 
systematic endeavors, repudiates reason altogether and embraces philosophy as art as a medium 
for exploring and communicating his eschatological intuitions (Three Conversations).
However, Romantic philosophy as art mounts another type of challenge for the Russian 
philosophers seeking the cognition and/or the attainment of the Absolute. The Romantics, who 
were the first to challenge the fundamental Idealist notions of the unconditioned ground (“first 
principle”) and systematic completeness, hold that philosophy, like an ancient epic poem, always 
starts “in the middle.” Both absolute “beginnings” and “ends” are inaccessible to the finite 
human mind and the sphere of philosophical inquiry is entirely limited to the historical. 
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Philosophy itself is nothing but a history of philosophy and none of its multiple competing 
systems can therefore aspire to the status of the absolute system. The actual state of our 
knowledge is incomplete and fragmentary and the integration of fragments into the definitive 
absolute system (otherwise referred to, in aesthetic terms, as “a perfect work of art”) is 
envisioned as a process of systematization that will never come to an end. The precarious 
condition of metaphysical groundlessness is an inherent part of being human, which is not to be 
deplored but rather to be celebrated. While the early Romantics acknowledge that the 
intellectual/aesthetic intuition can momentarily transport one beyond the finite (historical 
actuality) into the sphere of the infinite, neither a philosopher nor an artist, as they persistently 
emphasize, can express their insights in any other form but that of a linguistic representation 
(“utterance”). Irony is recommended by the early German Romantics as an indispensable 
corrective to the philosophers on the quest for the Absolute, for history and language cannot be 
transcended, and the Absolute as a fullness of being and knowledge can never be attained but 
only striven for.      
The inextricability of the creative act from the historical and the linguistic is the major 
challenge that the Russian practitioners of philosophy as art inherit from the early Romantics. 
Belyi, who in his theory of Symbolism seeks a synthesis of science and art, finds the path of art 
(as theurgy) toward the Absolute as unfulfilling as that of science. Instead of superseding 
Romanticism that plagues Belyi in the figure of his doppelgänger, Gogol', the Russian Symbolist 
cannot help but perform the same tragic role as Orpheus who fails to save Eurydice, a 
personification of Russia, from the clutches of death. Like Gogol', Belyi is confronted with the 
limitations of the medium of art. Unlike theurgy that remains an unfulfilled ideal, art is incapable 
of delivering the Absolute, since it is nothing more than a creative word of man that produces 
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only a series of finite representations as opposed to the creative word of God that transforms life. 
In his failure to bring about the theurgic transfiguration of the world, Belyi has to face the 
interminable arabesques of history which, for him, increasingly come to be identified with the 
tragic. 
The limitations of the “philosophy as art” approach in relation to cognizing and 
articulating absolute truth become most discernible in the aesthetico-philosophical projects 
pursued by two Russian religious thinkers, Nikolai Berdiaev and Lev Shestov, who were loosely 
affiliated with the Symbolist movement. Berdiaev, who, in contrast to the Symbolist Belyi, 
entirely repudiates the Idealist ideal of systematicity in favor of philosophy as art, is confronted 
with the same Romantic challenge. Similar to Belyi and other Symbolists, Berdiaev posits a 
creative (theurgic) act as a sought-for way to transform the world of necessity into the world of 
freedom, embodied for him as the fulfillment of Solov'ev's ideal of Godmanhood. However, in 
the fashion of Gogol' and Belyi, Berdiaev finds himself entangled in the same negative dialectic 
between creative inspiration and its material manifestation (a representation). A creative act that 
allows a philosopher or an artist to break through into the infinite realm of the Spirit has no other 
medium to realize itself than that of language that “objectifies” the inspiration by turning the 
transcendent vision into yet another product of culture. In other words, instead of “other being” 
(“inoe bytie”), man, as the Romantics already forewarned, is doomed to create mere artifacts. In 
his search to transcend the historical by means of the creative act (“philosophy as art”), Berdiaev,
like Belyi earlier, finds himself trapped in the historical and the linguistic.
Lev Shestov's practice of philosophy as art further exposes the impossibility of 
surmounting the Romantic challenge. Unlike Belyi and Berdiaev who still seek to forge a 
compromise between the Idealist conception of the Absolute as universal truth and the Romantic 
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vision of philosophy as art, Shestov radically separates the hitherto nearly identical concepts of 
the eternal Absolute and cognizable universal truth. For Shestov, Being is irrational and can be 
presented as intelligible and unified only by making it conform through violence to the general 
idea elevated into universal (objective) truth. Absolute truth, however, is not complete, self-
identical, transparent to reason, and universal, as was thought by the Idealists, but fragmentary, 
paradoxical, incomprehensible, and deeply subjective. A fleeting glimpse of it can be revealed to 
man only in the depths of his inwardness in the process of intensive solitary struggle. The 
extreme subjectivity and irrationality of truth makes it incommunicable via human language, 
generating the paradox of the entire Shestovian philosophical enterprise. Since absolute truth is 
inexplicable and inexpressible, Shestov has no other way of asserting its existence than by 
negation in the name of that unknown and unknowable truth. The negative thrust is directed 
against reason that stands in the way between man and faith associated with absolute truth. This 
battle against the corrupting influence of reason cannot, however, be fought by any other means 
than that of reason and, its ally, conceptual language, themselves. Thus, Shestov finds himself 
caught in an endless ironic cycle, in which reason that he defeats is perpetuated in the very 
moment it seems to be definitively vanquished. 
                                        
II. The End of Systematic Philosophy or Vladimir Solov'ev's Aesthetic Turn
In response to the crisis in western post-Kantian philosophy, Vladimir Solov'ev seeks to 
rejuvenate the philosophical enterprise, reduced to its “negative form,” by infusing it with “the 
positive content”—Christian religion. His solution to the crisis comes in the form of the synthetic
philosophy of All-in-Oneness193 which would reunite reason and faith both in theory and in 
193 For more information on Solov'ev's philosophical project of All-in-Oneness (“Vseedinstvo”), see Samuel D. 
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practice. This synthesis, in Solov'ev's vision, is to be brought about under the guidance of reason 
which is given precedence over religion. Resorting to system building as the most adequate 
(because purely rational) vehicle for such a task, the Russian philosopher finds himself 
inextricably entangled in the same epistemological issues that led post-Kantian philosophy to its 
impasse. Constrained by the formal demands of a philosophical system, Solov'ev cannot but 
appropriate the solution—the doctrine of pantheism—worked out by the Idealist branch of 
philosophy to address Kant's challenge to the possibility of knowledge. 
This pantheistic solution, however, puts Solov'ev at odds with the major tenets of 
Christianity which he is compelled to replace with surrogates congenial to reason in order to 
accommodate the restrictions imposed by the systematic approach. As a result, the truth of 
Revelation, “the positive content” of philosophy, vanishes from his system and the synthesis 
which is achieved is falsified and not viable. In this light, as the failure of Solov'ev's synthetic 
project of All-in-Oneness demonstrates, the union between reason and faith is not possible within
the framework of a philosophical system. Religious truth, the mystical truth of Revelation, cannot
be transposed uncompromised into a system. Confronted with the impossibility of reconciling 
reason and faith, Solov'ev comes in the end to renounce a philosophical system as a means of 
conceptualizing the Absolute and to embrace the aesthetic as the most appropriate medium of 
apprehending and conveying the divine. This move away from a system to art as an alternative 
way of pursuing truth paves the way for reconceptualizing the philosophical enterprise in Russian
religious thought. Thus, Solov'ev's aesthetic turn brings Russian philosophy closer to the 
Cioran, Vladimir Soloviev and the Knighthood of the Divine Sophia;  P. P. Gaidenko, Vladimir Solov'ev and 
filosofiia Serebrianogo veka; N. O. Losskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii (92-154); M. A. Maslin, Istoriia russkoi 
filosofii (333-348); Konstantin Mochul'skii, Vladimir Solov'ev. Zhizn' i uchenie; S. M. Solov'ev, Vladimir 
Solovyov: His Life and Creative Evolution; Jonathan Sutton, The Religious Philosophy of Vl. Solovyov: Towards 
a Reassessment; E.N. Trubetskoi, Mirosozertsanie Vl. S. Solov'eva; V. V. Zenkovskii, Istoriia Russkoi 
Philosophii, vol. 2. 
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Romantic legacy of philosophizing.
Solov'ev's life-long efforts to construct a comprehensive world outlook (“tsel'noe 
mirosozertsanie”) in the form of an all-embracing metaphysical system is a response to what he 
considered a crisis in western philosophy. In his dissertation, appropriately titled The Crisis of 
Western Philosophy (Krizis zapadnoi filosofii, 1874), the Russian philosopher attributes the 
present debacle to the ascendancy of discursive reason (“otvlechennoe ili rassudochnoe 
myshlenie”) over faith: “The overall limitation of western philosophy is a one-side prevalence of 
discursive analysis, establishing abstract notions in their separateness and thereby necessarily 
hypostatizing them”194 (SS I: 110). As a consequence of its divorce from religion, modern 
philosophy, devoid of all positive (i.e. religious) content, lost its vital connection with moral 
reality and acquired a purely theoretical and increasingly abstract character: 
Having been rooted therefore in the separation between a particular individual and 
society, philosophy marks the beginning of division between theory and practice, 
between school and life […] The impossibility of having a practical significance stemmed
from its [philosophy's] task that constituted in defining the fundamental elements of 
Being, the eternal order of things, and the relation of that eternal order of things to the 
knowing subject.195 (SS I: 118-120)
Instead of dealing with what ought to be, western philosophy became inextricably entangled with
what is. In other words, the entire philosophical project in the wake of Kant's Criticism was 
194 “ ... общ[ая] ограниченность западной философии — односторонее преобладание рассудочного анализа, 
утверждающего отвлеченные понятия в их отдельности и вследствие этого необходимо их 
гипостазирующего.”
195 “Коренясь таким образом в раздвоении между отдельным лицом и обществом, философия тем самым 
есть начало распадения между теорией и практикой, между школой и жизнью [...] невозможность иметь 
практическое значение вытекала прямо из ее [philosophy's] задачи, заключавшейся в определении общих 
основных начал сущего, вечной природы вещей и отношения вечной природы вещей к субъекту как 
познающему.”  
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reduced to epistemology and its limitations. In the light of post-Kantian philosophy's 
preoccupation with the problem of the possibility of knowledge, Solov'ev looks for the roots of 
the crisis in the epistemological issues with which it obsessively grapples. 
The whole development of modern western philosophy, as Solov'ev sees it, is driven by 
the epistemological questions and concerns that it cannot successfully resolve. Both dominant 
branches of modern philosophy, identified by the Russian philosopher as “rationalist” and 
“empirical,” reach an impasse. In its continuous struggle with dichotomies (the Cartesian mind 
and body problem; Kantian dualisms between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the sensible 
and the conceptual), the rationalist current of philosophy that runs from Descartes to Hegel 
eventually culminates in the complete banishment of both the object (Nature) and the subject 
(consciousness), thereby absolutizing a pure act of cognition itself. Empiricism, on the other 
hand, inevitably leads either to the triumph of absolute skepticism, as in the case of Hume, or 
takes one back to the deadlock of Kant's dualisms, as in the case of positivism. The development 
of pre-Kantian empirical philosophy results in skepticism concerning the overall possibility of 
knowledge, since causality that grounds the veracity of empirical cognition, as Hume 
demonstrates, does not possess unconditioned validity and as a result might be nothing more than
a mere habit of mind. By contending that one can know only the world of phenomena given by 
the external senses, positivism, in its own turn, revives Kant's unknowable “thing-in-itself” and 
therefore the pernicious dualism between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Thus, as Solov'ev 
shows in his critique, philosophical enterprise in the West has come full circle. Regardless of the 
route taken by philosophy, it ends up with the apotheosis of pure nothing.
 The solution to the unfolding crisis in European philosophy, as envisioned by Solov'ev, 
lies in the organic reunion of reason (science and philosophy) and Christian faith (religion) 
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within the framework of a philosophical system. The negative form, “the pure nothing,” of 
modern philosophy should be reinvested with the positive content of Christian religion. The 
universal synthesis of philosophy and religion is posed by the Russian philosopher as the ultimate
goal and culmination of human intellectual development: 
... the experience of synthetic philosophy, i.e. the one that does not establish itself in its 
separateness and uniqueness and strives toward inner unity with the other two branches 
of knowledge—theology and positive science—in order to realize complete and integral 
truth... the fulfillment of such synthesis is the highest intellectual task of the coming 
epoch.196 (SS I: 246)
Yet, while criticizing western philosophy for advancing the cause of reason at the expense of 
religion, the Russian philosopher appropriates its systematic (“rationalist”) approach as a vehicle 
for achieving the projected synthesis, thereby granting the unconditioned status to discursive 
reason as well. Although, at first glance, faith and reason might appear to be on an equal footing 
in Solov'ev's thinking, they are not endowed with the same standing or legitimacy in his synthetic
enterprise, for the final synthesis is to take place under the guidance, or rather dictatorship, of 
reason. 
To start with, for Solov'ev, genuine faith should not be a naïve and childlike belief, 
grounded in irrational feeling, but a fully conscious conviction interrogated and reaffirmed by 
reason. According to the Russian philosopher, Christian faith lost its former hold over mankind 
because it became buried under the dross of lies and prejudices intolerable to human rationality. 
To regain its eroded authority and legitimacy, faith must be cleansed by reason of all the 
196 “ ... опыт синтетической философии, т. е. такой которая не утверждает себя в своей отвлеченности или 
исключительности, а для осуществления полной, цельной истины стремится к внутреннему соединению с
двумя другими областями знания — теологией и положительной наукой... осуществление такого синтеза 
и есть высшая умственная задача наступающей эпохи.” 
167
preconceptions and misjudgments accumulated over the centuries. When people apprehend 
Christian truth through the lens of rationality in all its original fullness and power, they will 
necessarily come to believe in it, and once they come to believe in it, they cannot but reform their
lives in accordance with it: “When Christianity becomes a true conviction, i.e. the one that people
live by, [and] actualize in reality, then all will apparently change”197 (qtd. in Mochul'skii, 
Vladimir Solov'ev 40). Solov'ev's reasoning, succinctly expressed by Mochul'skii, proceeds as 
follows: 
Understanding, faith, and life, in Solov'ev's conception, follow one another with the 
necessity of logical deduction. And since all depends on and stems from understanding, 
one must first of all act on reason: feeling and will will follow it [reason] as necessarily 
as the conclusion follows premises in a syllogism.198 (Ibid.)
In order to transform the world, Christian truth must first become transparent and amenable to 
reason.  
Solov'ev places reason and faith in a hierarchical relationship, in which discursive reason 
possesses an unequivocal superiority and religion occupies a strictly subordinate position. Reason
is called upon to judge and vindicate faith as well as to select whatever is valuable in religion 
from the purely rational perspective. While the truth of Revelation must be verified and 
reaffirmed by reason, the faculty of reason itself is elevated by the Russian philosopher beyond 
all interrogation. Thus, for Solov'ev, no less than for John Scottus Eriugena, a medieval scholastic
philosopher, whom he critiques as a precursor of modern western rationalism, “authority acquires
197 “Когда же христианство станет действительным убеждением, т. е. таким, по которому люди будут жить, 
осуществлять его в действительности, тогда очевидно все изменится.”  
198 “Понимание, вера и жизнь в представлении Соловьева следуют друг за другом с необходимостью 
логической дедукции. А раз все зависит и исходит из понимания, то прежде всего нужно действовать на 
разум: чувство и воля за ним последуют столь же неизбежно, как в силлогизме вывод следует из 
посылок.”  
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its significance only when it is validated by reason; reason, on the other hand, is not in need of 
any validation on the part of authority, for it establishes itself [without the aid of external 
authority]”199 (SS I: 33). The fundamental belief of all rationalist philosophers, which is implicitly
embraced by Solov'ev, is that reason does not stand in need of any external verification and 
therefore justification, since it contains the foundation and criteria of its own veracity within 
itself.
As irony would have it, while condemning the rationalist excesses of continental 
philosophy, Solov'ev subscribes to the same point of view that led to these excesses in the first 
place. Like his European predecessors, he unequivocally acknowledges the omnipotence of 
reason allegedly grounded in its self-sufficiency. As in medieval thought that first wrestled with 
this thorny issue, Solov'ev's projected reconciliation of faith and reason, with the latter at the 
helm, “proves in actuality an acknowledgment of the exclusive rights of reason”200 because, as 
the Russian philosopher himself puts it with such impeccable logic, “if it [the authority of 
religion] is in agreement with reason, then it is obviously not necessary; if it [authority] is in 
conflict with reason, then it is false”201 (SS I: 30). Thus, already in its conception, Solov'ev's 
philosophy turns out to be as “individualistic” and alienated from “the people's religious 
consciousness” as modern European philosophy or its progenitor, medieval scholasticism. 
Moreover, the task that the Russian philosopher sets forth for himself is virtually identical
with that pursued by medieval church after it lost the spontaneity and immediacy of faith: 
“Therefore the task of medieval philosophy: to reconcile faith with reason or to vindicate faith 
199 “... авторитет получает значение только тогда, когда подтверждается разумом, разум же, напротив, ни в 
каком подтверждении со стороны авторитета не нуждается, но сам себя утверждает.” 
200 “... оказывается в действительности признанием исключительных прав разума.”   
201 “... если он [авторитет религии] согласен с разумом, то он очевидно не нужен, если он [авторитет] 
противоречит разуму, то он ложен.” 
169
before reason—was not the task of the common people's consciousness,—[for] it was not in need
of such a reconciliation—it was  the task posed by the separate individual intellect”202 (SS I: 120).
This deep-seated kinship with European rationalism is further betrayed by the fact that Solov'ev 
employs almost the same words to expose the hopelessness of the individualistic scholastic 
endeavor in his early work and to reaffirm his own synthetic mission at a later stage of his career:
“To vindicate faith of our fathers, to raise [faith] to a new stage of rational awareness, [and] to 
show that ancient faith coincides with eternal and universal truth... is the general goal of my 
present work”203 (SS IV: 214). Thus, Solov'ev remains closer to the rationalist strand of western 
philosophy than he is willing to admit. 
To make Christian truth defensible before the judgment of reason, one must, according to 
Solov'ev, “introduce the eternal content of Christianity into a new adequate form, that is an 
unconditionally rational form”204 (qtd. in Mochul'skii, Vladimir Solov'ev 40). This 
“unconditionally rational” form which would render the opaque Revelation transparent must 
come from the sphere of philosophy: “Positive science provides only material to true knowledge, 
the ideal form is supplied by philosophy, and absolute content [is furnished] by theology”205 (SS 
I: 247). This “ideal” form is nothing other than a philosophical system, a product of European 
rationalist thought. In other words, the truth of Revelation should discard the poetic form of the 
Scriptures that appeals almost exclusively to feeling and assume the form of a rigorous 
systematic exposition that would make it conform to the demands of discursive reason. Solov'ev 
202 “Таким образом задача средневековой философии: примирить веру с разумом или оправдать веру перед 
разумом — не была задачей общeго народного сознания, — оно не нуждалось в таком примирении, — это
была задача только отдельного личного ума.”    
203 “Оправдать веру отцов наших, возвести на новую ступень разумного сознания, показать, что древняя 
вера... совпадает с вечной и вселенской истиной... вот общая задача моего труда.”   
204 “... ввести вечное содержание христианства в новую, соответствующую ему, т. е. разумную безусловно 
форму.” 
205 “Положительная наука дает только материал истинному знанию, идеальная же форма дается ему 
философией, а абсолютное содержание теологией.” 
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believes that the content of Christianity would neither be compromised nor lost but rather 
enhanced in its appeal and intelligibility once it is rationally explicated and systematically 
presented.    
 Yet, instead of being amplified, the truth of Revelation is eroded in Solov'ev's religious 
philosophy. Systematic form takes over the positive content of Christianity and reshapes it in its 
own image, leaving it distorted, if not entirely void in the end. Lev Shestov, one of the sharpest 
critics of the cult of reason and its product, a philosophical system, was particularly sensitive to 
the erosion of faith in Solov'ev's philosophy: “He set himself the task of vindicating Revelation 
before reason at all costs—and in the end, there was nothing left of Revelation [in his 
philosophy] at all”206 (Umozrenie i otkrovenie 46). Discursive reason, which is given superior 
authority over its religious counterpart, ousts the genuine spirit of Christianity by supplanting it 
with pseudo-Christian surrogates that it can unproblematically arrange in a well-ordered system 
and unite in a higher synthesis with itself. The ultimate synthesis, if it can be called so, that takes 
place in Solov'ev's religious philosophy is not between reason and faith but rather between reason
and reason's proxies (monistic pan(en)theism and the Kantian realm of ends) offered in western 
philosophy under the name of religion, or, occasionally more honestly, as substitutes for it. 
This underhand substitution of Christianity with surrogates acceptable to reason that takes
place both in the ontological and ethical spheres of Solov'ev's philosophy is predetermined by the
form itself. By choosing a philosophical system as an “ideal” vehicle for conveying the truth of 
Revelation, the Russian philosopher commits himself from the outset to a certain order of 
exposition which cannot be neglected if a system is to be viable. A system-builder is expected to 
206 “Он задался целью во что бы то ни стало оправдать Откровение перед разумом — и, в конце концов, у 
него от Откровения ничего не осталось.”  
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open his system by delineating his epistemology. The purpose of epistemology is to explicate and
justify the principles of knowledge, by means of which truth was attained by the philosopher. 
Thus, the veracity and validity of the entire system, regardless of whether epistemology itself is 
of primary or secondary preoccupation to the thinker, is entirely dependent upon his theory of 
knowledge. While epistemology may not be in the foreground (as, for example, in Solov'ev who 
privileges ethics), it, nevertheless, predetermines and directs the construction of the argument in 
the other parts of the system, such as ontology and ethics. And it is the epistemological 
predicament inherited by Solov'ev from the “rationalist” current of European philosophy, German
Idealism, that confines him to the only available solution—ontological pantheism. This remedy 
admissible to reason, however, proves averse to the very spirit of Christianity. As irony would 
have it, Solov'ev finds his own synthesis of philosophy and Christian religion derailed by post-
Kantian epistemology that he sets out to supersede.       
As an heir to German Idealism and all its outstanding epistemological issues, Solov'ev 
cannot bypass the problem of the inherent limits of cognition posed by Kant's First Critique. 
Concerned as he is with the possibility of metaphysical knowledge questioned by Kant, Solov'ev 
has to find a way to justify the premise around which his entire metaphysical system is 
constructed—intelligibility as the fundamental predicate of being: “There must exist a certain 
correspondence between the phenomenal world known to us and the metaphysical world that 
serves as its true foundation, and it is on this correspondence that the possibility of metaphysical 
knowledge is established”207 (SS II: 325). This correspondence between empirical and 
metaphysical worlds that safeguards the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is ultimately 
207 “... между известным нам феноменальным миром и миром метафизическим, как его подлинной основой, 
должно быть определенное соответствие, на чем и утверждается возможность метафизического 
познания.”  
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grounded by the Russian philosopher in the consubstantiality of what Kant called “the noumenal”
and “the phenomenal”: “Phenomena cannot be separated from essence and it [essence] is more or
less cognized in them; … the subjective mode of being of forms of cognition does not prevent 
them from being in correspondence to independent reality situated outside the confines of the 
knowing subject”208 (SS II: 328). The assertion of the consubstantiality of the spiritual and the 
sensible attests to Solov'ev's at least partial endorsement of ontological monism, a theory that 
rejects the existence of the duality between God and the world or, in other words, pantheism, a 
doctrine that identifies God with the Universe. Most likely, he adopted this pantheistic solution to
Kant's problem of knowledge from Baruch Spinoza, who sought to resolve Cartesian mind-body 
dualism, as well as from the Spinozistic line of thought that took hold in German Idealism and 
Romanticism in the wake of Kantian Critical philosophy. 
This adoption of (the elements of) pantheism by Solov'ev is necessitated by his quest to 
resolve the epistemological issues originated in European philosophy. Yet while monistic 
pantheism establishes and justifies the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, it proves itself 
totally incompatible with the Christian conception of God. The irreconcilable nature of the two is
already evident in Spinoza's doctrine which, in its union of God and Nature, may have served for 
Solov'ev as an earlier, allegedly successful, embodiment of the religion of science and the science
of religion so eagerly sought by the Russian philosopher. In his endorsement of monistic 
pantheism, however, Spinoza pursued a goal contrary to the mission envisioned by Solov'ev. 
Instead of reuniting religion and science/philosophy, Spinoza sought, on the contrary, to divorce 
the two. Thus, it was nobody else but Spinoza, Solov'ev's first philosophical love, who actually 
208 “Явления не могут быть отделены от сущего и … оно в них более или менее познается; … субъективное 
бытие наших познавательных форм не мешает им соответствовать независимым реальностям за 
пределами познающего субъекта.”     
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“cut the umbilical cord which tied philosophy to religion” (Feldman 7). Furthermore, according 
to Wolfson, it is Spinoza, and not Descrates, who deserves the title of “the first modern 
philosopher” because it was he who effectively broke with the established religious tradition by 
refusing to rely on it as a major source of information and by employing exclusively scientific 
means (the geometrical method) for arriving at philosophical truth (5). Spinoza's advocacy of 
God as an eternal, necessary order of nature is actually a de facto demonstration of the non-
existence of the personal God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. The purpose of Spinoza's 
pantheistic project was, in other words, to “replace the traditional conception of God as a 
superhuman person with the scientifically inspired conception of nature as an infinite, necessary 
self-contained, and, above all, thoroughly intelligible system” (Allison 82). 
Thus, by accepting pantheism that proclaims the consubstantiality of spirit and nature as a
remedy for the epistemological problem, Solov'ev finds himself confronted with another grave 
dilemma, this time in the ontological sphere. He has to find a way to reconcile the irreconcilable
—impersonal pantheism with the Christian personalistic conception of God. In search for a 
solution, the Russian philosopher resorts to panentheism, a philosophical doctrine upholding that 
while being greater than the Universe, God at the same time includes and interpenetrates it. 
Panentheism is, in other words, an attempt to synthesize theism (god as a supreme being) and 
pantheism (God is all). For this purpose, in The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge 
(Filosofskie nachala tsel'nogo znaniia, 1877) and The Critique of Abstract Principles (Kritika 
otvlechennykh nachal, 1877-1880), Solov'ev works out the ontological theory about the two 
poles, the eternal and the dynamic, coexisting within the Absolute: 
The Аbsolute is necessarily differentiated into two poles or two centers in all eternity: the 
first—the origin of the unconditioned unity and oneness as such, the origin of the freedom
174
from all forms, from all manifestation, and consequently from all being; the second—the 
origin of or the productive force of being, that is the plurality of forms. On the one hand, 
the absolute [which] is higher than all being, is the unconditioned oneness, the positive 
nothing; on the other hand, it is the spontaneous potentiality of being or prima materia 
[…] The second pole is the essence or prima materia of the absolute, [whereas] the first 
one is the absolute itself, the positive nothing (Ein-Sof); this is not some new substance 
distinct from the absolute but the absolute itself that has established itself by affirming its 
own opposite.209 (SS I: 350) 
In his Lectures on Divine Humanity (Chteniia o Bogochelovechestve, 1877-1881), Solov'ev 
comes to explicitly equate the first, eternal, pole of the Absolute with the personal God revealed 
to the Jewish people and the second, dynamic, pole with the ideal, rationally comprehensible, 
cosmos revealed to the Greek genius (110). The synthesis between these two entities (the eternal 
God and the ideal Universe) was, according to the Russian philosopher, first accomplished 
theoretically by the Alexandrian Neoplatonists in their teaching about the Trinity and personally 
by Christ in history (111). 
Yet, while panentheism apparently allows Solov'ev to salvage the Christian conception of 
God as a supreme transcendent being existing independent from his creation, it, nevertheless, 
conflicts with a number of fundamental Christian tenets.210 First of all, it is at variance with the 
209 “Абсолютное необходимо во всей вечности различается на два полюса или два центра: первый — начало 
безусловного единства или единичности как такой, начало свободы от всяких форм, от всякого 
проявления и, следовательно от всякого бытия; второй — начало или производящая сила бытия, то есть 
множественность форм. С одной стороны, абсолютное выше всякого бытия, есть безусловное единое, 
положительное ничто; с другой стороны, оно есть непосредственная потенция бытия или первая материя 
[…] Второй полюс есть сущность или prima materia абсолютного, первый же полюс есть само 
абсолютное как такое, положительное ничто (эн-соф); это не есть какая-нибудь новая отличная от 
абсолютного субстанция, а оно само, утвердившееся как такое через утверждение своего 
противоположного.”
210 For an in-depth critique of Solov'ev's efforts to synthesize pantheism and Christianity, refer to Konstantin 
Mochul'skii, Vladimir Solov'ev. Zhizn' i uchenie; E. N. Trubetskoi, Mirosozertsanie Vl. S. Solov'eva; V. V. 
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core Christian belief that God is a person. Despite Solov'ev's attempts to identify his Absolute 
with Christian God, it has, in fact, little in common with it. The personal Christian God is entirely
supplanted in Solov'ev's two-pole Absolute by the impersonal divine entity (“the origin of the 
unconditioned oneness”211) originated and elaborated in Neoplatonic, Gnostic, Kabbalistic, and 
Theosophic (German mystical) teachings, all of which display a varied degree of antichristian 
spirit and a prominent pantheistic orientation. 
Even though the Russian philosopher endeavors to assert the personalistic nature of the 
eternal pole of the Absolute through the assignment of the traditional Trinity names (God the 
Father, God the Son, and the Holy Spirit) to its three modes of being, there is in fact no trace of 
Christian personalistic supernaturalism, apart from the names, in Solov'ev's primordial abyss, 
“the positive nothing.” The “Ein-Sof,” that the Russian philosopher forcibly identifies with 
Christian God, is actually conceived in Kabbalah, its authentic source, as an infinite impersonal 
unnameable origin of all being, which was conceived as direct opposition to the notion of God as 
a person. Furthermore, in the spirit of the Neoplatonic “One” and the Kabbalistic “Ein-Sof,” 
Solov'ev's “positive nothing” does not create the Universe distinct from itself in a free act of 
creation, the way it is construed in Christian orthodoxy, but, rather, projects itself, necessarily but
also freely, into its own opposite, the second absolute pole, or prima materia, thereby eternally 
encompassing it within itself as its own manifested essence (Idea). It is this second pole of the 
Absolute that constitutes the true origin of all being, the Universe, and embodies, for Solov'ev, 
the idea of Godmanhood.
Solov'ev's turn to panentheism to resolve the epistemological predicament that originated 
Zenkovskii, Istoriia Russkoi Philosophii, vol. 2.  For a critique of the pantheistic doctrine from the standpoint of 
Christianity, refer to A. I. Osipov, Put' razuma v posikakh istiny. 
211 “начало безусловного единства”
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in continental philosophy produces reverberations not only in the ontological sphere but in the 
ethical dimension as well. Most of the ethical problems that plague his system stem directly from
his partial endorsement of pantheism. The implications for his system are two-fold. First of all, 
there arises the thorny question of the origin and status of evil. By asserting that God and Nature 
are of the same essence, the Russian philosopher has to reject the metaphysical status of evil. For 
Solov'ev, evil does not possess independent existence since all possible existence is in God. Evil 
is only an appearance. The physical world is a distorted image of the divine and this distortion 
originates as a result of the World Soul's (i.e., prima materia's) sin, her fall away from God. But 
since evil, in Solov'ev's conception, is not self-subsistent and the World-Soul, the fallen Nature, is
one with God, it necessarily follows that evil is an inherent part of God's essence itself. Being of 
the same substance with God, the World Soul does not have freedom of will and since she cannot
act of her own volition, one cannot help but draw a conclusion that it is nobody else but God 
himself who desires and orchestrates prima materia's fall into sin. An inextricable contradiction 
emerges. While Solov'ev claims that evil is nothing but appearance, the hidden premises upon 
which he constructed his system testify to the very opposite: evil is metaphysical and it originates
in God himself. Viewed in the light of these disturbing ethical implications, Solov'ev's God bears 
more resemblance to the evil Gnostic demiurgic creator of the material Universe212 than to the 
Christian God who is all Good.    
The second major complication that arises out of Solov'ev's embrace of pan(e)theism is 
the absence of freedom in his system. Lack of free will is already evident in the nature of the 
metaphysical fall of the World Soul that results in the origin of the Universe. The banishment of 
212 On the Gnostic conception of the Universe that exerted a significant influence on Solov'ev's philosophy of All-in-
Oneness, see Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion. 
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freedom, however, has an even more dramatic set of consequences when it comes to the 
projected ideal of Godmanhood. 
The ideal of Godmanhood was not only theoretical (“integral knowledge”213) but also and 
primarily practical (“integral life”214). As Trubetskoi explicates Solov'ev's conception of the 
Absolute:
The Absolute is not only a foundation of cognition but also a foundation of all that is; at 
the same time it is the sought-for meaning of the thinking process as well as of the life 
process as a whole. Furthermore, it is simulatenously the essence and what ought to be, 
the ideal of cognition and true content—the norm of every action.215 (Vl. S. Solov'ev's 
Worldview I: 110)  
In this light, man's task is not only to come to know the world as All-in-One (“mir kak 
vseedinstvo”) but also and more importantly to realize it in actuality. This vision of All-in-
Oneness, for Solov'ev, must become a guiding ideal, a beacon, in the entire human life: man, and 
through him the whole Universe, must overcome the current (“fallen”) state of fragmentation and
alienation and achieve wholeness within the Absolute. To reunite with God, man must attain the 
state of Godmanhood by becoming one with Christ. The realization of the ideal is conceived as 
the arrival of the Kingdom of God on earth which, for the Russian philosopher, necessarily takes 
the form of free theocracy.216 
While Solov'ev's professed final goal, the Kingdom of God on earth, is religious, the 
213  “цельное знание”
214 “целостная жизнь”
215 “Абсолютное не есть только основание познания, но и основание всего, что есть; вместе с тем оно — и 
искомый смысл как мыслительного процесса, так и вообще всего процесса жизни. В одно и то же время 
оно есть и сущее и быть долженствующее, и идеал познания и истинное содержание — норма всякой 
деятельности.”  
216 Solov'ev elaborates on his ideal of free theocracy in The Critique of Abstract Principles (Kritika otvlechennykh 
nachal, 1877-1880), The History and Future of Theocracy (Istoriia i budushchnost' teokratii, 1885-1887), and 
Russia and the Universal Church (Rossiia i vselenskaia tserkov', 1889). 
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ethics underlying his ideal of free theocracy is “rationalist,” Kantian, at its very core. The entire 
edifice of free theocracy in his ethical vision is predicated on Kant's idea of obligation rather than
on the idea of Christian love. Christian love is a universal state which is to be achieved upon the 
realization of the Absolute rather than an active moral principle to be practiced as means of 
attaining that ideal. Solov'ev's free theocracy is, in the last analysis, the Kantian realm of ends 
grounded in the dictates of the categorical imperative concealed under the trappings of 
Christianity. 
There is a long-standing debate among scholars as to the nature of the relation between 
Kant's categorical imperative and the so called Golden Rule as it is expressed in Christian ethics. 
S. B. Thomas in “Jesus and Kant,” for instance, argues that the categorical imperative and the 
concept of Christian love as it is explicated in the New Testament are nearly identical as the 
universal principles of morality. In Thomas' interpretation, Kantian ethics simply supplies the 
missing rationale for Christian morality: “[The categorical imperative] provides the rational 
''form'' of a decision-making procedure that a Christian would follow anyway” (195). Thus, as it 
appears from this perspective, Kant's categorical imperative is nothing but a rationalized form of 
Christian love stripped of its religiosity. 
Yet, upon closer scrutiny, the two principles turn out to be incompatible, both from the 
standpoint of Kant's moral philosophy and of Christian religion. First of all, the notion of 
Christian love is based on the personal example of Christ, his virtuous life and teachings. In other
words, it is essentially an existential principle which, within the framework of Kant's ethical 
philosophy, would be considered heteronomous and therefore inadequate as a credible foundation
of universal ethics. More importantly, the categorical imperative does not admit of the concept of 
God, whereas a firm belief in the positive existence of God is indispensable to the very idea of 
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Christian love. For example, from the point of view of the Eastern Orthodox branch of 
Christianity (to which Solov'ev belonged by faith), Christian love, unlike Kant's categorical 
imperative, is not a product of the intellect but is the highest spiritual virtue. It is granted by the 
Holy Spirit to the one who has embraced the life of self-renunciation and asceticism and set out 
on the path of spiritual exploits. As clarified by Osipov: “True love for God and neighbor can be 
acquired only through the struggle with passions, weaknesses, temptations, through the 
fulfillment of God's commandments and repentance”217 (391). In this light, according to Eastern 
Orthodoxy, love is not a rational principle to be complied with but the highest spiritual virtue 
which can only be accomplished by the few. Thus, Christian love cannot be universally 
prescribed; it can only be voluntarily chosen by a person as a way of life. 
For Solov'ev, no less than for Kant, however, morals cannot be built on such a shaky 
ground as love for it cannot be deduced and understood by way of mere concepts. While the 
Russian philosopher differentiates between different types of love, he reduces all of them, 
including Christian love (SS II: 160), to the status of a personal inclination, thereby discrediting 
love as a possible ground for the foundation of ethics. Yet, in Eastern Orthodoxy, in contrast to 
Solov'ev's understanding, Christian love is viewed not as a psychological phenomenon but as a 
spiritual one. It is both a state and an active force, but this inner state that translates into an active
force is not a product of the strivings of the individual psyche but is granted exclusively as a gift 
by the Holy Spirit. As Osipov explicates the Orthodox conception of Christian love: 
The essence of true Christian love […] is completely different as compared to all the 
other types of love. According to the Holy Scriptures, it is a gift of the Holy Spirit and 
217 “Истинная любовь к Богу и ближнему приобретается только через борьбу со страстями, немощами, 
искушениями, через исполнение заповедей Божиих и покаяние.”
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not a product of emotional and intellectual strivings. As the Apostle Paul wrote: “… the 
love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us” (KJV, 
Romans 5:5). In other words, Christian love is spiritual, it is “the bond of perfectness” 
(KJV, Colossians 3:14) and, in Isaac Sirin's words, “it is a spiritual abode and [it] dwells 
only in the purity of the soul.”218 (396)
Thus, Christian love is received as the highest gift only by the one who has attained all the other 
Christian virtues, including the virtue of humility in the first place.
By disqualifying Christian love as a purely psychological phenomenon, Solov'ev, 
following Kant, seeks to build his ethics on purely rational conviction. Intuitive differentiation of 
good and evil that manifests itself in an individual conscience is not sufficient for the faculty of 
reason because it is too unreliable a measurement. If ethics does not entail a rational conviction, 
justified in its necessity, it cannot be affirmed as binding and cannot become a universal law. The 
foundational principle that serves as the determining ground of ethics must, according to 
Solov'ev, have a compulsory force that would make all mankind conform to it and abide by it. It 
is therefore Kant's categorical imperative of the moral law, theoretically demonstrable and 
universally binding, which is used by the Russian philosopher as a foundation for his ethics.
 Yet, unlike Kant, Solov'ev does not repudiate the idea of love altogether. Kant, on his 
part, saw no moral value in a natural inclination (such as love) and even considered its influence 
pernicious, capable of tarnishing and discrediting a genuinely moral action which was initially 
duly prompted by the idea of moral obligation. Solov'ev, on the other hand, does not banish the 
218 “Природа истинной христианской любви […] совершенно другая по сравнению со всеми другими ее 
видами. Согласно Священному Писанию, она есть дар Духа Святого, а не результат собственного нервно-
психического напряжения. Апостол Павел писал: ''… любовь Божия излилась в сердца наши Духом 
Святым, данным нам'' (Рим. 5, 5). То есть эта любовь — духовная, она — ''совокупность совершенства'' 
(Кол. 3, 14) и, по выражению преподобного Исаака Сирина, есть ''обитель духовного и водворяется в 
чистоте души.''”
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psychological faculty of feeling from the ethical sphere altogether but rather relegates it, like 
Christianity itself, to a subsidiary position and assigns to it a solely contributory role. While an 
action which is motivated exclusively by love does not, as in Kant, carry any moral value, an 
action actuated by duty in conjunction with love does not, for the Russian philosopher, this time 
in contradistinction to Kant, forfeit its moral value: 
It [moral action] is devoid of moral value only when it is performed exclusively in 
accordance with an inclination, without any awareness of one's duty or obligation, for 
then it is only an accidental psychological fact, bereft of universal objective 
significance.219 (SS II: 65)
But love by itself does not possess the necessity and the universal validity of moral worth and 
cannot act as the sole ground of determination of the will until it becomes a universal and 
necessary moral law: 
Love as a private and accidental fact undoubtedly exists in the natural order as well,—but 
as a universal and necessary law, that is in the form of an ethical principle, it can be 
affirmed neither on the material nor on the rational ground, neither from the standpoint of 
experience nor from the standpoint of reason.220 (SS II: 169) 
For Solov'ev, due to its conceptual indemonstrability, love is untenable as an ethical principle in 
the empirical sphere and it is only in the realm of the realized Absolute (Godmanhood) that love 
can (re)claim its role as a cohesive bond, because only in that mystical dimension does love 
become the binding law, to which everyone would freely submit and adhere: 
219 “Оно [moral action] не имеет нравственной цены только тогда, когда совершается исключительно по одной
только склонности, без всякого сознания долга или обязанности, ибо тогда оно является случайным 
психологическим фактом, не имеющим никакого всеобщего объективного значения.”  
220 “Любовь как частный и случайный факт, несомненно существует и в естественном порядке, — но как 
всеобщий и необходимый закон, то есть в форме нравственного принципа, она не может утверждаться ни 
на материальной, ни на рациональной почве, ни с точки зрения опыта, ни с точки зрения разума.”   
182
Only in such absolute order love is not an accidental state of the subject (the way it is in 
the natural order) but a necessary law of his being, without which he is deprived of his 
unconditional significance.221 (Ibid.)  
Love does not have an active moral force in the empirical realm and, paradoxically, the 
universal state of absolute love, the Kingdom of God on earth, is being brought about without 
minor individual acts of selfless love since in the eyes of reason they are neither universal nor 
necessary and, as it happens, without the concurrent prompting of duty, totally unethical. 
Furthermore, even in the domain of the actualized Absolute, love is deprived of active power 
because Christian love that would eventually unite people with each other as well as with God is 
nothing but an inner passive state:
In this divine order, however, man (each) as a known expression of All or of some divine 
idea (man in his ideal) is an object of contemplation and not of action, and love can exist 
here only as a passive inner state and not as an active relation.222 (SS II: 171) 
In Solov'ev's vision, man actuates the ideal of the unconditioned cosmic love not by 
practicing the Christian commandment of “love thy neighbor,” but by exercising his “rational 
freedom” in the material world of nature: 
Man or mankind is a being that contains in himself (in the absolute order) the divine idea, 
i.e. the all-in-oneness or the unconditioned fullness of being, and that enacts that idea (in 
the natural order) by means of rational freedom in material nature.223 (SS II: 174)
221 “Только в таком абсолютном порядке любовь является не случайным состоянием субъекта (какова она в 
порядке естественном), а необходимым законом его бытия, без которого он сам не может иметь 
безусловного значения.”  
222 “Но в этом божественном порядке человек (каждый) как известное выражение всего или некоторая 
божественная идея (человек в своем идеале) является предметом созерцания, а не деятельности, а любовь
здесь может быть только как внутреннее пассивное состояние, а не как деятельное отношение.” 
223 “Человек или человечество есть существо, содержащее в себе (в абсолютном порядке) божественную 
идею, то есть всеединство, или безусловную полноту бытия, и осуществляющее эту идею (в 
естественном порядке) посредством разумной свободы в материальной природе.”
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Solov'ev's “rational freedom” by means of which the goal of free theocracy is to be 
attained is not the freedom of the will in the Christian sense but the Kantian “freedom of 
subordination” to the universality of the moral law (obligation). Solov'ev's “free submission” 
(“svobodnoe podchinenie”) has a closer alliance with subordination than with freedom, for 
freedom in the Idealist sense more frequently than not denotes nothing other than a relentless rule
of necessity which, in its own turn, always stands in danger of degrading into outright 
compulsion in the sphere of practical action. This absence of genuine individual freedom (in the 
Christian sense) in what Solov'ev, after his Idealist predecessors, calls “rational freedom” or 
“freedom of subordination” was already pointed out by Shestov: 
Rational sight discovered the idea of “all-in-oneness”—and the idea of all-in-oneness, the 
idea of a whole unifying an infinite multitude of parts has become and still remains the 
foundation of philosophy. “To explain,” “to comprehend” the universe is construed as 
showing that all the parts out of which it is constituted—both living people and inanimate 
objects have a purely subordinate role—they must comply, obey, and submit. It is true 
that Solov'ev, like Schelling and Hegel, constantly speaks of freedom. But all his 
freedom, like that of the German Idealists, is reduced to freedom of subordination.224 
(Umozrenie i otkrovenie 77)
The only freedom granted by Solov'ev to the empirical subject is that of servitude in the name of 
the prospective Godmanhood collectively realized by humankind as a construction of free 
theocracy. As a rational being, the individual subject, in Solov'ev's conception, cannot but 
224 “Умное зрение открыло ''всеединство'' — и идея всеединства, идея целого, объединяющего бесконечное 
множество частей стала и доныне остается основоположением философии. ''Объяснить,'' ''понять'' 
мироздание значит показать, что все части, из которых оно составляется — и живые люди и 
неодушевленные предметы, имеют чисто служебное назначение — они должны слушаться, подчиняться, 
повиноваться. Правда, Соловьев, как Шеллинг и Гегель, постоянно говорит о свободе. Но вся свобода его 
сводится, как и у немецких идеалистов, к свободе повиноваться.” 
184
willingly submit to the authoritative judgment of reason that recognizes the absolute necessity of 
the ideal of All-in-Oneness in the form of free theocracy and therefore the necessity of self-
imposed bondage for the common good.
This (self-)imposed servitude for the sake of the common good, however, rapidly 
degrades into universal tyranny in Solov'ev's system. While the fulfilled Absolute is envisioned 
by Solov'ev as a blessed kingdom of ends, a religious community of free subjects united in the 
state of universal love, the transitional empirical realm is turned into a realm of means, in which 
every sphere of human being, every human faculty, etc. are harnessed as instruments toward the 
attainment of that Absolute: “If the highest goal is truly grasped as such in all its 
unconditionality, then human reason and freedom can only aspire toward the status of 
instruments or tools for the fulfillment of this ultimate goal”225 (SS II: 173). Not only are all 
empirical subjects converted into instruments, but they are also unequal instruments valued in 
proportion to the degree of their closeness to the Absolute. 
Thus, Solov'ev demands the establishment of a rigid social hierarchy in which people 
would be ordered strictly in accordance with their proximity to the idea of Godmanhood. The 
greater degree of the realization of the idea achieved by a particular man, the more perfect is that 
man, and consequently, the more power and authority he should be invested with, as compared to
those who are less advanced in their fulfillment: “Тhe degree of ideality must determine the 
degree of man's value and power (authority). The extent of rights must be in correspondence with
the heights of inner dignity”226 (178). And, vice versa, the further away a particular member of 
225 “Если высшая цель действительно сознана как такая во всей своей безусловности, то разум и свобода 
человеческие могут иметь притязания лишь на значения средств или орудий для осуществления этой 
сознанной высшей цели.”
226 “Степенью идеальности должна определяться степень значения и власти (авторитета) лица. Объем прав 
должен соответствовать высоте внутреннего достоинства.”
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society is from the realization of the idea within himself, the lesser the value and social standing 
he should be assigned: 
Since in the natural order, due to its inherent inequality, all beings are not uniformly 
close to the unconditioned goal, they cannot possess equal value, for their value is 
determined by the degree of their proximity to the unconditioned goal (all-in-
oneness).227 (180)
Individual man's freedom of the will is entirely annulled in Solov'ev's system. Freedom, together 
with man himself, is sacrificed in the service of the idea of Godmanhood. 
 The Christian spirit is compromised both in Solov'ev's ontological (pan(e)theism) and 
ethical (Kantianism) parts of the system. In his embrace of the Idealist system as a proper form 
for the synthesis of reason and faith, the Russian philosopher cannot avoid confronting baneful 
epistemological issues raised by Kant (dualisms and his restrictions upon the scope of human 
knowledge) which led western philosophy, according to his own analysis, first to a deadlock and 
ultimately, to its near demise. By choosing to adhere to systematic form, Solov'ev in his search 
for solutions cannot help but turn to the same set of remedies (Spinoza's pantheism, in the first 
place) that Idealist philosophy originally developed in its response to Kant. As a result, by 
appropriating these epistemological (“rationalist”) solutions,228 the Russian philosopher finds his 
own, primarily ethical, system in stark conflict with the major tenets of Christianity. In the end, 
Solov'ev's system offers no genuine synthesis of philosophy and religion. Reason ousts religion 
by substituting rationalist surrogates in place of the inscrutable truth of Revelation. As Novalis 
227 “Так как в естественном порядке, в силу присущего ему неравенства, все существа не одинаково близки к 
безусловной цели, то они не могут иметь и одинакового значения, но значение их здесь всецело 
определяется их относительной близостью к безусловной цели (всеединству).”   
228 Solov'ev borrows most of these solutions from Schelling's philosophy. 
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once remarked, “God himself can be active among us in no other way—than through faith”229 
(Novalis Schriften 2: 426, no. 33). With faith (“positive content”) evaporated, only an empty shell
of the system remains. In this light, the system, a product of rationalist thinking, proves incapable
of serving as an appropriate vehicle for synthesizing faith and reason, for it can tolerate religion 
only in the form of a surrogate congenial to itself. 
Solov'ev's difficulty in bringing about the absolute synthesis in theory is followed by his 
lack of success in actuating his idea of free theocracy in practice (1889-1891). This two-fold 
failure triggers a protracted spiritual crisis in the Russian philosopher that, in its turn, leads to the 
creation of “The Tale of the Antichrist” (“Povest' ob Antikhriste,” 1899-1900), a work that 
embodies Solov'ev's dramatic break with his philosophical past. While Three Conversations (Tri 
Razgovora, 1899), a series of dialogues that incorporates “The Tale of the Antichrist” as an 
embedded story, is ostensibly directed against Lev Tolstoi, most of Solov'ev's critics and scholars 
agree that by condemning Tolstoi's idea of rational religion, he also indirectly denounces his ideal
of All-in-Oneness. In Mochul'skii's words: 
By denouncing Tolstoi, Solov'ev punishes himself as well. In the distorted mirror of 
Tolstoi's teaching he saw his own former self: and in his philosophical thought there 
lurked temptations of naturalism, evolutionism and humanism which Tolstoi, in his 
characteristic straightforwardness, took to the extreme. That is why the tone of “Three 
Conversations” rises to a tragic pathos: Solov'ev could not have died without writing 
them. This is his repentance.230 (Vladimir Solov'ev 255-256) 
229  “Gott selbst ist auf keine andre Weise bey uns wircksam – als durch den Glauben.” 
230 “Обличая Толстого, Соловьев казнит и самого себя. В искривленном зеркале толстовства он увидел свое 
прежнее лицо: и в его философской мысли таились соблазны натурализма, эволюционизма и гуманизма, 
которые Толстой, со свойственной ему прямолинейностью, довел до крайнего выражения. Вот почему тон
''Трех разговоров'' возвышается до трагического пафоса: Соловьев не мог умереть не написав их. Это — 
его покаяние.”  
187
In the collapse of his own synthetic efforts guided by reason as well as in Tolstoi's analogous 
quest for rational religion, the Russian philosopher comes to recognize that reason erodes and 
displaces faith rather than vindicates it. Reason seeks to replace religion based on spontaneous 
(“naive”) faith with “the rationalistic hole” (“ratsionalisticheskaia dyra”) that it deifies and 
enthrones in place of the living God, Christ. 
Thus, the image of the Antichrist in Solov'ev's tale does not symbolize an 
uncompromising rejection of Christianity or a total absence of faith but rather an insidious 
“religious imposture” (“religioznoe samozvanstvo” 146), or, in other words, a “rationalistic hole” 
by whose side “the false Christian flag is hoisted.” Not unlike Tolstoi's rational religion, his own 
synthetic system, as the Russian philosopher makes it clear in the tale, is one of those instances 
of “religious imposture” that seeks to supplant Christian faith with a profane surrogate. In this 
light, “The Tale of the Antichrist” represents Solov'ev's renunciation of his system, a product of 
reason, and an unqualified endorsement of the supra-rationality of Christian faith, its 
eschatological nature, that does not stand in need of rational justifications. 
The tale depicts the pre-apocalyptic world beset by global cataclysms. By uniting the 
mongoloid race, the Japanese make a sweeping advancement on the west and establish a mongol 
yoke over the whole world that lasts for half a century. The yoke is ultimately overthrown as a 
result of the coup and upon regaining their independence, a conglomeration of European states 
fuses into the European United States. Yet, in this new climate of freedom there becomes 
apparent a new crisis—the crisis of faith. Most people have become non-believers, while those 
who retained their faith no longer possessed the spontaneity of their belief. One of the remaining 
believers who verifies faith by means of reason is a man who distinguished himself as a great 
thinker, writer, and a public figure. Considered by many an “Übermensch,” this man, engulfed by
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pride and arrogance, repudiates Christ as a mere precursor and comes to think of himself as a true
son of God. He awaits a divine token that would confirm his Sonhood but the sign will not come.
In a fit of desperation and bitter jealousy of Christ, he throws himself off the cliff but is saved by 
a supernatural power, the force of evil, that discloses itself as his real father. Having accepted his 
parentage, the great man starts acting “in his own name,” thereby revealing his true essence as 
the Antichrist. 
The great man, or the Antichrist, at first wins universal recognition as the greatest thinker 
by writing a treatise The Open Way toward Universal Peace and Prosperity and eventually comes
to rule the whole world by being elected and crowned as emperor. During his reign he acts as a 
benefactor of humanity by establishing universal peace and distributing bread. To keep people 
entertained, he also invites a magician, Apollonii, who performs various astonishing feats. After 
resolving the political and social problems, the Antichrist intends to approach the religious 
question. He convenes an ecumenical council so that the representatives of all Christian 
denominations could confirm him as a sole spiritual leader of all humanity, thereby merging the 
state and the church into a theocracy. While he succeeds in convincing most of the 
representatives, a handful of Christians such as Father Ioann (Eastern Orthodoxy), Pope Peter II 
(Catholicism), and Professor Pauli (Protestantism) refuse to endorse him, for they acknowledge 
only Christ as their lord. They openly denounce the great man as the Antichrist and depart. While
the populace is celebrating the Antichrist's alleged achievement of bringing about the union of the
Christian church and state under his exclusive leadership, the dissenting church leaders agree to 
reestablish the unified Christian church. At this moment of the reunification of Orthodoxy, 
Catholicism and Protestantism, there appears “a woman, clothed with the sun,” a harbinger of the
advent of Christ, who leads true Christians to mount Sinai. 
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The idea that lies at the core of “The Tale of the Antichrist” is a denunciation of reason 
alongside its accompanying attributes of pride and arrogance. For Solov'ev, the faculty of reason 
constitutes the truly human element, in contrast to the purely animalistic (body) and the divine 
(soul), and it is the power of reason personified in the image of the Antichrist that comes to claim
the place of God in his apocalyptic vision. The Antichrist, a man of superior intellect and a grand 
system builder, is, to a large extent, a parody of Solov'ev himself as a philosopher who 
presumptuously sought to construct the kingdom of God on earth (free theocracy) by his own 
effort. Thus, the Antichrist's magnum opus that has made him universally acknowledged as a 
genius and a benefactor of humankind is identical in its task with the goal pursued by Solov'ev in 
his own system of All-in-Oneness. For both, the universal synthesis is to be accomplished under 
the leadership of reason that takes precedence over faith: 
It will be something all-encompassing and reconciling all the contradictions. It will unite 
noble respect toward the ancient beliefs and symbols with the broad and bold radicalism 
of sociopolitical demands and directions, unrestricted freedom of thought with the most 
profound comprehension of all things mystical, unconditional individualism with an 
ardent devotion to the common good, the most exalted idealism of guiding principles 
with the complete certainty and vitality of practical solutions.231 (Tri razgovora 205)  
In other words, in the figure of the Antichrist Solov'ev comes to anathematize rational 
faith that he used to advocate in his earlier systematic writings. The Antichrist's faith in God, as 
Solov'ev portrays in the tale, is founded on a series of logical deductions. His is “rational faith” 
231 “Это будет что-то всеобъемлющее и примиряющее все противоречия. Здесь соединятся благородная 
почтительность к древним преданиям и символам с широким и смелым радикализмом общественно-
политических требований и указаний, неограниченная свобода мысли с глубочайшим пониманием всего 
мистического, безусловный индивидуализм с горячею преданностью общему благу, самый возвышенный 
идеализм руководящих начал с полной определенностью и жизненностью практических решений.”  
190
(“razumnaia vera”), which is not naive and spontaneous but authorised and shepherded by the 
voice of reason: “... a clear mind always pointed out to him the truth of what one ought to 
believe: good, God, [and] the Messiah. In this he believed, but he loved only himself”232 (199-
200). This rational faith, however, is exposed as deficient, for it leads away from, rather than to, 
God. Thus, it is the voice of reason that ultimately convinces the Antichrist that instead of Christ 
he is the true Son of God: “The selfish preference of himself over Christ will be justified by this 
man by the following reasoning”233 (201). The Antichrist does not have faith in Christ because 
one cannot deduce and intellectually apprehend the miracle of Christ by way of mere concepts. 
One can only believe in redemption through Christ, but it is in such spontaneous faith based on 
love that the Antichrist is lacking. As a result, he finds Christ's self-sacrifice out of love for 
humanity incomprehensible and unacceptable: “The moral triumph of Christ and His absolute 
uniqueness were incomprehensible to this mind darkened by self-love”234 (200). For the 
Antichrist, it is not love but the authority of reason that should provide the foundation of true 
religion. 
But, as the late Solov'ev shows, without love as a foundation, faith as a vital creative 
force degenerates into an empty concept subject to manipulation, misinterpretation, and abuse. 
Blinded by pride, reason cannot steer faith in the right direction, toward God, but rather seeks to 
deify and enthrone itself in his place. Rational faith turns out to be nothing but “rational and cold 
respect toward God and Christ”235 (202). And this feeling of cold, rational respect can be 
232 “... ясный ум всегда указывал ему истину того, во что должно верить: добро, Бога, Мессию. В это он 
верил, но любил он только одного себя.”
233 “Самолюбивое предпочтение себя Христу будет оправдываться у этого человека еще таким 
рассуждением.” 
234 “Нравственный подвиг Христа и Его абсолютная единственность были непонятны для этого омраченного 
самолюбием ума.” 
235 “... разумное холодное уважение к Богу и Христу.”
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ironically as easily replaced by the irrational feelings of envy and hatred, as it happens in the case
of the Antichrist in relation to his rival Christ. True faith, in other words, as the Russian 
philosopher comes to recognize, is based on such an apparently logically unjustifiable foundation
as love that, unlike the Kantian categorical imperative, cannot be rationally verified and 
universally prescribed as the immutable moral law. 
Furthermore, unlike in his earlier philosophical works propagating the ideal of free 
theocracy, in “The Tale of the Antichrist,” Solov'ev differentiates between moral rationalism and 
good will. There is a recognition that morality governed by reason and natural goodness are not 
necessarily the same. Thus, whereas the Antichrist embodies the cosmic force of evil, he is not an
immoral person. On the contrary, he is an incarnation of all virtues advocated by human reason 
(“a man of impeccable morality,”236 Ibid.). Besides leading a virtuous and ascetic lifestyle, he is 
also a humanist who, beyond everything else, desires to benefit humankind by bringing about the
Kingdom of God on earth. The Antichrist sins neither against reason nor Kantian ethics but he 
sins against God because, despite all his moral virtues and accomplishments, he is devoid of 
genuine goodness in his heart. Reason cannot reproach him for any moral flaw. Yet while being a 
man of impeccable moral integrity, he is still evil.  
In “The Third Conversation” that incorporates “The Tale of the Antichrist” as an 
embedded narrative, Mr. Z, a mouthpiece for Solov'ev, elaborates on the idea that the intellect is 
not indissolubly wedded to goodness. It is just an instrument which is highly ambivalent in its 
nature and for this very reason it can be wielded in the service of what is good as well as what is 
evil: “... reason turns out to be a dubious servant for it [good will], since it [reason] is equally 
capable and ready to serve two masters—both good and evil,—and so it means that in order to 
236 “человек безупречной нравственности” 
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fulfill the will of God and to attain the Kingdom of God, one needs something third in addition to
conscience and reason”237 (184). This mysterious third element which is elevated by the late 
Solov'ev over discursive reason and conscience that he privileged earlier is defined as 
“inspiration of the good” (“vdokhnovenie dobra”): 
To put it briefly, inspiration of the good or the direct and positive action of the principle 
of the good on us and in us. With such an assistance from above, both reason and 
conscience become reliable helpers of the good itself, and morality, instead of the always 
suspect “good behavior,” undeniably becomes a life in the good itself.238 (Ibid.) 
Thus, good emerges as a result of this inscrutable and logically indemonstrable “religious 
inspiration” rather than as a command of reason in the form of the immutable moral law: “If the 
good is exhausted by obedience to ''the rule,'' then where is the place for inspiration? ''The rule'' is
defined and given once and for all”239 (185). The source of this religious inpisration is a “naive” 
faith that manifests itself in spontaneous selfless acts of love instead of moral actions prescribed 
by reason.
As the late Solov'ev emphasizes in contrast to his prior moral vision grounded in Kant's 
ethics, good and evil cannot be distinguished by the powers of reason alone, for human reason is 
fallible, being susceptible to evil's insidious influence. Since one cannot tell good from evil by 
relying exclusively on one's rational judgment, the question that arises before the Russian 
philosopher with all its urgency concerns the true nature of evil and possible ways of resisting 
237 “... ум оказывается для нее [добрая воля] сомнительным слугою, так как он одинаково способен и готов 
служить двум господам — и добру и злу, — то, значит, для исполнения воли Божией и достижения 
Царства Божия, кроме совести и ума, нужно еще что-нибудь третье.” 
238 “Коротко сказать, вдохновение добра, или прямое и положительное действие самого доброго начала на нас
и в нас. При таком содействии свыше и ум, и совесть становятся надежными помощниками самого добра, 
и нравственность, вместо всегда сомнительного ''хорошего поведения,'' становится несомненно жизнью в 
самом добре.”
239 “Если добро исчерпывается исполнением ''правила,'' то где же тут место для вдохновения? ''Правило'' раз 
навсегда дано, определенно и одинаково для всех.” 
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and eventually prevailing over it. As Solov'ev himself articulates this critical question in the 
preface to Three Conversations: 
Is evil only a natural flaw, an imperfection, that disappears by itself with the growth of 
the good, or is it an actual force that rules our world by means of temptations, so that for 
a successful resistance to it, one must have a pillar of support in the other order of 
being?240 
This formulation reflects a dramatic shift that takes place in the Russian philosopher's 
understanding of evil over the course of his life. If the early Solov'ev buoyed by faith in the 
perfectibility of mankind embraced the first notion of evil as a mere moral flaw which is bound 
to vanish as a result of continuous unflagging growth and dissemination of good, in his late years 
he comes to view evil as a mighty metaphysical force that cannot be defeated by man single-
handedly but only with the aid of the divine power. Thus, in his depiction of the Antichrist's 
empire as an embodiment of Kant's kingdom of ends, a state of universal peace, prosperity, and 
happiness, Solov'ev denounces his former humanistic idea of mankind's purposeful progress 
toward the ultimate triumph of good. Man is powerless against evil that seduces him under the 
guise of reason and therefore he is not capable of reconciling the antithetical elements of the 
Universe by his own efforts in the cosmic synthesis of All-in-Oneness.
In this light, the establishment of the true kingdom of God, “a new Heaven and a new 
Earth,” will not happen as a result of the actualization of the universal synthesis engineered by 
reason but rather as a result of the division effected by the divine power: “''Suppose ye that I am 
come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division'' [KJB, Luke 12:51]. He came to 
240 “Есть ли зло только естественный недостаток, несовершенство, само собой исчезающее с ростом добра, 
или оно есть действительная сила, посредством соблазнов владеющая нашим миром, так что для 
успешной борьбы с нею нужно иметь точку опоры в ином порядке бытия?”    
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bring truth on earth, and it [truth], like the good, divides in the first place”241 (150). In the late 
Solov'ev's eschatological vision, man cannot unite what God has divided: 
There is a good, Christ's world founded on division that Christ came to bring on earth, 
that is on division between good and evil, between truth and falsehood; and there is a 
bad, worldly world founded on medley of random things or the external conjunction of 
all that which is inwardly in conflict with one another.242 (Ibid.)
As it transpires, the solution to the problem of evil is no longer historical but meta-historical, for 
man cannot defeat it all by himself unless aided by Christ. Thus, at the end of his life Solov'ev 
abandons his life-long project of Godmanhood, the attainment of the universal synthesis of 
oppositions through the exercise of reason and human action, in favor of Christian apocalyptic 
vision, thereby proclaiming the primacy of faith.  
  This radical reversal of hierarchy between reason and faith is accompanied by no less 
dramatic change of form in the late Solov'ev's work. Since the whole of Three Conversations is 
conceived as an indictment of human reason and its product, the system, the Russian philosopher 
resorts to the aesthetic as opposed to the discursive in order to communicate his past and present 
ethical ideas on the nature of evil as well as his eschatological vision. Similar to the Jena 
Romantics, Solov'ev comes to discard conventional systematic form, turning instead to the 
dialogue form that he uses as a framework for his embedded tale about the Antichrist. 
The early German Romantics celebrated the dialogue, alongside such genres as the 
fragment and the novel, as an alternative to the Idealist system, for in contrast to the system with 
241 “''Думаете ли вы, что Я мир пришел принести на землю? Нет, говорю вам, — но разделение.'' Он пришел 
принести на землю истину, а она, как и добро, прежде всего разделяет.” 
242 “Есть, значит, хороший, Христов мир, основанный на том разделении, что Христос пришел принести на 
землю, именно на разделении между добром и злом, между истиной и ложью; и есть дурной, мирской 
мир, основанный на смешении, или внешнем соединении того, что внутренно враждует между собою.”  
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its emphasis on uniformity and univocality, the dramatic dialogue allows conveying the 
multiplicity of perspectives. Indeed, for Fr. Schlegel, in the light of the fragmented state of our 
knowledge, a philosophical system cannot exist in any form other than dramatic: 
“System=Dramatic”243 (Literary Notebooks 104, no. 938); “System=absolute dramatic. A 
fragment= 'contracted' or 'condensed' dramatic”244 (no. 943). For until the absolute system, a 
perfect work of art, is realized, any attempt at universal systematization should reflect the 
swirling diversity of conflicting points of view without forcibly constraining or suppressing 
them, as happens in a rationalist system. The dialogue form therefore in the late Solov'ev, as in 
the early Romantics, aims at giving voice to a plurality of competing standpoints.
In the embedded novella, “The Tale of the Antichrist,” the Russian philosopher goes even 
further by reclaiming the medium of art as a vehicle for communicating the sacred. The 
apocalyptic vision cannot be conceptually articulated, for it transcends the discursive powers of 
reason. Eschatological intuitions rendered in aesthetic form stand in need neither of logical 
deductions nor of rational justifications because the aesthetic speaks directly to the sentiment, not
to the intellect. For Solov'ev, the essence of art lies not in the ideas themselves, which is a 
province of philosophy, but, in Mochul'skii's apt expression, in “sensuous expression of ideas” 
(“chuvstvennoe vyrazhenie idei”) (Vladimir Solov'ev 243). For this reason he does not want to 
analytically dissect his apocalyptic presentiments but to convey his intuitions to the reading 
public in all their tragic immediacy and vividness—“nagliadnym i obshchedostupnym obrazom” 
(Tri razgovora 19). By reviving the alliance between the aesthetic and the religious, Solov'ev 
approaches the early German Romantics who regarded art, rather than philosophy, as the most 
243 “System=Dramatisch.”
244 “System=absolut dramatisch. Fragment= 'radicirt' or 'condencirt' dramatisch.” 
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adequate representation of the divine ever attainable by man. It is “poetry” (“Poesie”), not 
philosophy, that stands closer to the apprehension and expression of the Absolute. As Novalis 
puts it, “A sense of poetry has a closer relation with a sense of the prophetic and the religious, 
with a sense of augury in general. The poet organizes, incorporates, selects, invents—and this is 
all without comprehending himself at all why should it be this way rather than the other”245 
(Novalis Schriften III: 685-6). 
 Three Conversations, however, does not represent a categorical rejection of the 
philosophical enterprise by the late Solov'ev but rather a shift toward its radical 
reconceptualization. In his embrace of the aesthetic as a channel for delivering his ideas, 
including his eschatological conception of history, the Russian philosopher moves closer to the 
Romantic ideal of philosophy as art and away from the Idealist conception of philosophy as 
science. Viewed in this context, the crumbling of Solov'ev's synthetic ambitions and his 
subsequent renunciation of the Idealist system in favor of art as a means of apprehending the 
Absolute presages the final repudiation of system building as a privileged way of philosophizing. 
The impossibility of constructing a full-fledged philosophical system which would yield a 
comprehensive worldview is particularly evident in Andrei Belyi, who makes the last-ditch 
attempt to salvage the Solov'evian notion of systematic philosophy in his ambitious Symbolist 
project. After Solov'ev, however, the Idealist conception of philosophy as science founded on the 
unquestioned authority of discursive reason comes under ever more intense scrutiny in Russian 
religious philosophy. Reason becomes suspect and the system is increasingly rejected in pursuit 
for alternative, more “poetic,” ways of doing philosophy, as one can observe, for example, in the 
245 “Der Sinn für Poesie hat nahe Verwandschaft mit dem Sinn der Weissagung und dem religiösen, dem Sehersinn 
überhaupt. Der Dichter ordnet, vereinigt, wählt, erfindet—und es ist ihm selbst unbegreiflich, warum gerade so 
und nicht anders.”  
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works of Nikolai Berdiaev and Lev Shestov. This tectonic shift from the understanding of 
philosophy as science to the notion of philosophy as art is accompanied by Russian philosophers' 
increasing movement away from the tradition of post-Kantian German Idealism towards the 
intellectual legacy of early German Romanticism.  
III. Between Idealism and Romanticism: Andrei Belyi's Discontinuous System
 A tension between two traditions, Idealism and Romanticism, or rather a set of  
philosophical outlooks associated with them, can be observed in Andrei Belyi's theory of 
Symbolism. Belyi's tripartite collection Symbolism, Arabesques, and The Green Meadow 
(Simvolizm, 1910; Arabeski, 1911; Lug zelenyi, 1910) is a transitional work, an epoch's fault line, 
that in its own tragic ruptures and inconsistencies embodies a dramatic rift between as well as the
shift from philosophy as science (Idealism) to philosophy as art (Romanticism). In his Symbolist 
project, Belyi pursues the synthetic task not unlike that of Solov'ev in its scope and ambition. 
Similar to the early Romantics, he seeks to reconcile philosophy and its ally, science, with art in 
the highest synthesis culminating in the triumph of religion. While Belyi more than once 
explicitly emphasizes the current impossibility of constructing such a comprehensive theory of 
Symbolism which would usher in the epoch of the religious synthesis, his own collection is, 
nevertheless, covertly intended and constructed as an incarnation and enactment of that ultimate 
synthesis. 
Despite his efforts to forgo a conventional philosophical system and develop a new 
synthetic form of the discontinuous system, Belyi flounders in his synthetic task no less 
completely than does Solov'ev. Edging in its fragmentary, arabesque-like, form closer to the 
Romantic style of philosophy, the Russian Symbolist, however, is not ready to disown his 
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Idealist-like faith in the power of human reason to conceptualize the Absolute. He paradoxically 
grounds his entire system (or rather, what he calls “prolegomena” to that system) in the tradition 
of Critical Idealism represented by Kant and Fichte that he intends to overcome retroactively 
through his future theory of Symbolism. By giving precedence to discursive reason in 
establishing the foundation of his system, Belyi, despite his Romantic proclamation of the 
supremacy of art over cognition, finds, not unlike the early Solov'ev, that reason sidelines its 
opposite, art, and derails the very possibility of the envisioned synthesis. Instead of the union of 
“form” (Kantian subject) and “content” (Kantian object) in the Symbol Embodied (the Absolute),
Belyi ends up with the absolutization of pure form. As a consequence, his constructed aesthetics, 
grounded in this provisional formalized theory of Symbolism, turns out to be in an irreconcilable 
conflict with his own understanding of the symbol as a unity of form and content. The two 
ladders, the ladder of cognition (linked with philosophy and science) and the ladder of artistic 
creativity (connected with art), represented by the two volumes, Symbolism and Arabesques 
respectively, never come to converge in the point of their intended destination, the Symbol 
Embodied (religion), which was to be incarnated in the last volume, The Green Meadow.246
 
Gogoliian Roots of Belyi's Discontinuous System
Unlike his predecessor Solov'ev, Belyi no longer believes in the possibility of employing 
a traditional philosophical system as a vehicle for the projected ultimate synthesis. The 
emergence of the new Symbolist sensibility necessitates the development of a new synthetic form
246 Andrei Belyi's tripartite collection Symbolism, Arabesques, and The Green Meadow (Simvolizm, 1910; Arabeski, 
1911; Lug zelenyi, 1910) has never been approached as a meaningful structural whole before. Most of the 
scholars discuss Belyi's philosophical vision of Symbolism by examining the essays included in his collection 
strictly in chronological order. On Belyi's theory of Symbolism examined in chronological order, see in particular
Steven Cassedy, “Bely the Thinker”; A.V. Lavrov, Andrei Belyi v 1900-e gody; and K. Mochul'skii, Andrey Bely. 
His Life and Works.     
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which would be adequate to the Symbolist task of fulfilling Solov'ev's ambitious enterprise—the 
realization of the ideal of Godmanhood: “Philosophical systems are possible at the stage of 
dogmatism and criticism, where understanding and reason come to the forefront of the ladder of 
our cognitive abilities. The ability of our cognition to creatively illuminate life as if from within 
is wisdom, and symbolism is the sphere of its application”247 (Simvolizm 29). In its consummated 
form as an all-embracing worldview, Symbolism must become a new wisdom, a new religion, 
and Belyi's theory of Symbolism, as explicated in his three volume collection Symbolism, 
Arabesques, and The Green Meadow, aspires to the status of The Total Book, or in other words, of
the new Bible. It covertly aims to supplement or rather to supersede the New Testament by 
becoming the definitive Third Testament which would disseminate the new word of 
Godmanhood. 
This endeavor to construct the Third Testament implies the utopian project of achieving  
totality through writing. By shaping total vision Belyi would not only bring the Bible project into
completion by supplying the closing chapter, the Third Testament, but also bring the history of 
humankind to closure. The attainment of textual totality, through the construction of the all-
embracing Symbolist system, would effect a no less complete transfiguration of the world. This 
written text, a man-generated totality, would transform the fractured state of the Universe and 
coincide with the newly emerged wholeness, heralding the long-awaited union of the earthly and 
the divine. Therefore the completion of the all-encompassing Text, of the theory of Symbolism as
a comprehensive worldview, would constitute a theurgic act, an act of cosmic significance, not 
unlike that of the original creation of the Universe by God by means of Logos.  
247 “Философские системы возможны на стадии догматизма и критицизма, где ум и разум выступают на 
первый план среди лестницы наших познавательных способностей. Способность нашего познания 
изнутри как бы творчески освещать жизнь есть мудрость, и символизм — область ее применения.” 
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 This total human text which is to become a new Revelation is envisioned by Belyi as a 
construction of the totalizing system, a “system of symbols”: 
Religious revelation is a system of correctly developed symbols. This is its external 
definition. If a symbol is a window unto Eternity, then a system of symbols cannot appear 
continuous, like the systems of dogmatism and criticism, in which all is connected by 
means of a logical form. This is a series of discontinuous symbols that reveal different 
aspects of the One.248 (Arabeski 229)
The system of symbols, as revealed in the quote above, is not continuous but discontinuous 
because, unlike Solov'ev's, it is not supposed to be entirely dependent on the discursive, logical 
form of traditional philosophy. Belyi envisions his absolute system as a system composed of 
disparate symbols manifesting the manifold facets of the One. In other words, this is a totalizing 
system consisting of and unifying fragments or, as Belyi calls them,“discontinuous symbols.” 
Thus, the Russian Symbolist seeks to elaborate a new type of systematic form whose purpose is 
to reconcile a system and a fragment. The goal of the entire enterprise is to reveal unity and order
in the apparent universal disarray by imposing a unifying conceptual scheme on the chaotic and 
fragmented state of the world. 
In his messianic mission to integrate the splintered Universe into a totalizing scheme by 
collecting fragments in a discontinuous system, the Symbolist Belyi retraces steps of the Russian 
Romantic, Nikolai Gogol'.249 Throughout his creative career Belyi had an intense sense of 
248 “Религиозное откровение есть система правильно развертываемых символов. Таково ее внешнее 
определение. Если символ — окно в Вечность, то система символов не может казаться непрерывной, как 
системы догматизма и критицизма, где все связано логической формой. Это ряд прерывных символов, 
раскрывающих разные стороны единого.” 
249 For more information on Gogol''s complex impact on Belyi's work, see V.M. Papernyi's serialized series of 
articles, “Andrei Belyi i Gogol'. Stat'ia pervaia” (1982); “Andrei Belyi i Gogol'. Stat'ia vtoraia” (1983); “Andrei 
Belyi i Gogol'. Stat'ia tret'ia” (1986). Also, refer to Ioanna Delektorskaia, “Andrei Belyi i Gogol': do Istorii 
stanovleniia samosoznaiushchei dushi, v Istorii stanovleniia samosoznaiushchei dushi i posle”, “''Gogolevskii 
siuzhet'' v zhiznetvorchestve Andreia Belogo (k probleme rekonstruktsii) (1),” “''Imeia plan, nuzhno umet' ot 
201
identification with Gogol'. In Papernyi's words, “A. Belyi was looking in Gogol' not for the Other
but for Himself; he wanted to become a New Gogol' and he perceived Gogol' as part of his own 
personality”250 (“Andrei Belyi i Gogol'. Stat'ia pervaia” 112). Belyi's ambition, however, was not 
just to become a new Gogol' as a celebrated writer but rather “to surmount” his Romantic 
predecessor by succeeding where his antecedent did not—in converting the creative word of man
into the creative word of God. The whole Symbolist enterprise of overcoming (“rewriting”) Jena 
Romanticism is indelibly linked with the negative legacy of Gogol', a purveyor of early German 
Romantic ideas in Russia, who fell prey to the demonic in his overhuman aspirations of 
supplanting Christ as a unifier of the earthly and the divine. 
The indebtedness of Belyi's all-encompassing project to Gogol' is indirectly 
acknowledged by the Russian Symbolist himself, not only through numerous references to his 
predecessor throughout the collection but also through the title of the second volume, 
Arabesques, which he names after Gogol''s miscellany of the same name. Gogol''s two volume 
assortment of essays, Arabesques (Arabeski, 1835), interspersed with novellas seeks to embody 
the same ideal of the ultimate totality, the unity of the manifold (the earthly) and the One (the 
divine), the pursuit of which would later preoccupy Solov'ev and Belyi. Gogol''s Romantic 
enterprise to reconstruct the shattered unity out of fragments marks the first attempt in Russian 
thought to create the project of the written whole. 
For the Romantic Gogol', there exists a tragic rupture between the realms of the profane 
and the sacred that has appeared and is progressively expanding due to the decline of religion as 
nego otvlekat'sia, gde nado'' (Andrei Belyi v rabote nad ''Masterstvom Gogolia'')”; Iu. V. Mann, “''Skvoz' 
magicheskii kristall...'' Andrei Belyi o Gogole”; A.A. Novik, “K teme ''A. Belyi i Gogol'''”; I.Iu. Simacheva, 
“Gogol' i Andrei Belyi”; L.A. Sugai, “''Zhivaia i mertvaia voda'': Pushkin i Gogol' v traktovke simvolistov”; S.D. 
Titarenko, “Misticheskie aspekty zhizni i tvorchestva Gogolia v interpretatsii russkikh simvolistov.”
250 “А. Белый искал в Гоголе не Другого, а Себя, он хотел быть Новым Гоголем, и он воспринимал Гоголя как
своего рода часть собственной личности” 
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a primary sphere of mediation between the human and the divine. The decay of faith in God has 
led to the current disjointed state of affairs that Gogol' metaphorically calls “a heap” (“kucha”). 
The only sphere through which the former wholeness can (potentially) be restored out of this 
“heap” is the medium of art. Art, for Gogol', is not “whim and pleasure” (“prikhot' i 
naslazhdenie”) but that vital sphere within which the human spirit preserves its connection with 
the divine. Like religion, art partakes of the divine nature due to its source of origin, for, as 
Gogol' gives to understand in the opening essay “Sculpture, Painting, and Music” (“Skul'ptura, 
zhivopis' i muzyka), it is God Himself who has revealed different types of art to man throughout 
the ages. The purpose of art is therefore not to entertain (which is a profanation of the sacred 
function of art) but to turn humankind back to God by elevating the human spirit through its 
education. In this age of growing atheism that has led to fragmentation, alienation, and 
mercantile self-interest, it is only through the sacred realm of art that the human being retains his 
tenuous bond with the spiritual and thereby preserves its humanity. Once this vital link is 
severed, the world is lost: “But in our young and decrepit age he sent us powerful music in order 
to turn us speedily back to him. But even if music abandons us, what will befall us then?”251 (13).
The world, in Gogol''s Romantic vision, can be saved from “the abomination of 
desolation” and elevated to the spiritual only through the medium of art. Since art is the only  
instrument by means of which the fractured wholeness can be restored and humankind returned 
to the bosom of God and religion, the role of the mediator between the human and the divine is 
delegated to the artist who assumes a distinctly religious (messianic) role. The artist whose soul 
is a receptacle for divine inspiration becomes the interpreter of God's inscrutable will and 
251 “Но в наш юный и дряхлый век ниспослал он могущественную музыку, стремительно обращать нас к 
нему. Но если и музыка нас оставит, что будет тогда с нашим миром?”
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therefore the guide of mankind toward salvation. Thus, the major task that lies before the artist of
genius is to transform history that looks like “a heap of incidents without order” into a universal 
work of art, “a poem”: “It, the universal history, must bring together all the peoples of the world, 
separated by time, accident, mountains, [and] seas, and unite them into one harmonious whole; 
create out of them one complete majestic poem”252 (26). Gogol' aspires to this role of the 
universal genius who would convert “a heap of discordant and heterogeneous incidents” into “a 
unified whole” with his “magic touch.” For him, “there is a thread everywhere” and it takes “a 
flair” (“chut'e”) of the universal genius to reveal it. As a “backward-looking prophet,”253 Gogol' 
strives to locate this divine thread which would enable him to decipher the hieroglyph of the 
arabesques of human history and thereby to transfigure the chaos of the fragmented world into a 
continuous meaningful whole, an absolute work of art, visualized by him as a Gothic cathedral (a
“poem”). 
It is most likely through his engagement with the early German Romantic legacy that 
Gogol' came across the idea of arabesques.254 Arabesques were a source of fascination for the 
early Romantics because they offered an artistic representation of their conception of the 
Universe (“the perpetual diversity within the eternal unity”255). They construed the endless 
enigmatic interplay of arabesques as an expression of “the sacred hieroglyph” of Nature. In his 
252 “Она всеобщая история должна собрать в одно целое все народы мира, разрозненные временем, случаем, 
горами, морями, и соединить их в одно стройное целое; из них составить одну величественную полную 
поэму.” 
253 Schlegel's definition of a historian: “A historian is a backward looking prophet” [“Der Historiker ist ein 
rückwärts gekehrter Prophet”] (KFSA II: 176, no. 80).   
254 In his Tkach i vizioner, Iampol'skii suggests that Gogol''s fascination with arabesques might have also had another
probable source: “Gogol''s Roman experience allows us to assume that the source of his ideas about arabesques 
was not only German aesthetics but also the practice of the Ancient and Renaissance art, Roman in particular” 
[“Римский опыт Гоголя позволяет предположить, что источником его представлений об арабесках была не
только немецкая эстетика, но и практика античного и ренессансного искусства, в частности римского”] 
(350). 
255 “Die unedliche Fülle in der unendlichen Einheit.”
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Dialogue on Poetry (“Gespräch über Poesie,” 1799-1800), Fr. Schlegel explicitly links 
arabesques with the realm of the sacred by comparing them to a trace left by a whiff of the 
divine: 
It [the sacred breath] cannot be seized forcibly and mechanically but it can be gently 
lured by mortal beauty in which it conceals itself. […] It is an infinite being who by no 
means limits its interest to persons, events, situations and individual inclinations: for a 
true poet, all this, so deeply as his soul may embrace it, is only an indication of the 
higher, the infinite, the hieroglyph of the one eternal love and the sacred exuberant 
fullness of the creative nature. 256 (KFSA II: 334)
And it is only the poet-magician, according to Novalis, with his gift of visionary insight who is 
capable of apprehending the simple truth of the arabesque-like Universe—the underlying unity of
all seemingly disconnected things. By striving to know oneself and through oneself the world, the
poet can break through to the higher meaning of the Universe and, consequently, learn how to 
read its hieroglyphs, thereby regaining the Logos-like power of converting words into objects. 
This process of deciphering or, in Novalis' terms, “translating,” like arabesques themselves, 
however, is an endless hermeneutic enterprise which can neither be brought to a stop nor to an 
end. The definitive deciphering of the hieroglyphic fabric of the Universe which would signify 
the ultimate concurrence of the word and the object, of the text and the world, and of the human 
and the divine in the absolute work of art is posed only as a Romantic imperative, as an infinite 
task that can never be completed.
256 “Er [der heilige Hauch] läßt sich nicht gewaltsam fassen und mechanisch greifen, aber er läßt sich freundlich 
locken von sterblicher Schönheit und in sie verhüllen. […] Es ist unendliches Wesen und mitnichten haftet und 
klebt sein Interesse nur an den Personen, den Begebenheiten und Situationen und den individuellen Neigungen: 
für den wahren Dichter ist alles dieses, so innig es auch seine Seele umschließen mag, nur Hindeutung auf das 
Höhere, Unendliche, Hieroglyphe der einen ewigen Liebe und der heiligen Lebensfülle der bildenden Natur.”   
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 Furthermore, before the ultimate meaning is attained upon reaching the termination of 
the endlessly unfolding chain of arabesques, arabesques themselves that serve as a visual 
metaphor for the incomplete universal project, the absolute work of art in the making, are not 
meaningful. They possess only what Iampol'skii calls an “impulse toward signification” rather 
than signification as such (351). As Derrida commented on this quality of arabesques: “Whereas 
here the movement of signification and representation is broached: the foliation, pure musical 
improvisation, music without theme or without text seem to mean or to show something, they 
have the form of tending toward some end” (The Truth in Painting 98). Despite this apparent 
telos-oriented movement ingrained in them, arabesques never go beyond the sheer gesture 
(“impulse”) toward meaningfulness and wholeness into the realm of meaningfulness and 
wholeness itself. Arabesques can be invested with meaning only retrospectively, upon the 
attainment of the higher meaning, the Absolute, the arrival of which, as was acknowledged by the
early Romantics themselves, is infinitely deferred. Since the deciphering of the sacred hieroglyph
is a never-ending enterprise, the entire fabric of the Universe, as well as the unattainable 
hieroglyph itself, which is supposed to supply the key to its definitive “translation,” is virtually 
meaningless. This realization can be both a source of enthusiasm, as in early German 
Romanticism, or despair, as in Gogol' and later in Symbolism. 
For Gogol', arabesques are inextricably connected with the Gothic (Frazier 15-16; 
Iampol'skii 352). In his vision, arabesques must cohere into the soaring Gothic cathedral or, in 
other words, the worldly fragmentation and heterogeneity must culminate in the divine order. 
Once the unifying “thread” is found and the hitherto inscrutable hieroglyph is decoded, the 
apparent chaos, fluidity, and arbitrariness of human history will miraculously assume the sublime
contours of the house of God. Humankind will no longer be metaphysically homeless, 
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languishing in exile, but will return to God who is also a sacred space—the primordial home. The
Gothic cathedral is perceived by Gogol' as an earthly incarnation of God, a visible symbol of its 
invisible but all-encompassing presence. It embodies an organic union between the material and 
the spiritual, the spatio-temporal and the eternal, the human and the divine, the multiple and the 
One, the parts and the whole, the individual and the collective. As Spieker observes, “Gogol' 
writes about the Gothic cathedral in the same way the mystics wrote about God. Indeed, like the 
God of the mystics, Gogol''s Gothic cathedral is ''everything'' at the same time: ''In it everything 
is combined'' (PSS VIII, 57)” (“Esthesis and Anesthesia” 168). The Gothic cathedral is that 
absolute work of art, a universal poem, in which the heterogeneous fragments are to coalesce into
the divine whole.    
But it is not only the Gothic cathedral, an incarnation of the Absolute, that “functions like 
an apophatic text” in Gogol''s Arabesques (Ibid.). Gogol''s miscellany itself is intended as such a 
total(izing) text that strives to encompass and combine everything. His human text aspires to 
recreate the divine whole by fusing the chaos of arabesques (empty signifiers) into a meaningful 
totality (Logos). In other words, the Russian Romantic's book aims to become (be?) that Gothic 
cathedral itself. Like Gothic architecture, his collection seeks to contain and bring into harmony 
the mutually exclusive qualities without annihilating them: “It [Gothic architecture] is as 
expansive and exalted as Christianity itself. It connects everything together: […] greatness and at
the same time beauty, sumptuousness and simplicity, gravity and lightness—these are such 
virtues that were encompassed by architecture in no other times”257 (57). The presence of this 
tendency toward being rather than describing is noted by Spieker who observes that “Gogol''s 
257 “Она [Gothic architecture] обширна и возвышенна, как христианство. В ней все соединено вместе: […] 
величие и вместе красота, роскошь и простота, тяжесть и легкость — это такие достоинства, которых 
никогда кроме этого времени не вмещала в себя архитектура.”    
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style resembles the cathedral it describes. […] [His] writing on the sublime does not merely 
describe, it performs258 sublime greatness” (166). Gogol' seeks to incarnate the Gothic ideal in 
and through writing. In his textual perfomativity there lies hidden desire to transcend the 
boundary separating language and life. It is the artist's word, in the Russian Romantic's messianic
vision, that must erect the total textual whole (the Gothic cathedral as an architectural text) that 
would redeem fragmentation and bring the stray humankind into the fold. The word of the artist 
must eventually coincide with that of God.  
  Since the Gothic cathedral representing the reintegrated cosmic whole is situated 
between the material, on the one hand, and the spiritual, on the other, the Gothic arabesque as its 
constituent part is ostensibly endowed with the power of crisscrossing between the two realms. 
Under the presupposition of such a (pre?)existent whole, the ultimate point of destination, 
arabesques appear as a provisional space of mediation between the human and the divine, the 
manifold and the One. Yet, while arabesques in Gogol''s work indeed crisscross between the 
realms, the crossings are emphatically not between the human and the divine but rather between 
the human and the demonic. Instead of unfolding ever upward, in the direction of the sky (the 
divine), Gogoliian arabesques rush downward, in the direction of the earth (the chthonic) that 
marks the ultimate state of fragmentation, alienation, and dissolution. The ascent implicit in the 
mystical union with the Godhead and allegorized by Gogol' in the soaring Gothic cathedral is 
supplanted in Arabesques with the precipitous descent into the darkness of isolation, insanity, and
death. This is particularly evident in the novellas, “The Portrait” (“Portret,” 1833-34), “Nevsky 
Prospect” (“Nevskii prospekt,” 1833-34) and “Notes of a Madman” (“Zapiski sumasshedshego,” 
1834) that dramatize the fate of the dreamers and artists, almost all of whom inevitably find 
258 The emphasis is author's. 
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themselves spiraling down into the abyss of madness and ultimately non-being. 
The very tool of salvation—art—by means of which the infinite interplay of arabesques is
supposed to be transformed into the perfect work of art incarnated as the Gothic cathedral turns 
out to be a demonic instrument of (self-)destruction. As it transpires most vividly in “The 
Portrait,” art, contrary to Gogol''s own assertion in his opening essay, “Sculpture, Painting and 
Music,” is by no means unambiguously divine. The novella recounts a tragic story of the young 
and talented painter Chartkov who by chance purchases a portrait depicting an oriental looking 
old man with eyes eerily alive. As it turns out, the portrait possesses a demonic power that 
corrupts Chartkov by tempting him through a large sum of money hidden in the frame to betray 
his selfless devotion to art in order to establish himself as a fashionable painter. Having forfeited 
his talent for money, Chartkov turns into a misanthrope who spends all his accumulated wealth to
purchase true masterpieces only to viciously tear them apart. Overwhelmed with jealousy and 
hatred, he eventually commits suicide. At the auction of his remaining property, one of the 
bidders who lays claim to the portrait narrates the story of its creation. 
The portrait was made by the bidder's father, a celebrated painter of holy subjects, who 
received a tempting order from a miserly pawnbroker notorious for his predatory practices that 
brought ruin upon many. While painting the pawnbroker, the painter experiences some 
inexplicable terror, evoked by the disturbing real-life semblance, of the eyes in particular. Unable
to complete the portrait, the painter runs away. The pawnbroker passes away the following day 
and his servant delivers the unfinished portrait to the painter. This portrait brings destruction to 
all its owners, starting with the painter himself who loses almost all of his family in strange 
circumstances. To expiate his sin, the painter confines himself to a monastery, in which he seeks 
to reclaim his compromised ability to draw sacred subjects. In the end, after a great deal of 
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fasting and praying, he succeeds in regaining his former power by depicting the scene of the 
nativity of Jesus imbued with a genuinely holy feeling. The demonic portrait, however, is still in 
circulation, causing much misery. The painter implores his son to trace and demolish the portrait. 
After spending many years tracking it down, the son at long last locates it at the auction of 
Chartkov's property. Upon completing relating the story, the painter's son, however, discovers 
that the portrait that he intended to destroy for good is stolen. 
Thus, art can be as easily employed in the service of the demonic, as of the divine, for its 
perpetuation and propagation. The overwhelming power of art to affect and transform can be 
exploited to turn the hearts and minds against the divine rather than towards it. And, what is 
worse, this terrifying work of art, perfect in its own way, can be a creation of a genuinely devout 
artist who has dedicated his whole life to the contemplation and representation of the holy. 
Through Chartkov, a painter who eventually succumbs to the allure of the demonic portrait, 
Gogol' raises the disconcerting questions about the darker side of art that manifests itself in the 
artist's desire to break beyond the sphere of art into the realm of life itself:
What is this?—he thought to himself—art or a supernatural kind of magic that has 
penetrated beyond the laws of nature? What a strange, what an incomprehensible task! Or 
there is such a borderline for man, to which leads the highest knowledge, and by 
trespassing which, he steals what was not created by man's effort, he tears out something 
living out of life animating the original. Why is this crossing over the line set as a 
boundary for human imagination so terrifying? Or beyond imagination, beyond impulse 
there at last lies reality, that reality, onto which imagination is knocked off its axis as if by
some extraneous push, that horrifying reality that presents itself to man longing for it at 
that moment when he, desirous of cognizing the beautiful man, equips himself with a 
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scalper, reveals his insides, and sees the disgusting man.259
In his striving to cross over into that sphere where art and life are fused into one, the artist
betrays his aspiration to assume the role of the Divine Creator. But in the very attempt to snatch 
away the secret of life, to attain “the highest knowledge,” the artist is bound to discover that this 
ambition is tarnished with the primordial, Luciferic, sin that inevitably leads to a tragic downfall. 
Instead of the desired transfiguration of life via art (the apprehension and subsequent creation of 
perfect man), the artist ends up with its very opposite, unspiritualized dead matter (his disgusting 
insides). This is the downward trajectory that Gogol''s own art would itself take starting with 
Arabesques. 
 The collection closes with the novella “The Diary of a Madman” that traces the titular 
counsilor Aksentii Poprischin's alienation from society and eventual descent into madness. This 
is a text that symbolically marks the point of non-arrival and non-fulfillment. Instead of the joint 
performance of worship in the Gothic cathedral, which would embody the union of the parts and 
the whole, the reader is confronted with its very opposite—“the ripping of the threads that 
connect the individual to the group” (Holquist 133). This “ripping of the threads” also represents 
a metaphoric attempt at the “ripping” of and through the arabesques, the “threads” of the 
universal fabric, in whose infinite capricious interplay between reality and dream-turned-
madness, the protagonist, Poprishchin (along with the author?), gets desperately lost. This wish to
break away from the ever expanding web of the encircling arabesques directly into the 
259 “Что это? — думал он сам про себя, — искусство или сверхъестественное какое волшебство, 
выглянувшее мимо законов природы? Какая странная, какая непостижимая задача! или для человека есть 
такая черта, до которой доводит высшее познание, и чрез которую шагнув, он уже похищает 
несоздаваемое трудом человека, он вырывает что-то живое из жизни, одушевляющей оригинал. Отчего же
этот переход за черту, положенную границею для воображения, так ужасен? или за воображением, за 
порывом, следует наконец действительность, та ужасная действительность, на которую соскакивает 
воображение с своей оси каким-то посторонним толчком, та ужасная действительность, которая 
представляется жаждущему ее тогда, когда он, желая постигнуть прекрасного человека, вооружается 
анатомическим ножом, раскрывает его внутренность и видит отвратительного человека.”        
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transcendent, the realm of the One, is manifested in Poprishchin's phantasmagorical flight in an 
imaginary troika: “Save me! Take me! Give me a troika of horses as fast as a whirlwind! Sit 
down, my coachman, ring, my bell, fly upward, my horses, and take me away from this world! 
Further, futher, so that I could see nothing, nothing at all.”260 Together with Poprishchin, at the 
finale of the collection, we indeed soar over the earth(ly) but this “soaring” turns out to be the 
inverse of the ideal of the Gothic cathedral, an embodiment of the perpetual diversity within the 
eternal unity. Poprishchin's mental flight signals a radical repudiation of the perpetual diversity, 
“arabesques,” viewed as irredeemably meaningless: “Further, futher, so that I could see nothing, 
nothing at all.”261 The impossibility of escape from this vicious circle of the profane is marked by
the opening of the new spiral of delusions, a new twist of arabesques, that supersedes the attempt 
at flight: “Do you know that the Algerian dey has a bump under his very nose?”262     
 A sense of non-fulfillment at the end of the collection is further reinforced by the parody 
of Poprishchin as a false Christ. It was Jenness who in her discussion of Arabesques observed 
that there are certain striking correspondences between the piece “Life” (“Zhizn',” 1835) that 
opens the second part of the collection and “The Diary of a Madman” that concludes it (Gogol''s 
Aesthetics 73-74). In “Life,” Gogol' deals with the sacred subject matter—the birth of Christ that 
heralds the advent of God-man, “the word [that] was made flesh” (KJB John 1:14): “An infant is 
lying in the wooden manger; his virgin mother is leaning over him and looking at him with eyes 
brimming with tears; the star is standing above him high up in the sky and casting its wondrous 
light over the whole world”263 (SS VIII: 84). These two themes—the mother shedding tears over 
260 “Спасите меня! возьмите меня! дайте мне тройку быстрых, как вихорь, коней! Садись, мой ямщик, звени, 
мой колокольчик, взвейтеся, кони, и несите меня с этого света! Далее, далее, чтобы не видно было ничего,
ничего.” 
261 “Далее, далее, чтобы не видно было ничего, ничего.” 
262 “А знаете ли, что у алжирского дея под самым носом шишка?” 
263 “В деревянных яслях лежит младенец; над ним склонилась непорочная мать и глядит на него 
212
her suffering son and the star twinkling in the sky—reappear in the concluding passage of “The 
Diary of a Madman.” Yet, rather than establishing a unifying “transcendental frame,” as Jenness 
claims,264 these echoes foreground the incommensurable gap between the sacred and the profane 
that Gogol' sought to unite in the edifice of the universal cathedral. Instead of the word of God, 
one hears the cry of human despair. The entire collection closes with an appeal to mercy by the 
false Christ crucified by the senseless quotidian life.
The Structure of Belyi's Discontinuous System
In the three volume collection, Symbolism, Arabesques, and The Green Meadow, Belyi 
follows Gogol' in his efforts to achieve a totality in writing and through writing—in the realm of 
life itself. Like his Romantic predecessor, the Russian Symbolist also seeks to demonstrate that 
the apparently haphazard combination of heterogeneous elements with which man is confronted 
in the Universe is not actually a meaningless chaotic “heap” of fragments but has an implicit 
organizing principle revealed to and by the artist of genius. In Gogoliian fashion, Belyi sets out 
on the quest to create an aesthetic (“written”) whole out of seemingly chaotic material. The 
Symbolist total book of aesthetics, no less than its Romantic antecedent, aims to incarnate and 
enact the ideal of the perpetual diversity within the eternal unity. 
Despite this cosmic ambition to reveal and bring about universal unity, Belyi's collection, 
similar to its Romantic counterpart, appears at first sight to be composed of a veritable chaos of 
conflicting essays and, perhaps unsurprisingly, it was taken as such by the bewildered readers. 
Later, Belyi, with a nod to this negative reception, himself acknowledged his failure at 
исполненными слез очами; над ним высоко в небе стоит звезда и весь мир осияла чудным светом.”  
264 “Everything is held together, however, by a transcendental frame: the star of Bethlehem casts its wondrous light 
over everything.” 
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articulating a unified theory of Symbolism: 
… while the clay colossus (over six hundred pages), “Symbolism,” of whose crudity I 
was aware even then, lives on as a monument to the epoch; a heap of glaringly 
contradictory essays—a reflection of my turbulent and painful personal life that was 
undermining my creativity at that time; if it succeeded in leaving an imprint, then, 
contrary to all deformations, by its vanity; it looks to me like a submerged continent, 
whose disparate peaks are barely showing above the water's surface.265 (Mezhdu dvukh 
revoliutsii 336) 
Seeking to excuse the ensuing “heap of glaringly contradictory essays,” Belyi cites not only the 
traumatic personal circumstances but also the wild hurry in which what was supposed to be the 
all-encompassing theoretical fabric of Symbolism was woven together: 
While organizing the book, I was clutching my head in bewilderment, seeing all the 
discrepancies: in methods of interpreting the problem; the only way out that was left to 
me: to stitch together disparate shreds of thought, already submitted to the printing press; 
after them one had to rush with an integrative commentary, pulling the contradictions 
together into some kind of unity; the essays had already been taken from me: into the 
printing press.266 (336) 
Yet, in spite of all these latter day apologies about a ragbag of antithetical Symbolist theories in 
place of the unified system, and the fact that most of the mutually incompatible essays included 
265 “... зато глиняный колосс (шестьсот с лишним страниц), ''Символизм,'' которого рыхлость я и тогда 
осознал, живет памятником эпохи; ворох кричаще противоречивых статей — отражение бурно-
мучительной личной жизни моей, разрушавшей тогдашнее творчество; если оно и оставило след, то, 
вопреки всем деформациям, суетой; оно выглядит мне не поднятым со дна континентом, которого 
отдельные пики торчат невысоко над водной поверхностью.”    
266 “Организуя книгу, хватался за голову, видя все неувязки: в методах трактовки вопроса; единственно, что 
оставалось: сшить на живую нитку отдельные лоскуты хода мыслей, уже сданные в типографию; 
вдогонку за ними надо было пуститься со сшивающим комментарием, стягивающим противоречия все же 
к некоторому единству; уже сами статьи от меня были взяты: в набор.”  
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in the collection were indeed a product of the earlier years, Belyi's collection that seeks to 
construct and be a “discontinuous system” is carefully thought out. As in Gogol''s case, the roots 
of its failure lie not in the lack of an organizing principle structuring the perceived confusion of 
heterogeneous material but, rather, in the impossible metaphysical task that it pursues: the 
definitive man-made reconciliation of the system and fragments, art and life, consciousness and 
nature, the divine and the human.  
The collection consists of three volumes Symbolism, Arabesques, and The Green Meadow.
Each volume is supposed to fulfill the role of one of the constituent elements in the synthetic a 
priori judgment of Kantian type, “form is content.” In Kant's philosophy, a synthetic  proposition 
is the one whose predicate concept (in Belyi's case, “content”) is not contained in its subject 
concept (“form”), though it is related to it; and an a priori proposition is such a type of judgment 
whose validity is not grounded in empirical experience and is therefore logically necessary. 
According to Kant, all scientific knowledge is built on synthetic a priori propositions and if 
metaphysics is to be considered a viable science, it also needs to construct a foundation out of 
such judgments. Kant strongly doubted such a possibility, raising questions as to the credibility of
metaphysical knowledge that appears to be purely speculative. Thus, Belyi aspires to overcome 
Kant's skepticism by providing such an a priori synthetic foundation for his metaphysical 
enterprise of elevating Symbolism to the status of an all-encompassing worldview.
The a priori synthetic proposition “form is content” is conceived by Belyi as a 
cornerstone of the future Symbolist aesthetics, in which art will become theurgy. “Form” or  
Kantian “concept” is represented by the volume Symbolism, which is aligned with the pole of 
science and philosophy. The volume Arabesques, on the other hand, stands for “content” or 
Kantian “intuition” and is associated with the pole of art. The ultimate synthesis of form 
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(philosophy and science) and content (art) should yield the Absolute, the Symbol Embodied, 
epitomized by the closing volume, The Green Meadow. Each volume, in its own turn, is 
composed of a series of essays, present-day fragments of Belyi's future holistic aesthetics, which 
are strategically and hierarchically arranged. Each essay aims to be a “step” of a ladder—either 
of “the ladder of cognitions” delineated in Symbolism or of “the ladder of creative acts” outlined 
in Arabesques. Together with the author, the reader is expected to make a journey, first, upward 
to the pinnacle to attain the Symbol Embodied and later downward, at first, on the side of 
cognitions and later on the side of creative acts. Each essay in the collection is either a step up, 
when we climb toward the Symbol or a step down, when we descend back into the manifold. 
The entire collection, in its triadic/triangular structure, therefore aims to epitomize and 
literalize a metaphysical mountain. Inspired by the Bible, Nietzsche, and Ibsen, Belyi reverts to 
an even more ancient symbol of the divine Cosmos than Gogol''s Gothic cathedral. Cathedrals, 
churches, and other sacred places of worship that seek to embody the idea of vertical expansion 
toward the divine have actually the image of a soaring mountain as their original prototype. In 
the mythological consciousness, the mountain is perceived as simultaneously the center and the 
axis of the Universe and its pinnacle as a point of convergence between the earth and the sky. In 
this light, like Gogol''s Gothic cathedral, Belyi's mountain represents the union between the two 
severed realms: the realm of contingency (the earth) and the realm of transcendence (the sky). 
With its broad foundation and pointed summit, the mountain is also traditionally seen as 
representing the underlying unity of the Universe. In other words, Belyi's mountain, similar to its 
Gogoliian architectural double, the cathedral, serves as a symbol of what the early German 
Romantics called “the infinite diversity within the infinite unity.” Progressing from the 
mountain's broad foundation symbolic of the diverse manifold, one ascends toward the pinnacle 
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emblematic of the transcendent Oneness. The journey up the mountain is therefore conceived as a
journey of spiritual elevation. It is on the summit of the mountain that one makes contact with the
transcendent and receives divine wisdom (revelation). 
The experience of reading the collection is envisioned by Belyi as such a spiritual 
(“theurgic”) journey toward the attainment of the ultimate wisdom. This spiritual journey starts in
the programmatic essay “The Emblematics of Meaning,” Symbolism with an ascent on the ladder 
of cognitions followed by an ascent on the ladder of creative acts. The reader together with his 
spiritual guide, Belyi, scales the two opposing slopes of the world mountain (emblematized as “a 
triangle of values” in the first volume) one after another toward the point of their convergence, 
the transcendent summit. In other words, in our quest for illumination, we set out from the realm 
of the particular (heterogeneity and fragmentation) gradually working our way up by eliminating 
each layer of the concrete to the lofty sphere of the universal (eternal unity). After ostensibly 
conquering the pinnacle, the seat of the Symbol Embodied, and attaining divine wisdom in “The 
Emblematics of Meaning,” we begin our journey back to the motley manifold. 
Again, as in the case of the initial ascent, we alternately descend the mountain/“triangle of
values” on its two no longer antithetical slopes: we climb down “the ladder of cognitions” in the 
second part of the volume Symbolism and later “the ladder of creative acts” in the volume of 
Arabesques. Upon our journey downward, we, empowered with wisdom, infuse the hitherto 
meaningless rungs of each ladder with symbolic meaning and value of the Absolute, the Symbol 
Embodied. Each of these preliminary “steps” therefore is transformed from a senseless layer of 
the infinite manifold into what Belyi calls “prototype-symbols” (“proobrazy-simvoly”): 
It is necessary to differentiate between the ultimate universal symbol and the prototype-
symbols, formed as a result of the diverse manifestation of our experiences in the world 
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of appearances. These prototypes may be called symbols; [but] one must differentiate 
them from the Ultimate Symbol. While they [prototypes] represent the process of the 
Ultimate's embodiment into the variegated features of the world [of appearances], the 
Symbol itself is the completion of this process, a complete merging of the unity with the 
diversity.267 (Arabeski 107) 
In the light of the Symbol Embodied, the former disconnected fragments coalesce into a 
hierarchical, unified system of symbols that enacts the process of symbolization of that Absolute. 
 Whereas in its outwardly arabesque-like fragmentation, Belyi's discontinuous system 
gestures toward its Romantic antecedents, Gogol' and the early German Romantics, it is, 
however, dramatically different from them in the rigidly systematic, purely formalist approach 
that it takes toward the organization of these discordant fragments into unity. In his attempt to 
impose the external unifying framework upon the fragmentary manifold, Belyi rather follows the 
deductive method of Kantian-Fichtean Critical philosophy. In his examination of the influence of 
Kant on Belyi as a thinker, Cassedy makes the pointed observation that Belyi “formulated his 
theory of Symbolism with the Königsberg philosopher always looking over his shoulder” (“Belyi
the Thinker” 314). While Belyi considered Kantian philosophy one of the greatest challenges to 
the triumph of Solov'ev's ideal of Godmanhood and persistently sought to overturn the virtually 
invincible edifice of his epistemology, “after a certain point,” in Cassedy's words, “in the logic of
Belyi's thinking as well as in the logic of its development, Kantianism remained both the point of 
departure and the system in relation to which everything else was defined” (313). And it is from 
267 “От предельного всеобщего символа следует отличать прообразы-символы, получающиеся от 
многобразного олицетворения видимостью наших переживаний. Эти прообразы мы можем называть 
символами; следует отличать их от Единого Символа. В то время как они являют процесс воплощения 
Единого в многообразные черты действительности, в символе — окончание этого процесса, полное 
слияние единства с множественностью.”  
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nobody else than Kant that Belyi inherits the classical understanding of a philosophical system as
a “body of knowledge derived from, and organized around, a single self-evident first principle” 
(Beiser, German Idealism 446). This impulse to complete, logically systematize, and formalize 
sets Belyi's discontinuous system apart from the Romantic system of fragments. 
Hence, Belyi does not entirely abandon a belief in the possibility of elaborating a perfect 
logical system which would conceptualize the ontological Absolute. In his struggles to overcome 
Kantian dualities, Belyi reverts to the post-Kantian Idealist ideal of self-enclosed systematicity 
founded on unconditioned first principles and deductive reasoning. His discontinuous system is 
entirely dependent on the presupposition of the most universal concept, The Symbol Embodied, 
that serves as the unconditioned ground. The hierarchical system composed of the “prototype-
symbols” is therefore bound to disintegrate into Gogoliian “heap,” a randomly arranged 
assortment of heterogeneous fragments, if the highest principle that holds the whole system 
together and endows it with symbolic meaning is invalidated. This is what happens in Belyi's 
theory of Symbolism that becomes disarranged due to the exposure of the Absolute as essentially 
lacking absoluteness. As it will be shown below, the Symbol Embodied is not even a symbol but 
a pure Kantian form, a falsely absolutized subject, that masquerades as a universal unity of form 
and content. With the collapse of the Symbol, the fragments, “steps” of the two antithetical 
ladders, do not cohere into a unified system since there is no pinnacle, the projected point of 
convergence of the two ladders, that would reconcile the oppositions (concept and intuition, 
subject and object, philosophy/science and poetry, the system and a fragment, human and divine, 
Idealism and Romanticism, etc.). The Idealist triangle of values on the side of cognitions never 
comes to coincide with the Romantic symbol of the mountain on the side of creative acts. The 
projected synthesis of the logical and the metaphysical is not attained. 
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Further, since the construction of metaphysical aesthetics (theurgy) proves untenable,  
exact or formal aesthetics, a product of the ladder of cognitions, that Belyi suggests as the only 
possible present-day alternative turns out to be an inversion of his Symbolist conception of art. 
Within the confines of exact aesthetics Symbolist art, conceived as a union of form and content, 
is turned into its very opposite emblematic art in which the symbol is supplanted by the allegory. 
The collapse of the entire metaphysical enterprise becomes apparent in the last, synthetic, volume
of the collection. The spiritual journey that was supposed to take us upward, to the soaring 
heights of the Symbol Embodied, takes us instead downward, into the subterranean recesses of 
the mountain, in which the reader sees the would-be theurgists, failed Orpheuses, languishing in 
the darkness and waiting for salvation. Like Gogol''s Gothic cathedral, Belyi's metaphysical 
mountain in its soaring loftiness never comes to be. 
The Volume Symbolism: the Symbol Embodied as a Pseudo-Absolute
The key to the structure of the entire collection lies in its first volume, Symbolism, or, to 
be more exact, in its theoretical manifesto, “The Emblematics of Meaning.” Here Belyi does not 
seek to establish Symbolism as merely an aesthetic theory but attempts to furnish the groundwork
(“prolegomena”) for a comprehensive system that would resolve all dualities and heal the ever 
increasing fragmentation of the modern world. The project undertaken by Belyi is not unlike that 
of the early Romantics who also sought to develop a doctrine of the Absolute that would dissolve
the oppositions (the phenomenal and the noumenal, the subject and the object) introduced by 
Kantian thought. Although the ultimate goal—the construction of the totalizing synthetic system
—is shared by the Symbolists and the Romantics, the philosophical ways of pursuing it prove 
widely divergent. In light of those differences, the reason behind the disintegration of Belyi's 
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discontinuous system—its excessive subjectivism—becomes apparent. 
 Belyi radically departs from the early Romantics in his search for the all-subsuming unity
situated “outside of being, outside of cognition, and outside of creation”268 (Simvolizm 83) 
already at the starting point. Unlike the Jena Romantics who start with the Universe as the only 
independent and self-sufficient substance that encompasses the subjective and the objective as its 
different degrees of organization and development, Belyi in his attempt to defeat Kant on his own
terrain subscribes to the principles of Kantian system, and therefore, by default, has the subject as
his starting point. By embracing (neo)Kantian thought, Belyi also inherits the dualistic impasse 
that plagues that system of thought—the subjective and the objective as two distinct ontological 
realities with no possibility of interaction between them. While the Romantics start with the 
Absolute itself and thus with the indivisible unity, Belyi starts with only one of its constituent 
parts (the subject) that, in addition, is, as Kant conceives it, irreparably separated from the other 
half: the world of objectivity. As it turns out, Belyi has to work his way up to the ultimate unity, 
the Symbol Embodied, by bridging the schism between the subject and the object as well as, by 
extension, between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. 
Starting with the subject, Belyi has no other choice but to follow the constitutive 
approach, that is to arrive at the Absolute, the Symbol Embodied,269 via the immanent and 
therefore by the application of discursive reason. Belyi builds an elaborate diagram, a triangle of 
values, that delineates a strategy of reasoned steps through which the Symbol can be approached 
by the finite mind. Cassedy describes Belyi's strategy the following way: 
268  “вне бытия, вне познания, вне творчества” 
269 “The Symbol itself is, to be sure, not a symbol; the concept of the Symbol, as well as its image, are only symbols 
of this Symbol; it [the Symbol] is an embodiment in relation to them [symbols]” [“Сам Символ конечно не 
символ; понятие о Символе, как и образ его, суть символы этого Символа; по отношению к ним он есть 
воплощение”] (133). 
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It [strategy] involves an ascent through a hierarchy of increasingly transcendent levels of 
human activity until the summit is reached at what Belyi calls the Symbol Embodied 
(Simvol voploshchennyi) and a subsequent descent through increasingly immanent levels 
of human activity for the purpose of infusing these levels with the supreme, absolute 
Value of the Symbol Embodied. (“Translator's Introduction” 20) 
Thus, as it turns out, the Absolute, as conceived by Belyi, has to be first derived by the subject by
discursive means and only then it can make the whole of human activity meaningful. 
The Absolute that has a derivative nature, however, essentially lacks absoluteness. The 
Absolute, as already recognized and emphasized by the early Romantics, cannot be known 
through conceptual reason. All discursivity turns the Unconditioned into its own inversion: by its 
nature, reason determines and conditions, while the Absolute, the indivisible whole of all that 
exists, cannot be determined and thus conceptualized (Beiser 373-374). In Novalis' words, “We 
search for the absolute everywhere and always find only things”270 (Novalis Schriften 2: 412, no. 
1). The infinite transcends the finite and limited human consciousness and therefore can only be 
vaguely and obscurely apprehended by non-discursive means—through immediate aesthetic 
intuition, by an act of an inspired insight that allows man to experience, however briefly, the 
yearned-for reunion will all things. In this light, Belyi who, like Solov'ev, seeks the 
conceptualization of the uncognizable, indivisible being through reason that, true to its nature, 
cognizes and divides, finds himself in the end with the pseudo-Absolute.
The Symbol Embodied glaringly betrays its lack of absoluteness in its incapacity to 
synthesize. Belyi's explicit goal, like that of the early Romantics, is to create a viable synthesis in 
which all oppositions, including Kantian schisms between the subjective and the objective, the 
270 “Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte, und finden immer nur Dinge.”  
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noumenal and the phenomenal, would disappear. The Symbol Embodied as Belyi's ideal, limiting
concept is proposed as such an ultimate unity in which all dualisms would be happily dissolved: 
“The Symbol [Embodied] is the limit of all cognitive, creative, and ethical norms: the Symbol is, 
in this sense, the limit of limits”271 (Simvolizm 111). However, the Symbol, as it turns out, only 
pretends to be what it is not. The movement of ascent along the triangular diagram with the aim 
of reaching the Absolute is the movement of increasing disembodiment as we proceed from pure 
immanence and concretion (chaos and number) to pure transcendence (Value and the norm of 
Value, The Symbol Embodied). The highest limit to this process of disembodiment is the point 
where all concretion and consequently, content vanishes and what remains is a pure form which 
is stripped of all embodiment altogether. Thus, the Symbol cannot be a workable synthesis 
because it is just a pure form with no content. It cannot be even called, as Belyi insists, the 
Symbol Embodied, for the simple reason that the term is the direct opposite of what it is 
supposed to stand for. As pointed out by Cassedy:
The word symbol in its general sense implies the representation, in concrete terms, of 
something that does not otherwise appear in concrete terms (because it is transcendent 
quality or essence). The Symbol, on the other hand, represents the extreme limit of the 
notion of symbolization in the direction of increasing transcendence: the point where the 
symbolic activity ceases to be symbolic since all the concreteness has been refined out of 
it. (“Translator's Introduction” 49-50) 
Pure form cannot be a symbol, and even less so, the Symbol Embodied. 
More importantly, this pure form, the Symbol Embodied, that masquerades as a synthesis 
271 “Символ есть предел всем познавательным, творческим и этическим нормам: Символ есть в этом смысле 
предел пределов.” 
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of form and content is nothing else but the subject, or pure consciousness, which, in Kantian 
understanding, is form. Belyi himself admits in passing that when the Symbol is considered in 
metaphysical terms it is symbolized as the subject: “ … this unity of ours is an uncognizable 
divine symbol; the norm, unity, and subject272 are only symbols of this symbol in metaphysical 
terms; the unconditioned, abyss, and parabrahman are symbols of this symbol in terms of 
mystical doctrines”273 (Simvolizm 83). The forming operations are provided by the subject while 
content (the “formed” content of consciousness) is what the subject knows. Thus, form is 
coterminous with the cognizing subject and content with the object of cognition. Belyi's absolute 
Symbol, as shown above, is devoid of all content: it is consciousness taken in its purity. 
In “The Emblematics of Meaning,” it is the formal subject who is ultimately declared to 
be the highest principle of all being. The deification of the subject, its elevation into the 
unconditioned ground, comes as no surprise, since starting from the Kantian-Fichtean subject, 
Belyi is bound to arrive at the subject rather than at the Absolute that stays out of his reach. 
Seeking to vanquish Kant by constructing the metaphysical theory of Symbolism from within the
paradigm of transcendental philosophy, Belyi instead finds his own discontinuous system 
derailed by the principles he attempts to overcome. Upon the collapse of the hegemonic 
subsuming concept, the logical hierarchy (a triangle of values) which was supposed to reproduce 
and become incarnated as the ontological mountain of wisdom falls apart into a “heap” of 
disjointed and conflicting fragments. Art and philosophy/science never come to merge into unity. 
272 The emphasis is mine. 
273 “... единство наше — непознаваемый, нерукотворный символ; норма, единство, субъект суть символы 
этого символа в терминах метафизических; безусловное, бездна, парабраман суть символы этого символа 
в терминах мистических доктрин.”
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Exact Aesthetics as an Inversion of Symbolism
The collapse of the Absolute in the prolegomena to the theory of Symbolism that attests 
to the impossibility of constructing the metaphysical Symbolist outlook on the premises of 
transcendental philosophy has dramatic implications for Belyi's overall aesthetic project. Instead 
of elaborating an aesthetics of Symbolism which is posited as a task for the future, he outlines 
purely formal aesthetics along Kantian lines. This exact or formal aesthetics that Belyi envisions 
and seeks to establish as a system of rigorous aesthetic sciences turns out to be in a irreconcilable
conflict with his Symbolist conception of art as an organic (“chemical”) unity of form and 
content. Within the confines of Belyi's formal aesthetics erected on Kantian foundation, the 
symbol as an indissoluble unity of form and content is supplanted by the allegory and Symbolist 
art is inverted into emblematic art. 
In his project, Belyi distinguishes two types of aesthetics: metaphysical aesthetics and 
exact or formal aesthetics. Metaphysical aesthetics the object of which would be art in the 
religious sense (life creation) is posed by Belyi only as an objective. This type of theurgic 
aesthetics is inherently linked with the success of the theory of Symbolism as a worldview: “The 
aesthetics of the Symbolist school must seek the foundations of aesthetics outside aesthetics. 
Without clarifying its relation to the theory of Symbolism, such aesthetics is meaningless”274 
(Simvolizm 137). Its logical foundation, like that of the theory of Symbolism as a whole, lies in 
and depends on the validity of the synthetic a priori proposition “form is content,” which is 
expressed in ontological terms as an absolute unity, the Symbol Embodied. As it has been 
demonstrated above, however, Belyi's synthetic a priori proposition “form is content” turns out to
274 “Эстетика символической школы должна искать обоснования эстетики вне эстетики. Без выяснения 
своего отношения к теории символизма такая эстетика не имеет собственного смысла.”  
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be an analytical one, in which “content” is not an equal concept but is subsumed under “form” as 
one of its predicates. In his prolegomena Belyi did not succeed in creating the ground for the 
future theory of Symbolism as “gnoseological metaphysics” and therefore in providing the 
theoretical basis for constructing metaphysical aesthetics of Symbolism.
Since the construction of metaphysical aesthetics is (infinitely) deferred, Belyi seeks to 
stake out the province of what he calls exact or formal aesthetics: “Art has no meaning of its own
apart from religion; within the confines of aesthetics, one deals exclusively with form; by 
rejecting the religious meaning of art, we deprive it of all meaning; its destiny then is either to 
completely disappear or to turn into a science”275 (223). The meaning of art lies outside its 
domain proper—in the sphere of religion, and until art as theurgy is realized and metaphysical 
aesthetics is fully elaborated, the study of its meaning (“content”) is beyond the scope of 
aesthetics. Therefore, Belyi contends, the only viable aesthetics which could be presently 
established on a solid epistemological foundation is aesthetics as science whose object of study 
would be form: 
Perhaps, the change in the nature of humankind will ultimately liberate all the existing 
arts from the power of form but these will be entirely unimaginable arts. While music 
remains music and sculpture remains sculpture, one can only silently approach the 
religious essence of art... And the task of all existing aesthetics is not in identifying the 
meaning of art: this task lies in the analysis of its form.276 (224) 
275 “Искусство не имеет никакого собственного смысла, кроме религиозного; в пределах эстетики мы имеем 
дело лишь с формой; отказываясь от религиозного смысла искусства, мы лишаем его всякого смысла; его 
удел тогда — исчезнуть или превратиться в науку.”  
276 “Быть может, изменение природы человечества освободит существующие искусства из-под власти 
формы, но то будут совершенно невообразимые искусства. Пока же музыка остается музыкой, а 
скульптура — скульптурой, возможно лишь молчаливое касание религиозной сущности искусства … И 
задача существующих эстетик не в указании на смысл искусства: эта задача в анализе его форм.”  
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So instead of crossing the threshold epitomized by Kantian gnoseology into the sphere of 
metaphysics, Belyi remains confined within the restricted perimeter demarcated by it. 
This formal (gnoseological) type of aesthetics irreconcilably conflicts with Belyi's 
Symbolist conception of art as an indissoluble unity of form and content. From the perspective of
formal aesthetics, art cannot be anything but bare schematism or emblematism. In Belyi's own 
words, “Art from the standpoint of formal aesthetics is nothing else but schematism (or 
emblematism)”277 (Kommentarii 525); “... the essence of art, since we consider it from the 
standpoint of the general conditions of its manifestation in the material, is already conditionally 
reducible to the schematism of the concepts of the understanding”278 (500). Within its discursive 
analytical framework, exact aesthetics inevitably turns a living experience captured in and 
conveyed by the symbol into its inverse, an allegorical representation: “The emblem is, in Kant's 
terminology, a monogram of pure imagination that connects creative images in a system; it is by 
means of the emblem that the ideas of reason can be thought in sensory images; any idea in art 
therefore is already an allegory”279 (501).  
The living unity of the symbol viewed through the prism of Kantian conceptual faculty of 
the understanding inevitably degenerates into an aggregate of disparate mechanically connected 
elements. The mysterious cohesive element “a” in the symbolic triad “abc” that merges “b” 
(objective embodiment) and “c” (inner experience) into the synthetic unity is supplanted by the 
formal surrogate, Kantian schema, that can produce only a mechanical synthesis of a concept and
an intuition. The schema is not capable of generating a chemical (organic) synthesis yielding a 
277 “Искусство с точки зрения формальной эстетики и есть схематизм (или эмблематизм).” 
278 “... сущность искусства, поскольку мы рассматриваем его с точки зрения общих условий проявления в 
материале, уже условно сводима к схематизму понятий рассудка.”   
279 “Эмблема есть, выражаясь языком Канта, монограмма чистого воображения [schema], соединяющего 
образы творчества в систему; посредством эмблемы идеи разума становятся мыслимыми в чувственных 
образах; а всякая идея в искусстве, стало быть, есть уже аллегория.”    
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living experience sought by the Symbolist, for, in Kant's epistemology, the schema is just a 
procedural rule that prescribes the way to relate pure concepts to given sense impressions to form
a representation. It has no creative transformative power beyond that of being a mere 'adapter.' Its
unifying ability stops at producing images of external objects (representations) and of the ideas of
pure reason (allegorical representations). Thus, within the conceptual framework of Belyi's 
formal aesthetics that dissects living art into mechanical constituents (concepts, feelings, and 
schemata) all symbols are bound to turn into emblems and allegories. 
Furthermore, through its exclusive emphasis on form, Belyi's exact aesthetics sanctions 
and perpetuates the forces of division and atomization that he sets out to battle with his all-
encompassing theory of Symbolism in the first place. Formal aesthetics encourages the 
development of the individual technique (“metod”), which in its own turn, leads to an 
accelerating fragmentation of art accompanied by a rapid deterioration in its meaning 
(“bespredmetnost'”): 
As soon as “meaninglessness” is established in art, an artistic method turns into a “thing-
in-itself,” resulting in extreme individualization; to find one's own method becomes the 
sole purpose of art; such an understanding of creativity will inevitably lead us to the 
complete disintegration of all forms of art, where each work of art is its own form; under 
such conditions, internal chaos will ensue in art.280 (452) 
The cult of pure form and unique technique authorized and reinforced by exact aesthetics is liable
to bring about chaos, fossilization, and, ultimately, the demise of art rather than the fulfillment of 
280 “А раз ''беспредметность'' водворяется в искусстве, метод творчества становится ''предметом самим в 
себе,'' что влечет за собой крайнюю индивидуализацию; отыскать собственный метод — вот в чем цель 
творчества; такой взгляд на творчество неминуемо приведет нас к полному разложению форм искусства, 
где каждое произведение есть своя собственная форма; в искусстве водворится при таком условии 
внутренний хаос.”
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the Absolute through the transformation of life via art. Symbolist art and exact aesthetics are, in 
the end, at cross purposes.
The Volume Arabesques: In Search of Metaphysical Aesthetics
The second volume Arabesques was conceived by Belyi in its thematics and problematics
as an antithesis (art and feeling) to the thesis of Symbolism (science and concept). Arabesques 
represents the antithetical /complimentary “ladder of creative acts,” the ascent up which should, 
like that up the “ladder of cognitions,” lead toward the Symbol Embodied, the summit that marks
the reunification of science and art, concept and feeling. While in Symbolism Belyi is 
preoccupied with laying the foundations for the theory of Symbolism as a worldview and 
working out exact aesthetics based on Kantian Critical Idealism, in Arabesques he is primarily 
concerned with the future possibility of establishing, or rather enacting, metaphysical aesthetics 
(art as theurgy). It is the conjunction between the aesthetic and the religious in place of the 
aesthetic and the scientific/philosophical that comes into the foreground in the second volume of 
the collection. In its singular emphasis on the religious dimension of art and the exalted role of 
the artist as a Christ-like Savior, Arabesques, in contradistinction to Symbolism with its dominant 
Idealist spirit, aligns itself with the pole of Romanticism.        
The composition of Arabesques is based on the same deductive principle established and 
elaborated in the first volume, Symbolism. Since Belyi assumes that the ascent was successfully 
completed and the Absolute attained (at least conceptually if not yet practically) in his 
programmatic essay, “The Emblematics of Meaning,” the second part of Symbolism and the 
entire Arabesques stage the descent along their respective slopes of the “triangle of values” which
takes on the distinctive contours of the metaphoric mountain of wisdom in the second volume. 
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Thus, in Arabesques the reader led by his guide, Belyi, descends “the ladder of creative acts” 
from the religious province of the Symbol Embodied (unity) to that of the unbounded chaos 
(ultimate state of dissolution). In other words, we descend from the realm of the universal 
(Oneness) deep into the world of the particular (division and fragmentation). 
On the side of creative acts, the Absolute manifests itself as nothing else but the desired 
state of Solov'evian Godmanhood that merges art and life, the human and the divine. This Christ-
like state of completeness is yet to be practically attained by the aspiring Symbolists and its 
fulfillment still lies in some distant future. In our backward journey from the yet-to-be-
experienced future into the present we traverse the three stages of individualism that constitute 
mandatory steps toward the attainment of collective Godmanhood. Belyi delineates these 
successive stages in his essay “The Crisis of Consciousness and Heinrich Ibsen” (“Krizis 
soznaniia i Genrik Ibsen,” 1910): 
Modern individualism must traverse three stages: from Baudelaire to Ibsen, from Ibsen to 
Nietzsche, and from Nietzsche to the Apocalypse. The path from Baudelaire to Ibsen is a 
path from Symbolism as a literary school to Symbolism as a worldview; the path from 
Ibsen to Nietzsche is a path from Symbolism as a worldview to Symbolism as a world-
feeling; this world-feeling leads to real symbolism; finally, the path from Nietzsche to 
John the Evangelist is a path from an individual set of symbols to a collective system of 
symbols, that is to the ultimate transfiguring religion, a system of symbols turns into 
incarnation, and symbolism—into theurgy.281 (210) 
281 “Три этапа надлежит пройти современному индивидуализму: от Бодлэра — к Ибсену, от Ибсена — к 
Ницше, от Ницще — к Апокалипсису. Путь от Бодлэра к Ибсену есть путь от символизма, как 
литературной школы, к символизму, как миросозерцанию; путь от Ибсена к Ницше есть путь от 
символизма, как миросозерцания, к символизму, как мироощущению; это мироощущение ведет к 
реальной символике; наконец, путь от Ницше до евангелиста Иоана есть путь от индивидуальной 
символики к символике коллективной, то есть к окончательной преображающей религии, символика 
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In the structure of Arabesques, the order of these progressive stages is reversed. In our downward
movement along the slope of creative acts, we proceed from the Absolute, the collective state of 
Godmanhood, as a metaphysical task which is still to be realized by mankind, through the 
domains staked out by Nietzsche (“Symbolism as a world-feeling”) and Ibsen (“Symbolism as a 
worldview”) to Baudelaire (“Symbolism as a school of art”) and, ultimately, to the Russian 
school of Symbolism. Belyi leads us downward from the heights of eternity and transcendence 
into the chaos of the historical present of early-20th-century Russia; from the sacred domain of 
collective unity into the profane realm of atomized particularity.  
Russian Symbolism as a literary movement therefore marks one of the lowest rungs on 
the ladder of creative acts that in its downward unfolding terminates in chaos. The Russian 
school of Symbolism is portrayed by Belyi as a predominantly negative landscape of bitter 
ideological divisions and incessant literary wars. Eroded by inner discords from within and 
corrupted by false allies from the outside, Russian Symbolism is on the brink of disintegration 
and its grand metaphysical enterprise of theurgy is at risk of imminent collapse. The Symbolist 
artists who are supposed to lead humankind toward salvation (Godmanhood) by setting a 
personal example of living the ideal are, in other words, at the crossroads themselves: 
... we overhear the trembling of a new person in ourselves; we overhear death and 
putrefaction in ourselves; we are the dead who are dissolving the old life but we are also 
those who have not been born yet to a new life; our soul is pregnant with the future: 
degeneration and resurrection are struggling with each other within it.282 (242) 
This moment of crisis for the Russian Symbolist movement is also an acute moment of 
становится воплощением, символизм — теургией.”  
282 “ ... мы подслушиваем в себе трепет нового человека; и мы подслушиваем в себе смерть и разложение; мы
— мертвецы, разлагающие старую жизнь, но мы же — еще не рожденные к новой жизни; наша душа 
чревата будущим: вырождение и возрождение в ней борются.” 
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crisis for the whole of humankind, for it is threatened to be deprived of all viable worldviews if 
Symbolism fails. Belyi views it as the critical moment of frontier (“pereval”) that marks the 
dividing cosmic line between life and death: 
Mankind faces the critical frontier, … the division between life and word, conscious and 
unconscious is taken to the limit; the way out of this division: either death or an inner 
reconciliation of contradictions in new forms of life: the element of art reflects both the 
gravity of contradictions and the presentiment of the sought-for harmony in a fuller and 
more independent way: art therefore is at present a vital factor in the salvation of 
mankind. An artist is a prophet of the future; his prophecy is not in the rationalist dogmas 
but in the expression of his inner “I”; this “I” is an aspiration and a path toward the 
future; he himself is a momentous symbol of what lies ahead of us. 283 (245-246) 
The outcome of this last struggle between life and death within the individual souls of Russian 
Symbolists will, in Belyi's vision, eventually determine the metaphysical fate of the entire 
humankind which is either to be plunged into the abyss of eternal darkness (Death) or to be 
elevated to the heights of eternal light (Godmanhood).  
The Volume Green Meadow: the Tragedy of the Languishing Orpheus
The collection closes with the volume The Green Meadow, conceived by Belyi as a 
synthesis which would consummate the entire Symbolist enterprise. The synthetic volume, 
283 “ ... человечество стоит на роковом рубеже, … раздвоенность между жизнью и словом, сознательным и 
бессознательным доведена до конца; выход из раздвоения: или смерть, или внутреннее примирение 
противоречий в новых формах жизни: стихия искусства полней, независимее отражает и тяжесть 
противоречий, и предощущение искомой гармонии: искусство поэтому есть ныне важный фактор 
спасения человечества; художник — проповедник будущего; его проповедь не в рационалистических 
догматах, а в выражении своего внуреннего ''я''; это ''я'' — есть стремление и путь к будущему; он сам —
роковой символ того, что ждет нас впереди.”   
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according to its place within the symbolic triad, was supposed to stage the triumph of 
Godmanhood as an embodied symbolic unity of word and life, form and content, Idealism and 
Romanticism, science and art, concept and feeling, a system and a fragment. Yet, instead of 
leading onto the alpine “green meadows” of the mountain of wisdom, the province of the Symbol
Embodied, the last volume plunges the reader into the very depths of chaos, the underworld, in 
which the decisive battle, as sketched out in Arabesques, is to be played out between life and 
death. The portrayal of Godmen is therefore supplanted by the depiction of the historical figures 
of Symbolists disguised in the mythological trappings of Orpheuses who set out to liberate 
Russia, their Eurydice, out of the subterranean realm. Like their Romantic antecedent Gogol', 
however, the Symbolists find themselves trapped in the metaphorical sphere of death, unable to 
save Russia, a personification of the Solov'evian World Soul, or to extricate themselves out of the
chaos of the chthonic world defined by division and fragmentation.     
The title of the third volume, The Green Meadow, is inspired by Briusov's poem “Orpheus
and Eurydice” (“Orfei i Evredika,” 1903-1904). Two lines from this poem also serve as an 
epigraph to the whole book: “Recall, recall the green meadow— / The joy of singing, the joy of 
dancing.”284 Briusov's poem provides the key to the architectonic composition of the last volume. 
The Green Meadow is conceived and structured by Belyi as a katabasis, an archetypal journey to 
the underworld. Engaging in no less than an act of theurgic mythmaking, Belyi casts himself 
alongside his fellow Symbolists in the role of Orpheus, the Savior, whose task is to lead the 
beloved Eurydice—the enchanted Solov'evian World Soul—out of the darkness of the 
subterranean world (death) back onto the green meadow (life).    
 Orpheus, for Belyi, is a mythological figure associated with Romanticism. This 
284 “Вспомни, вспомни луг зеленый— / Радость песен, радость пляск.”  
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association is explicated in the second essay of the volume, “Symbolism” (“Simvolizm,” 1908), 
in which the Russian Symbolist constructs historical progression of art using the symbolic triad 
(abc) as its model: form - content - a unifying symbol.285 He distinguishes two major divergent 
paths art has taken before the emergence of Symbolism conceived by Belyi as an overarching 
symbolic unity. The first path that leads from the law-regulated nature to the unstructured content
of consciousness is taken by Classicism286 while the second that proceeds from the unstructured 
content of consciousness to the law-regulated nature—by Romanticism. For Belyi, two mythical 
figures, Helios and Orpheus, exemplify these contrary directions trodden by art: 
Two myths embody these two paths; these myths manifest themselves in images: the first 
[representing the way of Classicism] is an image of the fair Helios (the Sun) illuminating 
the world with a magical torch in such a way that the images of this world are revealed 
most vividly; the other image [representing the way of Romanticism] is an image of the 
musician Orpheus, who conjures up a phantom into the actual world, i.e. a new image 
lacking in nature; in the first image the light of the creative act illuminates in nature only 
what is already there; in the second image, however, the power of the creative act bring 
into being what is lacking in nature.287 (Kritika 262) 
Тhese paths, however, are not just distinctive modes of creative writing employed by the 
exponents of these two literary schools in their works of art. Rather, for Belyi, they are deeply 
personal paths, modes of being, taken by the artists aligned with those schools. 
285 This is the same triangular model that underlies the structure of the entire collection. 
286 The path of Classicism is aligned with the pole of Kantian Idealism (form and duty).  
287 “ ... два мифа олицетворяют нам эти пути; в образах явлены эти мифы: первый [representing the way of 
Classicism] есть образ светлого Гелиоса (Солнца), озаряющего волшебным факелом так, что образы этого 
мира явлены с последней отчетливостью; другой образ [representing the way of Romanticism] есть образ 
музыканта Орфея, вызывающего в мир действительности призрак, т. е. новый образ не данный в природе;
в первом образе свет творчества лишь освещает в природе то, что уже дано; во втором образе сила 
творчества создает то, чего в природе нет.”
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Both creative paths are presented by Belyi as self-defeating and tragic. A Classicist-
Helios and a Romantic-Orpheus are inevitably misled, each in his own way, by Nature, 
personified by the Russian Symbolist as a devious elemental spirit, Lorelei, and, as a 
consequence, end in tragedy: “Both perish in the fight against fate: both are destroyed by the 
beauty Lorelei, who reveals herself for one as the nature of consciousness and for the other—as 
the nature of appearances”288 (264). Two types of artists are destroyed by the opposites to which 
they are irresistibly lured but which they cannot ultimately reconcile with their worldviews. A 
Classicist, a proud lawgiver of external Nature, the domain of necessity, is vanquished in his 
confrontation with internal Nature, the chaos of his own consciousness, and a Romantic, a master
of the chaos of consciousness (“khaos dushi”), is brought down by his collision with the 
necessity of external Nature. 
These tragic conflicts, however, according to Belyi, can be potentially resolved by the 
organic synthesis of the warring oppositions (i.e., the subject and the object, consciousness and 
nature) that would bring an end to the ongoing cosmic tragedy. The restoration of “the living I” 
that constitutes the true universal nature as opposed to the false one, Lorelei, will eliminate 
division and fragmentation and therefore the tragic conflicts generated by the divisive force: 
The true nature in the creative “I” and contemplation and the flow of necessity in the 
image of nature are parts of the disintegrated living “I.” A part destroys the whole. A part 
without the whole turns into fatum. Fatum in nature but also in consciousness; nature and 
consciousness are parts of our “I.” We carry fatum within ourselves.289 (264)
288 “В борьбе с роком гибнут оба: обоих губит красавица Лорелея, обернувшись для одного в природу 
сознания, для другого — в природу видимости.”    
289 “Подлинная природа в творческом ''я,'' созерцание и течение необходимости в образе природы — это 
части распавшегося ''я'' живого. Часть губит целое. Часть без целого становится роком. Рок в природе, но 
и рок в сознании; природа и сознание — части нашего ''я.'' Рок мы носим в себе самих.” 
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To recover the wholeness of “the living I” (the state of Godmanhood), the artist must transform 
his own life into art by becoming his own artistic form. In other words, the artist must elevate 
himself to the status of Godman Christ, for the word must be reunited with flesh anew. The path 
of “the word [that] was made flesh” (KJB John 1:14) is the path of the Titan Atlas, the only one 
that could lead out of the realm of the tragic into the religion of life: “All the existing forms of art
lead to the artist's tragedy: the victory over tragedy is the transubstantiation of art into the religion
of life. At this point the artist becomes like Atlas who supports the world on his shoulders”290 
(265). 
Since the state of Atlas-hood, the theurgic synthesis of art and life, is still a matter of the 
undetermined future, Belyi has no choice but to take one of the former tragic paths symbolized 
by the mythological figures of Helios and Orpheus previously developed by art. He takes the 
Romantic path of Orpheus in an attempt to stage a (theurgic?) mystery of death and subsequent 
resurrection through the force of love in a new, transfigured, state. Orpheus who would succeed 
in saving Eurydice, a personification of the World Soul, out of the clutches of death and thereby 
bridge the abyss between the hitherto irreconcilable dualities (the infinite and the finite, human 
word and Logos, form and content, art and life, etc.) would, in Belyi's mythological imagination, 
turn into the living symbol of unity, the Titan Atlas. Therefore the Russian Symbolist assumes the
Romantic role of Orpheus and metaphorically descends into the kingdom of death embodied by 
contemporary Russia in the grip of urbanization and industrialization (the triumph of mechanism)
in order to awaken its slumbering soul. Through this appropriation of the Romantic role of 
Orpheus, Belyi consciously gestures to Gogol' whom he directly associates with the tragic 
290 “Существующие формы искусства ведут к трагедии художника: победа над трагедией есть 
пресуществление искусства в религию жизни. Тут уподобляется художник могучему Атласу, 
поддерживающему мир на своих раменах.”  
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Orpheus-figure in his essay “Symbolism” (264).        
Like Romanticism in general, Gogol' emerges as Belyi's demonic double in the last 
volume. As in the case of Idealism in Symbolism, Belyi seeks to supersede Romanticism in 
Arabesques and The Green Meadow by dissolving it in the higher synthesis, the Symbol 
Embodied, that manifests itself as Godmanhood on the slope of creative acts. Therefore, by 
choosing the Romantic path of Orpheus, the Russian Symbolist finds himself confronted with the
tragic Gogoliian (“Orphic”) legacy. Gogol''s messianic enterprise of redeeming Russia through 
the creative word of man anticipates the theurgic project of the younger Symbolists and the tragic
failure of Gogol' to surmount the dualities casts a shadow over Russian Symbolists' chances of 
success of wresting Eurydice from the darkness of the underworld. 
The ghostly presence of Gogol' haunts The Green Meadow. Gogoliian motifs emerge 
forcefully already in the opening essay, “The Green Meadow” (“Lug zelenyi,” 1905), in which 
Belyi frames the battle over the soul of Russia by employing images from Gogol''s novella “A 
Terrible Vengeance” (“Strashnaia mest',” 1831) that recounts a tragic story of Catherine and 
Danilo Burul'bash, a Cossack couple, whose lives are ruined by the return of Catherine's long-
absent father, an evil wizard, who conceives an incestuous passion for his own daughter. Russia, 
as portrayed by Belyi, is represented as sleeping Catherine whose soul is being tortured by the 
evil wizard. She must awaken so that she could make “a conscious choice” between her beloved 
husband, Cossack Danilo (love and life), and her sinful father, an incarnation of evil (death). This
motif of Russia as a Sleeping Beauty, whose soul is submerged in a death-like slumber through 
an evil spell, also goes back to Gogol', for whom it is the devil who casts deadly torpor over 
human souls by bewitching them with boredom (“skuka”), banality (“poshlost'”), and lethargic 
idleness. To defeat the devil, Gogol' seeks to awaken Russia steeped in “the deadness of life” 
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(“mertvennost' zhizni”) with his creative and later moral word. This motif of bewitched Russia 
reappears again in the third essay of the volume, “The Present and Future of Russian Literature” 
(“Nastoiashchee i budushchee russkoi literatury,” 1907), in which Belyi, in Gogoliian fashion, 
depicts present-day Russia in its unspiritualized, unawakened state as a boundless icy space in 
the grip of diabolic forces: 
We are crushed by one icy plane. We have one common enemy. […] The icy plane is not 
life but death; not a state of wakefulness but a nightmare. We have been tortured by 
Devil's nightmare since time immemorial. And secretly the people are against one—
against Devil. That's why we, if we are one people, have one bond, one religion.291 (294) 
From the demonic plains of death, Russia, and here Belyi again follows in Gogol''s footsteps, can
be awakened only by its true lover. 
Thus, from the overview of the icy landscape of Russia, Belyi proceeds to the survey of 
Russian writers, potential Orpheuses, assessing Eurydice's chances of being delivered from her 
plight. Unlike in Arabesques where the gallery of Russian proto-Symbolist and Symbolist writers
is opened with the portrait of Vladimir Solov'ev, a similar gallery in The Green Meadow is 
opened with a sketch devoted to Gogol'. By being placed at the beginning of the Symbolist 
lineage, the Russian Romantic is turned into the point of Symbolism's origin. This point of origin,
however, turns out to be a tragic split, demonic lack, or, in other words, the gaping abyss itself. 
Gogol' is exposed by Belyi as a failed, demonic, lover of Russia. He fails at his sacred mission of 
leading Russia-Eurydice into the broad daylight of the green meadow by proving unable to 
construct “the bridge of love” which would connect the finite (man) and the infinite (Russia as an
291 “Нас задавила — одна ледяная равнина. У нас — один общий враг. […] Ледяная равнина — не жизнь —
смерть; не бодрствование — кошмар. Искони нас замучил кошмар Черта; и втайне своей народ — против
одного — против Черта. Вот почему между нами, если мы — народ, одна связь, одна религия.”  
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incarnation of the World Soul). Instead of redeeming Russia, Gogol' falls headlong into the abyss 
himself: 
The bridge of love transfiguring the earth collapsed for Gogol' and there opened a black 
roaring abyss between him and the face of God. […] Gogol' was terrified by the abyss 
but he vaguely remembered (not consciously, of course) that there was a sweet voice 
(billions of miles and years away) calling him beyond “that abyss”: Gogol' couldn't but 
follow the call: he went after it—and fell into the abyss: the bridge of love collapsed 
under him and Gogol' found himself unable to fly over the abyss.292 (312-313) 
In Belyi's interpretation, Gogol' fails in his Orphic mission not only because he was spiritually 
unprepared to confront the horrors of the underworld but rather because his love for Russia was 
not pure but demonic.  
The delivery of Eurydice-Russia is a mystery of love, in the first place. Love which is 
needed to construct “the bridge” over the abyss to join the immanent and the transcendent should 
be no less than divine. This is in fact the same type of pure, Christ-like, love that Aleksandr Blok 
was yearning for in order to be united with the Beautiful Lady. Finding himself short of such love
due to his incapacity to eradicate the egocentric element (erotic desire) from his earthly love for 
the Divine Feminine, Blok was plunged into the abyss of irony and nihilism. The fate of Blok 
was therefore foreshadowed by that of Gogol', to whom, as it was shown earlier in the first 
chapter, the Russian Symbolist turns at the height of despair (his essay “Irony”) in search of 
escape from the abyss. Gogol', like later Blok, was unable to overcome the temptation and 
succumbed to demonic eroticism. 
292 “... мост любви, преображающий землю, рухнул для Гоголя и между Ликом Небесным и им образовалась 
черная ревущая бездна […] Бездны боялся Гоголь, но смутно помнил (не сознанием, конечно), что за 
''бездной этой'' (за миллирдами верст и лет) милый голос, зовущий его: не пойти на зов не мог Гоголь: 
пошел — и упал в бездну: мост любви рухнул для него, а перелететь через бездну не мог Гоголь.” 
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Russia, as Belyi emphasizes, for Gogol', is a lover: “Gogol' loves Russia, his country; 
Gogol' loves Russia as a lover loves his beloved”293 (313). In the famous apostrophes to Russia in
the novel Dead Souls (“Rus'! What do you want from me?”294) that Belyi cites as an example, 
Gogol', in the guise of the soaring narrator, takes the place of the deity and engages in sacral 
coitus with Russia dressed in a woman's garb (Vajskopf 105). This marital union between the 
deified narrator and Russia, however, is illegitimate and marked by the primordial sin, because 
Gogol''s yearning for his country, as Belyi's insight into Gogoliian text shows, is akin to the evil 
wizard's incestuous desire for Catherine, his own daughter: “... Gogol' loves Russia with a 
primordial love: she is for him as the daughter is for the wizard; Gogol' performs magic rituals 
over her”295 (Lug zelenyi 313). Thus, Gogol' emerges as a usurper of the legitimate husband's, 
Danilo's, place, or, in the religious sense, of Christ's as a lawful bridegroom of Russia. In Gogol', 
as in Blok, there occurs an ironic inversion of roles. As a result of their human impotence to 
reach Christ-like purity in their love for Russia and the Divine Feminine respectively, the 
Romantic Gogol' and later the Symbolist Blok are hurled into the abyss of the demonic. Gogol' 
unable to save Russia remains, for Belyi, a captive of death.       
The survey of the other proto-Symbolist and Symbolist figures such as Anton Chekhov, 
Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, Fedor Sologub, Valerii Briusov, and Konstantin Bal'mont that Belyi lines
up after Gogol' does not bode well for his redemptive (“Orphic”) mission either. He struggles to 
detect a faint glimpse of life both in his predecessors and Symbolist contemporaries, whose 
works, upon closer scrutiny, also turn out to be suffused with the demonic spirit of division and 
death. Having opened his exposition of the Orpheus figures with Gogol', who in his quest for the 
293 “Любит Гоголь Россию, страну свою; как любовник любимую, ее любит Гоголь.” 
294 “Русь! Чего же ты хочешь от меня? ”
295 “... любит Гоголь Россию старинною любовью: она для него — как для колдуна дочь его, Катерина; над 
ней колдует Гоголь.” 
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restoration of the kingdom of God (“the green meadow”) succumbs to death, Belyi closes it with 
Bal'mont, “a split soul,” who finds himself condemned to “the cosmic desert of non-being” by 
failing to unite the earthly and the transcendent in the higher synthesis of the symbol (374). All 
the other figures (Chekhov, Merezhkovskii, Sologub, and Briusov) placed between Gogol' and 
Bal'mont also display a varied degree of corruption by chaos and death. Occasionally, in some of 
their images pervaded with the spirit of dissolution, as, for example, in the works of Chekhov and
Sologub, Belyi discerns a vague presence and therefore a whiff of hope of eternal life to come. 
But, as it happens most strikingly in the case of Sologub, he has to read against the grain of the 
author's works (Sologub's celebration of non-being) to arrive at the desired conclusion of the 
upcoming apotheosis of life. Thus, the landscape of the present, as shown by Belyi, is almost 
totally eclipsed by the near complete triumph of death, and the would-be saviors of Russia-
Eurydice stand themselves in need of salvation from the clutches of diabolic forces.       
The collection closes with the mystical essay “The Apocalypse in Russian Literature” 
(“Apokalipsis v russkoi poezii,” 1905) that reiterates and reinforces the dualities that plague the 
present rather than resolves them. The essay delineates the two lines of Russian poetic 
development originating with Aleksandr Pushkin whose image is linked with external wholeness 
and universality and Mikhail Lermontov who is associated with division and struggle between 
universality and individualism. It culminates in Valerii Briusov and Aleksandr Blok who 
represent “form” and “content” respectively: “Lermontov's and Pushkin's streams of Russian 
poetry that took their definitive shape in Briusov and Blok must merge into an inexpressible 
unity. But how? By means of a free union or subordination?”296 (388). These oppositions have 
296  “Лермонтовская и пушкинская струи русской поэзии, определившись в Брюсове и Блоке, должны 
слиться в несказанное единство. Но как? Путем ли свободного соединения или подчинения?” 
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reached their complete development in the images of the Muse, the Solov'evian World Soul, 
depicted by Blok and Briusov. Briusov's Muse is an incarnation of the body, a Great Harlot 
sitting astride the scarlet beast while Blok's is a manifestation of the spirit portrayed as the 
Beautiful Lady. The underlying unity between the two betrays itself for Belyi in the gravitation of
these antithetical images of the Muse toward their very opposite: “Briusov's Muse heads away 
from the horse tram toward the purple. And vice versa, Blok's Muse heads away from the purple 
toward... the horse tram”297 (387). The two Muses, emblems of the dualities between form and 
content, body and spirit, the earthly and the divine, must coincide and dissolve in the final 
revelation of Sophia, who is to become an organism of love. 
As in the previous essays, Belyi delineates and restates the oppositions but he is unable to
reconcile them. The synthesis appears to be indefinitely deferred into the future and the tragic 
conflict between the polarities is bound to continue until the transformation of the old Earth and 
the old Heaven into the New City of Jerusalem: “The problem raised by it [Russian literature] 
can only be resolved by the transformation of Earth and Heaven into the New City of 
Jerusalem”298 (389). This transformation, however, proves to be beyond the power of a Symbolist
poet turned Orpheus. The coda to the essay that, by extension, closes the last volume The Green 
Meadow as well as the trilogy as a whole is an appeal to the World Soul to reveal herself. It is, in 
other words, an explicit acknowledgment that it is not within the capacity of Orpheus, a 
Symbolist poet, to resurrect the beloved. She must awaken from her icy slumber herself and 
deliver the world, together with her captive lover, from the reign of chaos and death. The 
salvation of the world ultimately depends on the mercy of the divine power rather than on the 
297 “Муза Брюсова направляется от конки к багрянице. Наоборот, Муза Блока, явившись нам в багрянице, 
направляется... к конке.” 
298 “Вопрос, ее [русской литературой] поднятый, решается только преобразованием Земли и Неба в град 
Новый Иерусалим.”   
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exercise of the creative word of man. Belyi himself is not the Titan Atlas but tragic Orpheus who,
like his Romantic predecessor Gogol', fails to lead his Eurydice, Russia, back to the green 
meadow of life. 
Since Belyi's hybrid system does not deliver the Absolute, what was supposed to 
be(come) a long-awaited all-embracing worldview reconciling the plaguing dualities turns into a 
“heap” of conflicting points of view that deny and defy each other. Thus, in his discontinuous 
system the Russian Symbolist transcends neither Idealism nor Romanticism, failing to sublate 
Kantian dualities of form and content, the empirical and the noumenal in the higher synthesis of 
Symbolism. Like Gogol''s miscellany Arabesques, Belyi's ambitious trilogy is marked by non-
arrival and non-fulfillment. Instead of merging into the transcendent whole, the unsynthesized 
oppositions remain confined within the historical realm, bound to collide. Within the next few 
years Belyi would be increasingly preoccupied with the arabesques of history, exploring in his 
novels, The Silver Dove (Serebrianyi golub', 1909) and Petersburg (Peterburg, 1912-1913), the 
tragism of opposites locked in an irresolvable conflict. 
IV. The Curse of Objectivization: Nikolai Berdiaev's Philosophy as a Creative Act 
Nikolai Berdiaev's philosophy299 of the creative act explicated in The Meaning of the 
Creative Act (Smysl tvorchestva, 1916) constitutes the next stage in Russian philosophy's shift 
away from the Idealist ideal of discursive system (be it deductive or dialectical) toward the 
Romantic vision of philosophy as art. In the spirit of his predecessors, Solov'ev and Belyi, 
299 For an overview of Berdiaev's philosophy, see Edith W. Clowes, Fiction's Overcoat. Russian Literary Culture 
and the Question of Philosophy; A.A. Ermichev, N.A. Berdiaev: Pro et Contra; N. O. Losskii, Istoriia russkoi 
filosofii (268-288); Donald A. Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet: A Life of Nicolai Berdyaev; M. A. Maslin, Istoriia 
russkoi filosofii (435-447); S.A. Titarenko, Spetsifika religioznoi filosofii N.A. Berdiaeva.  
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Berdiaev also seeks to elaborate a synthetic worldview which would definitively reconcile the 
human and the divine, the subject and the object, a fragment and the whole, etc. But, in 
contradistinction to them, he divorces synthesis from the ideal of systematicity pursued by 
philosophy as science. Similar to the early German Romantics, synthesis and scientific 
systematicity, for Berdiaev, are not necessarily correlative. Synthetic wholeness arises not as a 
result of dialectical (as in Solov'ev) or deductive reasoning (as in Belyi) but underlies, enables, 
and informs every genuine act of philosophical cognition that, in Berdiaev's conception, has an 
essentially intuitive and creative nature. While Berdiaev explicitly espouses Romantic vision of 
philosophy as art, his relation with Romanticism itself, however, is ambivalent and fraught with 
tension. 
In the fashion of the younger Symbolists, Berdiaev sees in the intellectual legacy of early 
German Romanticism a metaphysical challenge that needs to be overcome. Despite their 
yearning for the transcendent, the early Romantics, in his view, failed to reconcile dualities and 
actualize the Absolute. The Russian philosopher views the solution to the Romantic debacle in 
the potency of the creative act, an act of creating “other being” (“inoe bytie”), through which 
man can transcend into a higher reality and theurgically transform the world of necessity along 
with himself. Yet, not unlike the younger Symbolists, Berdiaev finds himself caught within the 
negative dialectic of Romantic irony. The creative inspiration (or what the Romantics called 
“enthusiasm”) that brings about the desirable breach into the infinite realm of the Spirit is 
ineluctably bound up with its finite realization that inevitably turns the transcendent vision into a 
product of culture. In other words, instead of “other being” man is doomed to create mere 
artifacts. The redeeming creative act finds itself locked in an infinite dialectical struggle with its 
opposite: “objectivization.” Furthermore, on the textual level that aims to (re)produce the 
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transfigured ontological reality, the attempt to define the creative act itself encounters the 
linguistic barrier. Berdiaev's inability to offer a positive linguistic formulation of transcendent 
theurgy conceals itself behind the onslaught of aggressive dicta. Caught in the ironic spiral-like 
movement of definitions and redefinitions, primarily apophatic in nature, the Russian philosopher
can only interrupt their endless progression by overtly acknowledging the impossibility of such a 
task of characterization. Like the Symbolists, Berdiaev is unable to surmount the Romantic 
challenge and has to confront the tragedy of irreconcilable opposites in the realm of history.    
Berdiaev has an uneasy relationship with Romanticism. Not unlike Aleksandr Blok, he is, 
paradoxically, a Romantic who strives to overcome Romanticism. In his late autobiography Self-
Knowledge (Samopoznanie, 1949) after an initial declaration of his affinity with the spirit of 
Romanticism: “I am a Russian Romantic of the beginning of the 20th century”300 (14), the Russian
philosopher makes a further attempt at clarifying for himself as well as for the reader his complex
relation with that movement. Thus, Berdiaev, in his own words, is ready to acknowledge his 
“Romanticism” on the following counts: 
I am ready to recognize myself as a Romantic on the following counts: the primacy of the 
subject over the object, resistance to the determinism of the finite and striving toward the 
infinite, repudiation of belief in the possibility of attaining perfection in the “finite”, 
intuition versus discursive thought, anti-intellectualism and the understanding of 
cognition as an act of the integral spirit, the glorification of the creative act in human life, 
animosity toward the norm and the letter of the law, and the opposition of the particular 
and the individual to the power of the general.301 (113) 
300 “Я русский романтик начала XX века.” 
301 “Я готов признать себя романтиком вот по каким чертам: примат субъекта над объектом, противление 
детерминизму конечного и устремление к бесконечному, неверие в достижение совершенства в 
''конечном,'' интуиция против дискурсии, анти-интеллектуализм и понимание познания как акта 
245
At the same time he pronounces his antipathy toward early German Romanticism in no 
ambiguous terms: 
I am not at all fond of German Romanticism of Fr. Schlegel, Novalis, even of Schelling 
and Schleiermacher; their idealization of the “organic” which I consider reactionary is 
foreign to me. The notion of “nature” is entirely conditional and it is employed as a 
symbol of the rebellion against oppressive rationalism and norms of civilization, as a 
right to express creative individuality. But I decisively prefer the symbolism of the spirit 
over that of nature.302 (114) 
Despite this apparently offhand dismissal of early German Romanticism on account of its 
pantheism and conservatism, Berdiaev is not only indebted to this Romantic school as a 
philosopher but is involved in a perpetual struggle with its heritage.        
Berdiaev's contentious relationship with the legacy of early German Romanticism is in 
evidence in The Meaning of the Creative Act which is widely viewed by scholars of Russian 
religious philosophy as his declaration of philosophical independence (Lowrie 126-139). In the 
later revision of this work, the Russian philosopher explicitly defines his own position as 
“creative Romanticism.” Following in the Romantics' footsteps, Berdiaev seeks nothing less than 
a radical redefinition of philosophy and its task. Similar to the early German Romantics, 
philosophy, for Berdiaev, must reclaim its true nature, which is art (“creativity”): “Philosophy is 
an art and not a science. Philosophy is a special kind of art, fundamentally different from poetry, 
целостного духа, экзальтация творчества в человеческой жизни, вражда к нормативному и законничеству, 
противоположение личного, индивидуального власти общего.”   
302 “Я не очень люблю немецкий романтизм Фр. Шлегеля, Новалиса, даже Шеллинга и Шлейермахера, мне 
чужда их идеализация ''органического,'' которую я считаю реакционной. Понятие природы совершенно 
условно и оно употребляется, как символ восстания против давящего рационализма и норм цивилизации, 
как право раскрытия творческой индивидуальности. Но я решительно предпочитаю символику духа, а не 
природы.”  
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music and visual arts,—an art of cognition. Philosophy is an art because it is a creative act”303 
(59). However, in contrast to the early Romantics who insisted that philosophy as art (“Poesie”) 
is essentially historical, Berdiaev endows it with a transcendent potential. 
The Jena Romantics strive to divorce philosophy from the ideal of scientific 
(mathematical) construction, on which it was persistently modeled, on the grounds of 
mathematics' very antisystematicity.304 In Fr. Schlegel's words: “A philosophical system has a 
greater affinity with a poetic and historical system than with a mathematical one which is always 
considered exclusively systematic”305 (KFSA 18: 84, no. 650). Thus, for Fr. Schlegel, the 
mathematical method appropriated by discursive (deductive) philosophy is not systematic at all, 
since it presupposes an innately ahistorical and atemporal vision of knowledge and philosophy. 
Furthermore, Fr. Schlegel, who challenges the notions of the unconditioned ground (“the absolute
first principle”) and systematic completeness, contends that philosophy, similar to an epic poem, 
must have neither beginning nor end: “Philosophy is an epos, [that] begins in the middle”306 
(KFSA 18: 82, no. 626). Philosophy must reject the linear deductive procedure which is purely 
mechanical, for in the spirit of an epic poem, a philosophical system is also “a whole, and the 
way to know it is not a straight line, but a circle”307 (KFSA 18: 518, no. 16). 
In this light, a true system is not just a whole but an “organic whole,” in which parts are 
not related to each other linearly or mechanically but are rather involved in a relation of 
reciprocal determination: “System is a generally structured unity of scientific material, in a 
303 “Философия есть искусство, а не наука. Философия — особое искусство, принципиально отличное от 
поэзии, музыки или живописи, — искусство познания. Философия — искусство, потому что она —
творчество.”  
304  For a detailed discussion, see Nassar 89-97. 
305 “Ein philosophisches System hat mehr Aenlichkeit mit einem poetischen und Historischen System, als mit einem 
mathematischen, was man immer ausschließend für systematisch hielt.”  
306 “Die Philosophie ein epos, fängt in der Mitte an.”  
307  “… ein Ganzes, und der Weg es zu erkennen ist also keine grade Linie, sondern ein Kreis.” 
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continuous interaction and organic connection. Unity that in itself [is] a complete and unified 
totality”308 (KFSA 18: 12, no. 84). In other words, the entirety of universal history, living and 
constantly evolving, is such a true system and the task of philosophy, as envisioned by the early 
Romantics, is not to enquire after the primal (unconditioned) cause of all things but rather to 
understand each individual thing as a part of that dynamic process. Being is a process, not a static
entity, and can only be grasped historically. Thus, the proper realm of philosophy, which is also a 
process, is the historical (“becoming”): “History and systematic philosophy are completely 
identical”309 (KFSA 18: 95, no. 799).                                                                                                  
Berdiaev, for his part, repudiates the alliance between philosophy and science because 
science does not and cannot deliver absolute truth which should be the sole preoccupation of 
philosophy. Science cannot break through to the transcendent, the realm of eternal Truth, for it is 
nothing else but a useful instrument developed by man to better adapt to the fallen world of 
necessity: “In accordance with its essence and purpose, science always cognizes the world in the 
light of necessity, and the category of necessity is a fundamental category of scientific thinking—
the one that guides adaptation to the given state of being”310 (Smysl tvorchestva 57). Discursive 
reasoning cultivated by science cannot deal with the “beginnings” and the “ends” because it is an 
incarnation of “the kingdom of medium” and if left to itself, it falls victim to “bad infinity”: 
“Discursive thought, left to its own devices, falls victim to the power of bad infinity, of bad 
multiplicity. Here there is no definitive end, the way there was no beginning, no original 
308 “System is eine durchgängig gegliederte Allheit von wissenschaftlichem Stoff, in durchgehender Wechselwikung 
und organischem Zusammenhang.—Allheit eine in sich selbst vollendete und vereinigte Vielheit.”
309 “Historie und systematsiche Philosophie sind völlig identisch.”
310 “Наука по существу своему и по цели своей всегда познает мир в аспекте необходимости, и категория 
необходимости — основная категория научного мышления, как ориентирующего приспособления к 
данному состоянию бытия.”    
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source”311 (64). The “beginnings” and the “ends” can be known only through the medium of 
creative intuition, a faculty which is linked with the transcendent realm of the Spirit. The insights
of intuition cannot therefore be subject, as previously, to the judgment and criteria of the intellect,
for despite its pretenses to the opposite, discursive reasoning is a mere tool of intuition that truly 
“begins” and “completes” (64). Thus, it is philosophy as art, equipped with creative intuition that,
according to Berdiaev, can ultimately apprehend the transcendent which was closed off to 
philosophy as science, due to its excessive dependence on discursivity. 
Furthermore, instead of mirroring and thereby perpetuating the given world in the fashion
of science, philosophy, Berdiaev contends, must create “essential ideas” which would resist the 
necessity of that empirical world and penetrate into its transcendent essence. Philosophy must be 
an “active-creative defiance” of the world of necessity (70), overcoming and transforming it by 
means of the creative act, an act of philosophical cognition. Philosophy, for Berdiaev, is 
essentially “an action,” both cognitive and creative. Thus, the task of philosophy as art is not an 
elaboration of a logically rigorous system, a “dream” of a scientifically-minded philosopher, but 
“an action” performed through a transformative cognitive-creative act: 
The goal of philosophy is not the construction of a system but a creative cognitive act in 
the world. Philosophy does not have to be systematic at all. There is always an economic 
adaptation to necessity in the systematic; the systematic is the opposite of creative 
intuition. It is not necessary to identify synthesis with a system.312 (82) 
In other words, the goal of philosophy as art is the redemptive transformation of the fallen world 
311 “Дискурсивное мышление, предоставленное себе, попадает во власть дурной бесконечности, плохой 
множественности. Тут нет разрешающего конца, как не было и начала, не виден исток.”   
312 “Цель философии — не создание системы, а творческий познавательный акт в мире. Философия совсем и
не должна быть систематической. В систематичности есть всегда экономическое приспособление к 
необходимости, систематичность противоположна творческой интуиции. Не должно отождествлять 
синтез с системой.”   
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by means of the creative (theurgic) act. 
 As Berdiaev readily acknowledges himself, such a transfigurative type of creativity 
would be possible only in the new religious epoch which is still in the making. Until the advent 
of this theurgic epoch of Godmanhood, the creative act as practiced by men in the fallen world is 
afflicted with “sickness” and inevitably results in tragedy: 
Creativity is sickly and tragic in its essence. The goal of the creative impulse is the 
attainment of a different life, of a different world, an ascent in being. However, the 
fulfillment of the creative act is a book, a painting, or a steamboat company. The 
movement inward and upward is projected onto a plane. In this lies a great and tragic 
discrepancy between the task of the creative act and the outcome of the creative act. 
Instead of being, culture is created.313 (152-153)
With regard to this tragic state of being, “the sickness of creativity,” Berdiaev distinguishes two 
divergent existential attitudes which he identifies as “Classicism” and “Romanticism.” For the 
Russian philosopher, Classicism and Romanticism are not aesthetic but metaphysical categories 
applicable toward all spheres of creativity, cognition, ethics, etc. (153). In defiance of Goethe's 
famous definition of Romanticism as sickness, Berdiaev asserts to the contrary that it is 
Classicism with its cult of culture which is stricken with sickness. Whereas Romanticism that 
acutely senses the tragic incongruity between the task pursued by the creative act and its final 
product is more healthy. The intention of Classicism is to reconcile man with his limitations by 
means of the ideal of immanent perfection, but Romanticism rejects this attainable perfection in 
favor of the unattainable Absolute. For Berdiaev, Romanticism precedes the advancing creative 
313 “Творчество болезненно и трагично в существе своем. Цель творческого порыва — достижение иной 
жизни, иного мира, восхождение в бытии. А достижение творческого акта — книга, картина или паровое 
учреждение. Движение вглубь и ввысь проэцируется на плоскости. В этом есть большое и трагическое 
несоответствие между задачей творчества и результатом творчества. Вместо бытия творится культура.”  
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epoch but is not yet privy to the genuinely creative act. Therefore, like Classicism, Romanticism 
must be overcome. 
Yet, similar to Belyi who has to play the tragic role of the Romantic Orpheus rather than 
that of the Titan Atlas in the mysteries of Arabesques, Berdiaev is unable to go beyond 
Classicism and Romanticism into the higher realm of theurgy and falls back into Romanticism 
that he intends to supersede. Since the new epoch of creativity has not arrived yet and, as the 
Russian philosopher will later come to recognize himself, it may be indefinitely deferred, the 
creative act as exercised by Berdiaev himself is bound to create not the “other being” but “the 
differentiated culture.” Like the early Romantics, Berdiaev, who (re)establishes the dialectic 
between the infinite aspirations of the creative act (theurgy) and its finite fulfillment (a work of 
art), discovers irony coiling at its heart. The actualization of the creative act that always aims at 
the elevation of the world to a higher level of being brings about only its own “objectification”—
the creation of an artifact. The empirical “fallen” nature of the resultant artifact as contrasted with
the theurgic ideal of life-creation (“new being”) leads to another act of creativity that breaks 
through into the infinite only to produce another product of culture. In other words, the subject 
fails to fuse with the object into the higher synthesis and becomes alienated from the product of 
its own subjectivity. The subjective experience of the infinite vanishes into and is vanquished by 
its “objectification” as a part of “the differentiated culture.” Thus, the abyss dividing the 
subject(ive experience) and the object(ive realization) cannot be bridged (at least by human 
effort) but only mediated and contained by irony that, while mediating between the oppositions, 
also perpetuates the abyss. The subject always falls back into the empirical from the transcendent
heights of the creative act. 
Berdiaev, who at the time of the composition of The Meaning of the Creative Act, 
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believed in the imminent arrival of the new creative epoch, is as yet not fully aware of the 
negative processes of Romantic irony that will be more discernible in his later dialectic between 
freedom and necessity which is fully elaborated after his emigration to France. While the tragic 
nature of creativity incarnated in and made conscious by Romanticism is commented upon, he is 
intent upon its transcendence. This ongoing dispute with the spirit of “Romanticism” makes itself
manifest not only on the level of content but also and more emphatically on the level of form. 
Berdiaev's philosophy as art that rejects the Idealist ideal of scientific systematicity also seeks to 
redefine the role of the Romantic fragment lying at the core of the early Romantic understanding 
of philosophy (as art).  
For the early Romantics, the fragment simultaneously reflects the current fragmented 
nature of the world and gestures toward the utopian future.314 In Chaouli's words, “The allure of 
the fragment as genre lies in the fact that the very characteristics that make the fragment 
fragmentary imply its opposite, the system” (138). Unlike the absolute system, in whose service 
they stand, the fragments, being the product of the “chemical faculty” of wit,315 can only produce 
a “chaos of systems” instead of the definitive system of chaos, the ultimate unified totality. This 
incomplete and fluid “chaos of systems” consists of a variety of partial unions that find 
themselves in conflicting relations with each other due to the lack of a single systematic center. 
The spirit of contradictoriness, in Frank's opinion, is innate in the fragment itself for it is “a 
necessary effect of the detotalization or decomposition of the highest unity, which is no longer a 
unity of a whole (a system), but rather only a unity of a single thing and without systematic 
314 This discussion of the salient characteristics of the Romantic fragment is indebted to Manfred Frank's perceptive 
analysis of the fragment and its relation to the absolute system in The Philosophical Foundations of Early 
German Romanticism (210-214).  
315 Fr. Schlegel defined wit as “a transcendental logic, fragmentary mysticism” [“Transcendentale Logik, 
fragmentarische Mystik”] (KFSA 18: 90, no. 730).
252
relationship to other things” (The Philosophical Foundations 211). From this ensemble of 
multifaceted individual positions there results no system, no closed whole, but rather “''asystasy,'' 
''instability'' (Unbestand), ''disharmony'' (Uneinigkeit), incoherence, lack of connection” (211). 
The sum total of the fragments, regardless of their proliferating number and different types of 
recombinations produced in the quest for wholeness, always stands in contradiction to the idea of
the Absolute, which as the highest synthesis is beyond all oppositions. Thus, the fragments 
individually as well as cumulatively present, as Frank puts it, “the failed expression of the 
Absolute, which as such, remains incomprehensible” (214). It is in this perpetual tension between
the finite and incomplete fragment(s) and the unified totality of the Absolute (the absolute 
System) that the origin of Romantic irony lies, which in Fr. Schlegel's words, is “an essential 
surrogate of the hitherto impossible absolutization”316 (KFSA 18: 110, no. 976).  
Berdiaev seeks to annul this ironic Romantic dialectic between the fragment (a part) and 
the Absolute (synthetic wholeness) both in the textual and ontological senses. In place of the 
fragment, the Russian philosopher makes use of what he calls “an aphorism.” The aphorism is 
not presented in isolation but is integrated within the larger whole: the (discursive?) text, that 
implies a different type of relation between a part and the whole. In Berdiaev's own words:
... my thought is not disjointed, not fragmented, not focused on particulars and detail. On 
the contrary, it is very centralized, holistic, and focused on holistic comprehension of 
meaning. Everything is interconnected within it. An aphorism is a microcosm, it mirrors 
the macrocosm, it encompasses everything.317 (Samopoznanie 92) 
The dissimilarity between the fragment and the aphorism is already manifest in their 
316 “... ein wesentliches Surrogat der hier unmöglichen Absolutirung ist.”  
317 “.... моя мысль совсем не отрывочна, не фрагментарна, не направлена на частности и детали. Наоборот, 
она очень централизована, целостна, направлена на целостное постижение смысла. В ней все со всем 
связано. Афоризм есть микрокосм, он отражает макрокосм, в нем все.”
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etymology. The word “aphorism” goes back to “aphorizein” (“to define”), which is in turn 
derived from “horizein” (“to bound”; hence “horizon”), whereas “fragment” springs forth from 
“frangere” (“to break”) (Mautner 132-175; Chaouli 140). While seemingly unimportant at first 
glance, this etymological difference has far-reaching generic and philosophical implications. The 
aphorism, in Brand's words, aspires to be a “representation of non-linguistic ideas or facts” 
whereas the Romantic fragment “is not a representation, condensed or otherwise, but a gesture or
a move in a game that is wholly discursive” (41). In other words, the aphorism holds the promise 
of delivering a fleeting insight into, or “to bound,” capture the metaphysical reality lying outside 
the boundaries of human reason and language (even though, like the horizon, this metaphysical 
reality proves continuously elusive). The Romantic fragment, on the other hand, asserts the 
impossibility of such a movement of transcendence by completely confining itself to the 
immanent (the discursive and the linguistic). 
Furthermore, in its tendency toward the metaphysical, the aphorism is closely related to 
the symbol. In Brand's definition, the aphorism is “in fact a symbol made into a sentence” (41). 
In contrast, the Romantic fragment makes itself instead aligned with the allegory, for by limiting 
itself exclusively to the linguistic it can acquire signification only by virtue of its position, always
provisional, in relation to the other fragments that form together a continually shifting set of 
correspondences and differences. Thus, unlike the aphorism that perpetually strives for “a 
symbol-like closure” (the final or singular metaphysical meaning) without being able to attain it, 
the fragment calls attention to its own fragmentariness—its essential incompleteness and 
openness. The Romantic fragment consciously resists closure and always preserves a degree of 
autonomy from the larger whole (the absolute system) in the making. Its meaning is never stable 
because it is always defined and redefined depending on its volatile relations with the other 
254
fragments. It remains open to transformation, new meaning, and, of course, irony. 
Berdiaev's use of the aphorism in The Meaning of the Creative Act is modeled on and 
seeks to embody his philosophical vision of the relation between man (a part) and cosmos 
(wholeness) that seeks to eliminate the notion of fragmentation altogether: 
The microcosm in its creative-dynamic relation to the macrocosm is free from fateful 
rupture and antithesis. Man is related and similar to the cosmos but not because he is a 
fraction of the cosmos but because he is the whole cosmos himself and of the same 
composition with the cosmos.318 (159) 
The Russian philosopher does not recognize the existence of “fragments” estranged 
from/independent of the whole, for what is mistakenly taken as “a fragment” in the “fallen” 
world is nothing but a microcosm (a macrocosm in miniature) in the restored divine-human 
order: “In all the detailed, particular, and individual, I see the whole, the meaning of the whole of 
creation”319 (Samopoznanie 98). The entire text seems to harbor theurgic ambitions like that of 
Belyi and is constructed in accordance with this fundamental intuition. The whole of the project 
is conceived by Berdiaev as a macrocosm, while each smaller constituent (ranging from a chapter
to an individual aphorism) is supposed to present a microcosm that mirrors the larger whole. 
Each smaller segment (a chapter, a section, and most of all an aphorism) is meant to be self-
standing and should be able, at least in conception, to convey the central idea of Berdiaev's 
philosophy by itself, even if it happens to be detached from the totality of the textual macrocosm.
 In contrast to the Romantic fragment whose meaning is created ever anew, Berdiaev 
seeks to arrest the meaning of his aphorisms to ensure that the original signification (the 
318 “Микрокосм в своем творчески-динамическом отношении к макрокосму не знает рокового разрыва и 
противоположности. Человек родствен и подобен космосу, но не потому, что он дробная часть космоса, а 
потому, что он сам целый космос и одного с космосом состава.”  
319 “Во всем детальном, частном отдельном я вижу целое, весь смысл мироздания.” 
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microcosmic mirroring of the macrocosmic whole) is preserved regardless of the context or lack 
of it. This desire for the control of meaning and the imposition of closure, however, leads to the 
erosion of the symbolic plane of signification and the transformation of Berdiaev's aphorism into 
its very opposite, the dictum: “The submission of philosophy to science is the submission of 
freedom to necessity”320 (58); “The creative act is neither permitted nor justified by religion; the 
creative act is religion itself”321 (Smysl tvorchestva 143); “The creative act is inseparable from 
freedom. Only the one who is free can create”322 (177).323 In their dogmatic certainty, razor-sharp 
clarity, rhetorical tendency to totality, and unequivocal proclamation of absolute Truth (rather 
than a truth) Berdiaev's “aphorisms” approximate dicta which, in Morson's words, are “spoken by
a clear God in the language of science, mathematics, or Revelation” (423). Unlike the aphorism 
“spoken by a dark God in the incomplete language of mystery” (Ibid.), the dictum sees no 
mystery, for it considers the riddle of human existence to be successfully solved: “Its sense is: 
mystery is at last over” (416). 
Like dicta, Berdiaev's “aphorisms” posit an authority that transcends history. As many of 
Berdiaev's contemporaries observed, he speaks in the language of a prophet. As Rozanov puts it, 
“First of all, a deep reproach to the philosophical work: the author expresses himself but does not 
prove. We hear a preacher but we do not see a philosopher”324 (“Novaia religioznaia kontseptsiia”
262). Gertsyk echoes Rozanov, “In places, the style is maniacal; on some pages the word that 
carries the onslaught of his will is repeated at least fifty times: man, freedom, the creative act. He
furiously strikes the reader with his hammer. He does not reflect, he does not draw conclusions, 
320 “Подчинение философии науке есть подчинение свободы необходимости.” 
321 “Творчество — не допускается и не оправдывается религией, творчество — само религия.” 
322 “Творчество неотрывно от свободы. Лишь свободный творит.” 
323 The examples can be further multiplied. 
324 “Прежде всего — глубокий упрек философской книге: автор высказывает, а не доказывает. Слышим 
проповедника, но не видим философа.”  
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he commands”325 (48). As opposed to the aphorism that, despite its aspiration toward the 
transcendent acknowledges its own entrapment by language and categories of thought in the 
world of history, the dictum claims to see the world from the perspective of eternity and demands
power in the name of that perspective. In the manner of a Euclidean postulate (an axiom) with 
which it has a close affinity, the dictum presents itself as an incontrovertible universal truth, “free
from the taint of any merely personal source” (Morson 418). Such a rhetorical stance (“sub 
specie aeternitatis”) allows the dictum in contrast to both aphorism and Romantic fragment to 
shield itself from the assault of irony and history. Since the Truth enunciated by the dictum is 
(supposedly) eternal, it is not susceptible to ironic relativization like a historical truth. 
Yet, despite their categorical assertiveness, Berdiaev's dicta are unable to convey what the
world-transfiguring creative act in the final sense is. The forcefulness and aggressiveness of his 
dicta conceal his inability to define theurgy (religious creativity) that eludes definite linguistic 
formulation. This unsuccessful striving toward capturing and communicating the essence of the 
new type of creativity leads to the peculiarities of Berdiaev's style which Vyacheslav Ivanov 
characterizes as follows: “The author [speaks] in his nervous, hurried, and staccato style, in spite 
of long delays over the same thought or phrase and repeated returns to it in further progression 
that gives the latter [progression] the character of some kind of cyclicity”326 (“Staraia ili novaia 
vera?” 307). The text compulsively curls back on itself and incessantly repeats itself on both the 
micro and macro levels. The spiral-like progression that on the macro level leads toward the 
delineation of creativity through diverse spheres of human activity (gnoseology, freedom, 
325 “Местами стиль маниакальный; на иной странице повторяется пятьдесят раз какое-нибудь слово, несущее
натиск его воли: человек, свобода, творчество. Он бешено бьет молотком по читателю. Не размышляет, не
строит умозаключений, он декретирует.”  
326 “... автор [говорит] своим нервным, торопливым и отрывистым языком, несмотря на долгие задержки на 
той же мысли или фразе и неоднократные к ней возвращения в дальнейшем движении, что сообщает 
последнему характер какой-то спиральности.”  
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asceticism, sex, love, beauty, morals, mysticism, etc.) does not, however, result in the end in any 
clear(er) vision of what that theurgic creativity is or might look like. The spiral is and can, in 
effect, never be closed. At the end of his project Berdiaev himself ultimately admits his 
impotence to adequately express the fundamental intuition about the nature of religious 
creativeness: “The creative act is inexplicable”327 (372). Constrained by language, the Russian 
philosopher can present only a limited, finite embodiment (linguistic formulation) of what is 
essentially unlimited and infinite. His elucidation of creativity therefore, despite his employment 
of dicta with their claim on clarity and transcendent truth, turns into an endless ironic spiral of 
definitions and redefinitions (predominantly apophatic in nature) which is curtailed only by his 
own acknowledgment of the impossibility of such an explication. 
Berdiaev does not succeed in establishing the vital connection, both ontological and 
textual, between the macrocosm which is essentially indefinable and the microcosm that hides 
the incomprehensibility and inexpressibility of that Absolute behind the assured posturing of 
dicta. The attempt to insulate his philosophical articulation of religious creativity (“philosophy as
art”) from history leads only to a series of ironic inversions. Like Belyi, Berdiaev, who is also 
carried away by theurgic aspirations, finds himself confronted with the historical and the 
linguistic as the insurmountable challenges toward the attainment of the Absolute presented by 
early German Romanticism.     
V. In the Prison-House of Reason and Language: Lev Shestov and the Unspeakable
Truth
In sharp contrast to Belyi and Berdiaev, who still attempt to negotiate a compromise 
327 “Неизъяснимо, что есть творчество.”  
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between the Idealist conception of the Absolute as a knowable universal truth and the Romantic 
vision of philosophy as art, Lev Shestov328 is intent on the elimination of verifiable objective 
truth altogether. In his practice of philosophy as art there occurs a radical dissociation between 
the hitherto nearly identical concepts, the eternal Absolute and cognizable universal truth. While 
the existence of the Absolute in the form of nothing (and later, God) is affirmed, universal truth 
that can be discovered by a philosopher in the process of his reflective inquiry and deductive 
constructions is invalidated as a rational and tyrannical product of human mind. Man, for 
Shestov, exists in a state of metaphysical groundlessness, first explored by the early Romantics, 
in which all former verities and “self-evident” truths are gone. Truth therefore changes its status 
from complete, self-identical, transparent, and universal to fragmentary, contradictory, 
incomprehensible, and deeply subjective. The extreme subjectivity of truth, revealed to man in 
the depths of his interiority in the process of intensive personal struggle, prohibits its 
uncompromised expression to the outside world, raising the Romantic problem of 
communicability. This inexplicable and inexpressible nature of ultimate truth generates the major
paradox of Shestov's philosophy, locked in an agonized struggle with reason. Since personal-
cum-eternal truth is ultimately incommunicable, the Russian philosopher has no other means of 
announcing its existence than by forcefully negating that which this truth is not. It leads to his 
ceaseless, tragic battle with reason that stands in opposition to and overshadows eternal truth. 
This battle, however, cannot be waged on any other “ground” than that of reason and, its ally, 
328 For other approaches to Shestov's philosophy, see N. Berdiaev, “Tragediia i obydennost',” “Osnovnaia ideia 
filosofii L'va Shestova”; Edith W. Clowes,  Fiction's Overcoat. Russian Literary Culture and the Question of 
Philosophy; V. Lashov, Gumanizm L'va Shestova; N. O. Losskii, Istoriia russkoi filosofii (379); M. A. Maslin, 
Istoriia russkoi filosofii (447-456); Michael Oklot, “Dissecting the Toad: Unpacking Shestov's Thought on Gogol
Through Rozanov”; Vladimir Papernyi, “Lev Shestov: religioznaia filosofiia kak literaturnaia kritika i kak 
literatura”; Eva Patkosh, “Antirazionalizm L'va Shestova”; Poliakov S. A., Filosofiia L'va shestova. Opyt 
strukturno-istoricheskogo analiza; Olga Tabachnikova, “Anticipating Modern Trends: Lev Shestov—Between 
Literary Criticism and Existential Philosophy.”
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language. Thus, Shestov finds himself caught in an endless ironic cycle in which reason is 
perpetuated in the very act of its annihilation. 
Like Berdiaev, Shestov was deeply steeped in and shaped by Romanticism. According to 
Baranova-Shestova, “At one time he [Shestov] was very fond of Alfred de Musset and other 
French Romantics. ''The Flowers of Evil'' by Baudelaire and poems by Verlaine made an indelible
impression upon him”329 (Zhizn' L'va Shestova 14). While there is no sufficient evidence of his 
abiding interest in early German Romanticism per se, its intellectual legacy nevertheless made its
indirect but palpable impact on his thinking through his encounter with Nietzsche's and Heine's 
works. Nietzsche and Heine developed their distinctive philosophical and poetic outlooks 
respectively, at the early stages of their careers, particularly, under the influence of and, even 
more so, in confrontation with, Jena Romanticism. Thus, some of the original German Romantic 
ideas (philosophy as art, metaphysical groundlessness, the notion of human knowledge as 
irremediably fragmented, irony as a philosophical stance, etc.) found their way into Shestov's 
work in their transformed, late Romantic/Nietzschean (re)formulation.  
For both Shestov and the early German Romantics, the idea of groundlessness lies at the 
core of their respective philosophies. In their overt skepticism toward first principles and 
deductive thinking, the early Romantics are committed anti-foundationalists who repudiated all 
definitive “beginnings” and “ends.” In Fr. Schlegel's own words, he is “a fragmentary 
systematician”330 (KFSA 18: 97, no. 815) who conceives of his philosophy as “a system of 
fragments and a progression of projects”331 (KFSA 18: 100, no. 857). This “system of fragments,”
that Fr. Schlegel identifies elsewhere as “Chemische Philosophie,” “creates a whole by means of 
329 “Одно время он [Shestov] очень увлекался Альфредом Мюссе и другими французскими романтиками. 
''Цветы зла'' Бодлера, стихи Верлена произвели на него неотразимое впечатление.”  
330  “fragmentarischer Systematiker”
331 “ein System von Fragmenten und eine Progression von Projekten”  
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a permanent parabasis [irony]” (Chaouli 147). In this light, “Irony is a duty of all philosophy that 
neither history nor the System is”332 (KFSA 18: 86, no. 678). So the whole that emerges out of the
“system of fragments,” in Chaouli's words:
In the manner of a chain of chain reactions, gets permanently combined and recombined 
as one reads and rereads the fragments. Only in this sense can we understand the system 
to be a work, more precisely a work-in-progress. The system can be held only at the 
expense of its radical inconstancy; it can be produced but its half-life approaches zero. 
(147) 
The provisional wholeness that arises out of a volatile combination of fragments is instantly 
dissolved by the processes of irony ceaselessly hovering between the absolute poles of Non-
System and System, chaos and wholeness, nothingness and fullness, objectivity and subjectivity. 
In other words, the (re)created contingent wholeness disintegrates into “nothing” only to 
reemerge out of that “nothing” in a new, recombined, form, which is again inevitably exposed by 
irony in its incompleteness and imperfection and so ad infinitum. This is the current “floating” 
state of our philosophical knowledge which will persist until the emergence of the all-
encompassing system (the absolute totality variously referred to as “a perfect work of art,” “a 
plant,” etc.) which is posited by the early Romantics more as a regulative ideal to be striven for 
than as a historically realizable objective. 
The Shestov of The Apotheosis of Groundlessness (Apofeoz bespochvennosti, 1905), 
influenced by Nietzsche, is more radical than the early German Romantics in embracing the idea 
of metaphysical groundlessness. While rejecting the philosophical foundation in the form of an 
unconditioned ground, the Romantics still hold on to “the general idea” of the absolute system 
332 “Ironie ist die Pflicht aller Philosophie die noch nicht Historie nicht System ist.” 
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(organic fullness of being and knowledge) which is envisioned as a “telos,” a regulative ideal, 
toward which humanity should indefatigably strive. While the historical is deemed a volatile 
“chemical” (re)combination of system and non-system, the absolute system, though in fact 
unattainable, is nevertheless always present as the teleological goal that shapes and directs the 
development of history. Shestov, for his part, seeks to dispense with the idea of system as a 
“telos” to be striven for and the accompanying idea of  “progress” (even if infinite as in 
Romanticism). For him, fragments cannot and should not be even temporarily (re)combined into 
a systematic wholeness, let alone into the definitive absolute system, which is nothing but a 
tyrannical “general idea,” a product of reason (“philosophy as science”), that usurps the place of 
truth. Even though Shestov retains the Idealist/Romantic notion of the Absolute, he refuses to 
equate it in the fashion of the early German Romantics with any other “general idea” such as the 
absolute system, unity in diversity, organic wholeness, ultimate synthesis, etc.  
 Shestov contends that the Absolute as ultimate truth is nothing, or, in other words, that 
one should accept unintelligibility as the fundamental predicate of being. The Absolute is 
unknown and unknowable, but rather than as a cause for despair, the Russian philosopher 
suggests one should view the irrational nature of the Absolute that resists all attempts at 
conceptualization as a cause for celebration. Contrary to the widespread but misleading belief, 
reason does not liberate but enslaves. It seeks unity, uniformity, and consistency which cannot be 
achieved either in a philosophical system or in the social space other than through compulsion. 
By wielding the authority of the general idea (universal truth), falsely equated with the Absolute, 
reason dictates compulsory organization of human happiness at the expense of human freedom. 
The “universal” system(s) of values that it elaborates therefore can be maintained only through 
the violent suppression of all particularity and individuality. By identifying the Absolute with 
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nothing, on the other hand, Shestov invites one to set out on one's unique individual journey in 
search for ultimate truth. There is, however, no longer either a secure conceptual ground 
(metaphysical foundation) nor a clearly delineated destination (telos). One must immerse oneself 
into the state of radical metaphysical groundlessness by plunging into the abyss of nothing, and 
dare to create one's own values: 
Nature imperatively demands an exercise of individual creativity from each of us. People 
are reluctant to understand this and continue to expect from philosophy the delivery of 
ultimate truths which never were and never will be. Truths are as many as people in this 
world. And why should not every adult man be a creator, why should not he live at his 
own risk and have his own experience?333 (206)
Shestov envisions and structures The Apotheosis of Groundlessness as such a journey. The
book consists of a preface and two parts composed of an assemblage of aphorisms. The first part 
contains 122 aphorisms while the second—only 46. They are neither symmetrical nor logically 
sequenced. The first part is more negative than the second. Most of the aphorisms in the first part 
present an ironic attack against an idea, ideal, philosophical system, etc. embraced by humanity 
and held as immutable truth(s). Their task is to interrogate and undermine those systems of belief 
that claim the title of universal truth(s). The Russian philosopher does not seek to explicitly 
demolish these ideas so much as to plant doubt about their validity and source of authority in the 
reader's mind. Each aphorism by its paradoxical or interrogative or non-conclusive ending leaves 
the reader suspended, literally hanging in the air—the untenable situation symbolized and 
visualized by the white space that we face upon reaching its end. The reader feels compelled to 
333 “Природа повелительно требует от каждого из нас индивидуального творчества. Люди не хотят этого 
понять и все ждут от философии последних истин, которых не было, нет и никогда не будет. Истин 
столько, сколько людей на свете. Да почему бы в самом деле каждому взрослому человеку не быть 
творцом, не жить за свой страх и не иметь собственного опыта?” 
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hurry on to the next one in search of some assurance and mental comfort. All to no avail. Even 
though the next aphorism, separated from its predecessor by the disconcerting blank space (that 
the reader comes to dread as void), looks like a safe haven for the increasingly confused reader, 
the safety of the black print upon the page proves deceptive and much more dangerous each time 
than the white space itself. While thinking of being on solid ground, the reader loses more and 
more of it, with each new leap, with each new aphorism. 
By compromising all the solid and comforting “truths” and therefore by cutting the 
ground from under the reader's feet, Shestov seeks to encourage an individual search for truth. 
The second part of The Apotheosis sketches out Shestov's adogmatic and anti-systematic 
“program”—his philosophical vision of individual value creation and the never-ending quest for 
truth. It invites, or rather dares, the reader to set out on the lonely but exhilarating journey by 
venturing from “the valley” into “the mountains,” and taking part in the creative act by forging 
his own meaning, truth, and values. 
The trajectory of this individual journey in search for truth is for Shestov haphazard, 
criss-cross, sideways, circular, anything but linear. Its circularity is reflected in the structure of 
the book, in which each part traces a circle and curls back upon itself. Both parts open with an 
epigraph that announces the major theme or leitmotif around which most of the aphorisms 
belonging to that part revolve and to which they directly or indirectly allude. Each epigraph also 
serves as the concluding line of that part. Therefore, by reaching the end, we are immediately led 
back to the beginning and gently prodded into starting the journey anew. In the preface, Shestov 
says: “My whole task consisted precisely in getting rid of all sorts of ends and beginnings once 
and for all, which were imposed upon us by all kinds of founders of the great and not so great 
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systems with such an incomprehensible persitence”334 (11). By making the structure circular, the 
Russian philosopher eliminates the need for having clear-cut “beginnings” and “ends” since there
are none when it comes to the search for eternal truth. The journey toward truth is not linear. For 
Shestov, it always runs zig-zag and, most frequently, in circles.
Thus, together with the author, the reader constantly zig-zags and leaps over the white-
space abysses from one point (aphorism) to another, seemingly without any clear trajectory or 
guidance. The author, however, leads the reluctant reader untiringly toward the abyss of nothing 
which each of us has to face individually if we ever want, or rather dare, to look for Truth beyond
the false comfort of “universal truths.” The first part opens in the outskirts of the city (“back 
alleys of life”) and the second part ends high up in the mountains, leaving the disoriented and 
frightened reader staring into the precipice. From the darkness of the back alleys of life we are 
taken on a journey during which all the reliable landmarks (ideas, ideals, systems of belief, etc.) 
that used to guide us are subverted and, in the end, we are abandoned by the author all alone in 
the mountains, helpless, confused, and in utter despair over the absence of firm ground under our 
feet, with the parting “advice” to continue the perilous journey on our own (if we dare) and create
values out of nothing (if we can) OR to give up and return home to enjoy its illusory comforts 
and security: “For mountain paths, as any alpine guide will tell you, are only for those who are 
not prone to vertigo: nur für Schwindelfreie”335 (228). 
The book that leads the reader toward the abyss is also deeply personal. It is an 
expression of the author's own inner journey in search for truth. For Shestov, the aphoristic style 
334 “Вся моя задача состояла именно в том, чтоб раз навсегда избавиться от всякого рода начал и концов, с 
таким непонятным упорством, навязываемых нам всевозможными основателями великих и не великих 
философских систем.”   
335 “Ибо горные пути, как это вам скажет любой альпийский проводник, только для тех, кто не подвержен 
головокружению: nur für Schwindelfreie.”  
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in which this subjective experience is conveyed is of primary importance, for the aphorism 
allows one, in his conception, to capture and communicate, if only in part, the immediate and 
fluid living experience of a human being. It is owing to the aphoristic form of expression that 
Nietzsche, according to the Russian philosopher, was able to “walk without touching the ground”
and thus become a “representative of the divine groundlessness”: “Nietzsche succeeded in 
avoiding too sharp a distinctness and definiteness in the expression of his thoughts. He knew how
—and in this lies his most important merit—not to cross the thin line which divides actual 
experiences of man from fictitious ideas”336 (271-272). The aphorism, similar to poetry, gives one
a chance to escape the discursive, forcibly linear, mode of thought invariably associated with 
philosophical discourse and to express the fluidity of inwardness more faithfully: 
In my opinion, the aphorism is the best literary form. To be sure, even in the aphorism, a 
human thought will turn out more or less crumpled and crushed. But the aphorism gives 
one an invaluable advantage: it liberates one from consistency and synthesis. Nobody 
checks if the poet thought and felt the same way yesterday, last year, five years ago when 
he was composing his old verses—as he is feeling at the present moment. And if they do 
check and mark the difference, it is not to reproach him, but rather to praise him. Prose 
writers must achieve the same freedom....337 (264)
To communicate this living experience of (the quest for) truth, philosophy must renounce 
its ties with logic (reason) and become music: 
336 “Нитше удалось счастливо избегнуть слишком резкой отчетливости и определенности в выражении своих
мыслей. Он умел — и в этом его главная заслуга — не переступать ту тонкую черту, которая отделяет 
действительные переживания человека от выдуманных идей.”   
337 “На мой взгляд, афоризм — есть лучшая литературная форма. Конечно, и в афоризме человеческая мысль
окажется более или менее помятой и раздавленной. Но афоризм дает одно неоценимое преимущество: он 
освобождает от последовательности и синтеза. Поэта никто не проверяет, думал и чувствовал ли он вчера,
в прошлом году, пять лет тому назад, когда писал свои старые стихи — то же, что думает сегодня. А если 
проверяют и отмечают разницу, — то отнюдь не затем, чтоб укорять его, скорей — чтоб похвалить. 
Прозаикам необходимо добиться той же свободы....”      
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Schopenhauer weeps, laughs, rejoices, gets angry without thinking that this is forbidden 
to the philosopher. “Do not speak—sing” said Zarathustra and his precept was already 
largely fulfilled by Schopenhauer. Philosophy can be music—and this does not mean at 
all that music has to be called philosophy.338 (174) 
Viewed in this light, the entire journey that has a pronounced inward nature (exteriorized as a 
metaphorical ascent into the mountains, the seat of the Spirit) can also be construed as a series of 
fleeting inner states (moods, emotions, thoughts, half-thoughts, etc.), or, in musical terms, as a 
cycle of variations that can be continued ad infinitum.    
 The linkage of the inner (“living”) experience with truth, however, raises the problem of 
its adequate expressibility and communicability. The presence of this problem in Shestov's 
Apotheosis of Groundlessness was already pointed out by Berdiaev: 
He wants philosophical writings to cease being literature, so that they will not contain 
“ideas” but only experiences themselves. Music for Shestov is above all, he wants 
philosophy to turn into music or to become more musical at the very least. This is the 
reason why he began to compose aphorisms: he is afraid of violence over the individual 
sequence of his experiences, the rationalization of his experience. [...] Experiences can 
only be felt, a living experience can only be lived, while all literature as well as all 
philosophy are already a reworking of those experiences, of the living experience and 
this is absolutely inescapable. And the aphorisms are also artificial, they also rationalize 
the chaos of experiences, they are also composed of phrases that are nothing else but 
judgments, though not binding ones.339 (“Tragediia i obydennost',” on. s.)
338 “Шопенгауэр плачет, смеется, радуется, сердится — и отнюдь не думает, что это возбранено философу. 
''Не говори — пой'' сказал Заратустра, и его завет уже в значительной степени уже исполнил Шопенгауэр. 
Философия может быть музыкой — и это вовсе не значит, что музыка должна называться философией.” 
339 “Он хочет, чтобы писания не были литературой, чтобы в них не было "идей", а только сами переживания, 
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In other words, Shestov, like later Berdiaev himself in The Meaning of the Creative Act, 
encounters the linguistic challenge posed by the early Romantics. 
This challenge becomes even more apparent in Shestov's later, overtly religious, work. 
Starting with Sola Fide (Tol'ko veroiu, 1913-1914), Shestov comes to explicitly identify the 
Absolute with God. Unlike Apotheosis of Groundlessness, in which man is encouraged to dare 
the abyss of metaphysical groundlessness and create values out of nothing, in Sola Fide man is 
completely deprived of agency. It is not in his power to discover truth and create out of nothing, 
for it is only God who is in the possession of ultimate truth and can create out of nothing. God 
can always reduce man to nothing (for man is, in the end, a pure nothing) and, if He wills so, He 
can raise the crushed man, wallowing in despair, out of the abyss of nothing by (re)creating him 
anew. Man can never rise out of that abyss by his own effort. It is only in his arrogance, a product
of diabolical reason, that he thinks that he can ingratiate himself and negotiate with God and earn
salvation. For Shestov, man can find his way to God and therefore to salvation only through faith 
that involves a complete renunciation of all “ground” (reason): 
To unite with God—unum necessarium est—one thing is necessary: faith, that is a 
willingness to break out of the circle of all those ideas in which man usually exists. Or, 
to be more exact, faith and salvation are synonymous. Whoever has gained faith, that is 
has come to feel [faith inside], that person has been saved. Who has gained salvation, has 
gained faith, that is has come to feel that all the restrictive laws, all the foundations, all 
сам опыт. Музыка для Шестова выше всего, он хочет, чтобы философия превратилась в музыку или по 
крайней мере сделалась более музыкальной. Потому-то он и афоризмами стал писать, что боится насилия 
над индивидуальным сцеплением своих переживаний, рационализации своего опыта. […] [Но] 
Переживания можно только переживать, живой опыт можно только испытать, а всякая литература, всякая 
философия есть уже переработка переживаний, опыта, и это совершенно фатально. И афоризмы тоже 
искусственны, тоже уже рационализируют хаос переживаний, тоже состоят из фраз, которые 
представляют собою суждения, хотя и не общеобязательные.”  
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the supports that used to sustain man were broken, fragmented, destroyed, that all the 
guiding lights went out, all the points of orientation vanished....340 (Sola Fide 259) 
Like salvation, ultimate truth is beyond the power of man. It can be revealed to man only 
in his solitary communion with God: 
Man comes to God only when God calls him, when God guides him to Himself. The last 
truth is born in the deepest secrecy and loneliness. Not only does it not require, it actually 
forbids the presence of strangers. That is why it does not tolerate proof and fears more 
than anything that which sustains common empirical truths—universal recognition and 
final sanction.341 (284) 
Truth revealed by God to man in solitude is always partial, individual, inexpressible, 
incomprehensible and can only be inwardly experienced. It is situated beyond all human 
conceptions, ethical notions, and means of verification. It cannot be communicated from man to 
man, for there are no means availabe to a human being by which one can convey it 
uncompromised: 
At one of such moments of illumination, Jacob Boehme was not afraid to say that man 
cannot say anything about the divine to another man. That is, the divine, in its essence, is 
such that it can be expressed neither in a idea, nor in a principle, nor in a proposition, i.e. 
in none of those forms which man has to employ to communicate his experiences in 
340 “Чтоб соединиться с Богом unum necessarium est — необходимо одно: вера, т. е. готовность вырваться из 
круга всех тех идей, в которых обыкновенно живет человек. Или, выражаясь точнее, вера и спасение есть 
синонимы. Кто уверовал, т. е. почувствовал, тот — спасся. Кто спасся, тот уверовал, т. е. почувствовал, 
что все ограничительные законы, все устои, все опоры, которыми держался человек, разбиты, 
раздроблены, уничтожены, что все светочи погасли, все указания исчезли....”     
341 “Но к Богу человек приходит лишь тогда, когда Бог его позовет, когда Бог приведет его к Себе. Последняя 
истина рождается в глубочайшей тайне и одиночестве. Она не только не требует, она не допускает 
присутствия посторонних. Оттого она не выносит доказательств, и больше всего боится того, чем живут 
обыкновенные эмпирические истины, признания человеческого и окончательной санкции.”  
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order to share them, as truths, with one's neighbor.342 (282) 
Once clothed in words and shared with other people, divine truth becomes profaned and falsified.
 This intense interiority of truth that can neither be known nor expressed turns Shestov's 
philosophy into a paradox. Since absolute truth, as revealed by God to man, is private, 
inexplicable, and incommunicable, unable to be detached from the living experience of a 
believer, Shestov as a philosopher necessarily constrained by language has no other way to speak 
about it than through the negation of what that truth is not. It results in the primarily negative, 
apophatic nature, of his philosophical project. In Berdiaev's words:
The difficulty consisted in the verbal inexpressibility of what Lev Shestov viewed as the 
principal theme of his life, the inexpressibility of the most vital. He resorted to the 
negative form of expression more often and in this he was more successful. It was clear 
what he was fighting against. The positive form, on the other hand, was more difficult. 
Human language is too rationalized, too adapted to the needs of thought, a product of the 
Fall—of the knowledge of good and evil.343 (“Osnovnaia ideia filosofii L'va 
Shestova,” on. s.) 
The force of his philosophical ire is always directed against the demonic reason that stands in the 
way between man and God (ultimate truth). But in his struggle against the tyranny of reason that 
arose as a result of man's fall from grace, Shestov, ironically, can find no other “ground” to stand 
on in his battle against reason than that of reason and language (reason's primary tool) 
342 “Яков Беме, в один из таких моментов просветления не побоялся сказать, что о Божественном человек 
человеку не может сказать. Т.е., что Божественное, по существу своему таково, что оно не может найти 
себе выражение в идее, принципе, утверждении, т. е. ни в одной из тех форм, в которые человек должен 
облечь свои переживания, для того, чтобы поделиться, как истинами, с ближним.”  
343 “Трудность была в невыразимости словами того, что мыслил Л. Шестов об основной теме своей жизни, 
невыразимости главного. Он чаще прибегал к отрицательной форме выражения, и это ему более 
удавалось. Ясно было, против чего он ведет борьбу. Положительная же форма была более затруднена. 
Человеческий язык слишком рационализирован, слишком приспособлен к мысли, порожденной уже 
грехопадением — познанием добра и зла.”  
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themselves. This results in the perpetuation of the ironic cycle, in which the Russian philosopher 
cuts the “ground” from under the foundation of the prison-house of reason only to see that 
ground regrow, almost magically, in the very same instant.
   Despite his continuous struggle against the tyranny of reason, Shestov never directly 
confronted the linguistic challenge, initially raised by the Romantics. For his primary 
philosophical interest lay in the pre-verbial and suprarational space of interaction between God 
(ultimate truth) and man rather than in the social (linguistic and rational) sphere of 
communication between man and man. For the Russian philosopher, truth revealed in the 
irrational depths of interiority cannot and should not be articulated, for as soon as it becomes 
verbalized and shared, it turns into another dangerous falsehood. But as Berdiaev acutely 
observes, even though Shestov refuses to address the linguistic challenge, his philosophy itself 
embodies this unresolved and possibly eternally irresolvable problem of communicability: 
But his philosophy sharply poses this problem, he himself becomes a problem of 
philosophy […] Is communication among people possible on the basis of the truth of 
Revelation or is communication only possible on the basis of the truth of reason, adapted 
to the needs of everyday life, on the basis of what L. Shestov, following Dostoevskii, 
used to call “universal consciousness”?344 (Ibid.)
Thus, no less than philosophy as science, philosophy as art, as it becomes evident in its most 
radical, Shestovian, manifestation, due to its inescapably ratio-linguistic mode of being and 
expression, proves impotent to deliver absolute truth. There is, in the end, no escape from the 
tragedy of the human condition, tied to reason and language, as Shestov has long suspected, other
344 “Но его философия очень остро ставит эту проблему, он сам становится проблемой философии [...] 
Возможно ли сообщение между людьми на почве истины откровения, или это сообщение возможно лишь 
на почве истин разума, приспособленных к обыденности, на почве того, что Л. Шестов вслед за 
Достоевским называл ''всем-ством''?”
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than into the ultimate silence which is death.  
VI. Conclusion
Russian religio-philosophical enterprise runs into a stalemate. Neither philosophy as 
science nor philosophy as art can yield the Absolute. The infinite regress turns out to be a reality 
of all philosophizing, for ultimate truth proves epistemically inaccessible and/or linguistically 
inexpressible. The tragic rift between the finite and the infinite appears to be irreconcilable and 
the wanton play of irony inherent in the limitations of empirical consciousness, indelibly tied 
with reason and language, remains unabated. While the prospect of infinite philosophizing fills 
the early German Romantics, at least initially, with optimism, for the Russian thinkers, of the 
Symbolist orientation in particular, the eternal unattainability of the Absolute both in the 
intellectual and existential realms is unambiguously tragic. In the absence of the positive 
Absolute, a human being is abandoned to confront the nocturnal terrors of nihilistic irony, 
relativity, meaninglessness, determinism, and, ultimately, annihilation. 
 Despite a series of unsuccessful epistemological efforts to construct a unifying 
worldview that would herald the fulfillment of Solov'ev's ideal of Godmanhood in actuality, the 
second generation of Russian Symbolists refuse to accept what transpires as the irremediable 
tragedy of the human condition. Thus, Viacheslav Ivanov, Andrei Belyi, and Aleksandr Blok seek
to historicize man's tragic impotence to remedy the metaphysical rupture between the finite and 
the infinite by linking that failure with the Romantic movement itself. In their opinion, the 
Romantics, while recognizing the metaphysical affliction neglected to act on their tragic insight, 
resigning themselves instead to the never-ending play of ironic subjectivity. 
The way to overcome this tragic split that has become a breeding ground for nihilistic 
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irony lies, for Russian Symbolists, in the resurrection of tragedy both as a synthetic objective 
drama (Blok and Ivanov) and, more importantly, as a mode of heroic being in the world (Blok 
and Belyi). Only the restoration of tragedy in the aesthetic and existential spheres would 
effectively cleanse the world of the curse of alienated Romantic subjectivity and its product, 
ironic relativity, thereby paving the way for the realization of Godmanhood conceived as a 
universal enactment of the living mystery play. The Symbolists' engagement with tragedy as a 
potential solution to the tragic metaphysical severance between the finite and the infinite is 




The Symbolist “Romantic Debacle”: Between Tragedy and the Tragic Idea
I. Introduction
“The predominance, if not the complete domination, of the question posed by the idea of 
the tragic in the past two centuries is owing to the work of Kant […] One cannot understand the 
full force of the return of that question of tragedy without first coming to see it as a response to 
the challenge Kant poses to thinking” (Schmidt 74). After Kant exposed the fundamental 
limitation of the human intellect as one of the inescapable conditions of human experience, the 
problem of the end of philosophy became the quintessential problem for thinking. But while 
Kant, in Schmidt's words, is “the one who drives home the tragedy of reason without relent […] 
it is left to those after Kant [the early German Romantics and the Idealists] to expand the scope of
this peculiar fate and to demonstrate that the fate of philosophy, namely, to suffer what is 
indispensable as what is impossible, becomes the fate of human experience and of all history” 
(5). Thus, starting with the early German Romantics and Idealists, the idea of the tragic is no 
longer limited to tragedy as a literary genre. Having been abstracted from drama, the tragic 
acquires a life of its own outside the narrowly aesthetic confines, becoming a metaphysical  
category in its own right. In particular, the tragic comes to signify the constitutive self-division of
the primordial Absolute: “It announces the necessary split of a primordial unity, the reflective 
instance of substance, and the emergence of individuation into history” (Lambropoulos 11). In 
other words, the idea of the tragic is interpreted by the Idealists and Romantics primarily in terms
of the metaphysical rupture between the infinite and the finite that for the empirical human mind 
manifests itself in Kantian terms as a tragic rift (“antinomy”) between freedom and nature. 
It is an attempt to resolve this tragic contradiction within human autonomy that drives the 
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Idealist philosophical enterprise in the first place. The impossibility of resolving the tragic 
contradictions of liberty posited by Kant by purely conceptual means within the framework of a 
traditional philosophical system (see the second chapter) leads to a drastic shift in the 
conceptualization of the idea of the tragic: “Later, once the dialectics grows more systematic and 
absorbs contradictions into its very operation, the idea is also identified with what overflows, 
surpasses, oversteps human horizons—with whatever exceeds reason, knowledge, understanding,
history, justice, kinship and so on. The tragic represents what goes beyond but does not and 
cannot transcend” (Lambropoulos 10). Thus, the tragic becomes synonymous with humanity's 
experience of its radical limitations—a human being's inability not only to remedy but even to 
conceptually grasp the whole web of entanglements and contradictions that lie at the heart of 
Being. 
In this light, tragedy as a genre becomes an embodiment of a different type of knowledge
—experiential or “suffered” knowledge which is inaccessible to theoretical cognition. Tragedy, in
other words, turns into the very incarnation of the human predicament, a symbolic representation 
of the terrible contradictions of the human condition. In Schmidt's words, “In tragedy we are 
summoned to an experience of that which is greater than us and yet to which we belong. In this 
summons we are brought before our finitude not by being brought before an infinite, a god, 
before whom we pale, but by being reminded of a different sort of infinity, namely, the infinity 
and inexhaustibility of our limits” (9). This tragic experience of human limits is associated with 
the experience of death, the ultimate unfathomable limit that defines the very nature of humanity. 
The tragic, in the end, becomes identical for the Romantics with the human: the tragic is the 
human and the human is the tragic. The chasm separating human experience (the finite) and the 
Spirit (the infinite) therefore can be surmounted neither conceptually nor practically but can only 
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be experienced, lived through, and “known” in suffering.
Russian religious philosophy inherits this tragic divide between the finite and the infinite 
as part of the early German Romantic and Idealist philosophical tradition. Solov'ev, in particular, 
as has been shown in the second chapter, devotes himself to the conceptual reconciliation of the 
oppositions that would potentially culminate in the actualization of the state of All-in-Oneness in 
real life. The failure of his life-long theurgic project, however, triggers a profound crisis that 
leads to Solov'ev's turn to art for insights into the tragic nature of Being denied to philosophy 
(“The Tale of the Antichrist”). The realization that art surpasses the conceptual possibilities of 
philosophy allows Solov'ev to reflect on the tragic limits of the philosophical enterprise as a 
whole—its fundamental incapacity to remedy the ontological rift between the idea and the world.
In “The Drama of Plato's Life” (“Zhiznennaia drama Platona,” 1898), Solov'ev, using the ancient 
Greek thinker as his alter ego, dwells on the universal tragedy of the philosopher, the Titan of 
thought, who is defeated by the task of reconciling conflicting claims of theory and life. 
Regardless of intellectual capacity, a human being is left helpless in the face of the abyss between
the finite and the infinite that can only be bridged by the true Godman, Christ.
The second generation of Russian Symbolists inspired by the early Solov'ev's teaching of 
Godmanhood, initially sought to disprove the late Solov'ev's hard-won acknowledgment of the 
irremediably tragic nature of the human condition. Ivanov, Belyi, and Blok, in contrast, seek to 
historicize tragic human failure to heal the metaphysical rift between the finite and the infinite by
directly linking that failure with the Romantic movement. Thus, Romanticism is posited by 
Russian Symbolists as an epitome of human impotence to overcome the gaping abyss, for it is the
Romantics who come to (re)discover and perpetuate the philosophical notion of the ontological 
division as ultimately irreparable. The Symbolists seek to overturn the Romantic conviction that 
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the fundamental division that has split the unity of Being cannot be healed by human exertion. 
Paradoxically, the way to overcome modern tragic vision (“the tragic idea”) ushered in by the 
Romantics is envisaged by the Symbolists as a resurrection of tragedy both as a synthetic drama 
(Blok and Ivanov) and, more importantly, as a mode of heroic being in the world (Blok and 
Belyi).
This desire on the part of Russian Symbolists to revive tragedy both as a genre and a 
heroic mode of being in the world is just another configuration of and a path toward the 
realization of their Solov'evian ideal of fusing art and life. In Corrigan's words, the difference 
between tragedy and the tragic is the same as the difference between art and life: “When we talk 
about tragedy [as a genre], we are in the realm of aesthetics; when we discuss the nature of the 
tragic, we are in the realm of existence. In short, the difference between the two is the difference 
between art and life” (“Introduction: Tragedy and the Tragic Spirit” 8). To eliminate this 
difference by transplanting tragedy as a genre into the realm of life, thereby turning human 
existence into the living mystery play (“misteriia”), is the theurgic purpose pursued by the 
younger Symbolists.
The Symbolist ambitious enterprise of rewriting Romanticism by regenerating 
“objective” tragedy and reestablishing the heroic mode of behavior in the modern unheroic world
does not, however, succeed. The Symbolists (Ivanov and Blok) find themselves unable to move 
from the “subjective” (lyrical) tragedy inaugurated by the Romantics to the “objective” tragedy 
which would reunify the shattered cohesion between the alienated individual(ist) and the 
community. The creation of the tragic hero and the transposition of the heroic mode of behavior 
into the realm of actuality (Blok and Belyi) prove even less successful. The inability to revive 
heroism in the modern world leads to the unbridled play of skeptical irony and the forceful 
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assertion of fatalism. Thus, the ironic and deterministic perspective comes in the end to supplant 
the tragic standpoint in Symbolism. This, in turn, results in the reconceptualization of the notion 
of the tragic. The Symbolist aspiration to bend the line of history into the circle of eternity by 
transforming the rule of necessity into the freedom of Godmanhood only accentuates the extent 
of tragic human limitations in the face of the ontological abyss, in which nihilistic irony thrives. 
Art as the highest expression of human creative capacities proves powerless to heal the 
metaphysical divide between the human and the divine, thereby exposing the Symbolist artist as 
a pseudo-Christ. In this light, the tragic “failure” of Romanticism cannot be “rewritten,” for it is 
as much the tragic “failure” of theurgic Symbolism itself.  
II. Between Theory and Life: Vladimir Solov'ev on the Tragedy of a Philosopher
In “The Drama of Plato's Life” (“Zhiznennaia drama Platona,” 1898), Vladimir Solov'ev 
seeks to reflect on the reasons behind the failure of his life-long theurgic project which was 
supposed to bring about the synthesis of the infinite (divine) and the finite (human). He traces the
origin of the tragically irremediable split between theory and life back to Plato, a progenitor of 
Idealist philosophy, who was the first to conceptualize and attempt to overcome the divide 
between reality and appearance. By making use of Plato's life and philosophy Solov'ev seeks to 
create a myth about the titanic figure of a philosopher of genius whose superhuman quest for 
absolute truth is ultimately defeated by his feeble human nature. The Russian philosopher 
emplots the life of his ancient Greek alter ego as a succession of personal catastrophes that in the 
end come to represent the universal tragedy of a philosopher incapable of reconciling conflicting 
claims of theory and life. In other words, Plato is turned by Solov'ev into an archetypal tragic 
figure who comes to incarnate the tragic fate of the entire philosophical enterprise—its inability 
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to heal the rift between the idea and the world of appearances.  
For Solov'ev, it is not so much Plato's philosophy per se as his life engendering that 
dualistic philosophical vision that becomes a tragic battlefield of conflicting universal forces. 
Plato's living tragedy, as the Russian philosopher insists, is different from the two types of 
literary tragedy, ancient and modern, hitherto distinguished by aesthetics. While ancient Greek 
tragedy is defined as a “tragedy of universal necessity” (Aeschylus's Oresteia) and modern 
tragedy is generally seen as a “tragedy of individual character” (Shakespeare's Hamlet), the type 
of tragedy exemplified by Plato's life, according to Solov'ev, has a distinctly synthetic nature that 
brings together the universal (necessity) and the particular (individual character): “Is such a 
tragic situation not possible in which the most significant and universal collision of objective 
forces acting in the world would demonstrate its might on the most powerful and profound 
individual?”345 (Izbrannoe 201). In opposition to Nietzsche, who claimed that Socratic 
philosophy with its facile optimism supplanted the authentic tragic vision originally cultivated by
the ancient Greek drama, Solov'ev comes to apprehend philosophy as the very locus of tragic 
(“suffered”) knowledge and the failed life of a philosopher seeking absolute truth as a tragedy 
representative of the whole of humankind.  
 Plato's tragedy, as emplotted by Solov'ev, is framed by two catastrophic events at the start
and end of his life as a philosopher. The beginning of Plato's life drama is marked by Socrates' 
shameful death as a criminal: “Socrates was to die as a criminal. This is a tragic blow that befalls 
Plato at the beginning of his life drama. Similar to some of the ancient tragedies as well as to 
345
 “Разве невозможно такое трагическое положение, при котором наиболее значительное и 
универсальное столкновение объективных действующих в мире начал показывало бы свою силу на самой 
могучей и глубокой индивидуальности?” 
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Shakespeare's Hamlet, this drama not only ends but also begins with a tragic catastrophe”346 
(198). Plato's beloved teacher is condemned to death for his uncompromising quest for absolute 
truth. A martyr in the name of truth, Socrates falls victim to evil represented by the political 
expediency of the day. Thus, it was not intellectual contemplation but a tragic life event, Socrates'
unseemly demise, that revealed to Plato the hitherto veiled ontological abyss separating the realm
of being (absolute truth) from the world of appearances (falsehood). In this light, even though the
collision of “the profoundest evil” (embodied as the corrupt political establishment of Athens and
Sophists) with “the incarnation of truth” (Socrates) is played out among specific historical 
personages, it has, nevertheless, according to the Russian philosopher, an “objective” character 
possessing enduring and universal validity.
 Thus, the origin of Platonic Idealism, in Solov'ev's view, does not lie in the sphere of 
purely speculative thought but rather in the experiential realm of life—in the tragic. Plato's 
dualistic outlook mirrors the tragic antagonism between good/truth and evil/falsehood that he 
encountered in his first confrontation with an instance of supreme injustice (Socrates's trial and 
death). As a result, unlike Socrates, who as a philosopher still conceived of the ultimate good as a
necessary presupposition of the worldly actuality (205), Plato comes to divorce the highest truth 
from and oppose it to what he sees as a treacherously deceptive world of appearances. 
Furthermore, in contradistinction to his teacher Socrates, who sought the ultimate good primarily 
as a superior ethical norm which would preside over the practical life of man, Plato turns the 
highest good into a purely theoretical issue entirely removed from the worldly concerns of man. 
Truth is not of this world. The eternal world of essences and the transient world of appearances 
346 “Сократ должен был умереть как преступник. Вот трагический удар в самом начале жизненной драмы 
Платона. Подобно некоторым древним трагедиям, а также шекспировскому Гамлету, эта драма не только 
кончается, но и начинается трагической катастрофой.”  
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are presented and perpetuated by Plato as antithetical and irreconcilable.  
In his philosophical vision Plato lays bare the tragic ontological division coiled within the
divine cosmos without being able to heal the exposed rift. According to Solov'ev, Plato 
approaches the discovery of a potential intermediary—Eros—between the two opposed realms, 
the world of ideas (truth) and the world of appearances (falsehood), but stops short of developing
his own insight into the transfigurative potential of love. While the Greek philosopher perceives 
that the erotic task of “engendering in beauty” goes well beyond the mere scope of creative arts, 
he leaves the true nature of this generative power of love essentially unclarified. This human 
nearsightedness of Plato, who fails to apprehend the full potency of his own insight marks, in 
Solov'ev's opinion, the onset of his tragic downfall as a philosopher.  
To show that the tragic rupture between the two realms is not absolutely irreparable, 
Solov'ev takes it upon himself to expand on Plato's original idea of Eros as the one “engendering 
in beauty” (“rozhdaet v krasote”) by explicating his philosophy of love. For the Russian 
philosopher, the true and highest task of Eros that Plato ultimately fails to recognize is to make an
object of love immortal by spiritualizing matter (flesh), which is usually completely absorbed 
into and eventually eliminated by а ceaseless “flow of births and deaths”: “The real task of love 
is to truly immortalize the beloved [liubimoye], to truly deliver it from death and decay, and, 
finally, to regenerate it in beauty”347 (216-217). The triumph of love lies in “a full resurrection of 
life” (“polnoe voskreshenie zhizni”) as opposed to the perpetuation of the vicious circle of 
propagation and annihilation reigning on earth. Thus, Eros is posed by Solov'ev as a sought-for 
intermediary between the two realms tragically severed and never reunited in/through Plato's 
347 “Настоящая задача любви — действительно увековечить любимое, действительно избавить его от смерти 
и тления, окончательно переродить его в красоте.”  
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Idealist philosophy: “If Eros is a true mediator and pontifex—the bridge builder—between 
heaven, earth, and hell, then his true goal is their complete and definitive synthesis”348 (216). It is 
through the power of love that the idea of Godmanhood, the ultimate synthesis of the infinite 
(Plato's world of ideas) and the finite (Plato's world of appearances), can come into being. 
Plato's tragic downfall, however, happens not only as a result of his nearsightedness as a 
philosopher who fails to elaborate on his insight but rather and, for Solov'ev, primarily, in his 
incapacity to reconcile theory and life: 
Having come to know in feeling the power of two Eroses and having acknowledged in 
reason the supremacy of one of them, he did not allow him to triumph in actuality. He 
became satisfied with the idea [umstvennyj obraz] of Eros […] Having forgotten his own 
insight that this Eros “engenders in beauty,” that is in the actual realization of the ideal, 
Plato left it to engender in the intellect only. What is the reason behind this failure? It is 
the most common one: having soared above the mortals in theory, he ended up as an 
ordinary human being in life.349 (217)
Plato's true failure resides in his lack of attempting to act on his epiphany in the practical sphere 
of life. While in theory he poses, at least in passing, a possibility of restoring the shattered unity 
by means of the healing power of Eros, he does not seek to bring it about in real life itself. In 
Plato one observes, in Solov'ev's words, “a [dramatic] collision of lofty demands with real 
helplessness” (Ibid.). This tragic impotence to actualize the idea by bringing it to life is 
348 “Если Эрос есть действительный посредник и pontifex — делатель моста — между небом, землей и 
преисподней, то его истинная цель есть полное и окончательное их соединение.”  
349 “Изведавши в чувстве силу обоих Эротов и признав умом превосходство одного из них, он не дал ему 
побед на деле. Он удовлетворился его мысленным образом […] забыв свое собственное сознание, что этот
Эрот ''рождает в красоте,'' т. е. в ощутительной реализации идеала, Платон оставил его рождать только в 
умозрении. Какая же причина этой несостоятельности? Самая общая: и он, поднявшись в теории над 
большинством смертных, оказался в жизни обыкновенным человеком.” 
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illustrative of the tragic nature of the entire philosophical enterprise as a whole and, by extension,
of the tragedy of the entire humankind languishing within the world of appearances. Plato's fate, 
however, is even more tragic than that of the rest of humanity for “he was conscious of these 
demands more lucidly than others and could have more easily overcome this weakness with his 
genius”350 (Ibid.).
Plato's tragic downfall as a philosopher culminates in the ultimate catastrophe—the ironic
inversion of his original aspiration that consisted in the unrelenting quest for absolute truth. 
Having failed to comprehend the true task of love as a mediator between the eternal idea and 
actuality and to act upon this illuminative insight, Plato, nevertheless, finds himself unable to 
stay exclusively within the sphere of abstract contemplation (theory) and turns his attention to the
easier and more superficial task of the transformation of sociopolitical relations within the 
illusory world of appearances. For Solov'ev, however, this attempt to reform the corrupt realm of 
politics on the part of Plato presents not a welcome breakthrough into the realm of life but the 
final, ironic, twist of the greatest philosopher's tragic drama. In his effort to improve degenerate 
society, Plato, as irony would have it, comes to embrace the very same principles that Socrates 
perished battling against. His last work, Laws, in Solov'ev's appraisal, turns out to be an 
unapologetic repudiation of the very spirit of Socrates' teaching and, by extension, of the entire 
philosophical enterprise understood as an uncompromising quest for absolute truth: 
Thus, the greatest disciple of Socrates, who was awakened towards independent 
philosophical creativity as a result of resentment towards the legal murder of his teacher,
—comes to accept the standpoint of Anytus and Meletus who insisted on Socrates' death 
350 “... он яснее других сознавал эти требования и легче других мог бы одолеть эту немощь своим гением.”  
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penalty […] What a profound tragic catastrophe, what a complete inward downfall.351 
(225)
In the greatest philosopher's abandonment of the ideal, Solov'ev sees the most profound tragedy 
of humankind: “I don't know any more significant and profound tragedy in human history”352 
(Ibid.). 
Through the tragedy of Plato, the titanic figure in the history of philosophy, Solov'ev 
exposes tragic human inability to attain the craved-for synthesis between philosophy cognizant of
the ideal (absolute truth) and actuality resistant to that ideal's incarnation. In his portrayal of 
Plato's life drama, a philosopher figures as the most tragic figure among humankind, for, unlike 
its other representatives, a philosopher is acutely aware of the existence of the absolute ideal and 
yet he proves as helpless as a layman when it comes to its concrete realization in real life. By 
dwelling on Plato's tragic downfall, Solov'ev comes to indirectly acknowledge his own failure as 
a philosopher-cum-theurgist as well. A philosopher, regardless of the daring and profundity of his
theoretical insight into the realm of truth, is only a human being who is doomed to failure and 
defeat in his tragic life-long strife with the inert world of actuality: “The weakness and downfall 
of the “divine” Plato are important because they sharply highlight and explain the impossibility 
for a person to fulfill his purpose, that is to become a true overman, through the sheer force of 
intellect, genius, and moral will,—they explain the need for a true essential Godman”353 (226). 
Thus, for the Russian philosopher, human existence is circumscribed within the sphere of the 
351 “Таким образом, величайший ученик Сократа, вызванный к самостоятельному философскому творчеству 
негодаванием на легальное убийство учителя, — под конец становится на точку зрения Анита и Менита, 
добившихся смертного приговора […] Какая глубочайшая трагическая катастрофа, какая полнота 
внутреннего падения!”
352 “Я не знаю более значительной и глубокой трагедии в человеческой истории.” 
353 “Немощь и падение ''божественного'' Платона важны потому, что резко подчеркивают и поясняют 
невозможность для человека исполнить свое назначение, т. е. стать действительным сверхчеловеком, 
одною силой ума, гения и нравственной воли, — поясняют необходимость настоящего существенного 
богочеловека.”  
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tragic, for the disjuncture between the eternal idea(l) and the world of appearances suffered by 
man cannot be transcended by human effort alone, no matter how titanic it is. Mankind is 
condemned to the inhibitions of mortality and mutability, of finiteness and contingency until the 
Second Coming of Christ, a true Godman who in his own very person reconciles the seemingly 
irremediable, painful rupture between the finite (actuality) and the infinite (absolute truth). 
The tragic emplotment of Plato's life allows Solov'ev to acknowledge the limitation of all 
human existence, including his own as a would-be theurgist. The ancient Greek philosopher's 
tragedy is not just personal, limited to a particular moment in history but universal, for the source
of failure, as illustrated by Plato's calamitous downfall, resides within us, within our very nature 
of being human. Alongside “The Tale of the Antichrist,” “The Drama of Plato's Life” is 
Solov'ev's late-life recognition of the tragic presumptuousness and futility of human effort to 
reorder the state of things in the divine cosmos. 
III. Against Romantic Lyricism: Viacheslav Ivanov's Quest for Objective Tragedy
Ivanov's lifelong relation with the Romantic movement is marked by complexity and 
contradiction. Like Blok, he can be characterized as a (neo)Romantic who battles with 
Romanticism within and outside himself. Ivanov's die hard Romanticism was well recognized by 
his contemporaries, including his fellow Symbolists. Commenting on Ivanov's efforts to 
differentiate between Romanticism and Symbolism (“prophetic art”), Stepun stresses the 
presence of the powerful Romantic streak within Ivanov's Symbolist worldview itself: “Despite 
the correctly and excellently formulated opposition of prophetic service in respect to the future 
and the Romantic immersion in the past, Viacheslav Ivanov's constructs still bear very many 
Romantic-utopian features […] The main sin of Romanticism is its lack of sober view of the 
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reigning historical age and its inability to separate what will inevitably be from what appears to 
its dreamy gaze. From this point of view Viacheslav Ivanov seems to me (perhaps to himself 
also?) a typical Romantic” (236; tr. by Bird). Since then Ivanov's kinship with the Romantic 
movement has become a subject of extensive scholarly research.354 
Robert Bird, for one, was quick to discern the complexity of Ivanov's attitude toward his 
Romantic antecedents:
As our work [Bird's dissertation project The Tender Mystery] progressed, however, it 
became increasingly difficult to ignore the basic similarity and even identity of Ivanov's 
''aspirations'' with those of the Romantic movement, especially German Romanticism, 
understood broadly (following Ivanov) as embracing Schiller and Hegel as well as 
Novalis, Schleiermacher, and Schelling. Further, it also became evident that Ivanov saw 
his task as reaching beyond this rich but problematic heritage, in ''overcoming 
Romanticism,'' and that the originality of his Symbolist worldview depended largely on 
his success in doing so. (3-4) 
In Bird's analysis of Ivanov's work that spans the whole of Ivanov's creative career, the Russian 
Symbolist eventually succeeds in surmounting Romanticism, construed, after Carl Schmitt, as an 
“aesthetic occasionalism,” that is a playful attitude assumed by the Romantic subject toward real-
life conflicts and tensions when they become mere occasions for expressing his ever-changing 
moods and exercising his aesthetic activity and productivity. As a result, the Romantic subject 
loses touch with reality, for eventually he finds himself entirely confined to the realm of aesthetic
354 Apart from Robert Bird, the following works focus on Ivanov's lifelong engagement with the Romantic heritage. 
Michael Wachtel's Russian Symbolism and Literary Tradition explores Ivanov's relations with Romanticism as 
represented by the work of Novalis. In his article “Ivanov's Esthetic Thought,” Victor Terras gives a broad 
overview of Ivanov's intellectual sources, including German Romantic/Idealist legacy. Terras underscores the 
extent of Romantic/Idealist influence on Ivanov as a theoretician by tracing many of his salient aesthetic ideas 
back to Hegel, Novalis, and Schelling as his primary sources of inspiration.   
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subjectivity. Thus, it is only in his mature poetry and essays written in 1920s and 30s that Ivanov,
according to Bird, overcomes Romanticism when “art [in Ivanov's worldview] assumes a 
subordinate role in a human cosmos as the source of ethical and existential knowledge for the 
individual and nation” (13). 
The task of the present section, however, is to approach “Ivanov's central intellectual 
[Romantic] challenge,” which was “literally to gain a foothold in reality outside of the artist” 
(Ibid.), by examining his attempts to create an objective tragedy as a way of surmounting 
Romanticism. Therefore, only Ivanov's work produced over the years before his emigration from 
Russia to Italy will be considered below. For all the wide-ranging scope of his research, Bird 
pays only a passing attention to Ivanov's ambitious theatrical project, choosing instead to focus 
on his poetic and essayist legacy to trace the vicissitudes of the Russian Symbolist's continuous 
struggle against Romanticism. Yet, it is in Ivanov's effort to resuscitate tragedy as an objective 
genre that the Russian Symbolist saw the most effective way out of the impasse of solipsistic 
Romantic subjectivity. According to Ivanov's messianic vision, it was tragedy in the glory of its 
restored religious objectivity which was to pave the way for the final reconciliation of the 
excesses of aesthetic Romantic subjectivity (personified by the tragic hero) with the collective 
element (the chorus) in the ideal of sobornost', a religious community of people based on a 
spiritual unity of freedom and love. In other words, tragedy was to clear the path for and 
eventually dissolve into the living mystery play (“misteriia”) that would signify the fulfillment of
historical time and the transfiguration of mankind into Solov'evian Divine Humanity.   
Nevertheless, despite his best efforts neither in his theory devoted to the tragic nor in 
theatrical practice proper does Ivanov succeed in unifying the oppositions and thereby breaking 
out of the vicious circle of Romantic subjectivity into the realm of religious objectivity that 
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would subsume radical aestheticism. In his conceptualization of the tragic Ivanov is reliant on the
Romantic understanding of the tragic as the dialectical, seeking, like the Idealist Hegel, to 
subsume all the warring oppositions in the definitive all-reconciling synthesis (the Absolute), 
thereby bringing the tragic unfolding of human history to its cosmic fulfillment in the grand 
mystery play. Similar to the early Romantics, however, the Russian Symbolist is confronted with 
the quintessential openness of dialectics that resists any attempt at the ultimate closure. 
Ivanov's struggle with bringing about that closure is most apparent in his attempt to 
construct a synthetic history of tragedy in the ancient world which, in his theurgic vision, 
foreshadows the future teleological progression of humankind towards Godmanhood/Sonhood in 
the Christian one. To ensure the theurgic finale, Ivanov manufactures the synthetic image of 
Dionysus, made up of the Orphic divinity and the folk deity, which is offered by him as a 
harbinger of the coming deity, Christ-Dionysus, who would incarnate the absolute synthesis of 
the human and the divine (Divine Humanity). This synthetic image of Dionysus, however, bursts 
at its seams, for the folk Dionysus, the ancient Greek god of tragedy, does not have the least 
notion of transcendence and therefore is at perpetual variance with Orphic Dionysus, whom 
Ivanov sees as a precursor of Christ and for that reason seeks to turn into the patron of tragedy 
against the grain of all historical evidence. In short, the tragic conceived as the dialectical proves 
antithetical to Ivanov's theurgic vision.
In his theatrical practice Ivanov does not succeed in creating an objective tragedy in 
accordance with his vision of the genre as an organic unity of subjectivity and objectivity which, 
in his view, was forfeited after the decline of the ancient Greek drama. Rather than (re)uniting the
excessive Romantic subjectivity personified as a tragic hero with the objective element 
represented as a unified collective (chorus), Ivanov's tragedy elevates the solipsistic subject that 
288
manifests itself in both tragedies, Tantalus (Tantal, 1905) and Prometheus (Prometei, 1919), not 
only as a tragic hero but also, and more importantly, as the controlling authorial consciousness 
that stands behind all dramatis personae, its masks. This authorial (lyrical) consciousness 
suffuses all levels of the tragic action, stripping it of objectivity and turning it into an allegorical 
pageant of the author's pet ideas. Thus, in place of the objective tragic theater, Ivanov offers a 
Symbolist variant of the Romantic theater of the mind, in which none of the characters has an 
independent (“objective”) existence, being solely a vehicle for conveying the author's variegated 
psychological states. In Ivanov's tragedies, as in Romantic lyrical dramas, the single voice 
supplants the whole of reality. 
Against Romanticism: 
Ivanov's Call for the Resurrection of Tragedy as an Objective Genre 
Ivanov is one of the first among the younger Symbolists to posit the revival of tragedy as 
an “objective genre” (“ob'ektivnyi zhanr”), that is of tragedy as a religious ritual that integrates 
an individual and community, as a way to surmount Romanticism. In his 1906 essay 
“Premonitions and Forebodings. The New Organic Epoch and the Theater of the Future” 
(“Predchuvstviia i predvestiia. Novaia organicheskaia epokha i teatr budushchego”), Ivanov 
poses the vital question for the Symbolist movement: “Shall one view in contemporary 
Symbolism the return to the Romantic schism between dream and life? Or shall one hear in it a 
prophetic message about new life and its dream only precedes actuality? […] Is the soul of 
contemporary Symbolism Romantic or prophetic?”355 (SS, 2: 86). For Ivanov, there is no third 
way possible for the Symbolists, for it is only in Romanticism and “prophetic art” 
355 “Видеть ли в современном символизме возврат к романтическому расколу между мечтой и жизнью? Или 
слышна в нем пророческая весть о новой жизни, и мечта его только упреждает действительность? […] 
Романтична или пророчественна душа современного символизма?” 
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(“prorochestvovanie”) that art transcends the narrow confines of human culture by striving to 
become a means of life-creation. Thus, either the Symbolists will follow the prophetic path that 
leads to the fulfillment of Godmanhood or they will revert to the Romantic path that culminates, 
as shown by the failure of their predecessors, in the impasse of irreconcilable antinomies. 
Ivanov refuses to recognize the prophetic path as a mystical offshoot of the Romantic one,
presenting the two as the absolute opposites of each other:  
Romanticism is a yearning for what cannot come true, prophecy—for what has not come 
true yet. Romanticism is a sunset, prophecy is a sunrise. Romanticism is odium fati, 
prophecy is amor fati. Romanticism is at odds with historical necessity while prophecy is 
in tragic union with it. The Romantic temperament is melancholic, prophetic temperament
is choleric. The impossible, irrational, miracle is a postulate for prophecy; for 
Romanticism, on the other hand, it is pium desiderium. “The golden age” is in the past 
(the Ancient Greeks' conception)—Romanticism; “the golden age” is in the future (the 
Messianic conception)—prophecy.356 (87)
The most crucial difference between the two, however, is their relation to history and tragedy. In 
contrast to the “prophetic art” tragically wedded to historical necessity, Romanticism, Ivanov 
argues, is fundamentally anti-historical and anti-tragic. 
Because of its orientation toward the past rather than the future, Romanticism is 
historically barren. It cannot produce any viable progeny, for it finds itself perpetually locked in a
fruitless strife with historical actuality, the closest in time in particular, as a result of its futile 
356 “Романтизм — тоска по несбыточному, пророчество — по несбывшемуся. Романтизм — заря вечерняя, 
пророчество — утренняя. Романтизм — odium fati; пророчество — amor fati. Романтизм в споре, 
пророчество в трагическом союзе с исторической необходимостью. Темперамент романтизма 
меланхолический, пророчества — холерический. Невозможное, иррациональное, чудо — для пророчества
постулат, для романтизма — pium desiderium. ''Золотой век'' в прошлом (концепция греков) — романтизм; 
''золотой век'' в будущем (концепция мессианизма) — пророчество.” 
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pining away for the idealized past. In other words, Romanticism forfeits both the present and the 
future for the sake of the petrified past that cannot be resurrected. Furthermore, despite 
Romanticism's relentless battle with the historical present for the sake of the Absolute, this 
struggle against actuality is not tragic: “The Romantic remembers too well that his unattainable 
[ideal] is unattainable; his ideal is lacking in thrust and resistance indispensable to the tragic 
struggle”357 (88). Inhabiting the world of dreams and illusions (“simulacra inania”), the Romantic
is devoid of the prophetic vision of the transfigured earthly life awaiting man in the future and 
therefore has no real-life stakes in his half-hearted fight against the force of history. It is precisely
because genuine “tragism” is innately alien to the very essence of Romanticism that the 
Romantics are so fond of the external trappings associated with tragedy such as “tragic splendor”
and “the outward chaos of passions” (Ibid.).
The prophetic art, on the other hand, in Ivanov's conception, is entirely future-oriented 
and while it is also engaged in a relentless battle against the historical actuality of the present, its 
fight against historical necessity is tragic and therefore pregnant with potential for the fulfillment 
of the ideal. Unlike Romanticism that has just “one soul” despite its pretenses to the opposite, 
prophetic art is tragically split. It has “two souls” at war with each other: the one which is 
grounded in the inertia of the present and defying the call of the future and the other which has 
answered that call and “violently pulls” in the direction of the future. This inner division within 
the soul of a prophetic artist between the historical present (powerlessness of manhood) and the 
future ideal (the glory of Godmanhood) is genuinely tragic and it is for this reason that the 
prophetic artist not infrequently shies away from awakening “the slumbering storms of the 
357 “Романтик слишком хорошо помнит, что его несбыточное — несбыточно; в его идеале нет упора и 
сопротивления, необходимых для борьбы трагической.” 
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stirring chaos” (Ibid.). Thus, while a Romantic artist amuses himself with tragedy by trifling with
its outward “splendor,” a prophetic artist takes tragedy seriously, for his life itself is inherently 
tragic.   
While aspiring to become a prophetic (theurgic) art, the Symbolist movement, however, 
comes too close to its opposite pole, Romanticism, and finds itself at risk of taking the wrong, 
dead-end, path. In the 1910 essay, “The Testaments of Symbolism” (“Zavety simvolizma”) 
Ivanov acknowledges this dangerous convergence between the two movements while examining 
the development of Symbolism by adopting the Hegelian dialectical method. According to this 
triadic scheme, Symbolism has completed its optimistic stage (thesis) and has now entered into 
its negative period of development (antithesis). This antithetical stage is informed by the ironic 
spirit of Romanticism feeding off the unreconciled and irreconcilable dualities. “The slowdown” 
(“zamedlenie”) in this treacherous stage is perilous for Symbolism, since it is tantamount to the 
repudiation of the Solov'evian theurgic ideal of All-in-Oneness: 
 All slowdown in “[the stage of] the antithesis” was tantamount for art to repudiating the 
theurgic ideal and affirming the Romantic element. The reminiscence about the former 
radiant visions must have taken hold in the soul only as a reminiscence, thereby losing the
vitality of real presence,—to cradle the ailing soul with the dreamy songs about the 
distant and the unattainable; the contradiction between dream and reality will generate 
Romantic irony.358 (599)
Thus, Symbolism should do its utmost to transcend the antithesis or, in other words, its negative 
358 “Всякое замедление в ''антитезе'' равнялось для художественного творчества, отказу от теургического 
идеала и утверждению начала романтического. Воспоминание о прежних лучезарных видениях должно 
было укрепиться в душе только как воспоминание, утрачивая живость реального присутствия, — баюкать
больную душу мечтательными напевами о далеком и несбыточном; противоречие же грезы и 
действительности — взростит романтический юмор.” 
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“other,” Romanticism, and reach the culminating stage of synthesis, which, in Ivanov's vision, 
would signify the victory of “the inner canon” over Romantic irony within the artist's soul and 
the triumph of “the Grand Style” over Romantic lyricism within the sphere of art:    
In terms of aesthetics, the relation of free subordination [the “inner canon” within the 
artist's soul] stands for “the grand style.” The generic, hereditary forms of “the grand 
style” in poetry are epic, tragedy, and the mystery play: three forms of one tragic essence. 
If the Symbolist tragedy proves possible, it would mean that the “antithesis” is 
surmounted.359 (602)
In this light, Symbolism can overcome the pernicious antinomies of Romanticism that generate 
uncontrollable nihilistic irony only by restoring tragedy as an “objective” genre. 
Tragedy is deprived of its own—“objective”—essence in Romanticism as a consequence 
of the triumph of unbridled subjectivism. For Ivanov, as later for George Steiner, it is excessive 
lyricism (a poetic manifestation of extreme subjectivism) introduced and nourished by 
Romanticism that brings about the ultimate extinction of “objective” drama, thus setting off a 
severe crisis in modern theater:
Such a substitution of the heroic action with the hypostasis of the lyrical feeling 
expressive of suffering [inaugurated in Romantic and later taken to extremes by 
Modernist drama] results in the dissolution of the choral, communal [sobornyi] or social 
element of the drama. […] This crisis of the chorus is a crisis of the communal [sobornyi] 
element in the theater and of the theater as a whole.360 (209) 
359 “В терминах эстетики, связь свободного соподчинения [''the inner canon'' within the artist's soul] значит: 
''большой стиль.'' Родовые, наследственные формы ''большого стиля'' в поэзии — эпопея, трагедия, 
мистерия: три формы одной трагической сущности. Если символическая трагедия оказалась возможной, 
это будет значить, что ''антитеза'' преодолена.”  
360 “Такая подмена героического действия ипостазированием страдательно-лирического переживания ведет 
за собою исчезновение и хорового, соборного или общественного элемента драмы […] Этот кризис хора 
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Instead of religious sobornost' (the unity of one and all) established and cultivated through 
communal rites in the high (“objective”) tragedy in Ancient Greece and to a certain, diminished, 
extent in Shakespearean theater, the subjective Romantic and later Modernist drama aestheticizes
ephemeral and protean lyrical moods of a single individual—the author: 
Objective drama gives way to subjective; its [subjective drama's] personae become its 
creator's masks; its subject matter is his personality, his spiritual destiny. He believes (like
L[eonid] Andreev) that he shows to us the images of life and death, of the world and fate 
but in reality he only tells us about his attitude toward these images within himself, about 
the contradictions within his own I, about himself and not about all.361 (217) 
Thus, the isolated subject (modern artist) seeking to impose its own individualistic aesthetic 
vision upon a countless number of other alienated individuals (modern audience) supplants the 
authentic community of individuals made cohesive through shared religious rituals. As a result, 
rather than spiritually uniting disparate individuals in a collective ritual action, modern 
(“Romantic”) drama commits violence upon those individuals by forcing them to accept a limited
(“aesthetic”) worldview lacking all genuine (“religious”) universality: “The theater degenerates 
into a means of enslaving souls”362 (218).
 To regain its liberating potential subverted by Romanticism, the theater must become 
“objective” again. “Objectivity” is interpreted by Ivanov in terms of relations 1) between the 
author and the events depicted on the stage and 2) between an individual member of the audience
and the events played out on the stage: “It [the stage event] was objective in two senses; as an 
есть кризис соборного начала в театре и театра вообще.”
361 “Объективная драма уступает место субъективной; ее личины становятся масками ее творца; ее 
предметом служит его личность, его душевная судьба. Он думает (как Л. Андреев), что являет нам лики 
жизни и смерти, мира и рока, но в действительности говорит нам о своем отношении к этим ликам в нем 
самом, о противоречиях своего я, о себе, не о всех.”  
362 “В средство порабощения душ извращается театр.” 
294
object of communal contemplation and as a product of the creative process that considers life as 
an object of its representation,—[a product] of objective art”363 (217). Thus, in the “objective” 
theater the author does not exteriorize the contents of his individual (“lyrical”) consciousness as 
it happens in the “subjective” drama but displays the events that happen outside his circle of 
consciousness in the world existing apart from it. In other words, rather than focusing on 
expressing the inward transient feelings occasioned by the external events, an “objective” 
tragedian gives a mimetic depiction of the external, heroic actions. Furthermore, in the 
performance or, rather, in the ritual enactment of “objective” tragedy the stage serves as the locus
upon which “the threads” of individual consciousnesses are concentrated and in the process 
become harmoniously united in collective contemplation, as opposed to the dispersive effect of 
the “subjective” theater in which the stage event affects each individual consciousness violently 
and separately. This brand of “objectivity” forfeited in the Romantic theater was most fully 
incarnated in the Ancient Greek tragedy and medieval mysteries: “The divine and heroic tragedy, 
similar to the Ancient Greek tragedy, and a mystery play, more or less analogous to the medieval 
one, correspond above all to the sought-for forms of the synthetic action”364 (100).  
Symbolism must restore objectivity to the theater by reviving tragedy as a communal 
religious ritual. The Symbolist theater can rise fully to the occasion of tragedy only if it succeeds 
in bringing back the communal element prominent in the Ancient Greek drama and medieval 
mysteries and lost in the “subjective” theater of Romanticism. This communal essence of tragedy
resides in the vital presence of the chorus which was either eliminated by Romantic playwrights 
363 “Оно [the stage event] было объективным в двух смыслах: как объект общего созерцательного 
устремления и как результат творчества, полагающего жизнь объектом своей изобразительной 
деятельности, — творчества объективного.”   
364 “Божественная и героическая трагедия, подобная трагедии античной, и мистерия, более или менее 
аналогичная средневековой, прежде всего ответствует предполагаемым формам синтетического действа.”
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or reduced to a subsidiary, purely aesthetic, vehicle of conveying the author's moods, visions, and
aspirations. The distorted relations between the hero and the chorus in which the tragic hero first 
overshadows and then supplants the chorus should be set aright by restoring to the chorus its 
primary, religious, role that it used to perform when tragedy was more than just an aesthetic 
genre among others.  
For Ivanov, the equal presence of and the interaction between these two consciousnesses, 
the individual consciousness of the tragic hero and the collective consciousness of the chorus, are
indispensable to the very existence of tragedy as an “objective” genre (that is, tragedy as a 
communal religious ritual). For it is the complex dynamics between the hero and the chorus that 
ultimately defines the unfolding and resolution of the tragic action: “Thus, the basis of the tragic 
action, in its most general and constant features, is already predetermined by the very opposition 
of the acting individual as a bearer of the transformative [deistvennoi] form to the free united 
multitude as an element to be transformed”365 (207). The tragic hero represents the transfigurative
force of change, an irrepressible impulse towards action, while the chorus stands for “the united 
human multitude,” a collective embodiment of the stability of the cosmic order, which is to be 
transformed through this individuated active force: 
In order for the transformation of the living and free element [the united human 
multitude] to be possible, it is necessary that the impulse toward transformation arise 
within it of its own accord. The bearer of this impulse is an individual positioned in 
opposition to the multitude; the ancient name for this individual is “hero” and for the 
multitude is “chorus.” The heroic element in action consists in the energy of refashioning 
365 “Так основа трагического действа, в общих и постоянных чертах его, уже предопределена самим 
противопоставлением зачинательной личности, как носительницы действенной формы, свободному 
объединенному множеству, как стихии преобразуемой.”  
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and inward changing of the environment in a state of equilibrium by the acting 
individual.366 (205)
A conflicted interaction between the two opposing powers, a power of change (a sundered 
individual consciousness) and a power of stability (the unified collective), played out in tragedy 
as a ritual incarnates the progressive, if tragic, development of human history which would 
eventually culminate in a living mystery play of Godmanhood, a state of the integrated, non-
tragic, coexistence of the individual and the collective. 
However, while the two consciousnesses, individual and collective, are equally necessary 
to the existence of tragedy, it is “the truth” of the chorus, rather than that of the tragic hero that 
should soar triumphant at its finale: “The predominance of whose truth resolves the struggle of 
our sympathies through harmonious reconciliation? Undoubtedly, the predominance of the truth 
represented by the choral consciousness,—not the one, however, as it was at the beginning, but 
the one as it became upon the completion of the heroic action”367 (206). The hero's action 
reshapes the community but it is not his partial—“subjective”—truth which is recognized as 
supreme. It is subsumed under the universal— “objective”—truth of the transformed community 
represented by the chorus: “The last, decisive word in action belongs to the multitude as chorus. 
Dramatic art asserts its true nature not at the moment of the heroic initiative but at the moment of
the communal [sobornoe] unity,—not on the level of the individual but on the level of the 
community”368 (207). Thus, in tragedy as an “objective” genre it is the renewed collective 
366 “Дабы преобразование живой и свободной стихии [объединенное человеческое множество] стало 
возможным, необходимо, чтобы в ней самой самопроизвольно возник почин движения. Носительницею 
этого почина является личность в противопоставлении множеству; древнее имя личности — ''герой,'' 
множеству — ''хор.'' Героизм в действе есть энергия перестроения и внуреннего изменения пребывающей 
в устойчивом равновесии среды зачинательной личностью.”  
367 “Перевес чьей правды разрешает борьбу наших сочувствий гармоническим примирением? Несомненно, 
перевес правды хорового сознания, — но не того, каким оно было вначале, а того, каким оно стало по 
завершении героического подвига.” 
368 “Mножеству, как хору, и принадлежит в действе последнее, решающее слово. Искусство сценическое 
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element that finally reasserts its imperiled dominance and continuity over the disruptive truth of 
the isolated individual, as opposed to the “subjective” tragedy in which the severed individual 
consciousness defies and eventually displaces the communal truth. 
 The revival of tragedy as an “objective” genre would not be merely a victory of religion 
over aesthetics (the revival of the Ancient Greek model) but, more importantly, would have 
broader metaphysical repercussions. For the understanding of “objective” tragedy as a tragic 
conflict between the two types of truths, the individual and the collective, also serves as an 
ideological framework in Ivanov for conceptualizing the tension between Romanticism and 
Symbolism. In other words, Ivanov's notion of “objective” tragedy provides an optimistic 
(theurgic) scenario for the resolution of what is apprehended by the Russian Symbolist as a real-
life tragic conflict between the two antagonistic forces personified as Romanticism and 
Symbolism. The tragic conflict between Romanticism (the truth of individualism) and 
Symbolism aspiring towards theurgy (the truth of Godmanhood as a transfigured human 
collective) is envisioned as a particular, yet culminating, historical instantiation of the cosmic 
collision between the individual and collective truths. 
Thus, for Ivanov, the surmounting of Romanticism by Symbolism through the revival of 
tragedy as an “objective” genre does not involve a total annihilation of the Romantic spirit (the 
truth of individualism) as such. Rather, in the spirit of the Hegelian synthesis, Ivanov seeks to 
subsume what is viewed by him as an unbridled subjectivism of Romanticism in the synthetic 
truth of the Absolute (Godmanhood) which would signify the definitive reintegration of the 
subject (the alienated individual consciousness) with the object (the unified community). In this 
утверждает свою коренную природу не в момент героического почина, но в моменте соборного согласия,
— не в начале личном, но в начале общественном.” 
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light, the restoration of tragedy as an “objective” genre by Russian Symbolists would be nothing 
short of the theurgic cosmic moment marking the fullness of human history and paving the way 
for the triumph of the reestablished wholeness (Solov'evian All-in-Oneness) over the severed 
particular in the living mystery play of Godmanhood.   
“Squaring the Circle”: Ivanov's Philosophy of the Tragic
While Ivanov seeks to defeat the antithetical spirit of Romanticism by reviving tragedy as
an “objective” genre, his underlying philosophy of tragedy/the tragic betrays its heavy 
dependence on the Romantic tradition for its conceptualization. Even though there are 
undoubtedly significant divergences between Ivanov's vision of tragedy and that of the early 
Romantics, the core of Ivanov's theory of the tragic is deeply informed by its Romantic 
interpretations. This indebtedness to the Romantic ideas, particularly to their conception of the 
tragic as dialectical, challenges and undermines Ivanov's own synthetic efforts to establish 
totality in the form of the cosmic mystery play (“misteriia”). 
Like the early German Romantics, Ivanov is not so much interested in a poetics of 
tragedy as a genre proper (Aristotelian tradition) but rather in the tragic as a metaphysical 
principle that makes itself manifest in its unadulterated bloodcurdling purity in tragedy as a 
dramatic mode. In other words, similar to the early Romantics, tragedy, for Ivanov, is primarily 
situated at the crossroads of aesthetics (tragedy as a form of art) and metaphysics (the tragic as a 
metaphysical principle operative at the heart of the Universe), with metaphysics given 
precedence over poetics proper. Unlike the early Romantics, however, Ivanov seeks to extricate 
tragedy from the realm of poetics, its present day lowly domain to which it was reduced, by 
transposing it back into the sphere of religion (tragedy as a communal ritual bringing together an 
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individual and the collective) where it used to belong during the times of its origin and 
flourishing in the Ancient Greek culture. To state it otherwise, Ivanov makes a goal of healing the
primordial metaphysical wound—a seemingly irreparable ontological rupture between the 
infinite (life) and the finite (art as an expression of the essence of humanity)—exposed by the 
early German Romantics in their definitive divorce of the tragic (infinite life) from tragedy (finite
art). The reunion between the two, tragedy and the tragic, and therefore, between art and life, 
man and divine cosmos lies solely in the domain of religion, the universal triumph of which 
would signify, according to Ivanov, the long-awaited moment of the alienated mortal's return to 
the bosom of the collective and, ultimately, culminate in the establishment of life as an enactment
of the cosmic mystery play.  
Yet the difficulty encountered by Ivanov of conceptualizing mystery play in 
contradistinction to tragedy is already apparent on the lower, aesthetic (i.e., generic), level. In his 
article “Mystery play, Mythological Tragedy and the ''Genre Memory''” (“Misteriia, 
mifologicheskaia tragediia i ''pamiat' zhanra''”), Polonskii makes a convincing case that there was
no clear understanding not only in Ivanov's aesthetics but also among Russian Symbolists in 
general of what mystery play as a crowning synthetic genre is supposed to be like: 
“Mystery play” in Russia at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries is a product of the 
Dionysian confusion in the sphere of terminology. With all its pulsating and universally 
broad range of meanings, this concept often replaced the whole system of actual genres—
at the time of their mastering by modernist aesthetics.369 (276) 
Furthermore, this unsettling conceptual ambiguity surrounding the very notion of mystery play 
369 “''Мистерия'' в России рубежа XIX-XX веков — плод дионисических смешений в сфере терминологии. Со
всеми пульсирующими и универсально широкими вариантами своих значений это понятие зачастую 
замещало собой систематику конкретных жанров — при их освоении модернисткой эстетикой.” 
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leads not only to the occasional blurring of the vital boundaries between the two “objective” 
genres, mystery play and tragedy, but to the substitution of mystery play with the very genre—
lyrical drama—that represents in the eyes of Russian Symbolists themselves the essence of 
Romanticism, or, in other words, of the stage of antithesis, that Symbolism seeks to surmount. 
The genre of genres, the mystery play, which was supposed to be the incarnation of synthetic 
objectivity is supplanted by the genre which embodies the extremes of Romantic subjectivity that
mystery play was to subsume and thus to definitively overcome in the first place:
The vagueness of terminological meanings prompted by the “all-aesthetic imperative” 
[i.e., the regeneration of genre memory, a call to turn back to the original sources—to “the
liturgical service at the altar of the suffering god,” to the forgotten myth and to the 
abandoned cult] led to the fact that only tragedy possessed a set of relatively distinct 
features at the level of genre identification, and even then only in the work of those 
Symbolists who oriented themselves towards the archaic and classical Greek models 
(Viacheslav Ivanov in the first place—in light of his Dionysian interests). Much more 
often, however, mythopoetization propelled artists as different as Blok (The King on the 
Square, The Song of Destiny, and The Rose and the Cross) and Gumilev (Gondla), who 
were not directly interested in the archaic heritage and reinterpretation of the myths 
adopted by the traditional theater in the direction of “the lyrical dramas”—a generic form 
with a reduced potential for stage production and pronounced lyricism.370 (278-279) 
370 “Размытость терминологических значений при подобном ''общеэстетическом императиве'' [i.e., 
регенерации жанровой памяти, призыв обратиться к первоистокам — к ''литургическому служению у 
алтаря страдающего бога,'' к забытому мифу и оставленному культу] приводила к тому, что относительно 
четкой выявленностью на уровне жанровой идентификации обладала лишь трагедия, да и то в основном в
творчестве символистов, ориентированных на греческую архаику и классику (прежде всего Вяч. Иванова
— в силу его дионисических интересов.) […] Значительно чаще мифопоэтизация заставляла самых 
разных художников, от Блока (''Король на площади,'' ''Песня судьбы,'' ''Роза и Крест'') до Гумилева 
(''Гондла''), не нацеленных непосредственно на археологизм и обработку освоенных традиционным 
театром мифов, двигаться в сторону ''лирических драм'' — форм с ущемленной сценичностью и 
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This fundamental confusion of and convergence between mystery play and lyrical drama affects 
not only the theatrical practice of Blok, whose dramatic work can be viewed as the most 
representative, extreme, case of such a confluence, but also of Ivanov the playwright. While 
Polonskii argues that tragedy has more sharply delineated boundaries in Ivanov's work as an 
aesthetic genre in contrast to Blok, yet, as will be shown below, this is not necessarily the case. 
Unlike in theory, in practice Ivanov's tragedies often forfeit their generic specificity, most 
strikingly in Prometheus, whose “objective” tragic nature is continuously subverted and violated 
by pervasive authorial lyricism. 
  Moreover, while the specifics concerning mystery play as an absolute genre are sorely 
lacking, there is a general sense of unease among Russian Symbolists, including Ivanov, that 
mystery play and tragedy that precedes it on the ladder of the hierarchy of “objective” genres are 
actually contrary rather than complimentary in their aesthetico-metaphysical orientations. This 
fundamental difference between the two genres and, by extension, two metaphysical modes of 
being is grasped only hesitantly and to a large extent intuitively, and expressed most often in 
geometrical terms as an arch (a curve) versus a circle. Eikhenbaum, who at the beginning of his 
career as a literary critic was heavily influenced by Symbolist aesthetic theories, makes the 
following observation about the tangled relation between mystery play and tragedy: 
A new mystery play, towards which by all appearances modern theater is moving, must be
a development of tragedy. It must differentiate itself from tragedy by the fact that the line 
of the human soul does not only bend but also closes itself into a circle. The tragic curve 
wraps itself into a circle.371 (121)
выраженной лиричностью.” 
371 “Новая мистерия, к которой по-видимому, направляется современнный театр, должна быть развитием 
трагедии. От трагедии она должна отличаться тем, что в ней линия человеческой души не только 
сгибается, но и замыкается в кольцо. Трагическая кривая стягивается в круг.” 
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Like Ivanov and other Symbolists whose views inform his discussion of the relation between 
tragedy and mystery play, Eikhenbaum evades addressing the paramount question as to how a 
tragic curve, a metaphysical arch with its ends seemingly extending into infinity, would be 
brought to any sort of closure and transformed into a complete circle, a symbol of perfection.  
This underlying stark opposition between the two “objective” genres, tragedy and 
mystery play, is often deliberately concealed and smoothed over as it happens most 
conspicuously in Ivanov's aesthetics by their unproblematic presentation as successive, 
complimentary, steps on the ladder of the Grand Style leading up to the Absolute (the living 
mystery play of Godmanhood): 
The generic, hereditary forms of “the grand style” in poetry are epic, tragedy, and mystery
play: three forms of one tragic essence. […] Epic poetry is a negative affirmation of the 
individual through the renunciation of the individual and a positive affirmation of the 
communal [sobornoe] element; tragedy is a crowning of the individual and its triumph 
achieved by passing through the gates of death; mystery play is a victory over death, a 
positive affirmation of the individual, its resurrection.372 (SS, 2: 602)
The relation among these three objective genres is not apprehended in this case by Ivanov in 
accordance with Hegel's dialectical schema (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) which the Russian 
Symbolist adopts in his discussions of tragedy proper, but is rather conceived as three sequential 
and hierarchical manifestations of one tragic essence. These three generic emanations of one 
tragic essence allude instead to the Christian conception of the Holy Trinity where the Father, the 
372 “Родовые, наследственные формы ''большого стиля'' в поэзии — эпопея, трагедия, мистерия: три формы 
одной трагической сущности. […] эпопея — отрицательное утверждение личности, через отречение от 
личного, и положительное — соборного начала; трагедия — ее [личность] увенчание и торжество через 
прохождение вратами смерти; мистерия — победа над смертью, положительное утверждение личности, 
ее воскресение....”
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Son, and the Holy Spirit are featured as the coeternal hyspostases of one divine essence. Thus, 
the crucial aesthetico-metaphysical problem of transitioning between the two opposing 
“objective” genres/metaphysical modes of being—tragedy and mystery play—is veiled behind 
the central mystery of Christian faith. 
The antithetical nature between the two genres: tragedy and the genre of genres 
conceptualized in western aesthetics/metaphysics most often as divine comedy (Dante and 
Hegel) is, however, effectively exposed by contemporary literary criticism which does not have 
metaphysical stakes in obfuscating the radical difference between the two: 
And finally, a distinction, made by Harold Watts, between the comic and the tragic on the 
basis of the circular versus the linear: comedy promises a return to the familiar; tragedy is 
exigent—the choice opted for looks to the future, but in the dark; a leap into the unknown,
the unpredictable, the irrecoverable. (Michel 214) 
Unlike the closed off absolute genre, be it comedy or mystery play, that always features “a return 
to the familiar” which represents the triumphant restoration of the disturbed primordial unity (and
thus the completion of the cosmic circle), tragedy represents a leap into the cosmic darkness that 
knows no return to metaphysical home, no healing of the primordial wound. In his explication of 
the tragic form, Sewall stresses the fact that in opposition to the other traditional forms (comedy 
in the first place) marked by a powerful sense of closure, a point of rest, the tragic is 
fundamentally devoid of one: “Basic to the tragic form is its recognition of the inevitability of 
paradox, of unresolved tensions and ambiguities, of opposites in precarious balance. Like the 
arch, tragedy never rests—or never comes to rest, with all losses restored and sorrows ended. 
Problems are put and pressed, but not solved.” Even “an occasional ''happy ending,'' as in The 
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Oresteia or Crime and Punishment [a novel structured like tragedy373], does not mean a full 
resolution. Though there may be intermittences, there is no ultimate discharge in that war” (120). 
This conception of the tragic as an infinite arch that knows no rest and is in opposition to 
any genre (im)posed as absolute, closed-off, and perfectly circular such as the absolute system, 
(divine) comedy or mystery play goes back to the early German Romantics. The tragic is laid 
bare as the dialectical in its very essence and the tragic dialectics, like the dialectics of Romantic 
irony, is relentless. Indeed, some of the contemporary critics even claim that the speculative 
thought of Western philosophy or, in other words, the dialectics itself, arose from “a certain 
interpretation of tragedy” developed by the Romantics, starting with the early Schelling. In 
Lacoue-Labarthe's words:
Tragedy, or a certain interpretation of tragedy, itself reinterpreted or elaborated, making 
itself explicit as philosophical and desiring—above all—to be such is the origin or matrix 
of what, in the wake of Kant, is conventionally called speculative thought, that is to say, 
dialectical thought, or to take up Heideggerian terminology, onto-theo-logic in its final 
state. (“The Caesura of the Speculative” 57) 
This unveiling of the tragic as the dialectical itself by the early Romantics presents an 
irreducible challenge to the Idealist (speculative) thought seeking metaphysical closure, for in 
Szondi's articulation, the conceptual thought finds itself stalemated when it has to confront the 
open-ended dialectical nature of the tragic: 
Reaching the height of insight into the structure of the tragic, thought collapses, 
powerless. At the point where a philosophy, as a philosophy of the tragic, becomes more 
373 In Mochul'skii's words, “Crime and Punishment resuscitates the art of ancient tragedy in the form of a 
contemporary novel. Raskolnikov's story is a new embodiment of the myth of Prometheus' revolt and the tragic 
hero's destruction in the course of his struggle with fate” (Dostoevsky 312-313). 
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than the knowledge of the dialectic around which its fundamental concepts assemble, at 
the point where such a philosophy no longer determines its tragic outcome, it is no longer 
philosophy. It therefore appears that philosophy cannot grasp the tragic—or that there is 
no such thing as the tragic. (“An Essay on the Tragic” 49)
What Szondi actually reveals is that in its encounter with the tragic, speculative, Idealist, thought 
confronts its Other, its own open-ended dialectical essence that it refuses to recognize as its own. 
For unlike the early Romantics, the German Idealists seek a point of ultimate rest (“metaphysical 
home”) in the construction of the absolute system, a philosophical variation on the absolute 
literary genre of divine comedy. The dialectical, however, as long recognized by the early 
German Romantics, cannot be brought to a stop, and whenever a closure is forcefully imposed, 
the tragic reasserts itself by subverting the aspirations for the fulfillment of the Absolute. As put 
by Lacoue-Labarthe:
[The tragic] will have always represented the place where the system fails to circle back 
on itself, where the systematic does not quite succeed in its overlay of the historic, where 
the circularity (as Szondi says) modifies itself and becomes a spiral, while the closure can 
scarcely contain the divisive pressures to which, it has, perhaps, succumbed without 
anyone becoming aware of it. (“The Caesura of the Speculative” 72) 
The tragic, or the dialectical, has no return or relief and cannot be assuaged by the best efforts of 
philosophical speculative thought like Hegel's to bring it (back) to a place of repose.
 This impossibility of closing the tragic dialectics in theory was well grasped by 
Hölderlin, who compared the definitive unification of the subject and the object in the synthetic 
Absolute striven for by the Idealist philosophy starting with Fichte to the infinite enterprise of 
squaring the circle, a task fit only for an immortal: 
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I am trying to develop for myself the idea of an infinite progression of philosophy. I am 
trying to show that the relentless demand that must be made on every system, namely, the 
unification of subject and object in an absolute—in an ego or in whatever one wants to 
call it—is possible, albeit aesthetically, in intellectual intuition. It is possible theoretically 
only through an infinite approximation, as in the squaring of the circle. I am thus trying to
show that in order to realize a system of thought an immortality is necessary—every bit as
necessary as it is for a system of action. (qtd. in Krell, General Introduction 5)
This realization of the end of the Absolute, that is of any successful definitive resolution of the 
primordial separation between the subject (consciousness) and the object (nature), comes to 
Hölderlin together with the realization that consciousness is always and everywhere finite. In his 
1795 letter to Hegel, Hölderlin is one of the first to make a case as to why Fichte's idea of the 
absolute ego, or of any synthetic Absolute for that matter, is not viable: 
... a consciousness without an object, however, is unthinkable, and if I myself am this 
object, then I am necessarily limited, if only by my being in time, hence not absolute; thus
in the absolute ego no consciousness is thinkable; as absolute ego I possess no 
consciousness, and to the extent that I have no consciousness I am (for myself) nothing, 
so that the absolute ego is (for me) nothing. (Ibid.) 
As Krell further elaborates, finite consciousness, according to Hölderlin, “inevitably undergoes a 
radical separation from its most beloved objects. Judgment is by ordeal, and ordeal points to a 
primal division or sundering, Ur-Teilung, in being” (Tragic Absolute 4). This primordial wound, 
the primal split of Being into the subject and the object, cannot be healed conceptually as claimed
by Idealist thought. This tragedy of philosophy, its incapacity to stitch together what was 
rendered asunder, as attested to by a long succession of failed philosophical systems, is viewed 
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by Hölderlin, however, as a “good thing,” for “it is the first condition of all life and all 
organization—that in heaven and on earth no force rules monarchically. Absolute monarchy 
cancels itself out everywhere, for, it is without object; strictly speaking, there never was a 
monarchy. Everything that is interpenetrates as soon as it becomes active...” (qtd. in Krell, 
General Introduction 6). Separation is at the heart of what is known as finite life and ours, says 
Hölderlin, is the time of ''a frightful tragic muse''” (qtd. in Krell, The Tragic Absolute 4).
Following in the footsteps of his Romantic and Idealist predecessors, Ivanov also 
conceives of the tragic in his theory in dialectical terms. Unlike the Romantics and like the 
Idealists (Hegel, in particular), however, Ivanov believes in the remote possibility of the ultimate 
closure which would mark the onset of another mode of ontological being—Godmanhood—
embodied in the living mystery play. Ivanov's conception of tragedy as dialectics is most fully 
explicated in his major essay on tragedy “On the Essence of Tragedy” (“O sushchestve tragedii,” 
1912). Inspired by Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy (Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste 
der Musik, 1872), Ivanov approaches the problematics of the essence of tragedy in Apollonian- 
Dionysian terms adopted earlier by the German philosopher. Yet, unlike his German antecedent, 
Ivanov is not so much interested in the complex dynamics between the two conflicting forces that
define for Nietzsche the genre of tragedy as in the dialectical nature of the Dionysian itself: “By 
its nature, origin, and name, tragedy is a Dionysian art”374 (SS, 2: 237). Moreover, in contrast to 
Nietzsche who viewed the Dionysian drive as an aesthetico-metaphysical force and tragedy as a 
purely aesthetic phenomenon, Ivanov came to think of the Dionysian as a religio-metaphysical 
force and tragedy as a primarily religious phenomenon. According to the Russian Symbolist, it 
became his foremost goal “to overcome Nietzsche in the sphere of problematics concerning 
374 “Трагедия же, по своей природе, происхождению и имени, есть искусство Дионисово.”
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religious consciousness”375 (SS, 2: 21). Thus, in Ivanov's conception, the Apollonian which is 
identified with the aesthetic force (that is, the sphere of art proper) has a minimal role in the 
emergence and development of tragedy conceived as a communal religious rite. 
Further, contrary to Nietzsche, Ivanov views the two forces as simultaneously ontological 
(macrocosm) and psychological (microcosm) drives. The Apollonian is conceived by the Russian
Symbolist as representing the psycho-ontological element of unity (“nachalo edinstva”) while the
Dionysian stands for the force of dispersal and plurality (“nachalo mnozhestvennosti”) operating 
in both an individual's psyche and the entire universe. The psychological not infrequently takes 
primacy over the metaphysical in Ivanov's religious treatment of tragedy, due to the Russian 
Symbolist's persistent efforts to break the boundary between the two realms (man and the world).
The transformation of the whole macrocosm (the Universe), for Ivanov, will happen no sooner 
than the transfiguration of the microcosm (man's psyche). Therefore, the metaphysical forces, the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian, always appear in Ivanov's account of ecstatic experiences under 
the guise of the psychic drives. 
Moreover, diverging even more dramatically from Nietzsche's aesthetic conception of the 
Apollonian-Dionysian interrelation, Ivanov sexualizes the two psycho-metaphysical elements by 
identifying each with the opposing biological sex. The Apollonian force of unity is associated 
with the masculine element while the Dionysian force of rupture and scattering is equated with 
the feminine one: “The Dionysian dyad is opposed to the Apollonian monad the same way as the 
feminine element is opposed to the masculine”376 (SS, 2: 191). In this sexualization of the two 
psycho-cosmic drives, Ivanov is undoubtedly inspired by Solov'ev's Sophiology. Viewed in this 
375  “преодолеть Ницше в сфере вопросов религиозного сознания”
376 “Монаде Аполлона противостоит дионисийская диада, — как мужескому началу противостоит начало 
женское.”  
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context, it becomes apparent that Ivanov's conception of the tragic implicitly links Nietzsche's 
Dionysian drive with the divided Solov'evian feminine essence of the Universe, the fallen World 
Soul, whose ultimate fate is contested between spirit (infinite) and matter (finite). It is only the 
ultimate reintegration of the two antagonistic elements that could bring the seemingly relentless 
cosmic dialectics to a successful closure and humankind to its ultimate fulfillment as Divine 
Humanity which would herald the realization of the Absolute. 
In his attempt to close off the universal conflict between the antithetical forces at least in 
the remote future if not in the tragic present, Ivanov, like Solov'ev earlier, turns to Hegel, the only
Idealist philosopher, who seemed to have succeeded, at least conceptually, in bringing the 
dialectical movement of the self-divided Spirit to an end in a synthetic Absolute. According to 
Ivanov, “Such art [art whose content and task is to reveal the Dionysian dyad] must be internally 
dialectical. It will depict passions and events, the relations among which will form a dialectical 
chain”377 (192). The dialectical movement of the opposing elements within the genre of tragedy 
(aesthetics) is only a reflection or rather a projection of the dialectical movement of the 
conflicting forces (existence) within the Universe towards a successful resolution. 
For Ivanov, the dialectical art of tragedy is destined to break into and converge with the 
realm of life: “The task of the art of the dyad is to show us the thesis and the antithesis as 
embodied; we will see what Hegel called ''the becoming'' (Werden) unfolding before our very 
eyes; art will become the staging of life”378 (Ibid.). This relentless dialectical movement of the 
warring oppositions embodied as the conflicted humanity itself has only two possible cosmic 
377 “Такое искусство [искусство, содержание и задание которого составляет раскрытие дионисийской диады] 
должно быть внутренне-диалектическим. Оно будет изображать страсти и события, связь коих образует 
диалектическую цепь.”
378 “Целью искусства диады будет показать нам тезу и антитезу в воплощении; перед нашими глазами 
развернется то, что Гегель назвал ''становлением'' (Werden); искусство станет лицедействием жизни.” 
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outcomes or resolutions—a successful reintegration of two antithetical elements within a new 
universal whole or a catastrophic collision between the two followed by inevitable destruction: 
The resolution of the depicted process must consist in “canceling” or abolishing the dyad. 
Since the dyad will be represented in art by living forces, [or, in other words,] incarnated 
in individuals... they must transform themselves, become essentially different from what 
they used to be, or perish.379 (Ibid.) 
The first and more desirable resolution entails a dramatic change in human nature itself through 
its transformation into Divine Humanity which would mark the transition towards a new 
metaphysical mode of being—the living mystery play. Ivanov, however, bypasses the discussion 
as to how this quantum leap from humanity to Divine Humanity could possibly occur and 
focuses, instead, on the catastrophe that erupts as a result of the collision between the 
unreconciled forces of the former split whole. 
Thus, unlike Hegel who offers at least a contentious conceptual solution to the seemingly 
endless tragic dialectics of the self-divided Spirit, Ivanov finds himself unable to offer even a 
tentative theoretical vision of the aesthetico-metaphysical bridge between tragedy and mystery 
play beyond positing its potential existence. Until its theoretical/practical construction, however, 
the only partial resolution (a temporary discharge) of the tragic dialectics, according to Ivanov, 
lies in catastrophe. As the Russian Symbolist himself concedes, while mystery play would 
emblematize the emergence of Solov'evian Divine Humanity, the definitive synthesis of the 
human and the divine, tragedy is fundamentally human: “Tragic art is human art par excellence... 
the borderline on which a human being is positioned in the universe is tragic; man alone is fated 
379 “Разрешение изображаемого процесса должно заключаться в ''снятии,'' или упразднении, диады. 
Поскольку последняя будет представлена в искусстве живыми силами, воплощена в личностях... им 
надлежит совлечься себя самих, стать по существу иными, чем прежде, — или погибнуть.”  
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to experience an inner struggle”380 (193). 
By equating the tragic with the human, Ivanov seems to embrace the quintessential 
Romantic thought advanced by Hölderlin and Schelling that the tragic is the human and the 
human is the tragic. Or, rather, to put it more precisely, while the tragic is of a metaphysical 
nature, a result of the primordial sundering of Being, it exists exclusively for the finite human 
consciousness (Kantian subject) which is painfully aware of its severance from the divine, 
identified by the early German Romantics with the eternal realm of Nature (Kantian object). In 
the wake of that cataclysmic ontological split, the perfect circle of Being (the fullness of the 
primordial wholeness) gets shattered and the finite life that emerges is radically decentered and 
dispersed. In Hölderlin's words, “We all [as finite human beings] run along an excentric orbit” 
(qtd. in Krell, The Tragic Absolute 20). The excentricity of that orbit, as clarified by Krell, “does 
not enable humanity to turn smoothly about the sun of ideal beauty; the journey is also about 
being lost, torn from nature by striving and strife […]. We are tossed between mastery and 
servility; we are everything and nothing. And such striving, rather than ending in infinite 
unification, seems to go on and on” (20-21). The tragic divide, out of which the finite 
consciousness arises and on which it is ontologically positioned, precludes the very possibility of 
its ultimate erasure, thereby turning human life into a life of infinite approximation—into “a life 
lived asymptotically” (21). Thus, the tragic conflict between the finite and the infinite destined to 
be lived by human consciousness can never be resolved, for it is the very essence of human 
consciousness as such. As put by Hölderlin:
Whether we know it or not, the goal of all our striving is to put an end to that eternal 
380 “Искусство трагическое есть человеческое искусство по преимуществу... черта, на коей поставлен он в 
мироздании, есть трагическая грань; ему одному досталась в удел внуренняя борьба.”  
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conflict between our self and the world, to restore the ultimate peace, which is higher than
all reason, so that we can unite with nature in one infinite whole.
Yet neither our knowing nor our acting, in any period of our existence, takes us to the 
point where all conflict ceases, where all is one: the determinate line unites with the 
indeterminate line only in infinite approximation. (Ibid.)
With the harmonious reunification between the severed opposites, the finite and the 
infinite, being impossible, any attempt to bring about the union between the two disparate realms,
either on the part of humanity or on the part of divinity, can result only in catastrophe—tragic 
dissolution. The only type of unification which is possible between a mortal (the finite) and a god
(the infinite) is a tragic unification that takes place only in and as death. This is the insight which 
is pursued by the late Hölderlin who in his “Notes” to Sophocles' Antigone, declares that the god 
who appears on the scene comes exclusively and inevitably “in the figure of death,” in der 
Gestalt des Todes. Further, in one of the late fragments on tragedy, which may have been 
intended for an introduction to his translations of Sophocles' tragedies, Hölderlin writes that the 
point of encounter (that is, the point of tragic unification) between “the original” (nature) and 
“the sign” (the tragic hero) always equals zero: 
The significance of tragedies can be understood most easily by way of paradox. Since all 
potential is divided justly and equally, everything that is original appears not in its 
original strength, but rather, properly, in its weakness. Hence, appearance and the light of 
life quite properly belong to the weakness of every whole. Now in the tragic, the sign 
itself is insignificant, without effect, but the original is openly revealed. Properly 
speaking, the original can appear only in its weakness; but insofar as the sign in itself is 
posited as insignificant = 0, the original, the hidden ground of every nature, can also 
313
present itself. If nature properly presents itself in its weakest talent, then, when it shows 
itself in its strongest talent, the sign = 0. (qtd. in Szondi, “An Essay on the Tragic” 11)
In the finite world of appearances the infinite nature (“the original”) cannot manifest itself other 
than through the mediation of the sign which in tragedy takes the shape of the tragic hero. In its 
confrontation with the realm of finitude, the infinite must necessarily inhibit and limit itself and 
thus appear in its weakness, or as Krell translates it, “in its debility.” Paradoxically, Nature can 
manifest its might in the world of the finite only by turning weak, by becoming subject to the 
ticking of the earthly clock, by undergoing the passions of mortality itself. This point becomes 
clear in Hölderlin's discussion of Zeus' appearance to Danae, his earthly beloved, as a golden 
shower. Drawn by sexual desire in a fatal commingling with mortality, Zeus, “The Father of 
Time,” finds himself bound to the law of temporal succession, experiencing the passage of time 
as pain and suffering. It is the mortal Danae who, according to Hölderlin, teaches the immortal 
Zeus submerged into the foreign medium of time to count the hours: “She counted off for the 
Father of Time / The strokes of the hours, the golden” (Krell, The Tragic Absolute 9). Thus, by 
abnegating its infinity in that fleeting encounter with a mortal, Nature brings itself to the furthest 
point of alienation from its divine essence (eternity) and turns into the (dis)embodiment of 
temporality, death itself, or, in other words, zero. 
In its collision with Nature, “the sign” is inevitably destroyed by it, reduced by death to 
zero. Thus, the tragic hero is “insignificant” and “without effect.” He cannot withstand the power 
of the divine even in its diminished capacity and is destined to be annihilated in the fatal 
encounter (tragic unification). According to Szondi's interpretation of Hölderlin's passage, the 
tragic hero's demise, his reduction to zero, is indispensable to Nature, for it is only in and through
the tragic hero's death (tragic dissolution) that Nature can appear on the scene as a conqueror “in 
314
its strongest talent,” thereby allowing “the original [to be] openly revealed”: “Tragedy [is 
apprehended by Hölderlin] as a sacrifice that man offers to nature in order to help it achieve an 
adequate appearance. The tragic in man consists in the fact that he can render this service, which 
lends his being significance, only in death, when he is posited as a sign that is “in itself 
insignificant = 0” (12). Szondi, however, who traces the origin of the tragic back to the early 
Schelling' account of the tragic hero's defiant fight against necessity that culminates in the 
triumph of human freedom over the world of necessity, gives too positive a spin to Hölderlin's 
vision of the tragic. Rather than appearing in all its glory, as interpreted by Szondi, Nature (the 
divine) in the late Hölderlin appears to and consequently through the tragic hero in all its 
horrifying monstrosity—as the figure of death.  
Thus, the unification between the tragic hero and Nature can fulfill itself only as das 
Ungeheuer (“the monstrous”). Hölderlin's final definition of the tragic equates it with the 
monstrous: “The presentation of the tragic rests principally on the notion that the monstrous, the 
way in which the god and the human being mate, in which the natural force and the most inner 
part of man become one, boundless, in rage, is understood through the purification, by a limitless 
scission, of the boundless act of becoming one” (qtd. in Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Caesura of the 
Speculative” 80). The mating between the god and the human can take place only in the brief 
moment of the tragic hero's demise (death or insanity) that sees the disintegration of his identity. 
The dream of the absolute unity, in Hölderlin's tragic vision, turns out to be nothing else but the 
experience of the absolute separation (alienation and ultimate dissolution). Or, rather, to be more 
faithful to Hölderlin's paradoxical insight, in the fusion of the human with the divine the absolute 
union (“boundless act of becoming one”) and the absolute separation (“a limitless scission”) are 
indissolubly one. The two disparate elements (the mortal and the immortal) can be united only in 
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a monstrous way at a point where their irreparable separateness is both reinforced to infinity and 
reduced to zero—the moment of dissolution (death). The tragic dialectics, the dialectics of death, 
can never be closed off. 
Unlike the late Hölderlin,381 however, who views the only possible form of union between
the mortal and the immortal as purely tragic or, in other words, “monstrous,” Ivanov insists on 
differentiating between the two types of fusion, “right” and “wrong,” that may occur in, what the 
Russian Symbolist calls, a state of ecstasy when the human and the divine commingle in the 
tightest embrace possible. Depending on the form of “divine madness” that a state of ecstasy 
takes, the union with god, according to Ivanov, will prove either cathartic or destructive to a 
human being. For Ivanov, what Hölderlin conceives of as das Ungeheuer is a result of the 
purifying process of divine madness gone astray, in which the Dionysian violently assaults and 
tears apart the psyche of an individual defiantly entrenched in his earthly particularity. To this 
“wrong” type of fusion in which an isolated individual is mentally crushed (bad insanity) and/or 
physically annihilated (death) by the rage of the divine force, Ivanov seeks to oppose the “right” 
kind of madness that raises man to the level of the divine by uniting the two disparate elements in
harmony (Godmanhood). Yet, the second, “right,” type of divine madness, appears to be possible 
only upon the (re)establishment of the cosmic mystery play that would allow the collective union
with the godly. Until then, it is the first type of madness, akin to Hölderlin's horrific Ungeheuer, 
that seems to be the destiny of all men who dare to wrestle with the divine.
 For the most part, Ivanov examines a psychological state of ecstasy, which he considers 
381 The intellectual relation between Ivanov's work and Hölderlin's poetic and theoretical legacy is still largely 
unclarified. To this day very little research has been done as to the extent of Ivanov's engagement with 
Hölderlin's ideas on Dionysus, the Ancient Greek deity's relation to Christ, tragedy and beyond. While Ivanov's 
contemporaries and later literary scholars occasionally commented on certain conspicuous similarities between 
the two poets-cum-thinkers, Ivanov's own reticence regarding Hölderlin's theoretical and poetic heritage, given 
his profound knowledge of German Romantic culture, appears rather puzzling. 
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defining of all religious experience regardless of the creed, in his historico-philological inquiries 
dealing with the Dionysian cult and its relation to the origins of the Ancient Greek tragedy: The 
Hellenic Religion of the Suffering God (Ellinskaia religiia stradaiushchego boga, 1904), The 
Religion of Dionysus (Religiia Dionisa, 1905),382 and Dionysus and the pra-Dionysian (Dionis i 
pradionisiistvo, 1923). While these works were undoubtedly conceived by their author as 
unbiased scholarly inquiries into the worship of Dionysus and its psychology, they are, 
nevertheless, deeply influenced by Ivanov's own spiritual beliefs and philosophical predilections: 
Apart from academic training evident in Ivanov's works [The Hellenic Religion of the 
Suffering God/The Religion of Dionysus (1904-1905) and Dionysus and Early 
Dionysianism (1923)], one can trace two other palpable influences: German 
Romanticism and Russian religious thought. For example, Ivanov, like Erwin Rohde, 
finds himself under the strong influence of Schopenhauer and early Nietzsche. 
Furthermore, Ivanov's theistic position is simultaneously aligned with the Romantic poets 
(Novalis, in the first place), with German philosophers (in our view, mostly Schelling) 
and with Russian religious thought (Solov'ev).383 (Westbrook, Viacheslav Ivanov 28) 
Moreover, as further shown by Westbrook in his analysis of the Russian Symbolist's 
academically oriented projects, Ivanov's approach towards the subject of his scholarly research 
(the god Dionysus), like that of Nietzsche earlier in The Birth of Tragedy, is highly controversial 
382 The Hellenic Religion of the Suffering God and The Religion of Dionysus were originally conceived by Ivanov as 
a series of lectures which he delivered to the Russian community in Paris in 1903. The lectures were later 
published in Russia in two installments as The Hellenic Religion of the Suffering God in The New Path (Novyi 
put') in 1904 and The Religion of Dionysus in The Questions of Life (Voprosy zhizni) in 1905 after The New Path 
ceased to exist. 
383  “Помимо академического образования в работах Иванова [Эллинская религия страдающего бога/Религия 
Диониса (1904-1905) и Дионис и прадионисийство (1923)] сильно ощутимы два других явления: немецкий
романтизм и русская религиозная философия. Иванов, как например ранний Эрвин Роде, находится под 
сильным влиянием Шопенгауэра и раннего Ницше. Кроме того, теистская позиция Иванова подключается
одновременно и к романтическим поэтам (прежде всего, к Новалису) и к философам (на наш взгляд, к 
Шеллингу) и к русской религиозной мысли (Соловьеву).” 
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from the perspective of the discipline of philology. It is ahistorical, synthetic, and deductive 
rather than historical, analytic, and inductive (13, 27-28). Instead of being impartial in his 
treatment of the extant materials on the cult of Dionysus in the ancient world, Ivanov advances a 
highly idiosyncratic vision of that cult's origins, its subsequent development, and its role in the 
emergence of the phenomenon of tragedy. Behind a veneer of scientific objectivity, Ivanov 
pursues his own personal religio-philosophical agenda.  
The major idea around which all the historico-philological material is strategically 
arranged by Ivanov lies in his conviction that the religion of the suffering god is originated in the 
primordial chthonic cults and reaches its fulfillment in the Orphic mysteries of Antiquity. This 
line of argument, which is faulty in a variety of ways from the standpoint of historical evidence 
available even in Ivanov's times (Westbrook 17-43, 79-120), is indispensable to the advancement 
of the Russian Symbolist's agenda concerning the restoration of mysteries as a realization of the 
communal ideal of Godmanhood. Even though Ivanov accuses the Romantics of being oriented 
towards the past rather than the future, it is the past that he himself looks toward in the hope of 
discovering the signs of the Absolute's possible fulfillment in the distant future. The glorious 
past, as it transpires from Ivanov's approach, serves as a predictor for a hopeful future. Therefore,
as in the past in which all the disparate strands of the Dionysian cult ultimately converged in the 
synthetic rituals of the Orphic mysteries, all the sundered individuals of the present will likewise 
come together to celebrate the suffering god, this time in the image of the synthetic deity, 
Dionysus-Christ, in the living mystery play. The ancient Dionysus is fashioned by Ivanov into a 
predecessor of Christ and the development of his cult is apprehended in light of its supposed 
foreshadowing of the triumph of Godmanhood as Christianity's highest fulfillment.   
The development of the Dionysian religion in Antiquity from chthonic cults to Orphic 
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mysteries is built by Ivanov around the concept of ecstasy.384 According to the Russian 
Symbolist, before Dionysus obtained his name and acquired the status of the Greek deity, the 
Dionysian principle had already existed for the primordial human consciousness as a 
psychological state of ecstasy: “... the sacrifice in the Dionysian religion is more ancient than the 
god himself. But there is something else which is even more ancient than the sacrifice. This is the
psychological phenomenon of the orgiastic ecstasy in the spasms of overflowing fullness, of 
happiness dissolving into the enthusiasm of suffering, of the force seeking liberation from its own
excess in agony and death, and of the rapture of life turning into the joy of destruction”385 
(Ellinskaia religiia, 3: 61). Ecstasy, alternatively referred to by Ivanov as divine madness and 
orgiasm, is a foundation not only of the Dionysian religion proper but of all religions, including 
the Christian: “It is from the ecstatic states of the soul that religion emerged”386 (Religiia Dionisa,
6: 137). To drive the point home, Ivanov even defines man as “animal ecstaticum” [an ecstatic 
animal] (Ibid.). This orgiastic experience is fundamental to the birth of religious consciousness 
because it is only in a state of ecstasy that man becomes conscious of his union with god.   
In other words, in contrast to all the other psychological states, ecstasy induced by the 
intermingling of the human with the divine allows man to transcend, if only temporarily, the 
principle of individuation that has sundered the primordial unity of Being by populating it with 
particulars: 
It was not the dead consciousness of external dependence and servitude that engendered a 
384 For a more detailed discussion of the notion of ecstasy in Ivanov's scholarly works on Dionysus, see Westbrook 
143-200. 
385 “ … жертва в Дионисовой религии древнее бога. Но есть нечто более древенее, чем сама жертва. Это —
психологическое явления оргийного экстаза в его спазмах полноты, переливающейся через край, счастия, 
разрешающегося в восторг страдания, силы, ищущей освобождения от своего избытка в муке и смерти, 
упоения жизнью, переходящего в радость уничтожения.”
386 “Именно из экстатических состояний души проистекла религия.” 
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living religious feeling but a presentiment of the unity of the individual with everything 
outside of himself and through that—of the illusory nature of every individual. The 
feeling of one's own “I” outside of its defined boundaries prompts the individual to negate
himself and to dissolve into non-I which constitutes the very essence of the Dionysian 
enthusiasm.387 (143) 
Ivanov frequently uses the word “ecstasy” which literally means “to stand outside oneself” 
alongside the notion of “enthusiasm” which, in its turn, means “to be in god, to be possessed by 
god, or to be overflowing with the divine.” Thus, in a state of ecstatic enthusiasm, man is 
miraculously transported outside the confines of his individual consciousness, limited and finite, 
into the boundless sphere of the divine. 
This intermingling between the human and the divine, however, can take two widely 
divergent forms, according to Ivanov. The state of ecstasy can manifest itself either as “right” 
madness (“pravoe bezumie”) or “wrong” madness (“nepravoe bezumie”) depending on the 
conditions in which the encounter between man and god takes place. In order for an orgiastic 
experience to take the form of a salutary synthesis between the human and the divine and 
eventually resolve itself in purification (catharsis), it should be a collective experience: “We can 
speak of ecstasy or madness as a specifically cult phenomenon only when it assumes the 
character of a collective state”388 (“Ellinskaia religiia. Fragmenty verstki” 323). It is only when 
ecstasy is experienced collectively, that man, in Ivanov's view, can be truly (if temporarily?) freed
of the primordial curse of the principle of individuation without surrendering his personhood: 
387 “Не мертвое сознание внешней зависимости и подневольности породило живое религиозное чувство, но 
предчувствие единства индивидуума со всем, что вне его, и чрез то — призрачности всякого 
индивидуума. […] Чувство своего я вне его индивидуальных граней толкает личность к отрицанию себя 
самой и к переходу в не-я, что составляет существо дионисийского энтузиазма.” 
388 “Об экстазе, или безумии, как явлении особенно культовом мы вправе говорить только тогда, когда оно 
принимает характер состояния коллективного.” 
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“Passionate yearning for god destroys man's limited individuality: where love awakens, the “I” 
[limited, rational] dies”389 (Ellinskaia religiia, 8: 35).  
Ivanov's essay “Thou art” (“Ty esi,” 1907) gives a better understanding than his academic
works of what he sees as a successful course of divine madness leading to catharsis. Мan, who 
finds himself in the grip of the “right” type of madness, perceives the divine entering his 
consciousness not as a hostile impersonal force assaulting and crushing his autonomous 
individuality but rather as another “I” or, in other words, as “you.” As a consequence of its  
encounter with the divine, the ecstatic man's consciousness splits into two initially antagonistic 
parts which Ivanov designates respectively as “masculine” and “feminine.” The feminine part 
subordinated to the masculine element in ordinary circumstances violently emancipates itself 
from its confinement by “murdering” the masculine principle or, in other words, the rational “I” 
asserting itself in opposition to god: “The feminine part of our innermost being asserts its 
independent existence only upon extinguishing the inner source of the masculine energy. […] 
The spiritual stimulus that induces the feminine part of the soul toward this extinguishing, can be 
of such intensity that it neutralizes the influence of the masculine I violently and on its own 
initiative, as if sacrificially killing the masculine part of the soul, thereby reenacting the plastic 
type of a Maenad—a priestess and a murder of men”390 (SS, 3: 264-265). Thereupon the feminine
principle turns towards the awakened Eros in search of the ultimate (re)union with the divine. 
The feminine seeks its way back to God the Father (“Heaven or the Father in Heaven”), 
389 “Страстное стремление к Богу разбивает ограниченную индивидуальность человека: где пробуждается 
любовь, умирает [ограниченное, рациональное] я.”
390 “Женственная часть нашего сокровенного существа утверждает свою обособленную жизнь только при 
угашении внутреннего очага наших мужественных энергий […] Духовный стимул, побуждающий ее к 
этому угашению, может иметь такую напряженность, что она самопроизвольно и насильственно 
нейтрализует влияния мужеского я и как бы жертвенно умерщвляет его, внутренне воспроизводя собою 
пластический тип Мэнады — жрицы и мужеубийцы.” 
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her primordial metaphysical home, through the guidance of Eros, her betrothed, who is to make a
vital choice between fully identifying with the Son thereby becoming the heavenly Bridegroom 
(Christ) and turning away from the Father in rebellion. Psyche's successful return home 
(metaphysical wholeness) entirely depends on Eros' decision to embrace Sonhood: “No one 
comes to the Father except through the Son. Eros, for whom his wife Psyche is longing, whom 
his mother Maenad is calling,—whose scattered members his widow Isis is collecting,—is the 
Son”391 (SS, 3: 265). Furthermore, it is through this willing acceptance of Sonhood by Eros that 
the vanquished masculine element can come back to life. For this Bridegroom, Eros-Christ, 
whose mission is to elevate the soul, Psyche, towards Heaven through their harmonious union 
turns out to be no one else but the resurrected masculine principle miraculously transfigured 
through its violent death by sparagmos (Dionysian pathos): “Then Psyche recognizes her 
Bridegroom who is approaching her from the depth of consciousness as the resurrected I—as the 
awakened Son of God”392 (Ibid.). In other words, the finite rational “I,” torn apart by the enraged 
feminine element in a fit of enthusiastic madness and transformed by Eros' embrace of Sonhood, 
is to arise as/in Christ by the end of the ecstatic experience brought on by the “right” (collective) 
type of madness. 
Within the framework used by Ivanov to describe the travails of Psyche (soul) in search 
of Eros, her Bridegroom, one cannot help but recognize the fundamentals of the narrative 
structure employed by Solov'ev to recount the World Soul's journey back to God through the aid 
of Logos/Christ. Even though Ivanov avoids all overt references to Solov'ev's philosophy 
preferring to cite the Biblical, Ancient Greek and Egyptian mythologies instead, it appears almost
391 “Никто не приходит к Отцу иначе, как чрез Сына. Эрос, по которому тоскует Психея-жена, коего 
призывает Мэнада-мать, — чьи рассеянные члены собирает Изида-вдова, — есть Сын.”  
392 “Тогда Психея узнает своего Жениха, так приближающегося к ней из глубины личного сознания в образе 
воскресшего я, — как проснувшийся сын Божий.”  
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indisputable that he adapts Solov'ev's grand metaphysical scenario of the World Soul's reunion 
with God that unfolds within the Universe (macrocosm). The Russian Symbolist projects this 
cosmic script more forcefully onto the psychic processes happening within the individual man's 
consciousness (microcosm) than was done by his predecessor in his philosophy of love: “It is out 
of the microcosm, as from a mustard seed, that the future religious consciousness must grow,—
whereas the majority of historical doctrines (including the Church creed of so called “historical 
Christianity”) used the idea of the macrocosm as a springboard”393 (267-268). Ivanov seeks to 
enact a version of the soteriological plot featuring Eros as a protagonist bridging the divide 
between the finite and the infinite that, according to Solov'ev, was first dimly intuited and 
partially developed by Plato, but later tragically abandoned, in favor of what the ancient 
philosopher came to see as an irreparable dualism between the eternal ideas and their shadowy 
appearances. The tragic metaphysical severance of human consciousness (a particular) from the 
original unity of Being (wholeness) can be counteracted and annulled, in Ivanov's optimistic 
vision, through the restoration of that lost unity in a renewed form of Godmanhood within the 
religious experience of divine madness mediated by Eros as “Bridegroom” (Christ). 
This “right” type of madness, however, despite Ivanov's evasions on the matter, has never 
been fully experienced by men and may never be. As it emerges from Ivanov's scholarly works, 
in Ancient Greece the “right” type of madness was allegedly partaken of in their communal rites 
only by the Orphics, whom Ivanov fashions into the true devotees of the Dionysian religion: “On 
the other hand, one develops the impression [while reading Ivanov's academic works] that the 
right type of madness is exclusively confined to the context of mystery cults. In these mystery 
393 “Из микрокосма, как из горчичного зерна, должно вырости грядущее религиозное сознание, — тогда как 
большинство исторических вероучений (считая в их числе и церковное вероучение так называемого 
''исторического христианства'') отправлялось от идеи макрокосма.”   
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cults the catharsis is experienced through the right type of madness of collective ecstasy and the 
benevolent image of the Dionysian religion manifests itself”394 (Westbrook 170). Yet, the 
catharsis experienced within the framework of the Orphic rites may have been muddied and 
partial at best, for it resulted only in a temporary and therefore incomplete fusion with the Divine 
without culminating in the ultimate transformation of mankind into Divine Humanity. In Ivanov's
own theurgic vision, the only type of tragic catharsis which could be considered truly purifying is
supposed to come on the heels of the final synthesis between the human and the divine, heralding
the commencement of the cosmic mystery play of Godmanhood. In Friedman's words:
A genuine Theurgic catharsis can be experienced only once, for the first and last time—
during the participation in the “final and transformative [osushchestvitel'nyi]”Action of 
the Future mystery play. If one thinks of this type of catharsis as tragic, then one will not 
be able to find it in any of the existing tragedies [as well as, one should add, in the Orphic 
mystery rites which the Russian Symbolist seeks to present as a vehicle of the “right” type
of madness in Antiquity].395 (263-264)
In this light, the “right” type of madness can become a part of mankind's religious experience 
only in the apocalyptic moment when the human is transformed into the divine-human, thereby 
marking the theurgic realization of the grand mystery play. 
Yet, the merging of the divine and the human can lead not to their prospective definitive 
fusion culminating in the universal transfigurative catharsis (the cosmic mystery play) but to a 
394 “С другой стороны, создается впечатление [при прочтении ивановских академических работ], что правое 
безумие ограничено контекстом мистериальных культов. В них катарсис переживается через правое 
безумие коллективного экстаза, и проявляется благодатный облик Дионисовой религии.” 
395  “Подлинный Теургический катарсис может быть испытан только однажды, в первый и последний раз, —
при участии в ''окончательном и осуществительном'' Действе Грядущей мистерии. Если считать 
трагическим именно такой катарсис, то ни в одной ''наличной'' трагедии [as well as, one should add, in the 
Orphic mystery rites which the Russian Symbolist seeks to present as a vehicle of the “right” type of madness in 
Antiquity] он не обнаружится.”  
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complete obliteration of the human by the divine. The “wrong” type of madness, according to 
Ivanov, results in man's total annihilation by the Dionysian, destroying either his personhood 
(morbid insanity) and/or his body (death). As it transpires in the essay “Thou art,” this type of 
madness befalls any man who dares to oppose himself to the divine/the Dionysian by pridefully 
asserting his limited individuality (his “masculine principle”), thereby reinforcing the curse of the
principle of individuation: 
It is on the choice, given to the masculine principle, between god-defiance and the 
enactment of divine sonhood, between supra-individual will and individual alienation, the
radical manifestation of which on the microcosmic level corresponds to the macrocosmic 
falling away of Satan from God, that depends—in the case of the demonic self-
determination of our rational will—the “possession” of Psyche by the forces that are alien
to the Dionysian essence, her destructive frenzy, “the wrong type of madness,” the fatal 
“Lyssa” of the Ancients.396 (SS, 3: 266) 
Whereas the “right” type of madness, in Ivanov's conception, descends upon men only when they
are gathered as a unified collective in communal religious rites in honor of the suffering god, the 
“wrong” type of madness appears to be the singular fate of those men who isolate themselves 
from the community by becoming stubbornly entrenched in their “demonic” particularity. It is 
only when man is insistent on guarding the boundaries of his limited self, his empirico-
individualistic masculine principle, by refusing to succumb to the divine force within himself, 
that the Dionysian, acting through the enraged feminine element, violently attacks his 
396 “От предоставленного нашему мужескому началу выбора между конечным богопротивлением и 
осуществляющимся богосыновством, между сверхличным изволением и личным отъединением, 
последняя ступень которого в микрокосме соответствует макрокосмическому отпадению Сатаны от Бога, 
— зависит, в случае демонического самоопределения нашей умопостигаемой воли, ''одержание'' Психеи 
силами, чуждыми естества Дионисова, ее пагубное неистовство, ''неправое безумие,'' роковая ''Лисса'' 
древних.”
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consciousness and tears it apart:
The repudiation of the supra-individual principle located in the center of consciousness 
deflects the will of the masculine I towards its periphery, where Psyche, who is struggling
to liberate herself, encounters the masculine element in the image of a hostile pursuer or 
an insidious seducer. She can flee and remove herself from him or rebel and attack him, 
like the Maenad Agave, the murderess of Pentheus: such a division of consciousness 
cannot but manifest itself in one or another form of mental illness, in madness or 
despair.397 (Ibid.)  
If the “right” type of madness is only a desirable religious experience postulated in theory
rather than ever fully experienced in life, the “wrong” type of madness, as Ivanov has to concede 
in his scholarly works, is the very stuff of the ancient cults and myths from which tragedy has 
eventually arisen. In his “Orphiocentric” presentation of the history of the Dionysian cult that 
shows tragedy reaching its height only within the civilizing (“Apollonian”) framework of the 
Orphic religion, Ivanov cannot get around the fact that the original element from which tragedy 
emerged is not the Orphic mysteries but the folk chthonic cults. The folk conception of Dionysus 
is much darker and more violent than the image of the suffering god supposedly worshiped by 
the Orphics. In the folk imagination, Dionysus is first and foremost a god of death and 
destruction, whose orgiastic cult(s) demanded human sacrifices: 
The murderous side of the Dionysian orgiasm is an orgiasm of cannibalism. This 
cannibalism, in principle, has forever remained a part of the Dionysian religion, even 
397 “Отвращение от сверхличного начала, полагаемого нами в средоточии сознания, уклоняет волю 
мужеского я к его периферии, где освобождающаяся Психея встречает его в образе враждебного 
преследователя или коварного соблазнителя. Она может бежать и удалиться от него или восстать и 
напасть на него, подобно Мэнаде Агаве, убийце Пентея: такой раскол сознания не может не проявиться в 
том или ином виде душевной болезни, в безумии или отчаянии.”  
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though it has been weakened in actual practice. Human sacrifice has never been 
completely abolished but the devouring of human flesh has been forbidden.398 (Ellinskaia 
religiia, 5: 31)
In his essay “Nietzsche and Dionysus” (“Nietzsche i Dionis,” 1904), Ivanov makes this point 
even more explicit: 
Tragedy emerged from the orgies of the god torn apart by the frenzied devotees. What is 
the origin of frenzy? It is closely linked with the cult of souls and the primordial funeral 
feasts. The funeral feast which was a sacrificial service to the dead ancestors was 
accompanied by the uncontrollable outburst of sexual passions. Was it death or life that 
eventually outweighed the scales, both of whose oscillating cups were similarly 
overloaded? But Dionysus, nevertheless, was, in the eyes of those ancient people, not the 
god of the wild weddings and sexual intercourse but the god of the dead and the darkness 
of death. By surrendering himself to be torn apart and enticing countless sacrificial 
victims into the darkness of the night in his wake, he brought death into the celebrations 
of the living.399 (SS, 1: 720)
Even though the ambivalence of Dionysus as a god of death and life (regeneration) was in 
evidence already in those archaic orgiastic cults, it was the god's destructive aspect that was 
mostly revered by his early devotees. The myths that go back to these primordial times when the 
cult of Dionysus as a god of death was in full swing all universally depict the human wreckage 
398 “Убийственная сторона дионисического оргиазма есть оргиазм каннибализма. Этот каннибализм в 
принципе навсегда сохранился в Дионисовой религии, но был ослаблен в применении. Человеческие 
жертвы никогда не были упразднены окончательно; но пожирание плоти человеческой было отменено.” 
399 “Трагедия возникла из оргий бога, растерзываемым иступленными. Откуда исступление? Оно тесно 
связано с культом душ и с первобытными тризнами. Торжество тризны — жертвенное служение мертвым
— сопровождалось разнузданием половых страстей. Смерть или жизнь перевешивала на зыблемых чашах
обоюдно перенагруженных весов? Но Дионис все же был, в глазах тех древних людей, не богом диких 
свадеб и совокуплений, но богом мертвых и сени смертной и, отдаваясь сам на растерзание и увлекая за 
собою в ночь бесчисленные жертвы, вносил смерть в ликования живых.” 
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(insanity and death) left behind by the vindictive and bloodthirsty deity. For Ivanov, this chthonic
past of Dionysus when the god manifested himself predominantly as a destroyer rather than as a 
purifying Savior (i.e., as an ancient antecedent of Christ) presents an instantiation of the “wrong” 
type of madness. As Westbrook observes:
When one examines the myths about Dionysus and the Dionysian frenzy that came down 
to us, one can draw the conclusion that the wrong type of madness [according to Ivanov] 
can be encountered most often in the primordial cults. Given the sheer number of myths, 
the content of these myths is catastrophic. In this case, we witness the enactment of the 
wrong type of madness.400 (170) 
Thus, the origin of tragedy (primordial chthonic cults) as well as its content (archaic myths), 
whose restoration is, in Ivanov's eschatological vision, to redeem humanity is indissolubly linked 
with the “wrong” type of madness. 
What Ivanov identifies as the “wrong” type of madness that inevitably strikes the tragic 
Ancient Greek heroes whose path is fatally crossed by Dionysus (“the divine”) bears a striking 
resemblance to what the earlier Hölderlin called das Ungeheur (“the monstrous”). Thus, the 
divine in Ancient Greek tragedy, as seen through the eyes of the German Romantic Hölderlin and
the Russian Symbolist Ivanov, invariably comes across as a hostile force of Nature that moves 
toward a destructive union with man. By pitting himself against the god through the (re)assertion 
of his individuality (particularity), the tragic hero steps into the path of fate, making himself 
vulnerable and exposed to divine rage. In his doomed struggle with the divine, the tragic hero, 
who represents a living embodiment of the principle of individuation, is bound to suffer divine 
400 “При рассмотрении знакомых нам мифов о Дионисе и дионийском безумии, можно сделать вывод, что 
неправое безумие [according to Ivanov] чаще всего встречается в первобытных культах. Содержание 
известных нам мифов катастрофично, если принять во внимание многочисленные убийства. В таком 
случае, перед нами — реализация неправого безумия.”
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madness (the “wrong type,” in Ivanov's estimation) and lose his individuality in the embrace of 
the enraged god. Therefore, the (re)union between the alienated particular and the divine happens
only in the paradoxical moment of their final estrangement—when the particular is stripped of its
individuality in the deadly merging with the divine. The product of that irrefragably tragic union 
is not Divine Humanity that represents a harmonious synthesis of the two opposites but a 
complete annihilation of the human (the individual) by the divine. 
This association of tragedy with the folk Dionysus, the destroyer and instigator of the 
“wrong” type of madness that results in a “monstrous” union between the human and the divine 
(inevitably fatal for the human), presents a rather uncomfortable fact for Ivanov's conception of 
tragedy as a penultimate step towards the realization of the cosmic mystery play, whose prototype
one can vaguely glimpse in the orgiastic Orphic mysteries of Antiquity. Therefore, to make up for
tragedy's genesis in the chthonic cults celebrating the deadly (“Ungeheuer”) side of Dionysus, 
Ivanov seeks to link the establishment of the classical Attic tragedy with the development of the 
Orphic religion within which the “right” type of madness was cultivated (if not fully 
experienced): “Ivanov believes that only the religious reform executed by the Orphics made the 
emergence of Attic tragedy possible”401 (Friedman 262). This attempt to wrest tragedy away from
the guardianship of the folk Dionysus by re-ascribing it to the Orphic Dionysus in the face of 
historic evidence is motivated by Ivanov's ill-concealed uneasiness about the legitimate patron of 
tragedy. 
For despite the Russian Symbolist's best efforts at their reconciliation, the folk cult of 
Dionysus and the Orphic conception of Dionysus are at odds with each other. The folk Dionysus, 
401 “Иванов полагает, что только религиозная реформа орфиков сделала возможным возникновение 
аттической трагедии.”  
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with his hunger for human blood, stubbornly refuses to be subsumed under and superseded by the
Dionysus of the Orphic religion. As a result, what Ivanov seeks to present as a synthetic image of
the suffering god developed in Antiquity is just a shaky assemblage of mutually exclusive 
historical phenomena (folk chthonic cults and esoteric Orphic religion) hidden behind the deity's 
common name, “Dionysus.” In his analysis of Ivanov's attempt to produce a viable synthetic 
image of Dionysus, Friedman comments on this persistent phenomenon of doubling or even 
trebling (if one takes into account the anticipated coming of Dionysus-Christ) of the image of the 
god in the Russian Symbolist's philological work:   
Ivanov's inexorable will toward synthesis built on the basis of the broadly understood 
Dionysianism gives an appearance of the triumphant expansion of Dionysus: under the 
name of “the Orphic Dionysus,” he rules as a governor over the patrimony of Apollo (the 
sector of AK [Apollonian catharsis]); under the esoteric name of “the Gnostic 
Dionysus”—over the inheritance of the Theurgist (the sector of TK [Theurgic catharsis]). 
[…] However, upon closer examination, it turns out that the expansion of Dionysus is 
primarily of the onomastic nature. Moreover, the aggressive strategy of Dionysus not only
fails to strengthen his position but, paradoxically, results in the fragmentation of his 
originally unified image into a number of doubles. The “just Dionysus” (the folk 
Dionysus) acquires a double-mediator (the Orphic Dionysus).402 (261-262)
This fragmentation of the manufactured image of the “synthetic” Dionysus into the folk and 
402 “Всесокрушающая воля Иванова к синтезу, творимому на основе широко понятого ''дионисийства,'' 
создает видимость победной экспансии Диониса: под именем ''Диониса орфического'' он, в качестве 
наместника, управляет наследной вотчиной Аполлона (сектором АК [Apollonian catharsis]); под 
эзотерическим именем ''Диониса гностического'' — законными владениями Теурга (сектором ТК 
[Theurgic catharsis]). […] Однако при ближайшем рассмотрении выясняется, что экспансия Диониса носит
по преимуществу ономастический характер. Более того, завоевательная стратегия не только не укрепляет 
позиций Диониса, но, парадоксальным образом, приводит к дроблению его изначально единого образа на 
ряд двойников. У ''просто Диониса'' (Диониса общенародного предания) появляется двойник-медиатор 
(Дионис орфический).”
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Orphic gods, who have nothing in common with each other but their name, presents a challenge 
for Ivanov the theurgist, for the image of the Orphic Dionysus featured as a triumphant synthesis 
of all the Dionysian cults in Antiquity is treated by the Russian Symbolist as a harbinger of the 
coming deity, Christ-Dionysus, who would incarnate the synthesis of the human and the divine. 
Both syntheses, however, are disrupted by the incompatibility of the soteriological visions 
represented by the folk Dionysus, a historically legitimate patron of tragedy, with Ivanov's 
theurgic enterprise. The vision of the eternal return of sameness inherent in tragedy, as was 
already intuited and agonized over by the early German Romantics, is at cross-purposes with the 
pursuit of the synthetic Absolute, whose attainment would mark the transcendence of Nature with
its never-ending cycle of births and death.  
The folk Dionysus stands for a path of salvation that defies Ivanov's theurgic ambitions, 
threatening to bring them to naught. As shown by Friedman in his critique of Ivanov's synthetic 
approach to tragedy, the folk Dionysus whose spirit historically presides over tragedy has no 
notion of transcendence indispensable to the workings of theurgy (263). The folk Dionysus is not
aware of the existence of any other, higher, world apart from the realm of Nature that the 
theurgist strives to overcome. Thus, instead of operating within the starkly dualistic framework 
espoused by the Idealist strands of philosophy (including the ancient Orphics) and Christianity, as
Ivanov seeks to prove in his philological works, the Dionysian tragedy falls within the monistic, 
Heraclitean, conception of the Universe, as the late Hölderlin and, later, Nietzsche averred. In 
other words, the idea of eternity that exists outside the whole temporal process of Nature is 
utterly alien to the sphere of the Dionysian tragedy that can only accommodate the notion of 
“eternity” in the meaning contrary to the Platonic-Christian understanding, that is as persistence 
through endless time. Hence, it is the “eternal repetition” of the earthly, of the natural cycle of 
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life and death, with no possibility of its redemption or theurgic transcendence that constitutes the 
very fabric of tragedy. Dionysian tragedy offers no way for man to escape the inhibitions of 
mortality and mutability, of finiteness and contingency. The temporal condition (i.e., the 
inevitability of death) is a singular plight man is born for, and tragedy in its Ancient Greek 
instantiation knows no other mode of being outside the Heraclitean perpetual flux, or, to put it in 
Romantic terms, beyond the individuation of becoming.  
Since in the world of the Dionysian tragedy, the eternal contradictions residing in Nature 
can only be lived (“suffered”) through but never resolved, it cannot provide the type of theurgic 
catharsis instilled by the “right” type of madness that Ivanov looks for. While the Russian 
Symbolist has a profound grasp of the type of catharsis the Dionysian tragedy evokes (or used to 
evoke) as a collective religious ritual, which is attested to by the fact that he calls its purifying 
affect at one point “Heraclitean rapture”403 (SS, 4: 527), he, nevertheless, continually seeks to 
replace it with the type that would bring it closer to the desired theurgic effect. Unlike the 
theurgic catharsis (the ideal affect) or its Ancient Greek surrogate supposedly experienced during 
the Orphic mysteries, the Dionysian catharsis does not bring to the participating community a 
sense of transcendence of the earthly or the human. While the Dionysian catharsis aims at 
alleviating the pains of individuation, it achieves this exclusively within the empire of Time, the 
sphere of the transitory, rather than outside it. The agony of individuation that bedevils man from 
his birth is annulled, as Friedman points out, only by the return of a particular to the “species 
norm” that signifies the inextinguishable renewal of life: 
In contrast to the theurgic, the Dionysian personality is constituted in the mode of “eternal
return”; the dissolution of individuation is conceived here as a return to the generic norm. 
403  “гераклитовый восторг”
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The return is “eternal” only to the extent the spiral of the renewed life of the genus is 
viewed by the individual as a visible image of eternity.404 (266) 
Thus, unlike the theurgic catharsis, whose ultimate goal is to transcend humanity, the Dionysian 
catharsis associated with Ancient Greek tragedy works in the diametrically opposite direction: it 
helps a human being to reconcile himself with mortality and contingency. 
Given the obstinacy of the folk Dionysus not to adhere to Solov'ev's theurgic vision of 
Godmanhood, it comes in the end as no surprise that Ivanov, ever in pursuit of the cosmic 
mystery play, seeks to supplant the ancient deity with a more pliant Orphic Dionysus, who is, to a
large extent, a product of his synthetic imagination rather than of historical reality. Unlike the 
early German Romantics (Hölderlin and Schelling, in particular), the Russian Symbolist, who is 
acutely aware of the fundamentally human nature of tragedy, nevertheless, refuses to 
wholeheartedly embrace the fact of the ceaselessness of its dialectics and the irresolvable 
character of the tragic metaphysical disjuncture between the infinite and the finite. More like the 
Idealist Hegel, Ivanov yearns to close off the unremitting dialectical unfolding of the tragic by 
transforming it into the comic (the living mystery play) and thereby crossing over into the realm 
independent of the rule of Time. The phenomenon of ancient tragedy, however, as becomes 
evident in its genetic ties with the folk Dionysus, resists his elaborate scholarly maneuverings 
and refuses to accept as its patron the synthetic image of the Orphic Dionysus concocted by 
Ivanov as a precursor of the universal synthesis embodied by the “Son” deity, Christ-Dionysus. 
Thus, Ivanov's ambition to present the “Orphicized” Ancient Greek tragedy as a bulwark against 
the extremes of Romantic lyricism, expressive of modern individualism, and as a prototype of the
404 “В отличие от теургической, дионисийская личность конституируется в модусе ''вечного возвращения,'' 
снятие индивидуации здесь мыслится как возврат к родовой норме […] возврат является ''вечным'' лишь в
той мере, в какой спираль возобновляющейся родовой жизни представляется индивиду зримым образом 
вечности.”
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future cosmic mystery play falls through. Tragedy and the Christian idea of salvation inherent in 
the theurgic ideal of Godmanhood turn out to be incompatible.
 
Ivanov's Theatrical Attempts to Create an Objective Tragedy
Over the years Ivanov made a few attempts to create a theatrical instantiation of the 
“objective” type of tragedy. None, however, has proved successful if judged in light of his own, 
anti-Romantic, conception of tragic drama. Out of numerous attempts, the Russian Symbolist 
was able to complete only two plays, Tantalus (Tantal, 1905) and Sons of Prometheus (Syny 
Prometeia, 1915; known as Prometheus (Prometei) after the 1919 edition). Niobe (which was 
originally conceived as a second part of the trilogy, of which Tantalus was only the first part), 
Antigone (in the 1920-s), and Nal and Damayanti (in the 1930-s) remained unfinished. In his two
completed tragedies, Tantalus and Prometheus, Ivanov seeks to incarnate those principles of 
objectivity which would allow him to overcome the excesses of Romantic subjectivism that in 
the form of all-pervasive lyricism seems to have thrown into doubt the very possibility of the 
restoration of tragedy as an aesthetic genre and even more so as a religious communal rite. In 
spite of his quest for the reintegration of subjectivity with stolid objectivity that motivated Ivanov
to go back to the Ancient Greek tragic practices, his Symbolist tragedies are no less subjective 
than the Romantic ones against whose solipsistic individualistic spirit they were intentionally 
written. In his theatrical practice Ivanov is unable to transcend the negative (“antithetical”) stage 
of Romanticism by restoring the realm of mythological (religious) objectivity. 
The explosive and unsubsumable nature of Romanticism comes into sharp relief in 
Ivanov's first tragedy, Tantalus,405 which revolves around the eponymous character, a supreme 
405 For more on Ivanov's tragedy Tantalus, see L.M. Borisova, “Tragedii Viacheslava Ivanova v otnoshenii k 
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individualist, who decides to throw a challenge to the gods inhabiting Olympus by becoming an 
immortal himself. Tantalus, a son of Zeus, comes to think of himself in his excessive pride as an 
equal to the immortals. Blessed with all sorts of abundance, he spurns the gods' gifts and makes 
up his mind to lay claim to the only privilege he is denied as a human being: a drink of ambrosia 
that confers immortality. Tantalus sees a dream that forebodes his downfall but instead of trying 
to avoid it, he seeks to bring it about. He gives his youngest son Pelops away to Zeus who is in 
love with the boy, in order to distract the supreme god's attention, and steals ambrosia. At first he 
offers the drink to his oldest son Broteas, an embodiment of penury, who hates his father and 
spills the cup in an act of defiance. Later, Tantalus offers the drink of immortality to the heroes 
Sisyphus and Ixion, with whom he intends to take on the Olympic gods. The three storm 
Olympus but are easily defeated by the gods and thrown into Tartarus. Each is sentenced to 
endure punishment for all eternity: Sisyphus is to push the stone up the hill only to see it roll 
back; Ixion is to spin in an ever-moving winged fiery wheel; and Tantalus, in a dramatic 
departure from the ancient Greek myth, is to hang in the air, supporting the edge of the enormous 
extinguished sphere. 
In Tantalus, Ivanov in fact does not strive to resurrect the Аncient Greek tragedy but aims
instead for a new type of synthesis that would subsume the rampant excesses of individualism 
under a new type of religious objectivity which would not annihilate Romantic subjectivism but 
rather reintegrate it with the communal element it came to negate. To put it differently, Ivanov 
pursues the higher, Symbolist, synthesis of Romanticism (extreme individualism, particularly, as 
simvolistskoi teorii zhiznetvorchestva”; E.K. Gertsyk, “O ''Tantale'' Viacheslava Ivanova”; Hetzer, A. Viačeslav 
Ivanovs Tragödie “Tantal”: Eine literarhistorische Interpretation; G. A. Stepanova, Ideia ''sobornogo teatra'' v 
poeticheskoi filosofii Viacheslava Ivanova; V. Stephan, Studium zum Drama des russischen Symbolismus; V.N. 
Toporov, “Mif o Tantale: Ob odnoi pozdnei versii—tragediia Viach. Ivanova”; T. Venclova, “On Russian 
Mythological Tragedy: Vjačeslav Ivanov and Marina Cvetaeva.” 
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manifested in Lord Byron's works) and the Аncient Greek tradition of tragedy (representative of 
religious objectivity). Thus, Tantalus can be most fittingly described as a Byronic tragedy cast in 
Aeschylean form. The “objective” form, however, is completely overshadowed by the Romantic 
subject-matter of the play. Despite the painstaking conformity to the exterior features of 
Aeschylean tragedy (including even the total number of lines, 1400), the Romantic content of 
Tantalus, its Byronic expansiveness and resentment of binding formal constraints, refuses to be 
contained and subdued, making the metric form seem suffocatingly stilted and the language 
jarringly obsolete. By the end of Ivanov's tragedy, the Romantic content and the Ancient Greek 
form come to be ever more at odds with each other instead of being harmoniously reconciled 
under the aegis of Symbolism.
To expose the solipsistic nature of Romantic subjectivity, Ivanov turns to the English 
Romantic tradition in his dramatic practice rather than to the German. It is, in particular, the 
phenomenon of Byronism rampant in 19th century Russia that comes to incarnate for him all the 
tragic excesses of Romantic individualism: “Byronism was a more profound phenomenon than 
just a mere style of Childe Harold's cloak, Podolinskii's elegies and even Pechorin's 
disillusionment. It contained within itself the riddle of the Sphinx and called upon the Russian 
Oedipuses to confront the challenge”406 (SS, 4: 295). Byron, characterized by the Russian 
Symbolist as “a poet of daring and rebellion”407 (282) and “a herald of the autonomous 
individual's extreme claims, a Herostratus of solitary self-affirmation”408 (283), presents an 
epitome of the antithetical stage of Romanticism. It was the British poet, according to Ivanov, 
who brought to the world a resounding message of the human “I am,” that is of the individual's 
406 “Байронизм был более глубоким событием, чем мода Гарольдова плаща, чем элегии Подолинского и даже
печоринская разочарованность. Он нес в себе загадку Сфинкса и звал на испытание русских Эдипов.”  
407 “певец дерзновения и мятежа”  
408  “глашатай крайних притязаний своеначальной личности, Герострат уединенного самоутверждения”  
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inalienable right to freedom and self-determination, both before other people and God himself. 
This “Byronic spirit,” “antithetical” and “rebellious,” defines and positions itself in opposition to 
the other universal pole, the divine “I am.” The antagonism of these two “I am,” human and 
divine, can be resolved for the Russian Symbolist only in the collective “thou art,” Solov'evian 
type of theurgic synthesis, incarnated as sobornost': 
The thesis of the divine “I am” and the antithesis of the human “I am” [ushered in by 
Romanticism personified by Byron] are synthetically united in the communal principle 
that stands under the sign of the universal “thou art.” All three vertices of the triangle are 
sacred; that is why Dostoevskii calls Byron, who came to the new world—as if primarily 
to the Slavs—with the message of antithesis, “the great and sacred phenomenon of the 
European spirit.409 (295-296) 
In order to reach this stage of the all-reconciling synthesis, the phenomenon of Byronism has to 
be confronted by Russian Symbolists as the Sphinx was confronted by Oedipus. Thus, Byronism 
can be surmounted, in Ivanov's vision, only within the space of tragedy. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the conflict staged in Tantalus, despite the 
trappings of the Ancient Greek myth, is borrowed straight from the Byronic playbook: the brazen
defiance of God(s) by the proud hero-individualist who refuses to relinquish his free will to what 
is viewed by him as an oppressive divine power, antagonizing in its inaccessibility and opaque 
intentions. This conflict, played out in one way or another in many of Byron's poems and plays, 
is portrayed with the utmost vividness and force in his two mysteries, Cain and Heaven and 
409 “Теза Божьего ''Аз есмь'' и антитеза человеческого ''аз есмь'' [ushered in by Romanticism personified by 
Byron] синтетически объединяются в начале соборности, которая стоит под знаком вселенского ''ты еси.'' 
Все три вершины этого треугольника святы; вот почему Достоевский называет Байрона, пришедшего в 
новый мир, — как бы преимущественно к славянству — с вестью антитезы, — ''великим и святым 
явлением европейского духа''.”
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Earth, which exerted a strong influence on Ivanov's drama: “In both plays [Byron's Cain and 
Heaven and Earth] man is presented in an intolerable situation: he must either submit his will to 
an inscrutable, inaccessible God, or else risk damnation by following the demands and yearnings 
of his own fallen nature—questing for knowledge [Cain] or for human allegiance [Heaven and 
Earth]” (Fitzpatrick 615). For the Byronic hero, the extreme individualist, the choice between 
submission and calamitous revolt is tragic but clear: he chooses willful damnation. The Byronic 
rebel who pits himself against the limitations of mortality (the curse of death) imposed by the 
divine power as a punishment for the original transgression is always in a rush to confront his 
fate rather than to circumvent it. 
All these elements of the fundamental Byronic conflict (a proud defiance of the divine 
power; preoccupation with mortality; revolt against the inhibitions of the human condition; 
willful damnation) are in evidence in Ivanov's Tantalus. Thus, in the Byronic spirit, there is no 
attempt on the part of Tantalus to avoid his disastrous fate as, for example, is the case in 
Sophocles' Oedipus. On the contrary, he seems determined to fulfill it at all costs. Like Byron's 
Cain, Tantalus is animated by the desire to push beyond the limits of his mortality imposed upon 
him as his human lot. Instead of seeking to reconcile himself with his limitations as a mortal, 
Tantalus chooses the brazen, open-eyed daring of the inscrutable fate, Adrasteia, dreaded even by
the Olympic gods. He decides to take for himself, and by himself, against all odds and divine 
prohibitions, what was denied to him by the jealous gods—a drink of ambrosia that confers and 
sustains immortality. In full knowledge of his inevitable downfall revealed to him in his dream, 
Tantalus nevertheless exercises his free will in order to bring it on upon himself rather than to 
avoid it. There is no Oedipus-like blindness involved in the tragic conflict, for in Ivanov's 
Tantalus the downfall is fully self-willed by the hero. 
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Due to this open-eyed Byronic-style revolt, there is no ambiguity in Tantalus concerning 
the respective roles of “ethos” and “daimon” [fate] in the tragic hero's downfall so quintessential 
to the workings of the Ancient Greek tragedy (Vernant 49-84). Romantic free will that asserts its 
independence (its right to damnation) even in the presence of fate cancels the ambiguity in which
the hidden springs of human motivation and the pre-ordinance of fate coexisted. As a result of 
this imbalance, the religious (“objective”) element that manifested itself in the ancients in the 
precedence of divine background over human action becomes attenuated and turns secondary in 
Romanticism to the free will of the rebellious individual who increasingly comes to usurp the 
center-stage all for himself. According to Kitto, it is this withering of the divine backdrop 
privileged by the ancients that prevented Romanticism from going beyond “subjective” tragedy: 
“Nor did the Romantic movement bring any great amendment. True, it deposed the Rules of Art 
and exalted imagination; but by now individualism was rampant. The Hero, with his attendant 
personages, became the whole play” (149). In this light, despite his struggles to create 
“objective” tragedy to overcome the excessive subjectivism of Romanticism, Ivanov, as a result 
of his reliance on the Byronic model, cannot help but reenact the same Romantic imbalance. 
This excessive emphasis on the Byronic individual, Tantalus, however, has far-reaching 
negative consequences for Ivanov's tragic enterprise as a whole. It frustrates his hopes for 
creating “objective” tragedy in accordance with his own theoretical vision. First of all, unlike in 
the Ancient Greek tragedy in which a general action is specified through the figure of the tragic 
hero, in Ivanov's tragedy, as in its Romantic counterpart, it is an individual action that becomes 
generalized: “At the center of liberal tragedy [as opposed to the Ancient Greek one] is a single 
situation: that of a man at the height of his powers and the limits of his strength, at once aspiring 
and being defeated, releasing and destroyed by his own energies” (Williams 87). To start with, 
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Tantalus as king does not possess the general and representative quality which would make his 
individual fate “objective” or, in other words, tied with that of the broader community. From the 
very beginning he is shown as existing distinctly apart from the rest of the human community 
(the wider collective element), which is actually present in the play only by its conspicuous 
absence. Rather than being representative of the people he rules over, he seeks to divorce himself 
from humanity altogether by forging an entirely new community of Übermenschen, like himself, 
who would dare to take on the immortal gods and brazenly claim immortality for themselves. By 
the end of the play Tantalus ends up in complete isolation, being deprived even of the company 
of his superhuman accomplices. In this light, the individual, Tantalus, does not shed his earthly 
particularity even after he dies. The anguish of isolated individuality to which man is condemned 
after his separation from the original unity continues even after his demise. This agony does not 
seem to have an end, for the pains of individuation do not cease but rather intensify upon death. 
Instead of transcending the principium individuationis and its correlative, Time, death in Ivanov's
tragedy ushers in the eternity of time and the individual who has presumed upon immortality is 
condemned to the experience of suffered time (the essence of his mortality) for all eternity.
This focus on the isolated hero leads to the reduced role of the chorus, which, according 
to Ivanov, is the very backbone of objectivity forfeited by Romanticism. While the chorus 
expressive of the communal element is present at the beginning of the play, its role gets 
progressively diminished toward its end. It plays no part in the play's conclusion, for the spotlight
is by now completely shifted toward the fate of the supreme individualist Tantalus thrown into 
the depth of Tartarus as punishment for his transgression. This end with its exclusive emphasis on
the outcast hero goes against Ivanov's own key theoretical pronouncement that it is the chorus as 
multitude that should have the last, decisive, word in tragic action: 
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The last, decisive word in action belongs to the multitude as chorus. Dramatic art asserts 
its true nature not at the moment of the heroic initiative but at the moment of the 
communal [sobornoe] unity,—not on the level of the individual but on the level of the 
community. One can even say that if the initiative in a play belongs to the hero, then 
creativity proper belongs to the community.410 (SS, 2: 264) 
In Tantalus, however, it is the tragic hero who literally has “the decisive word,” echoed only by 
Adrasteia, in the void of the underworld.
By ending the action of the play with the downfall of the tragic hero condemned to suffer 
in isolation for all eternity and not with the affirmative song of the chorus, Ivanov's tragedy 
actually gives no sense of how the broader human community is affected as a result of Tantalus's 
tragic action. For it is the role of the chorus, as Ivanov himself insisted, to welcome the 
transformed world order that emerges as a result of the tragic hero's death, even more so if this 
death intended to be a “sacrificial” (Dionysian) one. In his discussion of tragedy, Williams 
notably states, “We think of tragedy as what happens to the hero, but the ordinary tragic action is 
what happens through the hero [in the wider world that persists after the hero's tragic demise]” 
(55). It is this “through” which struck such a powerful note of religious affirmation in the final 
song of the chorus in Ancient Greek tragedy that is sorely missing in Ivanov's Tantalus. Since it 
does not transpire how Tantalus's tragic action reverberates across the wider human community 
and Universe, the tragic action itself does not transcend the boundaries of a purely individual 
action by becoming the general (universal) one. Thus, the circularity of Romantic subjectivism is 
not subsumed in a higher synthesis but is rather reinforced and perpetuated. As a result, the new 
410 “Множеству, как хору, и принадлежит в действе последнее, решающее слово. Иксусство сценическое 
утверждает свою коренную природу не в момент героического почина, но в момент соборного согласия,—
не в начале личном, но в начале общественном; можно даже сказать, что если герою принадлежит в пьесе 
почин, то собственное творчество отдано в нем общине.”
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redistribution of forces, social and/or cosmic, one would expect at the end of “objective” tragedy,
does not emerge. Life does not come back. We as readers are left in the realm of shadows, 
Tartarus, for all eternity to watch the agonies of solipsistic subjectivism without any hope of 
cathartic release.  
Romantic individualism that Ivanov sets out to battle literally absorbs the whole of the 
play. The entire tragedy turns into an allegoric representation of alienated Romantic 
consciousness that seeks to subordinate reality to itself: “The character of Tantalus embodies the 
poet's principal idea—the destructiveness of the solipsistic ''I am'' that makes the revelation of 
''thou'' impossible, thereby making impossible the ''self-emptying''—kenosis and descent—the 
blessed resurrection to a new life”411 (Stepanova 107). For all Ivanov's use of Ancient Greek 
mythology, there is no objective action in his tragedy. The Ancient Greek names cannot conceal 
the fact that there are no individualized characters, for all the dramatis personae are mere 
reflections of the protagonist,412 Tantalus, who is himself just a walking personification of 
excessive Romantic subjectivity. The profoundly allegorical nature of the play aligns Ivanov's 
tragedy with Romanticism (Shelley in particular) and sets it further apart from religious 
objectivity, at least as it manifests itself in the Ancient Greek drama. In August Schlegel's words: 
Ancient mythology is in general symbolical, although not allegorical; for the two are 
certainly distinct. Allegory is the personification of an idea, a poetic story invented solely 
with such a view; but that is symbolical which, created by the imagination for other 
purposes, or possessing an independent reality of its own, is at the same time easily 
susceptible of an emblematical explanation; and even of itself suggests itself. (88)
411 “В образе Тантала представляется ключевая идея поэта — гибельность замкнутого ''Аз есмь'' при 
невозможности раскрытия ''Ты,'' невозможности самоумаления-кенозиса и нисхождения — благодатного 
воскресения к новой жизни.”  
412 For a detailed discussion of mirroring/doubling that takes place in the play, please see Stepanova 111.
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The allegorical staging of the agonies of the solitary mind is also deeply personal, for this 
alienated consciousness that engulfs the whole cosmos belongs to no one else but the author 
himself: “In his tragedies [Tantalus and Sons of Prometheus/Prometheus], however, Ivanov 
portrayed not so much the ecstasy of unity as the agony of individualism, his own and his fellow 
Symbolists' inner drama”413 (Borisova 64). In this light, Tantalus is not so much an instantiation 
of “objective” tragedy reinstating the collective element (the ideal of sobornost') as it is a lyrical 
drama, the drama of the mind, that, in the best Romantic fashion, reasserts the subjective even 
while seeking to dethrone it. 
In Prometheus,414 Ivanov seeks to enclose and thereby contain the unbridled Byronic 
individualist, the Titan Prometheus, within a redemptive framework. His apparent aim seems to 
be no less than defusing the explosiveness of Romantic subjectivity within a teleologically-
oriented narrative of the Christian type that turns the very sin of individuation that generated the 
endless chain of becoming into a felix culpa. By introducing this framework of the expectant 
deliverance into his tragedy, Ivanov tries to steer it away from the excesses of Romantic 
subjectivity toward religious objectivity and therefore toward its future transformation into  a 
theurgic mystery play. This infusion of Christian teleology into tragedy, however, annuls or at the
very least enervates the genuinely tragic that in its essence admits of no definitive solution to the 
conflicted state of things in the Universe. 
In his Prometheus, Ivanov creates not an objective tragedy but, to borrow Steiner's term, a
413 “В трагедиях [Tantalus and Sons of Prometheus/Prometheus], однако, Иванов запечатлел не столько экстаз 
единения, сколько муки индивидуализма, свою и единомышленников внутреннюю драму.”
414 For other approaches on Ivanov's tragedy Prometheus, see L.M. Borisova, “Tragedii Viacheslava Ivanova v 
otnoshenii k simvolistskoi teorii zhiznetvorchestva”; D.G. Mureddu, “The tragedy of Prometheus by Vjačeslav 
Ivanov”; O.A. Prokopova, “Geroiko-titanicheskii mif v estetike D.S. Merezhkovskogo i Viach. I. Ivanova”; B. 
Sabo, “Iazyk tragedii ''Prometei'' Viach. Ivanova kak kliuch rasshifrovki tragedii”; B. Sabo-Trifkovich, Tragediia
''Prometei'' Viacheslava Ivanova; G. A. Stepanova, Ideia ''sobornogo teatra'' v poeticheskoi filosofii Viacheslava 
Ivanova; V. Stephan, Studium zum Drama des russischen Symbolismus; T. Venclova, “On Russian Mythological 
Tragedy: Vjačeslav Ivanov and Marina Cvetaeva.” 
343
“near-tragedy.” In his attempt to surmount rampant subjectivism associated with Romanticism, 
Ivanov, as irony would have it, follows in the footsteps of numerous Romantic playwrights who, 
while being obsessed with the tragic, evaded the finality of tragedy in their theatrical practice: 
“They [Romanticism and tragedy] cannot honestly go together. Romanticism substituted the 
realness of hell which confronts Faustus, Macbeth, or Phedre, the saving clause of timely 
redemption and the ''compensating Heaven'' of Rousseau” (The Death of Tragedy 135). By 
presenting Prometheus as the one who rebels against the usurper, Zeus, son of Cronus, for the 
sake of the future coming of the Savior, “the Bridegroom,” Ivanov extends hope to suffering 
mankind that its tragic condition is bound to be redeemed. But this promise of salvation, of the 
theurgic transformation of the Universe, destroys the tragic and Ivanov's Prometheus as a 
tragedy. Furthermore, the very form of Prometheus, upon closer examination, betrays its lack of 
theatrical objectivity, for Ivanov's tragedy is nothing but an instantiation of the Romantic lyrical 
drama, a drama of the solitary mind, that he sets out to defeat in the first place. 
 Prometheus opens showing the Titan hammering in the underground. He forges tools for 
humankind to help it survive on a daily basis. While toiling away, he expects inevitable 
punishment from the supreme god Zeus, son of Cronus, for having fashioned humanity out of 
clay and stealing fire to sustain it. In the meantime, death and strife make their entry among 
humanity. Aphtodikes, one of Prometheus' sons, intends to murder him to avenge the death of his 
beloved brother, Opheltes, who was torn apart by a lion. Having failed to kill Prometheus, 
Aphtodikes commits suicide. Another son of Prometheus, Archemorus perpetrates the first 
homicide by slaughtering his brother Archates out of jealousy. The sons of Prometheus are 
growing increasingly resentful of their father for having brought them into the world of penury, 
hard work, violence and, worst of all, death. Prometheus, who is well aware of all future agonies 
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awaiting his sons and daughters on earth, however, puts all his faith in the resurrection of the 
child-god Dionysus, who was torn limb from limb by the rebellious Titans and whose place as a 
supreme deity is currently usurped by Zeus. 
Prometheus grows more and more weary and falls asleep. While he is asleep, his mother 
Themis, appears on the stage and tells the audience about the unchaining of Pandora, Prometheus'
feminine essence whom he estranged from himself so that he could have a model to create 
humankind. After making use of Pandora for his ends, Prometheus spurned her, thereby exposing
himself as a false bridegroom, and now the jilted Pandora expects the coming of her true 
bridegroom, Dionysus. Pandora later appears among humankind in order to stir the revolt against 
Prometheus. The sons and daughters of Prometheus elect her as their Queen. Pandora encourages
her subjects to wreak revenge on Prometheus for all his wrongdoings, but instead seven young 
men who swore to serve their queen faithfully throw their spears at her. While dying, Pandora 
confesses her love for Prometheus, who is taken away in chains at the orders of Zeus by Kratos 
and Bia. Humanity distressed at the loss of their father demands the return of Prometheus, whom 
they declare their true king. They try to fight against Kratos and Bia to liberate Prometheus but to
no avail. Humankind is shown as powerless and in the grip of despair at the end of the play.
The tragedy presents Ivanov's private myth of the emergence of individuation into history.
The figure of Prometheus personifies the universal principle of individuation that inflicts the 
wound of mortal existence on the already shattered original unity. Into the newly established 
cosmic harmony marked by the ascendance of Zeus, son of Cronus, and the throng of Olympian 
gods, the Titan Prometheus introduces a new source of universal division and conflict by 
moulding mortal mankind out of clay. The outcome of this further split of the primordial unity is 
not only an exponential intensification of the processes of fragmentation, discord, and disunity 
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that have already affected the Universe as a consequence of the violent tearing apart of Dionysus 
by the Titans, but also and, more importantly, the incursion of death into the world of the 
immortals. The ushering in of the reign of death is Prometheus's crime which is inherited by his 
“sons” (humankind) in the form of tragic guilt. The very fact of being born turns into hereditary 
guilt: “Guilt lies in birth”415 (SS, 2: 110), for, in the words of Frye, in the fallen world “merely to 
exist is to disturb the balance of nature. Every natural man is a Hegelian thesis, and implies a 
reaction: every new birth provokes the return of an avenging death” (105). The temporal nature 
of existence measured by mental anguish and physical suffering becomes the lot (curse) of all 
men, thrust from birth into the ceaseless flow of Heraclitean becoming.  
To atone for Prometheus' crime, the particular (mankind) must suffer and be annihilated 
in the process, for it is no longer an inalienable part of the lost primordial unity. Prometheus 
initiates the chain of becoming, the endless cycle of creation and annihilation, thereby shifting 
the universal state of things further away from the original nexus of being (wholeness) into the 
tragic abyss of non-being. The recent order, a semblance of harmony, reestablished by Zeus, son 
of Cronus, is upended by Prometheus's (mis)deed and the Universe becomes a space of perpetual 
conflict that tears its fabric further and further apart, pitting mortals against mortals and mortals 
against the presiding gods themselves. Throughout the play we can see the ever progressive 
acceleration of the forces of fragmentation and particularization operating in the Universe. 
 Prometheus, who further undermines the original cosmic harmony by creating 
humankind, is affected by the process of division that he unleashed in the first place. He loses his
androgynous wholeness—his original primordial unity of the feminine and masculine essences 
by separating and objectifying his feminine side into Pandora. Prometheus estranges and 
415 “Вина—рожденье.” 
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sacrifices his feminine self in order to obtain the prototype for his creation of humankind, which 
is a singular product and a mirror reflection of his excessive Romantic subjectivity seeking self-
assertion: “My bridegroom and brother took off my veil/ But not in order in a sweet embrace/ to 
unite a body with a body!/ The artist sought a prototype in me/ in order to create a race of 
humankind (mirroring drains the soul)”416 (SS, 2: 148). By rejecting his feminine self, his psyche, 
Prometheus alienates Pandora who turns in rage against the masculine (rational) principle, 
privileging division and strife over harmony and love. To avenge her spurned love, she turns 
Prometheus' sons and daughters against their own creator. The enmity and conflict brought into 
the Universe by Prometheus through the estrangement of his feminine essence spills over and 
turns against himself. In his inner conflict against his feminine essence externalized in his 
dismissal of Pandora, his bride, Prometheus betrays himself as a pseudo-bridegroom. In the 
words of Themis, Prometheus' mother, who created Pandora out of Prometheus' severed feminine
essence: “Pandora is unchained. Towards the Bridegroom/ She stretches her arms... But the 
bridegroom/ Is not you, not you!.. The infant is growing, who was /tortured to death in time 
immemorial... He turned into a youth... It is him/ that she yearns for... He will take her for a 
bride, /When he sets you free... But you/ Have rejected her. Because she is you yourself”417 (133).
The reunification of Prometheus with Pandora, and therefore, the restoration of the lost 
androgynous wholeness, can happen only through the mediation of the true Bridegroom, 
Dionysus-Christ, whose coming is still in the distant future. 
Conflict and enmity affect Prometheus' sons dividing them against each other and turning 
416  “И снял с меня фату жених и брат... / Но не затем, чтоб в сладостном объятьи / Любовию смеситься телу 
с телом! / Прообраза искал во мне художник / Своим твореньям (пьет зеркальность душу!).” 
417  “Раскована Пандора. Жениху / Обьятья простирает... Но жених — / Не ты, не ты!.. Растет младенец, 
древле / Замученный... Стал юношей... Его / Она желает... Он ее возьмет, / Когда тебя освободит... А ты 
— / Ее отверг. Зане она — ты сам.”
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them against their own creator. Innocent humankind, ignorant of suffering and death, sets out on 
the accursed path of Cain when the first blood is shed by Archemorus, jealous of Archates over 
the privilege of tending the sacred fire. The first murder turns the very fire of freedom, given to 
humankind by Prometheus as a token of their Dionysian ancestry, into a divisive weapon of 
enslavement and internecine conflict. Physical death introduced by Archemorus into the world 
affects not only mankind but also corrupts the whole of nature as becomes evident when the lion 
attacks and murders another son of Prometheus, Opheltes. Opheltes' violent demise, in its turn, 
provokes the suicide of Aphtodikes, who is unable to withstand the suffering occasioned by the 
loss. The fall of mankind initiated by Archemorous' murder results not only in the ever 
intensifying violence but also in their betrayal of Prometheus, their father. Prometheus's sons turn
away from him in order to welcome Pandora as their queen, but in accepting her as their ruler, 
they only further strengthen the chain of slavery that they have already started wrapping around 
themselves after the first blood defiled the earth. The end of the play sees humankind engulfed by
despair over the far-reaching consequences of their disloyalty to Prometheus. 
The chorus, which is the backbone of religious objectivity in Ivanov's conception of 
tragedy, is also increasingly affected by division until it completely breaks apart. As was already 
noticed by Stepanova, there is no chorus as a unified collective even at the beginning of the play. 
Instead of presenting a cohesive community, the chorus is nothing but a multitude of isolated 
“I's”, each engaged in its own theomachy: 
In Ivanov's tragedy one can observe a symbolically significant violation of the 
Aeschylean tradition—the tradition of the chorus's monologism. Aeschylus's chorus 
speaks on behalf of the “I.” By using the first person plural “we” [“We do not submit/ To 
the yoke of Atlantis”], the poet signals the original fragmentation of the choral body, 
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which is, in his conception, a direct consequence of the individualistic Titanic 
theomachy.418 (120) 
This lack of universal unity and stability manifests itself in the constant change of the body of the
chorus throughout the play, culminating in the total disintegration of the chorus into unrelated 
and disconnected particulars: 
At the beginning of the tragedy one finds the chorus of Oceanides on the dark orchestra. 
As the play progresses, the chorus of Oceanides is either submerged into darkness, with 
its three participants left in the spotlight, or is replaced with the chorus of Nereides. In the
third act the chorus fragments itself into “the chorus of men” and “the chorus of women.” 
And, finally, Ivanov comes to designate the tragic chorus with an expressive symbolic 
name “a crowd.”419 (Ibid.) 
This dissolution of the chorus linked with the religious principle of objectivity is reflective of the 
triumph of Romantic subjectivism ushered in by the Byronic arch-individualist, Prometheus. 
The unleashed enmity and strife seem to have engulfed the entire Universe, but Ivanov 
seeks to contain all this intensifying tragic process of particularization and fragmentation by 
creating an overarching framework of future redemption. As it transpires in Prometheus' and 
Pandora's monologues, the Titan dares to stand up against the Olympic gods not simply out of 
subjective theomachic impulse but, curiously enough, in the name of two gods, the original Zeus 
and his son, Dionysus: “It is to him, oh children, / You should submit yourself / To the one who is
418 “В трагедии Иванова — символически значимое нарушение эсхиловской традиции, традиции 
монологичности хора. Хор Эсхила выступает от имени ''я.'' Употребляя 1-е лицо множественного числа —
''мы'' [“Мы выи не клоним / Под иго Атланта... ”], поэт заявляет об изначальной раздробленности 
хорового тела, что в его концепции является прямым следствием индивидуалистического титанического 
богоборства.”
419 “В самом начале трагедии на темной орхестре — Хор Океанид. В дальнейшем Хор Океанид то 
погружается во мрак, оставляя ''на свету'' трех его участниц, то заменяется Хором Нереид. В третьем 
действии Хор распадается на ''Хор мужчин'' и ''Хор женщин.'' И, наконец, Иванов обозначает хор трагедии
выразительным символическим именем — ''толпа''.”  
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immortal within yourself”420 (SS, 2: 127); “But I will invite to our festive celebration / to the 
communion of fire and food of Zeus, / In honor of consigning to oblivion all untruth and 
resentment / And of uniting all in One / Whose flame is burning within the immortals and us”421 
(128); “Not to prostrate oneself before but to join / The oldest in Heaven and in Heaven the One /
Who is Himself within the gods and Himself within you, the free one”422 (Ibid.). The Byronic 
rebel, Prometheus, appears to be playing a preordained role in the seemingly tragic scenario 
which is, as it is given to understand by Ivanov, to metamorphose into the universal mystery play 
upon the return of the legitimate lord of the Universe (the Son, Dionysus-Christ). There is a 
divinely authored script at work that the rebellious Titan, an embodiment of radical Romantic 
subjectivity, is an indispensable part of and he seems to be fully conscious of his role in God's 
grand design.  
Viewed from within the divine framework, Prometheus is not actually the one who ushers
in the rule of death, for the seemingly interminable cycle of birth and death (expected to be 
followed by resurrection) has already been initiated by the god Dionysus, the son of the true Zeus
(“iskonnyi Zevs”/ “Sam”), through his birth and subsequent violent demise. It is Dionysus who 
introduces Time (and therefore, death) upon the earth: “Time was born/ With the birth of the 
Son”423 (145). Thus, the cosmic clock ticking off the hours has been set in motion well before 
Prometheus' rebellion against the usurper Zeus, son of Cronus. In this light, Prometheus only 
takes the next step by creating mortals out of clay, by animating that clay with the “fire” left after
the immolation of the Titans who dismembered and devoured the child Dionysus (149). In his 
420  “Ему, о дети, / Покорствуйте! Бессмертному в себе!”
421  “Но приглашу на праздничный наш пир / К общению огня и пищи Зевса, / В забвение неправды и обиды /
И в единенье всех о Том Едином, / Чей пламень в небожителях и в нас.”  
422  “Не раболепствовать, но приобщаться / Старейшим в небесах, и в них Тому, / Кто Сам в богах и Сам в 
тебе, свободном.”  
423  “Родилось время / С рожденьем сына.” 
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speech about Arkhemor who fell the first victim of death, Prometheus describes his creation as 
“an innocent vessel of lightnings on the earth, / That emerged under my creative hand / The 
suffering image of the eternal infant”424 (120). Man is therefore consciously fashioned by 
Prometheus after the suffering god, Dionysus, whose image imperceptibly merges with that of 
the coming Christ, who is to succeed Dionysus as another incarnation of the Son in the ages to 
come. In this light, men's inescapable death is nothing but an imitation of Dionysus's death by 
dismemberment/or the future Passion of Christ on the cross, which are to be followed by the final
resurrection and triumphant return of the suffering god, Dionysus-Christ. 
Humankind, as foreseen by Prometheus who is endowed with prophetic powers, is 
destined to enact the same cycle of birth, death, and, ultimately, resurrection: “The Bridegroom 
will arrive and set us free”425 (122). Jesus Christ is traditionally referred to as “Bridegroom” in 
Christian theology but in Ivanov's conception of the Suffering God, Christ is just another 
manifestation of the Son, whose first, pagan, incarnation is Dionysus. Thus, Christ is to liberate 
humankind from the chains of Zeus, son of Cronus, who has usurped the place of the legitimate 
ruler, the Son, and, in a more distant future, from the reign of Death itself. The definitive victory 
over Time and Death eventually awaits humankind in the image of the resurrected Suffering God 
(the Second Coming of Christ-Dionysus): “The lot fallen to the phalanx is to perish / On the 
battlefield; to the leader abandonment / And long captivity. But to all of us—a victory […] Your 
lot is to die—and arise like me...”426 (126). Future immortality lies in store for languishing 
mankind yearning for liberation. 
424  “... сосуд невинный молний на земле, / Возникший под моей рукой творящей / Страдальный облик 
вечного младенца.”  
425  “Придет жених и нас освободит.”  
426  “Фаланге жребий пал — костьми полечь / На бранном поле; сиротство вождю / И долгий плен. Но вкупе 
нам — победа […] Вам умереть удел — и встать, как я....”
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Hence, the importance of the “seed” motif throughout the play. This motif ties together 
paganism and Christianity, for the idea of the dying and germinating seed dwells at the center of 
both worldviews. The essence of the archaic Greek vision of Dionysus, in Ivanov's opinion, lies 
precisely in the suffering god's association with the process of dying and subsequent resurrection 
embodied by the sprouting seed: “Thus, the mortal aspect of the suffering god precedes the 
vegetative one. Life arises out of death. The seed will not bear fruit unless it dies. […] Life arises
out of death: such is the essence of the religion of the god of vegetation, the god of abundance”
427 (Ellinskaia religiia 69). The same message about the necessity of death for the renewal of life 
symbolized by the seed resounds in Christianity: “Verily, verily I say unto you, unless a grain of 
wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit” 428  
(KJV, John 12:24).429 Man is such a seed sown in the Universe by Prometheus: “I arose and 
fulfilled myself. You will arise. But now you are only a seed. In order to turn into dust, you are 
sown onto the field of the dark Gaia”430 (SS, 2: 118). Having the “seed” of the dismembered and 
immolated child Dionysus planted within themselves, men are made in the image of the Suffering
God. In Pandora's words, “He needed neither a spouse nor a concubine. He desired only the seed 
from Dionysus”431 (149). This “seed,” which is also referred to by Ivanov as a “spark,” manifests 
427  “Итак, смертный аспект бога страдающего первее аспекта растительного. Из смерти — жизнь. Семя не 
даст плода, если не умрет. […] Из смерти — жизнь: таково исконное представление религии бога 
цветущего, бога изобильного.” 
428  “Истинно, истинно говорю вам: если пшеничное зерно, падши в землю, не умрет, то останется одно; а 
если умрет, то принесет много плода” (Иоан 12:24).
429  While the seed seems to be at the core of both paganism and Christianity, one should emphasize that the 
meaning behind death and resurrection of the seed is rather different than Ivanov is willing to acknowledge. In 
the archaic Greek culture the renewal of the seed does not carry the same connotation of the definitive annulment
of death as it does in Christianity. Instead, the image of the seed stands for the ever-lasting natural cycle of births 
and deaths that Ivanov seeks to terminate by fusing this pagan imagery with the Christian message of eternal life.
While death is viewed as an indispensable part of the renewal of Nature in paganism, in Christianity death is 
unnatural, a result of the sin, and to be ultimately defeated through the resurrection and second Advent of Christ.  
430  “Я стал и совершился. Ты же — будешь. А ныне — только семя. Чтоб истлеть, / Посеян ты на ниву Геи 
темной.”
431  “Ему не нужно было / Супруги, ни наложницы. Желал он / От Диониса семени.”  
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itself in humankind as the divine spirit or, what in Christian terms, could be designated as free 
will: “Prometheus thought of adorning the Universe / With humankind, of raising to the skies / 
The conflagration struck out of the Dionysian spark”432 (147). People are destined to realize that 
the “seed” hidden within themselves but they can fully test and exercise their freedom of will 
only by going through the agonies of division and conflict with their own selves, each other, and 
the gods. Hence, Prometheus's defiant insistence that he has sown a Titanic “seed of discord” not 
of peace through and among his “sons.” Mankind will not be able to freely accept the true god 
and the new life that the god represents unless men come to know the anguish inflicted by the 
irreversability of Time and the terror struck by death. 
Humankind has to suffer in order to fulfill itself as a divine collective, thereby realizing 
its Dionysian-Christian potential concealed within the seed. Thus, in Ivanov's conception, man is 
to replicate the destiny of the Suffering God in his pains of growth: birth—violent death—
resurrection. Man must suffer and die so that he can be reborn into new, eternal, life. There can 
be no resurrection without death: 
The human spirit had to be crucified with Christ and, having joined him on the cross, to 
accept his stigmata. Only in this highest sacrament of fusion [through suffering and death]
was it given to man to experience the All-in-Oneness once again as partaking of the 
universal Crucifixion. Through man's partaking of Christ, the whole world comes to 
partake of Christ. And in the image of the suffering universal Christ crucified on the tree 
there reveals itself again the ancient Dionysus, the ancient world tree of life. And the 
long-awaited transformation of Nature has ultimately come to pass: the one who has 
accepted the image of Dionysus accepts the image of Christ, and those resurrected in 
432 “Промыслил человеком Прометей / Вселенную украсить, взвеять к небу / Из искры Дионисовой пожар.”
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Dionysus are resurrected in Christ.433 (Religiia Dionisa, 7: 143)
The advancement of humankind through birth, struggle, sufferings, and death towards 
resurrection as Divine Humanity is a reflection of the progression of the Universe itself through 
unity, conflict and division to the new type of absolute unity, All-in-One, which would not 
annihilate the sprung up diversity but would harmoniously reintegrate it within the One. The 
microcosm (man) is shown as existing in full alignment with the macrocosm (the Universe) 
embodied in the image of the Suffering God, and, as Ivanov strives to communicate in 
Prometheus as well as in his other works, the transfiguration of the one cannot happen without 
the transformation of the other. 
Yet by seeking to sublate Titanic individualism or, in other words, explosive Romantic 
subjectivity within the reunifying redemptive framework of the Christian type that promises the 
annulment of man's ultimate alienation (death) in the triumph of eternal life (future resurrection 
in Dionysus-Christ), Ivanov effectively undermines the tragic nature of his play. This is by no 
means to assert that Christianity is devoid of tragic spirit altogether. However, the fundamental 
message of Christianity revolves around resurrection and therefore the definitive annulment of 
death that defines the very nature of humanity from the perspective of tragedy. Thus, the generic 
mode within which the Christian narrative can be apprehended is comedy rather than tragedy. In 
Frye's words: “Christianity... sees tragedy as an episode in the divine comedy, the larger scheme 
of redemption and resurrection. The sense of tragedy as a prelude to comedy seems almost 
433 “Человеческий дух должен был сораспяться Христу и, соединившись с Ним, принять Его стигмы. Только 
в этом высшем таинстве слияния [through suffering and death] дано было человеку снова ощутить 
всеединство, как причастие распятию вселенскому [universal Crucifixion]. В приобщении Христу 
человека, Христу приобщился мир. И в образе страдающего и на древе распятого мирового Христа опять 
открылся древний Дионис, древнее мировое Древо Жизни. И явным стало чаемое преображение 
Природы: приявший образ Диониса приемлет образ Христов, и воскресающий в Дионисе воскресает в 
Христе.”
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inseparable from anything explicitly Christian” (106-107). Viewed in this context, the very crime 
committed by the Titan Prometheus that brought the sin of individuation into the world forfeits 
its tragic nature, for it is a crime akin to Adam's felix culpa, a fortunate sin in Christianity, that 
sets in motion the workings of salvation and the blessedness of the Redemption within the 
Universe.  
Furthermore, tragedy does not permit the triumphant (re)assertion of the moral order 
associated with Christian salvation: “Christianity is intransigent to tragedy: tragedy bucks and 
balks under Christianity” (Michel 232). Even if the paradoxes and ambiguities that haunt 
humanity are transcended in tragedy for the moment in a higher vision (as it happens, for 
example, in Aeschylus' tragic trilogy Oresteia and Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus), they still 
persist, for they are in the end insoluble. Tragedy gives no consoling answer, no definitive 
explanation, as to why a human being has to suffer. And, in Steiner's words, “Why should there 
be [such an answer]? If there was, we would be dealing with just or unjust suffering, as do 
parables and cautionary tales, not with tragedy. And beyond the tragic, there lies no ''happy 
ending'' in some other dimension of place or time. The wounds are not healed and the broken 
spirit is not mended. In the norm of tragedy there can be no compensation” (Death of Tragedy 
129). It is this chance of being saved safeguarded by the overarching framework of future 
redemption that destroys in Ivanov's Prometheus the tragic sense of being inescapably trapped 
within the woes of mortality and mutability, or, to put it otherwise, in the status quo of being 
human. 
Moreover, this unsuccessful attempt to subjugate tragedy to the Solov'evian-cum-
Christian narrative of redemption and transcendence of humanity further exposes a deep-seated 
affinity between Ivanov's tragedy and the subjectivism of Romanticism that it seeks to subsume
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—its fundamentally lyrical nature. Bird puts his finger on the problem: 
Ivanov knew better than anyone that, in theory, tragedy is the merciless enactment of 
man's encounter with cosmic darkness. In practice both Ivanov's tragedies [Tantalus and 
The Sons of Prometheus/Prometheus] and the mythological systems he uses turn out to be
unabashed allegories for his religious-philosophical views. The ritual experience of 
ancient tragedy is replaced by a largely intellectual demonstration of immanent 
transcendence of God in man and in the cosmos. (The Tender Mystery 146) 
Thus, instead of creating an “objective” tragedy, Ivanov creates a subjective drama in the spirit of
Romanticism that he so strongly objected to in contemporary (modernist) theater. 
This shift from the objective to the subjective is particularly striking in Ivanov's use of 
mythology in his tragedy. Similar to the Romantics, Ivanov has to face the fact that modern 
culture is torn loose from the moorings of collective (“objective”) mythology that used to “center
the imaginative habits and practices of western civilization” (Steiner 323). And, as a 
consequence, like his Romantic predecessors, the Russian Symbolist has to confront the same 
uneasy choice as to whether to live “by the rags and leavings of old, worn-out mythologies” or to
seek “to create new ones in their stead” (321). To fill a void of meaning left by the decline of the 
classic and Christian world orders, Ivanov seeks to reanimate the defunct Ancient Greek and the 
ailing Christian mythologies by infusing them with new meanings. These new meanings, 
however, are an act of private invention (i.e., a product of individual genius) rather than a 
creation of collective imagination. As a result, these collective mythologies that used to be 
comprehensible to all members of the public (“the people”) lose their objective nature and turn 
into an esoteric lore accessible to the select few. 
Through this act of private reinvention, the Aeschylean myth of Prometheus is 
356
transformed in Ivanov's tragedy into a subjective allegory, no less lyrical than Shelley's 
Prometheus Unbound. As in Shelley's lyrical drama, lyrical potentiality (i.e., subjective mood) is 
elevated in Ivanov over dramatic objectivity. That it is a drama of thought, an aspiration of the 
solitary ego is already evident in the fact, according to Bird, that Ivanov's final choice of the title 
for his tragedy is Prometheus rather than Sons of Prometheus. As a result of this change of title 
the emphasis dramatically shifts from “highlight[ing] the hereditary and historical nature of the 
dilemma faced by the heroes [Prometheus's progeny]” to “stress[ing] the individualistic 
interpretation of the tragedy in a way that makes it into an allegory of the creative process [as 
opposed to an objective representation of the unfolding historical process]” (The Tender Mystery 
145). This shift in emphasis “represents a triumph of the Romantic-lyrical strain of the work,” for
“the different voices [dramatis personae] are revealed to be modifications of the central hero's 
own voice, which in turn is identical to the voice of the poet” (147). In this light, Ivanov's tragedy
does not appear significantly different from Romantic lyrical drama, which Christensen defines 
as “the pathetic [passionate and implicit rather than theatrical] representation of the mind in the 
meditative passage of characters” (61). Thus, Ivanov's objective tragedy turns out to be the 
subjective drama of the mind he originally sets out to overcome. Instead of objective theater, 
Ivanov creates another Romantic “song transcribed for one voice” (Ibid.) or, in his own words 
that he used to castigate modern(ist) drama:
Such an action where the abstract schemes and amorphous ghosts rustle and sigh and rush
like autumn leaves, obeying the breath of the unknown will; for such a substitution of the 
heroic action with the hypostatization of the passio-lyrical experience results in the 
dissolution of the choral, communal or social element of the drama.434 (SS, 2: 268-269). 
434 “Такое действие, где перед нами отвлеченные схемы и неопределенные призраки шелестят и вздыхают и 
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Rather than reinstating the collective, Ivanov contributes to its demise.   
In his theatrical practice Ivanov is unable to create objective tragedy as he conceptualized 
it in his theory of tragedy. Rather than subsuming rebellious Romantic subjectivity personified as
a tragic hero, the supreme individualist, under the objective element represented as a unified 
collective (chorus), Ivanov's tragedy does the very opposite. The processes of fragmentation and 
individuation associated with the elevation of the subject penetrate the very fabric of the chorus, 
either relegating it to the background, thereby emphasizing its merely subsidiary status (Tantalus)
or dispersing it altogether (Prometheus). In both tragedies, the object is not an objective action 
but, emphatically, what stands behind the semblance of that action which is an expressive 
representation of the author's subjective intellectual vision. All the dramatic figures are not 
individualized characters but allegorical articulations of ideas, carriers of symbolic meaning 
which can be deciphered only from within the framework of Ivanov's private arcane mythology. 
The overarching symbolic idea, a product of the solitary genius, gains control over the action that
becomes nothing else but an enactment of this idea. 
In place of the objective tragic theater that reintegrates the individual and the collective, 
Ivanov offers a Symbolist version of the Romantic theater of the mind that stresses the 
supremacy of the lyric as the province of subjective psychological states over drama as the realm 
of objective action. In other words, the subject, the controlling authorial consciousness that 
manifests itself via dramatis personae (its masks), entirely supplants the objective dimension in 
Ivanov's tragedies, for, like the Romantic lyrical drama, they are solely enabled and impelled by 
the lyric. Thus, the lyric (“Romantic”) element deeply embedded at the heart of Ivanov's 
носятся, как осенние листья, повинуясь дыханию неведомой воли; ибо такая подмена героического 
действия ипостазированием страдательно-лирического переживания ведет за собою исчезновение и 
хорового, соборного или общественного элемента драмы.”
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tragedies makes tragedy in the objective sense no longer possible.  
IV. Andrei Belyi: The Irony of the Tragic Romance
Like Ivanov, Belyi views the path toward Solov'evian theurgy as lying through the realm 
of the tragic, a successful transition through which would allow Russian Symbolists to surmount 
the Romantic debacle. For both Symbolists, the tragic is the penultimate stage before the 
fulfillment of the Absolute that would herald the definitive synthesis of the finite and the infinite, 
of art and life that Romanticism in its defeat came to view as unattainable. Unlike Ivanov, 
however, Belyi is not so much interested in restoring tragedy as an objective theatrical genre as in
transposing the tragic conflict between the tragic hero (free will) and fate (necessity) into the 
realm of life itself: “It is not from life that we should run to the theater in order to sing and dance 
over the dead tragic goat and then after getting back to life, get astounded at what we have done. 
This is how an escape from fate takes place. And fate will burst into the theatrical temple after us 
and destroy our songs and dances. We must transform life itself into drama”435 (Arabeski 27). The
tragic must become the mode of being in the world. Life itself should be transfigured into tragic 
drama if the metaphysical impasse exposed and embodied by Romanticism is ever to be resolved.
 Moreover, in contrast to Ivanov, Belyi, who is no less eager to “rewrite” Romanticism, 
nevertheless, views it as only one of the severed opposites that threaten the promise of the 
absolute synthesis represented by the fulfillment of Symbolism as the triumph of Godmanhood. 
As in his theoretical project which was to unify the antithetical poles of Romanticism and 
Idealism (“Classicism”) under the aegis of the Symbol Embodied, Belyi sees the drama unfolding
435  “Не от жизни должны мы бегать в театр, чтоб петь и плясать над мертвым трагическим козлом и потом, 
попадая в жизнь изумляться тому, что мы наделали. Так совершается бегство от рока. И рок ворвется за 
нами в театральный храм разложит нам наши песни и пляски. Самую жизнь должны мы претворять в 
драму.”
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in life as culminating in the tragic confrontation between man (associated with the pole of 
Romanticism) and the artist (linked with the pole of Classicism) in each aspiring theurgist (proto-
Symbolist/Symbolist): 
Balance, a triumph over Romanticism is not the final goal of art; balance, the harmony of 
form is just a temporary stop on the path of madness called creativity [tvorchestvo]; the 
drama of creativity consists of three acts: the first act—Romanticism—the wine of the life
of creativity is still young, it is fermenting; the second act—wine is poured into the wine 
bags and grows stronger under the mask of Olympianism (Classicism); the third act—
wine that has become strong turns into blood and the fire of life at the same time: the 
mask of tranquility is shattered, and either the artist in a man of genius seeks to murder 
the man (wine in the wine bags is transformed into art) or the man in a man of genius 
murders the artist (wine bursts the wine bags asunder). It is then that one hears 
“thunderings and voices”; the last days are approaching […] he is now a prophet because 
the final goal of art is a prophecy about the last goal of life.436 (Kritika 398-399) 
To attain the stage of Symbolism or, in other words, Solov'evian Godmanhood, the artist has to 
tragically confront his nemesis, for only in the tragic collision between the tragic hero and fate  
that manifests itself as “Romanticism” (unformed content of life) or “Classicism” (empty form of
art) can a new, theurgic, order of things be born. Further, in contrast to Ivanov, who views the 
reunion between the individual (the tragic hero) and the collective (the chorus) as a prerequisite 
436  “Уравновешенность, победа над романтизмом не последняя цель художественного творчества; 
уравновешенность, гармония формы есть лишь временная остановка на пути безумия, называемого 
творчеством; у творческой драмы есть три акта: акт первый — романтизм — вино жизни творчества 
молодо, оно бродит; акт второй — вино заключается в мехи и крепнет под маской олимпийства 
(классицизм); акт третий — окрепшее вино становится и кровью, и огнем жизни: маска успокоенности 
разбита, и либо художник в гении стремится убить человека (вино в мехах перешло в творчество), либо 
человек в гении убивает художника (вино разрывает мехи). Вот тогда-то слышны "громы и гласы"; 
приближаются последние развязки […] он теперь пророк, потому что последняя цель искусства —
пророчество о последней цели жизни.”
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for the restoration of tragedy as an objective genre, Belyi regards the collective embodied by the 
folk Russia with suspicion—as inert matter or, in other words, as the fallen World Soul, ensnared 
by the demonic. It is the Titanic individual, the tragic hero, who after having valiantly confronted
fate from within himself will be able, in Belyi's vision, to liberate the collective Russia by 
confronting fate from without. The synthesis of the individual and the collective can take place 
only under the stewardship of the heroic individual. 
While throughout his creative career Belyi pursues the goal of subsuming “Romanticism”
and “Classicism” under Symbolism through the tragic hero's heroic action, he nevertheless finds 
himself unable to resolve the fundamental dichotomy. He cannot break away from the 
dichotomous conception of the Universe: his thinking as reflected in imagery, rhetorical figures, 
and structure is always in oppositions that align themselves with the antithetical poles of 
Classicism and Romanticism. Originally, the Russian Symbolist conceives of the metaphysical 
feat of cosmic synthesis as one that is to be accomplished in line with the Romantic notion of the 
heroic Romance—solely by the efforts of the Titanic individual who has raised himself above the
ordinary human lot. This Romantic tragic hero, however, finds himself positioned, as it becomes 
discernible in the novel The Silver Dove (Serebrianyi golub', 1909), in the mechanistic and 
deterministic Universe that denies the existence of free will indispensable to the very existence of
the hero. Thus, instead of finding reconciliation within the framework of Symbolist thought, the 
“Romantic” tragic hero and the “Classicist” conception of the Universe as governed solely by 
necessity collide, vying for supremacy. 
The Romantic tragic hero, being stripped of his will, is in the end overpowered, for 
Belyi's prefigurement of historical processes as operating by the same laws of causality as Nature
crushes his aspirations for transformative human action. The Russian Symbolist's descent into 
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fatalistic determinism that leads him to satirize the very tragic emplotment that he earlier sought 
so eagerly to actualize in life and art is manifest in his second novel Petersburg (Peterburg, 
1912-1913). The “Classicist” model of the Universe as deterministic comes to hold sway over 
Belyi's imagination, plunging him into the ironic mode, for which previously he denounced Blok 
as a traitor to their theurgic cause (see the first chapter). In his inability to reconcile the opposites 
in fiction as well as in life, Belyi comes to face the same truth as the late Solov'ev who admitted 
by the end of his life that the tragic divide between the finite and the infinite cannot be bridged 
by any human being, no matter how Titanic he may appear. 
This painful insight into the disjointed nature of all things earthly leads to Belyi's 
dramatic reconceptualization of the idea of the tragic. From the tragic as a battle between human 
will and necessity that transforms the Universe in its wake, Belyi shifts towards the fatalistic 
conception of the tragic, characteristic of so-called “modern vision”—as the tragism of 
irreconcilable opposites. The Russian Symbolist comes to view the human condition as 
ineluctably tragic, with no possibility of breaking away from the vicious circularity of history 
from within its circle. Nevertheless, Belyi refuses to yield to nihilistic irony and despair 
characteristic of late Modernism faced with the same metaphysical stalemate. Like Solov'ev, 
Belyi resorts to the consolation promised by Christianity. If the tragism of opposites cannot be 
resolved from within (solely by the heroic human effort), it will be canceled from without 
(through divine intervention). It is this belief in external salvation that allows Belyi not to plunge 
into complete fatalism that Blok, on other hand, would not be able to escape.   
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Belyi's Conception of the Tragic: 
History as a Tragic Romance
It is Belyi's theory (Arabesques, The Green Meadow) that gives a clear understanding of 
his ideal vision of the tragic as a mode of being that should be actuated in history, as opposed to 
his novels, The Silver Dove and Petersburg, where the ideal emplotment of history as tragic 
drama finds itself perpetually in conflict with the representation of history as a deterministic 
course of events that characterizes its current development. The ironic mode of exposition that 
dominates the novels is a product of the collision between the ideal of history which would 
ultimately lead to its termination, and its reality as embodied in the vicious circle of temporality. 
This ideal unfolding of history is envisioned by Belyi in terms of heroic Romance. Like the 
earlier Romantics (Schelling, Byron, Carlyle, and Wagner), the Russian Symbolist seeks to give 
human life an awareness of its potentially heroic nature. It is in the exercise of one's freedom 
against the law of history that man reinvents himself by creating a new, tragic mode of existence 
which is in due course to culminate in the attainment of Godmanhood. History is thus cast into 
the role of fate (necessity) that, according to Belyi, has another embodiment as Nature. While in 
the essays, fate can manifest itself on occasion in the shapelessness of Romantic chaos, it is the 
Classicist/rationalist conception of history as an endless cause-and-effect chain that becomes 
Belyi's nemesis. This problematic conjunction of the Romantic hero (free will) and the rationalist
model of the deterministic Universe, concealed under Belyi's theoretical proclamations of the 
hero's eventual triumph, leads later to the explosive collision between the two poles, 
Romanticism and Classicism, with the heroic tragic degenerating into the ironic.   
In his collection of essays, Arabesques, in which Belyi most fully elaborates his 
conception of the tragic, the Russian Symbolist seeks to emplot history as a Tragic Romance. A 
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Symbolist is cast by Belyi into the role of the tragic hero who is to wrestle with fate that 
manifests itself in two antithetical forms as “Romanticism” and “Classicism”:  
If the Classic identifies his “I” with the principle of creativity, the Romantic identifies 
himself with the content of creativity: the universal chaos reveals itself in his “I.” The first
is a word without flesh, the second is a flesh without word. The first comes into conflict 
with the content of his own soul, the second—with the law of his own consciousness. The
heights of Classic and Romantic art merge with tragedy. These contradictions are 
reflected in the antinomy between form and content; but these contradictions are also 
reflected in the antinomy between the world of being and the world of art; the way out of 
the first contradiction is the unity of form and content of art [tvorchestvo]; the way out of 
the second contradiction is an expansion of the forms of art into the sphere of life and the 
transformation of life through art; the way out of the first contradiction is possible only in 
the case when the artist recognizes himself as his own artistic form and his life—as art 
[tvorchestvo]; the way out of the second contradiction is possible if the boundary between
life and art dissolves in the religious transformation of life. The unity of form and content 
is the postulate of all Symbolism. The meaning of art is solely religious.437 (219)
“Romanticism” and “Classicism,” for Belyi, as has already been discussed in the second chapter, 
437 “Если классик олицетворяет свое ''я'' с принципом творчества, романтик олицетворяет себя с 
содержанием творчества: в его ''я'' открывается хаос мира. Первый — слово без плоти, второй —
бессловесная плоть. Первый вступает в противоречие с содержанием собственной души, второй — с 
законом своего сознания. Вершины классического и романтического творчества переходят в трагедию. 
Эти противоречия отображаются в антиномии между формой творчества и его содержанием; но эти же 
противоречия отображаются в антиномии между миром бытия и миром искусств; выход из первого 
противоречия — единство формы и содержания творчества; выход из второго противоречия —
расширение форм художественного творчества до жизни или преображение жизни искусством; выход из 
первого противоречия возможен лишь в том случае, когда художник сознает себя своей собственной 
художественной формой, а свою жизнь — творчеством; выход из второго противоречия возможен, если 
стирается граница между искусством и жизнью в религиозном преображении жизни. Единство формы и 
содержания искусства и жизни и есть постулат всяческого символизма. Смысл икусства — только 
религиозен.”
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are not mere literary movements confined to a certain period of history but two opposing 
metaphysical poles that he comes to identify in various essays respectively with the irrational 
(feeling) and the rational (understanding), Kantian unstructured content (chaos) and pure forms 
of consciousness (time and space, in particular), Schopenhauerian will and representation, and 
Nietzschean Dionysian and Apollonian principles. The triumph of either Romanticism (pure 
chaos) or Classicism (pure form) is fatal to the theurgic enterprise and a Symbolist is to lead a 
tragic battle simultaneously on two fronts, against both monstrous manifestations of fate: “The 
hero fights against the night of the image-less [represented by the pole of 
Romanticism/Dionysian/the irrational/pure chaos]; but he fights against the dead image of life 
[represented by the pole of Classicism/Apollonian/the rational/empty form] as well”438 (11). 
Thus, depending on the enemy, Romanticism or Classicism, with which Kantian Criticism is 
closely aligned, that Belyi fiercely battles at any particular point, fate takes either the shape of 
nocturnal terrors (in other words, the pure chaos of Romanticism) or the inexorable course of 
Nature and history (in other words, time and space as Kantian a priori forms of pure sensibility). 
In “The Song of Life” (“Pesn' Zhizni,” 1908), Belyi creates a myth of how the two 
elements, here designated as the Dionysian (unbridled chaos) and the Apollonian (empty form), 
became the nemesis of mankind. According to this myth, in the primordial times man did not live
in a state of harmony with Nature but rather was engaged in a continuous tragic conflict with it. 
This tragic struggle of the primeval man with Nature originally perceived by him as unbridled 
Chaos (night and its terrors) represents, in Belyi's view, the very enactment of the process of life-
creation in which art and life are truly one: “In this dark prehistoric period the creation of a 
438 “Герой борется с ночью безобразного [represented by the pole of Romanticism/Dionysian/the irrational/pure 
chaos]; но и с мертвым образом жизни [represented by the pole of Classicism/Apollonian/the rational/empty 
form] он борется тоже.”
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harmonious individual, that is a strong personality (a hero), is a necessary condition of life; life 
here is a drama and the individual is a hero: life here is like art and art here is like life”439 (43-44).
This prehistoric period of theurgy in which man was a participant in the living tragic drama of his
own making is a period of unceasing metaphysical advancement in the realm of Being: “The hero
was fighting against the disembodied spirit the same way as with the bear, he advanced and 
conquered; and the line of his nocturnal path was illuminated by the light of created images; 
images, daily routine, the idols of thought are trophies snatched from the hands of the night”440 
(49). The hero climbs the ladder of Being, advancing ever further and further, by uniting the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian in his tragic confrontation with fate. 
The Apollonian images that the tragic hero creates in his battle against the Dionysian 
night are, however, turned into “idols” by the clan who mistakenly sees in the products rather 
than in the process itself a shield against Chaos. The clan is only concerned with building a 
strong wall by employing images (idols) as bricks so that the wall would keep out the night with 
its unspeakable terrors. Unlike the tragic hero, the clan is not interested in wrestling with and 
defeating fate (night) but only in defending itself against its encroachment. With time the tragic 
process of life-creation is abandoned by the hero for the sake of the product (artifact) demanded 
by the clan. Thus, the heroic individual is sacrificed to the needs of the clan and the theurgic art 
(the unity of the Apollonian and the Dionysian) degenerates into mere “techne” (Apollonian 
craft) by losing its vital connection with life (Dionysian chaos). This process of disintegration of 
theurgy into life and art brings about the curse of history:  
439 “В этот доисторический темный период — созидание гармонической личности, т. е. личности сильной 
(героя), есть необходимое условие жизни, здесь жизнь — драма, личность — ее герой: здесь жизнь, как 
творчество, здесь искусство, как жизнь.”
440 “Герой боролся с бестелесным духом одинаково, как и с медведем, он наступал и побеждал; и линия его 
ночного пути озарялась светом возникших образов; образы, быт, кумиры мысли — это трофеи, 
вырванные из рук ночи.”
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At the moment when the hero perished on a pile of trophies, having surrounded himself 
with images, history emerged, that is a hero's dream; the ocean of the night was breaking 
into the mainland of images: and the hero built a citadel out of those images (law and 
state); thus he shifted the protection of his own life to the fetish instead of realizing that 
the struggle against fate is a struggle with his own inertia; for it is only this struggle that 
cleaves new steps on the ladder of the universe. 
In that period, however, when man turned a creative step into the plane of being, the plane
turned out to be an infinity of this life and the hero became a wanderer on the surface of 
the infinite plane; thereby humanity changed the line of its path: the line of the former 
path stretched out into the sky, became the sky hanging over man, and the new path 
became the earth. And so began the period of the defensive art.441 (49)
However, the protective cover made of Apollonian images so carefully erected by 
humanity as a way to defend itself against the terrors of the night has ironically turned into 
another manifestation of fate that it sought to stave off in the first place. If the unrestrained 
Dionysian force (the irrational) is a pure chaos threatening to annihilate all culture and 
civilization (structured order), the rigid Apollonian cultivated by mankind to shield itself from the
darkness of the night degenerates into infinite series of fragmented empty forms of art (artifacts). 
Art (the Apollonian) in its divorce from life (the Dionysian) has become fatal, for the tragic 
creative consciousness congeals into the rigid a priori forms of Kantian consciousness that turns 
441 “В момент, когда герой опочил на трофеях, окружив себя образами, возникла история, т. е. сон героя; 
океан ночи врывался в материк образов: и герой выстроил из образов цитадель (законы, право, 
государство); так свалил он защиту собственной жизни на фетиша, вместо того чтобы понять, что борьба 
с роком — борьба с собственной косностью; ведь только эта борьба высекает новые ступени на лестнице 
мироздания. 
В тот период, когда человек превратил творческую ступень в плоскость бытия, плоскость оказалась 
бесконечностью этой жизни и герой стал блуждающим странником по плоскости бесконечности; так 
человечество изменило линию своего пути: линия прежнего пути продолжилась в небо, стала небом, 
висящим над человеком, а новый путь — землей. Так начался период оборонительного искусства.”
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into mankind's other nemesis. The protective wall (pure form) becomes a suffocating prison-
house of the phenomenal world which, for Belyi, has found its ultimate manifestation in the 
tenets of Kantian Critical philosophy. 
In “The Crisis of Consciousness and Henrik Ibsen” (“Krizis soznaniia i Genrik Ibsen,” 
1910), Belyi states that the greatest tragedy faced by mankind is the tragedy of cognition revealed
by Kant in his Critical philosophy by exposing the unreconciled dualities (noumenal and 
phenomenal; concept and feeling; the faculty of sensibility and the faculty of understanding) 
plaguing human consciousness: 
The greatest tragedy is a tragedy of cognition which is aware of its crisis; and if forms of 
cognition are essentially the conditions of the empirical reality itself experienced as life, 
then the crisis of cognition is reflected in life as the most disastrous collapse of life itself. 
[…] our tragedy is predetermined by the tragedy of cognition that conditions life without 
being merged with art [tvorchestvo]; […] the tragedy of cognition puts us under the heavy
yoke of inexorable fate.442 (196)
Unlike in prehistoric times in which fate manifested itself to the savage man predominantly in the
form of unstructured Chaos, modern man is mostly confronted with fate as a priori forms of 
Kantian intuition, Space and Time: “Like a machine man obeys the iron laws of necessity. This is
an immutable course of constellations and this is the immutable course of history. Hard fate 
crushed us with space and time”443 (19). In other words, it is the causal law of Nature and the 
442 “Самая большая трагедия есть трагедия нашего познания, сознающего свой кризис; и если 
познавательные формы суть условия самой эмпирической действительности, переживаемой как жизнь, то
кризис познания отображается в жизни как самое страшное крушение жизни. […] наша трагедия 
предопределена трагизмом познания, обусловливающего жизнь и не приведенного к творчеству; [...] 
трагедия познания обрекает нас во власть сурового рока.” 
443 “Как машина, человек подчиняется железным законам необходимости. Вот непреложный бег созвездий, и
вот непреложный бег истории. Пространством и временем задавил нас тяжелый рок.”
368
relentless, also causal, course of history, two divergent yet interrelated forms of necessity, that 
Belyi sets out to battle in his Symbolist enterprise. Of the two, however, it is the form of 
historical Time that he finds the most menacing. 
Working from within the framework of Kant's Critical philosophy, Belyi posits a 
historical determinism as one of the consequences of the a priori conditions of human experience.
In other words, in his apprehension of the historical field as it appears to the Kantian subject, that
is, as an interminable series of cause-effect relationships, Belyi aligns himself with what he calls 
the Classicist, or, in other words, the Enlightenment vision of history that appeals to strict laws of
causal determination. Unlike the Romantics (Carlyle, Schlegel, Novalis) who predominantly 
approach the field of history as “Chaos of Being” and thus as inherently disordered, 
incomprehensible, and infinitely complex, the Enlightenment thinkers tended to view history as 
being subject to the same rigorous laws of necessity as Nature. The Newtonian notion of the 
Universe predicated on determinism that gained traction in the exact and natural sciences was 
also extended and applied to the nascent social and human sciences, including history. Since 
every historical action becomes the effect of some previous mechanical cause, the course of 
history is apprehended in terms of the run of a mechanism. On this deterministic (mechanistic) 
definition of the workings of the Universe, individuals were stripped of history-altering roles, for 
their personal actions were viewed not as a product of their free will (self-determination) but 
rather followed as a result of the causal interplay of impersonal forces. 
Therefore, if the theurgic mode of being is ever to be consummated, the deterministic 
course of history must be overcome. To surmount history, modern man must convert the causal 
chain of historical processes into tragic drama by confronting this temporal form of necessity as 
the tragic hero endowed with free will. Kant sets strict laws of causal determination at the center 
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of his apprehension of the phenomenal world conditioned by the transcendental forms of 
consciousness but, for Belyi, phenomenal determinism is just a demonic illusion that can be 
vanquished by virtue of one's tragic participation in history. Human history as an area of 
happening dominated by cause-effect relationships can be tragically confronted and gradually 
brought to completion only by the artist, for, according to the Russian Symbolist, only the 
creative will of the artist is genuinely free: “Free will is a creative will. It is only creativity 
[tvorchestvo], regardless of the highest forms it manifests itself in, that carries free will within 
itself”444 (19). Thus, the tragic conflict which would define the destiny of the Universe, is to take 
the form of the mortal conflict between human freedom (creative will) and the power of the 
phenomenal world, between the artist and necessity as embodied by the strict laws of causal 
determination.
This tragic conflict is simultaneously internal and external, taking place on both the 
microcosmic (human consciousness) and macrocosmic levels (the outward world): 
Initially we feel within ourselves two realities (the reality of outer experience and the 
reality of inner experience); by subjecting ourselves to outer experience, we lose 
awareness of one's own “I”; by subjecting ourselves to inner experience, we dissolve the 
unity of our consciousness into the sea of illusions; it is only in the tension between the 
two types of experience, in the struggle of our “I” that the self feels free.445 (168) 
The first, crucial, stage of the tragic battle is essentially a struggle of man against his own 
limitations that came into being as a result of his unheroic desire to hide from the terror of the 
444 “Свободная воля есть воля творческая. Только творчество, в каких бы оно ни возвышалось формах, носит 
в себе вольную волю.”
445 “Первоначально мы ощущаем в себе две действительности (действительность внешнего опыта и 
действительность опыта внутреннего); подчиняя себя внешнему опыту, мы теряем сознание своего "я"; 
подчиняя себя опыту внутреннему, мы также растворяем единство нашего сознания в море иллюзий; 
только в трении обоих опытов, в борьбе наше "я" ощущается свободным "я".”
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night in a sanctuary of images such as laws, state, historical art, etc. By erecting the protective 
wall, man sought to repress the rebellious unconscious by means of the intellect and its rational 
constructions. This repression, however, generated the rupture within man himself and only the 
inward synthesis between the two warring forces—the irrational (the Dionysian) and the rational 
(the Apollonian)—could bring about the rebirth of the tragic hero in place of the divided man 
sheltering behind Kantian a priori forms. For it is only the tragic hero, in Belyi's vision, who, in 
full possession of personhood, can effectively engage with the external opponent, Life itself, in 
order to reshape it in accordance with his will: 
Personhood is a product of the union between two principles: the impersonal force of 
action (the spirit of Dionysus as Nietzsche said) and the equally impersonal power of 
imagination (a representation or, in other words, the spirit of Apollo). The union between 
these two principles in man's soul opposes him as a person to the impersonal character of 
the fragmented decaying life. Struggle erupts between life and the individual (the hero). 
The hero fights against the night of the image-less; but he fights against the dead image of
life as well.446 (11)
The tragic hero is doomed to perish in his unequal combat with necessity: 
The artist is always in combat with fate. Art is doomed to perish as a creation of dead 
forms (works of art). In drama one can find for the first time a foreshadowing of the 
demise along with fate and all the temporal conditions of fighting with it. Art will perish. 
What of it? The first rows of fighters always die.447 (20) 
446 “Личность — в соединении двух начал: Безличной силы действования (духа Диониса, как говорил 
Ницше) и столь же безличной силы воображения (представления, т. е. духа Аполлона). Соединение двух 
начал в душе человека противопоставляет его, как личность, безличию несоединенной, разлагающейся 
жизни. Между жизнью и личностью (героем) возникает борьба. Герой борется с ночью безобразного; но и
с мертвым образом жизни он борется тоже.”
447  “Художник в борьбе с роком неустанно. И художественному творчеству суждено погибнуть, как 
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Art must be tragically swept away in its collision with Nature and history for theurgy to come 
into being. The artist must fall in his battle with necessity for the Godman to arise in his stead. 
The emergence of the Godman would mark the transformation of the divided tree of knowledge 
back into the tree of life that disappeared from view with the onset of history: “History turned the
tree of life into the tree of knowledge of good and evil” (54).448
Thus, Belyi seeks to reconceptualize the “Classicist” view of history as a relentless 
unfolding of the causal chain into the tragic Romance:
The Romance is fundamentally a drama of self-identification symbolized by the hero's 
transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it and his final liberation from 
it—the sort of drama associated with Grail legend or the story of the resurrection of 
Christ in Christian mythology. It is a drama of the triumph of good over evil, of virtue 
over vice, of light over darkness, and of the ultimate transcendence of man over the world
in which he was imprisoned by the Fall. (White, Metahistory 8-9) 
The seemingly unalterable and eternal conditions under which man must labor (i.e., the 
inexorable course of Nature and history) are nothing but an illusion, a nightmarish dream, from 
which man can gradually free himself in the very process of the tragic strife against those 
conditions. 
In this light, the tragic struggle against necessity is viewed as an upward path, an ascent, 
towards the consummation of the Romance which would liberate man from the crippling 
inhibitions of mortality and mutability. The overarching frame of the Romance redeems and 
surmounts the temporal condition of man exposed and reaffirmed by tragedy. Tragedy that 
творчеству мертвых форм (произведений искусства). В драме впервые дается нам предзнаменование о 
погибели вместе с роком и всех временных условий борьбы с ним. Погибнет искусство. Что из того? 
Первые ряды борцов всегда гибнут.”
448  “Древо жизни превратила история в древо познания добра и зла.”
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depicts the Universe of irreconcilables and the plight of man placed in that Universe is enclosed 
within the Romantic mode that defuses its explosive potential, makes its somber insights 
innocuous by offering a full resolution to the conflict(s) viewed by tragedy as interminable and 
irremediable. While tragedy asserts that man cannot change the conditions of finiteness and 
contingency, Romance, on the other hand, promises transcendence of those blighting conditions. 
Terrible disjunctures portrayed by tragedy, including the fall of the protagonist and the 
catastrophic shaking of the world, are painful but indispensable steps towards the final triumph of
good (the way the passion of Christ is a painful but indispensable moment in the story of 
humankind's salvation). In the end, the Romance is supposed to sublate tragedy and extinguish 
the tragic insight into the human condition. Tragedy that brings into realization the highest 
possibilities of man is employed as a vehicle towards the actualization of the Absolute. 
In his theoretical emplotment of history as the tragic Romance, Belyi in fact follows 
Romantic historiography, an offshoot of philosophical Romanticism, that he strives to surmount 
in the first place. His apprehension of history as a heroic ascent towards the Absolute falls under 
the type of history that Nietzsche defined as monumental: “Monumental history... seeks not the 
old but the manifestly great, the heroic, and holds it up as an example of man's creative power to 
change and transform this world: hence it is future-oriented” (White 68). This hero-serving view 
of historiography, inspired by Schelling's conception of the tragic hero who reaffirms his freedom
at the very moment of his defeat by necessity, was originally developed and employed by the 
Romantics. In White's words, “The conception of history as the story of heroes, of the historical 
process as “the essence of innumerable biographies” [...] was the special achievement of the 
Romantic age of the early nineteenth century” (Ibid.). By drawing on this Romantic model that 
emphasizes the role of mighty individuals in the creative transformation of history, Belyi makes 
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an attempt, as has been shown in the second chapter, to construct a monumental literary history in
his collection of essays, Arabesques, in which he traces the line of tragic ascent from Baudelaire 
to Nietzsche, who marks the highest point reached by humankind thus far on its way to 
Godmanhood. 
Yet, despite his best efforts at developing a tragic interpretation of literary history, Belyi 
cannot help but admit that there is no tragic hero as of now who would be able to confront fate in 
its two adverse manifestations as Nature and history: “Modernity does not know a truly tragic 
hero; we all, regardless of the way we look at the world, are only optimists, [or] only pessimists; 
no, we don't have a tragic outlook!”449 (170-171). Therefore, the tragic task that Russian 
Symbolists face is to pick up where Nietzsche left off: 
Either this is an ultimate cowardice bordering on fearlessness,—a leap (because only the 
mountain goats rush into the abyss) or this is a prophetic courage of the neophytes who 
believe that at the very moment of the fall the wings of salvation will grow and carry 
humanity over history. The task of the theurgists is challenging. They must push onward 
where Nietzsche has stopped,—they must walk on air.450 (237)
The Symbolists must become tragic heroes to facilitate the future triumph of theurgy. Yet Belyi 
can neither find the tragic hero in real life nor create him in his own art. 
Belyi's inability to sustain the tragic emplotment in praxis that he advances in his theory 
is already in full evidence in his earliest attempt to produce a mystery play about the end of 
history. Judging by the two extant fragments, it becomes apparent that instead of depicting the 
449 “Современность не знает подлинно трагического героя; мы все, как бы мы ни глядели на мир, мы только 
оптимисты, только пессимисты; нет, мы не трагики!” 
450 “Или это последняя трусость, граничащая с бесстрашием, — скачок (потому что ведь только каменные 
козлы на рога бросаются в бездну), или это пророческая смелость неофитов, верующих, что в момент 
падения вырастут спасительные крылья и понесут человечество над историей. Задача теургов сложна. 
Они должны идти там, где остановился Ницше, — идти по воздуху.” 
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monumental battle between the tragic hero and the forces of fate, Belyi is carried into the ironic 
mode, marked by fatalism, determinism, and passivity. The same problem persists in his two later
novels The Silver Dove and Petersburg that deal with Russian history. In his novelistic portrayals 
of history, the genuinely tragic seems to elude the Russian Symbolist, whose perception of 
contemporary socio-historical reality is more in accordance with the “Classicist” mode and 
therefore comes across as inherently deterministic, severed, and atomized. 
The real course of history, as it appears to Belyi's eyes, does not live up to his vision of its
ideal unfolding as the tragic Romance. By proceeding from the rationalist (“Classicist”) 
conception of history as Nature only in a different guise, he approaches the historical field as a 
ground of cause-effect relationships. This mechanistic conception, however, does not allow for 
the exercise of free will necessary for the workings of tragedy. In the world which is only a 
product of the endless series of causal determinations, man is not its master but its captive. While
in The Silver Dove there is still an ironic oscillation between the two conceptions of history, 
monumental (Romantic) and mechanistic (Classicist), in Petersburg, the movement of history is 
conceived totally under the auspices of the metonymical paradigm, with the result that the ironic 
completely supplants the tragic.  
In the Grip of Irony and Fatalism: 
Failure of the Tragic Mode in Belyi's Early Mystery Play
Belyi's struggle to write in the tragic mode is apparent in his early attempt to compose a 
mystery play.451 Inspired by Solov'ev's “Tale of the Antichrist,” he seeks to create a mystery play 
that would stage a triumphant end of history culminating in the Second Coming of Christ. In his 
451  For a comprehensive discussion of Belyi's theater see Tat'iana Nikolesku, Andrei Belyi i teatr. 
375
own definition of this genre of genres, the Russian Symbolist emphasizes that it should depict a 
tragic struggle between the godlike hero and fate: “Its [the mystery play's] theme is always the 
same: a god-like individual fights against fate”452 (27). Similar to Ivanov, however, a mystery 
play, in Belyi's apocalyptic vision, is not a tragedy proper, but a near-tragedy, for the tragic ascent
would eventually bring the inexorable course of successive linear time to an end, thereby bending
it into a circle of Eternity. Yet in his early mystery play, as attested to by the two remaining 
fragments, Belyi is unable to sustain the tragic mode. Rather than representing the tragic collision
between human freedom and fate, he is instead propelled into the anti-heroic, ironic, mode. As a 
result, the representation of the field of history which was supposed to stage the final tragic battle
is instead distinctly marked by passivity and a debilitating sense of determinism (fatalism). The 
mystery play freezes in an ironic paralysis and its discontinuous line is never brought into a 
circle.
The first extant fragment that comprises the first act of the unfinished mystery play was 
published under the title The One Who Came (Prishedshii, 1903). It depicts a group of devotees 
who are expecting the imminent advent of Christ. From the opening conversation that takes place
between two junior adherents, Sergei and Mikhail, the reader learns of creeping doubt that has 
corrupted the expectants. Mikhail has lost his faith and shares his doubts with Sergei. As it turns 
out, Mikhail is not the only one who is stricken with skepticism. Il'ia, a junior disciples' mentor, 
is also plagued with cynicism and secretly questions the promised coming. Nikita, a revered 
prophet among the adherents, seeks to boost their flagging spirits by bitter reproaches and 
impassioned proclamations of his faith. One of the disciples, Fedor, makes an announcement that 
a stranger has arrived and will soon appear in their midst. Some of the disciples leap to the 
452  “Тема ее [мистерии] всегда одна: богоподобный человек борется с роком.”  
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conclusion that this stranger is no one else but Christ. Nikita, however, immediately denounces 
him as the Antichrist. When the stranger makes his entry at long last, his appearance is rather 
equivocal, lending itself to conflicting interpretations. It also transpires that he has come not at 
his own will but by order of some higher authority that manifests itself in the play as a 
disembodied voice. 
Due to the theme of confused identities that dominates The One Who Came, the entire 
excerpt is full of disconcerting dualities, unsettling ambiguities, and the incessant play of masks. 
Almost everyone in the first act appears to wear a mask behind which he conceals his corroding 
doubts and unbelieving fears. Even though not everyone is exposed as being disloyal to his 
proclaimed faith, either by himself while openly discussing his doubts with another devotee or by
the obliging author through the stage directions, the reader develops a suspicion that everyone 
expecting the arrival of Christ may be afflicted with disbelief and cowardice. Lack of faith coils 
and eats away at their hearts. The author tries his best to control the reader's growing suspicion 
about the total absence of faith among the expectants, but given the number of revelations of 
disbelief made by the high priest and other adherents, one cannot help but began to doubt the 
sincerity of all the other followers (including the revered prophet Nikita) who have not as yet 
been unmasked. This pervasive motif of masks and duplicity indirectly betrays Belyi's own 
anxiety about his and his comrades' wavering faith as well. 
Plagued by doubt and wearing masks in a desperate effort to conceal it from others, the 
devotees receive the long-awaited visitor whose identity, however, is cloaked in ambiguity. It is 
not entirely clear until the end whether the newly arrived stranger is Christ or Antichrist. Belyi 
gives conflicting clues as to the nature of his true identity. To start with, his appearance is one of 
sheer contradiction. The stranger has a beautiful face and yet this face is contorted into a 
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terrifying mask when his plea for divine mercy is rejected: “The one who came kneels. His 
beautiful face is distorted with convulsion and seems like a terrible mask”453 (25). The one who 
came is capable of ardent prayer but once his plea is repulsed by the higher power (God or 
Satan?), he evinces not only feelings of inward torment but also of resentment, even though he 
makes an effort at concealing (“masking”) them: “A shadow of anguish and suppressed 
indignation runs over his wondrous face”454 (24). The colors which are always instrumental in 
Belyi's work in determining the metaphysical essence of his characters are inconsistent as well. 
The newcomer wears a golden sparkling crown (an insignia of his kingly status) but his gown is 
of a gray, mousy, color. Christ is expected to reveal himself in white, not gray, and the color of 
the stranger's tunic seems to definitively unmask him as the evil double of Christ: “The 
embodiment of non-being in being that imparts ghostliness to the latter is symbolized by the gray
color. And since the gray color is created by the relation of black to white, the definition of evil 
which is possible for us lies in the relative mediocrity, ambiguity”455 (Arabeski 115). And yet, 
strangely enough, the one who came appears before the crowd covered with the roses of Eternity.
Belyi seeks to arrest the ironic fluctuation by providing more definitive clues as to the nature of 
the stranger's true identity. These clues, however, lose their univocal meaning within the context 
ridden with doubles, contradictions, and uncertainties. Thus, the voice from above declares the 
newcomer as “the beloved czar over the earth”—a title that does not illuminate but rather 
obscures the essence of the new arrival. This appellation sounds particularly ambiguous in the 
context of historical views on the nature of tsarist power as they took shape first in Tsarist and 
453 “Пришедший опускается на колени. Его прекрасное лицо искажается судорогой и кажется страшной 
маской.”  
454  “Тень мучения и сдержанного негодования пробегает по его дивному лицу.”  
455 “Воплощение небытия в бытие, придающее последнему призрачность, символизует серый цвет. И 
поскольку серый цвет создается отношением черного к белому, постольку возможное для нас 
определение зла заключается в относительной серединности, двусмысленности.” 
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later in Imperial Russia. As shown by Uspenskii and Zhivoi in “The Tsar and God,” the popular 
attitude towards the monarch in Russia was dramatically different from the one traditionally 
shown to the emperor or the king in the West. Beginning with the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the 
attitude toward the Tsar assumed a distinctly religious character. By inheriting the parallelism 
between the Tsar and God from Byzantine tradition, the Russians took this idea further by 
ascribing special charisma to the Tsar that conferred on him an aura of sacredness: “Sacralization 
presupposes not only an analogy between the Tsar and God but also the attribution to the 
monarch of a special charisma, of special blessed gifts, in light of which he begins to appear as a 
supernatural being”456 (208).
This identification of the Tsar with a divine being resulted in the reconceptualization of 
the traditional notion of legitimacy that was in circulation in Muscovite Rus': “This conception of
the Tsar's special charisma radically changes the traditional notions: the opposition of the 
righteous and the wicked Tsar turns into the opposition of the true and false Tsar. In this context 
the word “righteous” may mean not “just” but “authentic” and “authenticity” is determined by 
election. Thus, it is not conduct but predestination that defines the true Tsar”457 (218). This 
reconceptualization, in its own turn, leads to the problem of discriminating between the false and 
the true Tsars: “If the true Tsars receive power from God, the false ones, on the other hand, 
receive it from the devil. Even the religious ceremony of coronation and anointing does not 
confer divine grace upon the false Tsar, because the ceremony itself is nothing but an appearance,
456 “Сакрализация предусматривает не просто уподобление монарха Богу, но усвоение монарху особой 
харизмы, особых благодатных Даров, в силу которых он начинает восприниматься как 
сверхъестественное существо.”
457 “Концепция особой харизмы царя коренным образом меняет традиционные представления: 
противопоставление праведного и неправедного царя превращается в противопоставление подлинного и 
неподлинного царя. В этом контексте ''праведный'' может означать не ''справедливый,'' а ''правильный,'' 
''правильность'' же, в свою очередь, oпределяется богоизбранностью. Таким образом, не поведение, а 
предназначение определяет истинного царя.”
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for in reality it is the demons who crown and anoint the Tsar following the devil's order.”458 
Moreover, the reader is left in the dark regarding the identity of the voice resounding from
above that seeks to confer legitimacy upon the stranger: Was it the voice of God or the voice of 
Satan? Is the appearance of Antichrist an ironic inversion of the biblical narrative of Christ's 
sacrifice? This doubt is never resolved, for the play breaks off after the first act. Further, the one 
who came is greeted with “mute silence” by the crowd of devotees which may serve as another 
indication as to his true colors. But since the adherents grew weary of waiting and became 
unsteady in their faith, their mistrustful reception of the newcomer may be interpreted as 
evidence of their deepening skepticism, if not of burgeoning cynicism. As in his Symphonies 
written at about the same time, Belyi appears to be unable to effectively control the play of irony 
that he unleashes. 
The most ironic thing about the figure of Antichrist, since Belyi apparently intends the 
newcomer to be him, is that he is literally forced to play his iniquitous role. Like Christ in 
Gethsemane who prays, “Let this cup pass from me,” the stranger also prays to be spared, but the
voice from above (God's or Satan's?) is relentless: “It is too late.” An ironic doubt arises in the 
reader's mind as to the true reason why “it is too late.” Has the time ripened? OR is God in a 
hurry to stage the last act because “the audience-cum-participants” are losing their patience and 
faith? Like Christ, Antichrist is to play his preassigned role until the bitter end, according to the 
script devised by the divine (demonic?) stage director. The show must run its course despite the 
antagonist's unwillingness to act his part as a villain. Thus, the major participant of the universal 
drama is shown as being totally deprived of free will and as a result comes across as nothing but 
458 “Если истинные цари получают власть от Бога, то ложные цари получают ее от дьявола. Даже церковный 
обряд священного венчания на царство и миропомазания не сообщает ложному царю благодати, 
поскольку от этих действий сохраняется лишь видимость, в действительности же его венчают и мажут 
бесы по приказанию дьявола.”
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a pathetic marionette whose strings are being pulled by the higher power instead of an 
independent agent and a worthy opponent of Christ. The tragic confrontation between good and 
evil is supplanted in Belyi's mystery play by a deterministic scenario, in which evil (and by 
extension good as well) is depicted as having no agency of its own.  
In short, the entire fragment produces an unsettling impression of being an ironic 
inversion of the mystery play into a ceaseless ironic play of masks and doubles that the author is, 
in the end, unable to effectively control. Everything is not what it seems in this (pre-)apocalyptic 
world with the result that the mystery play finds itself on the verge of degenerating into its dark 
ironic opposite. As a consequence, this rapid proliferation of masks, contradictions, and 
uncertainties propels the genre of the play itself into a dangerous zone of ironic ambiguity. 
Overwhelmed by irony, the fragment compromises its tragic earnestness. The play begins to 
hover uneasily between a solemn mystery play and a farce, threatening to disintegrate entirely 
into a piece of theatrics, a masquerade. That the play is precariously leaning toward the farcical is
apparent in Belyi's implicit privileging of the deterministic conception of the Universe that 
effectively cancels the tragic stakes involved in the unfolding universal conflict. 
The second extant fragment of the same mystery play published in 1906 under the title 
The Jaws of the Night (Past' nochi) only further discloses the extent of the problem Belyi 
confronts in the first act—his inability to sustain the tragic mode by slipping into fatalism and 
irony. Like the earlier fragment, the latter excerpt revolves around the ironic interplay between 
faith and doubt, reality and semblance, truth and falsehood. The fragment delineates the last 
stronghold of the remaining Christians, who had to hide themselves high in the mountains to 
avoid being captured by the evil king, allegedly Antichrist, who established his reign somewhere 
in the North. The sun is extinguished and the Christians are in the grip of the darkest night and in 
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danger of annihilation. It is only the strength of their prayers that protects them from being wiped
off the face of the earth by the evil king. Some of the Christians, however, seem to be wavering. 
This (re)introduction of the theme of doubt injects even more uncertainty as to the identity of all 
characters, their true allegiances, and the nature of events unfolding in the play. Similar to the 
earlier fragment, this dichotomy between appearance (falsehood) and reality (truth) is never 
successfully settled, due to the absence of the definitive finale.   
The strongest case of doubt in the later fragment is represented by the character of the 
mother. The woman is shown as bitterly castigating the holy man with whom her child spends 
most of the time, for misleading people and abandoning them to their death in the desolate 
mountains without the light of the sun. The mother accuses the holy man of taking them away 
from Him and therefore from the sun: “Why did you, Christians, took us to this gloomy lair when
He, free and joyful, turned life into light-string music?”459 (70). The holy man objects to her that 
it was God who extinguished the sun but the mother counters this objection with: “It is not true! 
It is enough to walk one or two hundred miles away to see the sun. This is all your sorcery, old 
men”460 (Ibid.). She also hurls at him an accusation that he has corrupted her innocent son with 
the delirium of “night and death” (Ibid.). While the mother might be displaying spiritual 
cowardice, the battlefield, nevertheless, seems to be won by her, for the old man did not in the 
end have anything to say to disprove her assertion about the flourishing of the sun away from the 
mountains swallowed by the night. He retreats in anger, possibly in anger at her apparent lack of 
faith but also possibly at his own inability to refute her accusations or offer a consolation to boost
her low morale. Thus, the woman reintroduces the problem of the true identity of the stranger 
459  “Зачем вы, христиане, увлекли нас в это угрюмое логовище, когда Он, свободный и радостный, 
превратил жизнь в легкострунную музыку?” 
460  “Неправда! Стоит отойти на сто, двести верст, чтобы увидеть солнце. Это все ваши чары, старики.”  
382
(“evil king”) as well as of the faithful, Christians, themselves. There is a perpetual ambiguity 
concerning who is good and who is evil which is never satisfactorily resolved in the text itself. 
Furthermore, in both fragments Belyi appears unable to move beyond the ironic moment, 
the moment of fluctuation between reality and semblance, faith and doubt into the realm of tragic
action which would bring at least some clarification, if not a definitive resolution, to the 
entanglement of confusing dualities and ambiguities reigning in the play. Each fragment breaks 
off on the verge of a more decisive action which, however, never takes place. What Belyi 
successfully portrays is the mood of intense expectancy in all its shades and variations, from 
ardent belief to disappointment and bitter doubt, but he is incapable of depicting a transformative 
tragic action or any action at all for that matter. The play does not progress beyond conversation 
scenes and in its utter inaction is strongly reminiscent of Maeterlinck's theater of stasis. 
This influence proves fatal to Belyi's Romantic vision of mystery play as a godlike man's 
tragic struggle against fate, for in Maeterlinck's drama man is portrayed as completely powerless 
against the forces of fate. Stasis in Maeterlinck stems from his fatalistic conception of the 
Universe in which man is not an autonomous individual (an agent endowed with free will) but a 
mere puppet, a victim of malevolent powers, to which he cannot help but passively surrender. As 
Szondi puts it, “In Maeterlinck's work only a single moment is dealt with—the moment when a 
helpless human being is overtaken by fate” (Theory of the Modern Drama 32). Some of 
Maeterlinck's fatalism makes itself manifest in Belyi's mystery play not only in the absence of 
action but in the absence of the tragic hero. The only character who seems at least remotely to 
qualify for this role is the stranger (“the one who came”) but he is almost immediately shown as 
an unwilling participant, a mere marionette, of some higher power (evil or good?) in the cosmic 
drama in which there is no place for free will. 
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In other words, Belyi seems to covertly embrace the idea of the omnipotence of an 
external fate (fatalism) but, in the words of Frye, “the fatalistic reduction of tragedy does not 
distinguish tragedy from irony” (102). Irony engulfs Belyi's apocalyptic Universe, making the 
attainment of salvation through an individual tragic action, as envisioned by him in his theory of 
the tragic, totally impossible. The characters entrapped within the jaws of the night have nothing 
else to do but wait until the Second Coming of Christ. But their waiting for extrinsic deliverance, 
as it transpires in Beckett's later drama of the absurd, Waiting for Godot, might be endless, for, in 
the words of Belyi himself, “The modern drama of Symbols is doomed to the Apocalypse 
without the Second Coming”461 (Arabeski 35). 
Belyi's inability to create a mystery play for the stage which would represent an active 
realization of the Absolute fuels his polemics with Ivanov on the nature of the tragic and its 
proper place in the theater. A mystery play as a tragic ascent towards Godmanhood, according to 
him, should be staged not in the theater, which would be a mere profanation of the sacred battle, 
but rather performed in real life: “Let the theater remain the theater and a mystery play—a 
mystery play. To conflate one with the other is to create without destroying and to destroy 
without creating. This is just flirting with emptiness”462 (22). For that purpose Belyi turns to the 
exploration of contemporary Russian history in his two successive novels, The Silver Dove and 
Petersburg, searching for a potential tragic hero who would be capable of opposing his free will 
to necessity as it makes itself manifest in the field of history. In his novels, however, the Russian 
Symbolist is confronted with the same set of problems that he was not able to resolve in his 
mystery play—irony, passivity, and fatalism (determinism).   
461  “Современная драма символов обрекается на Апокалипсис без Пришествия.”  
462 “Пусть театр остается театром, а мистерия — мистерией. Смешивать то и другое — созидать, не 
разрушая, разрушать, не созидая. Это кокетничанье с пустотой.”
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The Silver Dove as a Heroic Romance
Belyi seeks to provide a historical justification of his vision of history as a Romantic 
drama of redemption in his novel The Silver Dove (Serebrianyi golub', 1909).463 The ideal 
conception of history as the tragic Romance that he advances in his theory, however, collides 
with his perception of the real course of history apprehended by him in the “Classicist” fashion as
abiding by the strict laws of causal determination. The apprehension of the historical field in the 
novel ironically hovers between the two irreconcilable conceptions of history—history as the 
Romance (the pole of Romanticism) and history as the Satire (the pole of Classicism), always 
teetering on the brink of a pure satire. The protagonist Petr Dar'ial'skii, a composite image of 
Belyi's fellow Symbolists, an aspiring theurgist, who is originally cast into the role of the tragic 
hero destined to redeem bewitched Russia falls pitifully short of heroic stance. By the end of the 
novel Dar'ial'skii more and more gives way to the Dionysian element and ultimately perishes as a
passive victim rather than as a tragic hero who dies triumphant by appropriating his own 
suffering. 
The Silver Dove is centered on the character of Petr Dar'ial'skii, an aspiring writer and a 
member of the Russian intelligentsia, who spends the summer in the countryside together with 
his friend Schmidt, studying mysticism and theosophy. Dar'ial'skii meets, falls in love with, and 
eventually becomes engaged to Katia Gugoleva, a niece of the local noblewoman, Baroness 
Todrabe-Graaben, who appears to be well-off but whose estate teeters on the brink of ruin. While 
courting the innocent girl Katia, Petr Dar'ial'skii is also tormented by carnal desire for a red-
463 For more on Belyi's novel The Silver Dove, see Vladimir Aleksandrov, Andrei Bely. The Major Symbolist Fiction 
(68-99); Andrew Barratt, “Mystification and Initiation in Serebrjanyj golub': Belyj, the Reader, and the Symbolist
Novel”; Nikolai Berdiaev, “Russkii soblazn (Po povodu 'Serebrianogo golubia' A. Belogo)”; Thomas R. Beyer, 
Jr., “Belyj's Serebrjanyj golub': Gogol' in Gugolevo”; Maria Carlson, “The Silver Dove”; Samuel D. Cioran, The 
Apocalyptic Symbolism of Andrei Belyi; John D. Elsworth, “The Silver Dove: An Analysis.” 
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haired and pockmarked peasant woman, Matrena, sent by the carpenter Kudeiarov, the leader of 
the heretical sect of the Doves, to seduce Dar'ial'skii. The merchant Eropegin, unable to forgive 
the Baroness for her spurning him in their youth, threatens her with bankruptcy and the distraught
Baroness becomes engaged in a bitter argument with Dar'ial'skii over his acquaintance, 
Chukholka, who is staying at the house. Dar'ial'skii storms out and breaks off his engagement to 
Katia. 
Dar'ial'skii moves in with Kudeiarov and starts a passionate relationship with Matrena. 
This intensely sexual affair is encouraged by Kudeiarov who is eagerly awaiting the birth of the 
miracle-child, “the Dove,” whose destiny is “to redeem” Russia. Yet Matrena fails to conceive 
and Dar'ial'skii is blamed for the failure by the more and more jealous carpenter who is now 
impatient to get rid of his unwelcome guest. Dar'ial'skii becomes increasingly disenchanted with 
Matrena and more sensitive to the presence of evil surrounding Kudeiarov and his Dove cult. He 
plans an escape to Moscow but is detained on the way by Sukhorukov, one of the members of the
cult. Having missed the train, Dar'ial'skii is invited to stay over for the night at Eropegin's house. 
After some hesitation he accepts the offer without being aware that Eropegin's wife is one of the 
major practitioners of the cult and her house is the focal point of the Doves' activities. At night 
the Doves, assisted by Eropegin's servant, Annushka, break into Dar'ial'skii's room and brutally 
murder him. 
The novel bears striking similarities to the emplotment used by Belyi in The Green 
Meadow, the third volume of his ambitious philosophical enterprise, discussed in the previous 
chapter. The character of Dar'ial'skii is tested by Belyi for the tragic role of Orpheus who is to 
lead Eurydice, bewitched Russia, back into the light of the day. Dar'ial'skii, an aspiring 
Übermensch, is fashioned as a composite portrayal of all major Russian Symbolists who 
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embraced theurgy as a path toward Godmanhood. While some critics identified Dar'ial'skii 
alternately with Gogol', Blok, and Sergei Solov'ev, this character can by no means be reduced 
exclusively to any of them. For besides sharing certain similarities with Gogol', Blok, and Sergei 
Solov'ev, Dar'ial'skii, also has many features in common with Ivanov, Ellis, and Belyi himself. In 
other words, Belyi shapes Dar'ial'skii into an archetypal Symbolist figure, with all their strengths 
and weaknesses, for he seeks an answer to the question whether Russian Symbolists could live up
to the ideal of the tragic hero who would battle with fate and, in the process of the tragic ascent, 
bend it to his will. 
Dar'ial'skii is facing the inner tragic conflict within himself which is mirrored by the 
external conflict playing out in the Universe at large. This inner (microcosmic) conflict is 
epitomized as Dar'ial'skii's inner division and continuous fluctuation between the two types of 
love: chivalric and lustful. Like Blok, Dar'ial'skii initially falls in love with the Dawn, a symbol 
of the Divine Feminine, and starts searching for its human incarnation. He comes to be divided 
between two women, Katia and Matrena, whom he views as the two possible earthly incarnations
of his transcendent love. Using Belyi's terminology employed in the Arabesques essays devoted 
to the tragic, one can say that Katia is connected with the rigidity of Classicism (pure form) while
Matrena stands for the insanity of Romanticism (unbridled feeling). Katia, who is brought up on 
French literature and is not infrequently depicted with a volume of the Neoclassical tragedian 
Racine, personifies the Apollonian drive and all the values associated with it such as culture, 
refinement, civilization, and the individual. In other words, Katia is identified with the pole of the
West and therefore with Reason. Matrena, on the other hand, who comes from the depths of the 
Russian countryside represents the Dionysian element and thereby intrinsically linked with the 
ritualized (unredeemed) earth, the dark roots, flesh, savagery, and unstructured chaos. Thus, as 
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the polar opposite of Katia, who is clearly identified with the western aspirations of the Russian 
intelligentsia, Matrena embodies the people of Russia, or, to put it simply, unredeemed, debased 
Russia herself. These two loves reflect two sides of Dar'ial'skii: the innocent child (Serebrianyi 
golub' 148) and the beast (145). Suspended between an angel (childlike purity) and a beast, 
Dar'ial'skii is, however, not a(n over)man yet and his tragic task is to become one. 
In order to rise to the stature of the tragic hero able to confront the external enemy 
personified as Kudeiarov and his demonic sect of the Doves, Dar'ial'skii has to inwardly 
overcome the tragic divide between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, form and content, 
understanding and feeling, and thereby, by extension, between West and East, the intelligentsia 
and the people through fusing all these antinomies into unity. Only through this superhuman act 
of synthesis would Dar'ial'skii prove himself able to save Russia from its indenture to the 
demonic. For the character of Matrena, a lascivious peasant woman, represents Russia in the grip 
of the force of evil or, to put it differently, the languishing World Soul, the Divine Sophia 
degraded to the state of the unspiritualized matter as a consequence of her fall. The fallen World 
Soul is awaiting her Savior to deliver her from her earthly imprisonment and only the tragic hero,
Nietzschean Übermensch, who would be akin to Christ in his might, could lead her back into the 
realm of the Spirit.   
Thus, Matrena, similar to Dar'ial'skii is a highly ambivalent character, hovering between 
the abyss of the flesh and the heights of the spirit. Like Gogol''s Katerina from “A Terrible 
Vengeance,” she finds herself under the power of the demonic (Dionysian) carpenter Kudeiarov, 
modeled on the evil wizard, Katerina's father.464 The carpenter, who has enchanted and 
464  In addition to Gogol''s A Terrible Vengeance, Belyi might be also alluding to Dostoevsky's novella The Landlady
(Khoziaika, 1846-1847), which, in its own turn, is strongly influenced by Gogol''s tale. In The Landlady, the 
young and beautiful woman Katerina is perceived by Ordynov, the protagonist of the story, as being held captive 
through some devilish sorcery by her malignant old husband Il'ia Murin, who might also be, as Katerina herself 
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imprisoned Matrena's soul in a lecherous body, turns her into a witch and an insatiable she-beast. 
Viewed through another Symbolist prism, Matrena is Belyi's version of Blok's prostitute, both an 
ironic antipode and a debased incarnation of the Divine Feminine. However, despite her carnal 
degradation, she still has a spiritual side to her which is clearly evident in her bottomless blue 
eyes (148). Furthermore, against the carpenter's strictest prohibitions, she becomes genuinely 
fond of Dar'ial'skii, her lover, who cries in her arms like a child. Thus, she has a kind, maternal 
nature deeply buried within her, concealed behind the vulgar manners and lewd appearance of a 
promiscuous woman. Matrena's duality attests to her inner capacity for spiritual resurrection. Her
imprisoned soul can still be liberated, for her body can be potentially spiritualized. But like the 
shadow of Eurydice, she cannot leave the realm of the dead all by herself, for she is in need of 
the rescuer, an Orpheus, who would bring her from the night of the Dionysian abandon back into 
the light of the day. 
By positing the tragic hero, a supreme individualist, as the one who is capable of 
redeeming the collective Russia fallen captive to the evil spirit of the Dionysian, Belyi engages in
debate with Ivanov on the nature of the tragic as a penultimate step to the triumph of theurgy. 
Deeply suspicious of the Dionysian as the epitome of the tragic, Belyi seeks to show that the 
synthetic Christian-Dionysian view propagated by Ivanov as a path towards Solov'evian 
Godmanhood is in its essence demonic. Belyi senses the innate hostility of the folk (“chthonic”) 
Dionysus to the very possibility of transcendence of the earthly existence, uneasily concealed by 
Ivanov, as has been shown in the previous section, behind his tacit identification of the folk 
Dionysus with the Orphic deity more compatible with Christianity. The chthonic Dionysus 
represents for Belyi Nietzschean-Heraclitean paradox of the eternity of the earthly existence, of 
intimated, her biological father. 
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persistence through endless time, with no possibility of ever breaking through toward the 
transformed, overhuman, mode of existence outside the whole of temporal process. In other 
words, the pagan deity stands for the finality of death, the impossibility of resurrection in the 
context of human, earthly life, symbolized by the very figure of Christ and, therefore, its 
injection as an unsubdued impulse into the bloodstream of Christianity might prove fatal to the 
Symbolist theurgic aspirations.  
Thus, Christianity (the promise of resurrection) and the Greek cult of Dionysus (the 
inescapability of the earthly existence) cannot be wedded under the guidance of Dionysus, as 
promoted by Ivanov, for the primitive Dionysian energy sabotages the essence of Christianity by 
turning it into the cult of Antichrist. In Clowes' words:
The greatest intellectual contrast between Ivanov and Belyi can be seen in each writer's 
evaluation of the Dionysian. Whereas Ivanov views it as pregnant chaos, Belyi cannot 
forget its terrible power to destroy. […] Despite its seeming vitality the Dionysian can 
produce no true resurrection. The dark, tyrannical side of Dionysus, in Belyi's view, must 
take the upper hand in the end. (The Revolution of Moral Consciousness 164) 
In this light, the horror of the savage Dionysus associated by Belyi with the dark, chaotic element
of the folk consciousness, the very element that Ivanov holds as presiding and redemptive, must 
be subdued and subsumed under Christianity, whose essence is represented by the figure of the 
first true Godman, Christ, whose spirit triumphed over chaos and death. 
The earth and, therefore, by extension, the collective element of Russia, the people 
(Ivanov's collective consciousness), cannot be affirmed and embraced as they are, for the earthly, 
unless spiritualized, is evil. The higher synthesis of the spirit and the flesh, the mind and the body
can happen only under the guidance of the spirit emblematized by the superior (i.e., overhuman) 
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subjective consciousness that has successfully triumphed over the tragic divide within itself. 
Thus, unlike in Ivanov, in Belyi's conception, it is the tragic hero who should preside over the 
synthetic fusion between the conflicting forces of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, West and 
East, reason and feeling, because the Dionysian chaos must be restrained and transcended for the 
theurgic Absolute to come into being. The folk Russia, the swirling element of the Dionysian, can
be led out of the darkness of the night (the chthonic underworld) into the light of the day (the 
green meadow of the eternal life) only by the tragic hero, the Nietzschean down-goer, who would
confront and ultimately defeat the enemy even at the price of his own life (Christ-like sacrifice).
 Thus, in order to prove his tragic mettle and save his Eurydice ensnared by the Dionysian
chaos, Dar'ial'skii has to become a down-goer, to descend into Hell, “into the red”: 
Here the enemy reveals himself in his ultimate essence accessible to us—in the fiery-red 
glow of the hell fire. One should remember that this is the last limit of relativity—a 
phantom of a phantom which can, however, prove more real than the real itself, having 
assumed the shape of a serpent: “And behold a great red dragon, having seven heads and 
ten horns, and seven crowns upon his heads. And his tail drew the third part of the stars of
heaven” (Revelation [KJV 12:3-4]).465 (Arabeski 120) 
The red signifies for Belyi a stage of apocalyptic crisis, a precarious stage of transition 
(Zarathustrian bridge) between evil and good, death and life, the flesh and the spirit, the finite 
and the infinite. 
This is the final and the hardest stage to overcome on the way to the living mystery play 
465 “Здесь враг открывается в последней своей нам доступной сущности — в пламенно-красном зареве 
адского огня. Следует помнить, что это — последний предел относительности — призрак призрака, 
способный, однако, оказаться реальнее реального, приняв очертания змия: "Вот, большой красный дракон
с семью головами и десятью рогами, и на головах его семь диадем. Хвост его увлек с неба третью часть 
звезд" (Откровение).”
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of Godmanhood, for this is the stage of the last temptation by the flesh (by carnal love and all-
consuming passion) that defeated many a hero: 
Love at this stage is suffused with the fiery color of all-devouring passion; it is full of 
dark enchantment and evil earthly fire. […] Such love can reveal the image of the one of 
whom it is spoken in Revelation: “And I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet coloured beast... 
And upon her forehead was a name written, mystery, Babylon the Great, the mother of 
harlots and abominations of the earth” [KJV 17: 3, 5]. One cannot stay here. Here one 
will be consumed by flames. One must go forward. For […] this is a temptation.466 (Ibid.) 
But this is also the stage of purifying Christ-like sufferings that redeem the diabolical nature of 
the flesh because “it depends on our own will to extinguish the fire [of carnal passion], to 
transform it into the purple robe of suffering”467 (121). Thus, by descending into the very depths 
of the Dionysian, the realm of dark chaos, Dar'ial'skii will have to prove whether he is the 
Zarathustrian Übermensch that he imagines himself to be, a true tragic hero capable of 
withstanding the temptation by undergoing a Christ-like Crucifixion and ultimately emerging 
victorious like Godman into new life: “It was necessary for Christ to become incarnate in the 
midst of struggle and horror, to descend into hell, into the red, in order, after overcoming the 
struggle, to leave the path open to all”468 (Ibid.). 
Since this stage of the red, the last trial by passion, is a stage of transition, it is full of 
dualities, uncertainties and ambiguities. The color red that simultaneously stands for Christ's 
466 “Любовь на этой стадии окрашена огненным цветом всепожирающей страсти; она полна темных чар и 
злого, земного огня. […] Такая любовь способна явить образ той, о которой сказано в Откровении: "И я 
увидел жену, сидящую на багряном звере... И на челе ее написано имя: тайна, Вавилон великий, мать 
блудницам и мерзостям". Здесь нельзя оставаться. Здесь сгоришь. Нужно идти вперед. Ведь [...] это—
искус.”
467 “От нашей воли зависит собственной кровью погасить пожар [of carnal passion], превратить его в 
багряницу страдания.”  
468 “Нужно было воплотиться Христу в средоточие борьбы и ужаса, сойти во ад, в красное, чтобы, преодолев
борьбу, оставить путь для всех свободным. Он победил.” 
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passion and sexual (diabolical) passion, is inherently linked with duality that breeds the play of 
irony. Like Belyi's early mystery play, The Silver Dove deals with the theme of confused 
identities between Christ and Antichrist so crucial to the Symbolist theurgic enterprise. The 
problem that the novel raises is whether Dar'ial'skii, a quintessential Symbolist, is a Christ-like 
figure, a true tragic hero, who by exercising his will transcends the world of experience, or a 
mere impostor, who has brazenly assumed the role of Zarathustrian down-goer without being 
capable of fulfilling the tragic task. Thus, throughout the novel the character of Dar'ial'skii 
ironically hovers between the images of Christ and False Christ, the tragic hero who valiantly 
confronts the raging chaos and a helpless victim of the Dionysian element. This wavering 
between the two conflicting identities and destinies is emblematized by Dar'ial'skii's red shirt 
that, on the one hand, stands for his all-consuming carnal passion for the fiery wench, Matrena, 
and, on the other, for his impending violent death (his Crucifixion). 
The novel's ambivalence as to the true identity of Dar'ial'skii (a tragic hero or just an 
impostor, a pseudo-Christ?) is closely linked with Belyi's conflicting apprehension of the 
historical field which is simultaneously emplotted both as a tragic Romance and a Satire. Thus, in
correspondence with these antithetical visions of the unfolding of history, the historical processes
are conceptualized by Belyi both in the metaphorical (Romance) and metonymical (Satire) modes
which are in constant competition with each other. The metaphorical mode is inherently linked 
with the Christian conception of history culminating in the Divine Comedy of Salvation and 
therefore with the image of Dar'ial'skii as a heroic figure akin to Christ in his role of Russia's 
Savior. In White's words:
The Christian apprehends the world as one term of a Metaphor, the other and dominant 
term of which, that by which the world is given its meaning and identity, is conceived to 
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exist in another world. And, far from recognizing the claims of a Metonymical or Ironic 
comprehension of the world, the Christian strives for the transcendence of all the tensions
between the ideal and reality which these modes of comprehension imply. (125)
The metonymical mode of comprehension, on the other hand, is associated in Belyi's 
historiographical consciousness with Nietzschean vision of history as eternal return. It is this 
conception of history as eternal recurrence of the same, eternity of successive time that knows no
closure in the transcendent, ushered in by Nietzsche as the celebration of the earthly that, in 
Frye's opinion, marks the triumph of irony over tragedy: 
In irony, as distinct from tragedy, the wheel of time completely encloses the action, and 
there is no sense of an original contact with a relatively timeless world. […] The 
extraordinary treatment of the tragic vision of time by Nietzsche's Zarathustra, in which 
the heroic acceptance of cyclical return becomes a glumly cheerful acceptance of a 
cosmology of identical recurrence, marks the influence of an age of irony. (214) 
Within this ironic framework signifying the endlessness of the historical processes, Dar'ial'skii's 
pretensions as to the role of Christ the Redeemer are exposed by Belyi as a masquerade, in which
the would-be hero is nothing but a pathetic puppet caught in the web of causal determinism.  
This ironic fluctuation between the two competing emplotments of the historical 
processes, tragic and ironic, reflects Belyi's long-standing ambivalence about the existence of 
free will and therefore the very possibility of the tragic mode of being in history required for the 
fulfillment of the theurgic Absolute. Aleksandrov comments on the ironic disjuncture between 
Belyi's theoretical vision and its fictional embodiment: 
In some essays, especially when he discusses Nietzsche and Ibsen, Belyi makes it seem as
if through sheer force of will an individual can tear himself away from the beliefs and 
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values of the past and become a representative of the new mankind of the future. At the 
same time, in formulations about the ties between inner experiences and the transcendent 
[...] he presents a thoroughly deterministic view of existence, showing emotions, 
thoughts, and actions of individuals to be the product of inscrutable supernatural forces. 
In later fictional and theoretical works Belyi resolves this paradox in the direction of 
determinism that completely swallows the individual. But in The Silver Dove the crucial 
question about the exact nature of man's ties to the transcendent does not yet receive a 
clear resolution. Characters speak of existential actions even though their lives belie any 
possibility for real choices. And the fact that contradictory conceptions of symbolic 
cognition seem to be at work in the novel should perhaps be understood as a sign of 
Belyi's ambivalence about the reality of free will. (Andrei Belyi 84)
While this ambivalence between the tragico-romantic and satiric (ironic) modes persists 
throughout the first part of the novel, throwing the reader into confusion as to the true nature of 
the unfolding events, it becomes increasingly evident by its end that Dar'ial'skii is not a tragic 
hero, for he “is not controlling his own life” (88). His lack of agency is particularly striking in the
concluding episodes leading to his violent demise which, in its own turn, becomes the apex of his
passive victimhood. Unlike the tragic hero proper, Dar'ial'skii proves incapable of “making fate 
his own” by appropriating his own suffering. In other words, Dar'ial'skii, who arrogantly thinks 
of himself in terms of the Nietzschean Übermensch capable of independent transformative 
action, turns out, in the end, to be a powerless victim of the metaphysical force of evil. The hero 
deludes himself into believing that he has free will and that whatever happens happens by his 
own volition. In fact, he becomes a plaything of supernatural forces (the Dionysian) over which 
he has no control. 
395
Thus, the tragic mode (the heroic) completely disintegrates into the ironic (the anti-
heroic), for if there is no possibility for an individual meaningful choice, then tragedy becomes 
impossible. The tragic man is neither entirely free nor completely determined, for the nature of 
the tragic requires the continuous tension, confrontation, between human agency (Greek ēthos 
[the hero's character] or Christian free will469) and necessity (fate). In Sewall's words, “He [tragic 
man] is not the plaything of fate, but he is not entirely free. He is ''both creature and creator'' (in 
Niebuhr's phrase)—''fatefully free and freely fated'' (in George Schrader's)” (“The Tragic Form” 
123). If either pole becomes dominant, tragedy ceases to exist: “Tragic man is constituted within 
the space encompassed by this pair, ēthos [character, a certain set of characteristics that makes a 
hero what he is] and daimōn [a vehicle of fate]. If one of the two is eliminated, he vanishes” 
(Vernant 37). In Belyi's novel it is the pole of fate that gains the upper hand, swaying the 
comprehension of historical processes from their emplotment as a tragic Romance toward its 
very opposite—complete determinism and fatalism. 
As a result, the proto-heroic narrative that casts Dar'ial'skii into the role of the tragic hero 
(re)shaping the world is inundated with irony and degenerates into a sheer parody of its own self. 
For irony is what is left once the heroic disappears. In Frye's words, irony is actually nothing else
but “the non-heroic residue of tragedy,” which centers on “a theme of puzzled defeat” (Anatomy 
of Criticism 224). It represents “the end of the age of heroes and of the capacity to believe in 
heroism. The anti-heroism is what makes it the “antithesis” of Romanticism” (White 237). The 
dramatic swing of Belyi's narrative toward the fatalistic pole of “Classicism” by the end of the 
novel, as opposed to the self-determination advanced by the heroic strand of Romanticism, 
469 While the ancient Greeks did not have the notion of free will that enters Western thought only via Christianity, 
the tragic hero, nevertheless, is never depicted as a helpless victim entirely determined by fate. He (or she) 
always acts in accordance with his or her “ethos” (character) and it is this line of action defined by the hero's 
nature that brings about the fulfillment of fate. (Vernant 49-84)
396
ushers in the Nietzschean conception of eternal recurrence (the endless persistence of Time), 
which, in Frye's and White's opinion, represents the absolute triumph of irony:
When the implications of Irony “on the other side of Tragedy” are pushed to their logical 
conclusions, and the fatalistic element in human life is raised to the status of metaphysical
belief, thought tends to revert to and see the world in the imagery of the wheel, eternal 
recurrence, closed cycles from which there is no escape. Frye calls this apprehension of 
the world the Irony of Bondage; this is the nightmare of social tyranny rather than dream 
of redemption, a “demonic epiphany.” (White 238-39)
Thus, Dar'ial'skii's violent death by sparagmos, a Dionysian act of tearing apart of living flesh, at 
the hands of the demonic worshipers, represents the victory of the Dionysian element that brings 
in its wake the idea of the inescapability of the earthly and the impossibility of salvation in the 
human context. The modality of contiguity expressive of the metaphysical condition of severance
and division that has taken hold in Russia is manifest in the metonymical reduction of the tragic 
hero, her would-be Savior, to his mutilated body: 
“Here, catch hold of him!...”
“Ah?”
“Pull him along, pull!...”




“Clack-clack-clack,” the trampling feet sounded in the darkness. They stopped trampling; 
470  The emphasis is mine. 
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in the deep silence heavy sighs could be heard coming from four figures [literally: 
“backs”], merged shoulder to shoulder, stooping over some object. Then there was the 
sound of a chest being crushed; and silence again...
“Clack-clack-clack,” the feet started trampling again...
[…]
a certain pale face bent over him, the head covered with a dark kerchief; and from that 
face tears fell on his chest, and the the upraised hands of that sorrowful-looking person, 
hands crossed in the form of a crucifix were lowering a weighty silver object.
“My own dear sister,” a distant voice sounded.
“Peace, brother,” came the reply from far away.
He was still alive when she closed his eyes; he moved away and did not come back....
In the gray barely perceptible dawn, the yellow flame of a candle danced on a table; grim,
foreheadless men hung about in the small room, while Pyotr's body, breathing feverishly, 
still lay on the floor; with blank faces that had no expression of cruelty on them the men 
stood over Pyotr's body, staring curiously at their handiwork, at the blueish shade of 
death, and the rivulet of blood seeping from his lip, which had probably been bitten 
through in the heat of the struggle. 
“Looks like he's still alive...”
“He's breathing!”
“Choke him a little more...”
The woman, prostrate, held the emblem of the Silver Dove over him [literally: covered 
him with the Silver Dove].
“Let him be. He's our brother, isn't he!”
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“No, he's a traitor,” Sukhorukov called out from a corner, rolling a cigarette between his 
fingers.
But the woman turned on him reproachfully and said:
“You can't tell. Maybe he's a brother.”
A whisper of sympathy ran round the room:
“Dear heart!”
“We didn't finish him off...”
“He's going!”
“Gone!”
“The Kingdom of Heaven be with him!”
“Are the spades handy?”
“They are.”
“Where shall we put him?”
“In the orchard.
And again from the corner a clear voice said:
“I whacked with that cane of his, which he tried to pull away from me on the road.”
[His clothes were removed; his body was wrapped in something (what seemed like a mat) 
and then carried away.
A woman with her hair hanging loose was walking ahead, holding the emblem of the dove
in her hands.471] (The Silver Dove 417-419)472    
471   The last two lines are missing in Reavey's translation and were added and translated by me.
472     - Давай-ка!.. 
   - А? 
   - Тащи, тащи!.. 
   "Ту-ту-ту", - топотали в темноте ноги. 
   - Веревку!.. 
399
However, even though Dar'ial'skii falls victim to fate without being able to offer heroic 
resistance to it, Belyi refuses, in the end, to fully embrace fatalism that seems to assert itself so 
triumphantly by the end of the novel. As in his earlier Symphonies he seeks to curb the excesses 
of irony turned nihilistic by extending hope into the future. The metonymical mode that 
culminates in the reduction of the would-be tragic hero, a pseudo-Christ, to his mangled body 
appears to prevail over the metaphorical mode heralding the definitive victory of Christ over 
   - Где она?.. 
   - Давни ошшо... 
   "Ту-ту-ту", - топотали в темноте ноги; и перестали топотать; в глубоком безмолвии тяжелые 
слышались вздохи четырех сутулых, плечо в плечо сросшихся спин над каким-то предметом; потом 
явственный такой будто хруст продавливаемой груди; и опять тишина... "Ту-ту-ту", - затопотали в 
темноте ноги.
[…]
что какое-то бледное над ним склонилось лицо, темным покрытое платом; и с того лица на его грудь 
капали слезы, а в вознесенных руках этого грустного лица, как водруженное распятье, медленно 
опускалось тяжелое серебро. 
   "Родненькая сестрица", - пронеслось где-то - там." 
   "Почий, братец", - отозвалось оттуда. 
   Она ему еще живому прикрыла глаза; он отошел; он больше не возвращался... 
   В хмуром, едва начинающемся рассвете, на столе плясало желтое пламя свечи; в комнатушке 
стояли хмурые, беззлобные люди, на полу же - судорожно дышало тело Петра; без жестокости, с 
непокрытыми лицами они стояли над телом, с любопытством разглядывая то, что они наделали: и 
смертную синеву, и струйку крови, сочившуюся из губы, прокушенной, верно, в горячке борьбы. 
   - Жив ошшо... 
   - Дыхает! 
   - Давни-ка ево... 
   Простертая женщина накрыла его серебряным голубем. 
   - Оставь: он ведь - наш братик! 
   - Нет, ён придатель, - отозвался из угла Сухоруков, свертывая цигарку. 
   Но она обернулась и укоризненно сказала: 
   - Ведь ты не знаешь: а може, и он - братик. 
   И стоял кругом соболезнующий шепот: 
   - Сердешный! 
   - Не додавили... 
   - Коншается! 
   - Сконшался! 
   - Царства ему небесная!.. 
   - Заступы-то готовы? 
   - Готовы. 
   - А куда? 
   - А на агород. 
   И явственный из угла опять-таки дошел голос: 
   - Еттой я ево сопственнай ево палкай, которую он у меня в дороге вырывал. 
   Одежу сняли; тело во что-то завертывали (в рогожу, кажется); и понесли. 
   Женщина с распущенными волосами шла впереди с изображением голубя в руках. (289-290)
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death. Yet, despite his defeat by the demonic forces, Dar'ial'skii's soul is allowed by Belyi to 
escape into the ether and it is only his maimed body, the soul's earthly cage, that remains in the 
Doves' power. Furthermore, the demonic Doves themselves, or at least Annushka, seem to be 
genuinely affected by his sufferings, for she comes to recognize a “brother” in Dar'ial'skii as he 
came to recognize her as a “sister” before his violent death. Thus, as intimated by Belyi, there is 
still a possibility in the future that the intelligentsia (the West) and the people (the East) may still 
come together in true brotherhood in Christ. 
This hope is reinforced by Belyi's refusal to submit to the metonymical mode emblematic 
of the finality of death and his switch in the concluding sentence of the novel to the metaphorical 
mode symbolic of the future resurrection in Christ: “It was a breezy morning: the trees were 
rustling. The purple strands of feathery clouds, radiant blood, were passing in the sky in radiant 
streams”473 (Serebrianyi golub' 290). The arrival of the new morning awash in (redemptive?) 
blood succeeds the horrors of the Dionysian night. The satirical mode that has seemingly 
established its metaphysical predominance is thereby, at least partially, redeemed by Belyi 
through the opening of another loop in the unfolding historical spiral that promises the coming of
the new, spiritual, epoch that would put an end to the vicious cycle of temporality.  
By exposing Dar'ial'skii, the archetypal Symbolist figure, as a pseudo-Christ incapable of 
actualizing the mystery of love, Belyi shows that heroism and effective action demanded by the 
theurgic enterprise are sorely missing in real life. Belyi's inability to find, or even create, the 
viable tragic hero in the current historical circumstances leads to his complete abandonment of 
the heroic Romantic paradigm that he failed to establish in The Silver Dove. Instead, he descends,
473 “Утро стояло свежее: лепетали деревья; пурпуровые нити перистых тучек, ясная кровь, проходили по 
небу ясными струйками.”  
401
into, if not fully embraces, the Satirical mode of representation that comes to define his 
conception of history in Petersburg. The heroic mode of being in the world is no longer deemed 
possible, for the entire historical field is shown as captive to the ceaseless conflict between the 
two evil metaphysical forces, the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The war between these two 
unsympathetic forces, with no possibility of their reconciliation, turns into an inhospitable 
eternity, “the Irony of Bondage,” where the condition of historical man, conflicted and 
fragmented, is viewed only as ever more anguished. In Petersburg, Belyi undergoes a dramatic 
paradigm shift by moving away from the heroic conception of the tragic as a confrontation 
between free will and fate toward its understanding as an unbridgeable rift between the infinite 
and the finite, or, in Mochul'skii's definition, as the tragism of unreconciled opposites (Andrei 
Belyi 153). 
The Tragism of Opposites in Petersburg
In contrast to The Silver Dove in which the heroic and the ironic compete for dominance, 
in Petersburg (Peterburg, 1912-1913)474 the satirical mode of representation gains full sway. 
Heroic action in the world of history, while desirable, is deemed, in the end, impossible. The 
unfolding of history is shown by Belyi in his second novel as nothing but “a receding sequence 
of interlocking forces” rooted in the transcendent (Aleksandrov 90), of which man is just a 
passive victim. In relation to the two psycho-metaphysical poles, “Romanticism” and 
474  For more on Belyi's novel Petersburg, see Vladimir Aleksandrov, Andrei Bely. The Major Symbolist Fiction 
(100-152); Dagmar Burkhart, “Leitmotivik und Symbolik in Andrej Belyjs Roman 'Peterburg'”; Maria Carlson, 
“The Ableukhov Coat of Arms”; Leonid Dolgopolov,  Andrei Belyi i ego roman ''Peterburg''; Roger Keys, The 
Reluctant Modernist: Andrei Belyi and the Development of Russian Fiction, 1902-1914; Magnus Ljunggren, The 
Dream of Rebirth: A Study of Andrej Belyj's Novel Peterburg; Timothy Langen, The Stony Dance. Unity and 
Gesture in Andrey Bely's Petersburg; Robert A. Maguire and John E. Malmstad, “Petersburg”; Ada Steinberg, 
Word and Music in the Novels of Andrey Bely.  
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“Classicism,” that he seeks to reconcile and synthesize in theurgic Symbolism, Belyi swings 
radically toward the ironic determinism of the “Classicist” axis. While the ultimate goal of  
historical process envisioned by Belyi remains that of perfect unity (the Absolute), the 
metonymical paradigm under whose auspices the Russian Symbolist apprehends the present field
of historical happening precludes any type of definitive reconciliation. Metonymy as the mode of
severance and extrinsic opposition prohibits any closure, for history approached as an endless 
chain of conditions, as has been earlier shown by the early German Romantics, can by no means 
culminate in the unconditioned. Therefore, the resolution of the conflict between the warring 
cosmic opposites, presented in Petersburg as the Apollonian and the Dionysian drives, proves 
impossible, for the movement of history is exposed as deterministic, cyclical, and self-
perpetuating. Like Solov'ev by the end of his life, Belyi finds himself confronted with the ironic 
“tragism of opposites,” the gaping abyss between which cannot be bridged by any man, 
helplessly caught in the deterministic web of history. 
Petersburg depicts the Russian capital on the eve of the 1905 Revolution. A secret 
revolutionary organization headed by Lippanchenko demands that Nikolai Apollonovich 
Ableukhov keep his promise and commit a terrorist act against his father, the senator Apollon 
Apollonovich Ableukhov, who occupies one of the highest posts in Imperial Russia. Nikolai 
Apollonovich gave that fatal promise as a result of his disappointment in love affair without 
thinking through the consequences. He became infatuated with Sofia Likhutina, the wife of his 
childhood friend, Sergei Likhutin. Sofia, however, despite being attracted to Nikolai 
Apollonovich, rejected his advances. Aleksandr Dudkin, one of the revolutionary terrorists, 
brings the bomb packaged in a sardine box to Nikolai Apollonovich, and at the masquerade ball 
Sofia Likhutina gives him the letter containing the order to assassinate his father. Sofia, who has 
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acquainted herself with the contents of the letter, thinks that this is just a practical joke and is 
painfully struck when she sees Nikolai Apollonovich's very real distress. This masquerade ball at 
which Sofia delivers a blow to Nikolai Apollonovich and sees the White Domino (Christ?) 
changes her in the most profound way, thereby bringing her back to her estranged husband, 
Sergey Likhutin, who during her absence has attempted suicide.      
Distraught, Nikolai Apollonovich is in two minds about how to act with regard to the 
orders. On the one hand, he hates his father, being disgusted with their physiological similarities; 
on the other hand, deep at heart, he loves and pities him. He decides to confront Dudkin on the 
issue;  Dudkin, however, professes his utter ignorance about the whole affair and expresses 
outrage at the very idea of parricide. He promises Nikolai Apollonovich to talk to the leader of 
the revolutionary group and clarify the matter. Dudkin goes to Lippanchenko and recounts the 
incident, hoping that it was just some confusion. Lippanchenko accuses Dudkin of lack of 
revolutionary spirit and asserts that Nikolai Apollonovich is an informant employed in the service
of the tsarist police. During this exchange with Lippanchenko, Dudkin realizes that 
Lippanchenko is a provocateur himself. Back at home Dudkin, who is an alcoholic vulnerable to 
hallucinations, experiences a series of unsettling visions involving Falconet's statue of Peter the 
Great, the celebrated Bronze Horseman. As a result, he goes completely insane and murders 
Lippanchenko by stabbing him with a pair of scissors.
In the meantime there is a happy event in the Ableukhov family. Apollon Apollonovich's 
wife who had run away with a musician to Spain a couple of years before returns. This family 
reunion positively affects the relationship between father and son, but not for long. By accident 
the absent-minded Apollon Apollonovich takes the sardine tin containing the bomb out of Nikolai
Apollonovich's room and brings it to his own. The forgotten bomb goes off at dawn without 
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injuring anyone. The relationship between Apollon Apollonovich and Nikolai Apollonovich, 
however, is ruined for ever. They spend the rest of their lives living away from each other. 
Apollon Apollonovich retires from government service and moves together with his wife out of 
Petersburg to the countryside. Nikolai Apollonovich leaves for Egypt and later travels extensively
in the Middle East. He returns to Russia only after both of his parents pass away. While Nikolai 
Apollonovich lives abroad, he experiences a profound spiritual transformation which is manifest 
in his turning away from reading the German Idealist Kant to Grigorii Skovoroda, the originator 
of Russian religious-philosophical thought.  
For the ends of his second Symbolist novel Belyi appropriates the Nietzschean opposition
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian,475 which the Russian Symbolist, however, links not 
with their original interpretation in The Birth of Tragedy as “artistic drives of nature” (24) but 
rather with his two antithetical metaphysical poles of “Romanticism” and “Classicism,” the 
epitome of the cosmic disjuncture, and therefore with the whole set of related associations long 
prevalent in Belyi's thought such as East and West, the irrational and the rational, 
Schopenhauerian will and representation, and Kantian notions of the feeling and understanding. 
Nowhere is the divergence between Nietzsche and Belyi as wide as in their understanding of the 
nature of the tragic and of the role of the two drives in its production. For Nietzsche, the two 
aesthetic principles are deemed indispensable to the successful life of the individual in the world 
of history, with the Apollonian illusion casting the veil over the Dionysian abyss of suffering and 
contradiction. The tragic as an aesthetic category makes the earthly life tolerable and even 
475 For more on the role of Friedrich Nietzsche in Belyi's novel Petersburg, see Virginia Bennett, “Echoes of 
Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy in Andrej Belyj's Petersburg”; Horst-Jürgen Gerigk, “Belyjs 
'Petersburg' und Nietzsches 'Geburt der Tragödie'”; Robert Mann, Andrei Bely's Petersburg and the Cult of 
Dionysus. On Belyi and Nietzsche in general refer to Virginia Bennett, “Esthetic Theories from The Birth of 
Tragedy in Andrei Bely's Critical Articles, 1904-1908”; Edith W. Clowes, The Revolution of Moral 
Consciousness: Nietzsche in Russian Literature, 1890-1940.  
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desirable. Thus, both drives in their conflict and interdependence prove to be fertile and life 
affirming unless either runs amok, unrestrained by its opposite. 
For Belyi, however, both forces, the Apollonian as well as the Dionysian (which is 
privileged by Nietzsche), are lethal, with neither being positively charged. Each impulse is 
associated by him with death, violence (both physical and psychological), and psychic 
degeneracy. The two psycho-metaphysical drives are engaged in a deadlocked struggle that 
serves as the driving force of history in post-Petrine Russia. According to the paradise lost type 
of myth created by Belyi, the demon of history, or, in other words, the violent cyclical succession
of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, is unleashed single-handedly in the “prelapsarian” Russia 
by Peter I, the Great, who, as the Bronze Horseman, becomes the incarnation of the horrors of 
history. In his effort to turn the underdeveloped and barbaric Asiatic Russia into a technologically
and culturally advanced European state, the Russian tsar has triggered the dramatic split that 
shattered the “Original unity,” setting explosive history into motion. Ever since then Russia has 
been pulled apart by the two warring forces: the Apollonian, emblematic of the West and its 
prized values of order, rationality, and individual identity, and the Dionysian, symbolic of the 
East with its penchant for irrationality, self-abandonment, and nihilism. At the time of the events 
portrayed in the novel, the pre-revolutionary days of the 1905 Russia, the Dionysian force is 
shown in the ascendant, and the fierce battle between the two opposing drives is fought for every 
inch of and on every level of human existence: the civilizations (East versus West), the state 
(revolution versus reaction); the Provinces versus the capital, Petersburg (the Islands versus the 
Nevsky Prospect), the family (son versus father; wife versus husband), and the individual where 
the conflict bifurcates into psychological (as exemplified by the duality of every character in the 
novel) and corporeal (as revealed by the androgynous or hybrid nature of every character in the 
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novel).
The course of history, as depicted by Belyi in Petersburg, presents a cyclical succession 
of phases in which the Apollonian and the Dionysian alternately prevail. This movement of 
history, however, is totally devoid of any sense of dialectical progression toward the Absolute, 
for, as it transpires in the novel, the relentless interchange between the two warring forces is 
entirely meaningless: it does not lead to any, even provisional, synthesis(es) and therefore to any 
respite in their interminable conflict. Belyi's tactics are unmistakably those of a dualist, and, as 
White observed in relation to the Romantic historian Michelet who found himself in a similar 
dualistic predicament: “And, as in all dualistic systems of thought, there was no way in his 
historiographical theory for conceiving of the historical process as a dialectical or even 
incremental progress toward the desired goal. There was merely an interchange between the 
forces of vice and those of virtue” (150). Thus, this dualistic approach that merely keeps alive the
senseless interchange of oppositions precludes any possibility of the synthetic solution (the 
Absolute) sought by Belyi. 
This irresolvable dualism can be traced back to Belyi's predilection for viewing the 
unfolding of human history, as it becomes fully manifest in The Silver Dove, as an endless series 
of causal determinations. For the Russian Symbolist, history as an embodiment of temporality is 
only a manifestation of fate, whose other visage representing space is Nature. The two, as 
phenomenal incarnations of fate, follow the same laws—the laws of necessity (causality), 
weaving an endless chain of causes and effects around humanity. This approach toward history as
a second nature, a legacy of Enlightenment, was severely critiqued by Hegel who discerned 
ironic nihilism as an inescapable outcome of such a mechanistic model: 
It is small wonder, Hegel remarked later on, that those who began with the assumption 
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that history is only nature in a different guise are led by the logic of the mode of explanation 
suitable for comprehending nature alone to the conclusion that history has no meaning, 
for “The State of nature is [in fact] predominantly that of injustice and violence, of 
untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings [41].” (White 111) 
By embracing this deterministic vision of history, originally developed by the 
Enlightenment historians, Belyi finds himself in the same trap as his “Classicist” predecessors. 
While the Enlightenment philosophers dreamed of the triumph of reason, they could not, try as 
they might, recognize any progress towards the desired goal in the Universe that worked like a 
clock. Their optimistic proclamations concerning the unqualified rational and moral progress to 
be achieved by humanity found themselves at odds with their analysis of historical reality 
apprehended as an endless causal chain. The conflict between reason and unreason appeared to 
be endless, for in the deterministic world, of which history was a part, no synthesis or victory of 
one force over another was possible. In White's words:
Having precritically decided by their [metonymical] prefiguration of the world as a 
severed field, of causes on the one hand and effects on the other, that no unity was 
possible, they [the Enlightenment philosophers] progressively gave up the ideal on behalf 
of the reality. This reality presented itself to them as an irreducible mixture of reason and 
unreason, as tainted beauty, and finally, as a dark fate that was as incomprehensible as it 
was ineluctable. (66) 
In this light, the descent into nihilistic irony, with its intolerance of all Absolutes, a danger Hegel 
recognized and sought to dissolve by means of his dialectics, is an unavoidable result of the 
metonymical mode of apprehension of human affairs inherent in the mechanistic vision of the 
Universe.     
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Belyi's metonymical prefigurement of the field of history is manifest in his pervasive use 
of metonymy as a stylistic device and other, mainly visual, means employed to convey the utter 
fragmentation and disintegration of the world together with its inhabitants. There are no whole 
people in the novel. Apart from their split psyches, characters are also deprived of their physical 
completeness. In Belyi's Petersburg, it is impossible to meet a human being in one piece; instead, 
the streets are flooded with detached body parts and autonomous articles of clothing: 
The swarms of bowlers darkened; top hats glistened revengefully; the philistine nose leapt
from everywhere again: noses flew by in multitudes: aquiline, cock, chicken, greenish, 
purple; and—a nose with a wart: absurd, hurried, and enormous.476 (Peterburg 368)
This impression of extreme fragmentation and dismemberment is further reinforced by the visual 
discontinuity of the text itself. Belyi breaks his page up into small units “with a profusion of 
dashes, dots, and paragraphs,” creating “a nervous and disjointedly-looking discourse” (Maguire 
and Malmstad xvii). Thus, the visual layout mimics the world of the novel which is completely 
“out of joint.” 
These fragments are nothing but the shards of the world which is being dispersed
through an endless series of acts of violence, “terror” acts, committed by its inhabitants against 
each other, where every character is simultaneously and inescapably a victim and an executioner. 
History, as it emerges from Belyi's novel, is as brutal as Hegel predicted it would be if it is 
conceived by analogy with Nature—as a narrative “of injustice and violence, of untamed natural 
impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings.” In Belyi's vision, history turns into an interminable 
collective terror act. The conflict between the two escalatingly violent historical (and 
476 “Потемнели рои котелков; мстительно заблистали цилиндры; отовсюду снова стал понаскакивать 
обывательский нос: носы протекали во множестве: орлиные, петушиные, курьи, зеленоватые, сизые; и —
нос с бородавкой: бессмысленный, торопливый, огромный.”  
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psychological) forces has reached such a degree of tension that it can only be followed by a 
world explosion marking the end of history. The endless chain of earthly violence can be 
seemingly eliminated only by a terror act on the universal scale. This world explosion is 
associated with the explosion of Nikolai Ableukhov's bomb by which the prominent Senator, 
Apollon Apollonovich Ableukhov, his father, is to be murdered. The bomb intended for the 
Senator, an embodiment of the State, comes to be identified in Nikolai's unsettled mind with the 
“bomb” of history, the explosion of which will lead to the arrival of the Apocalypse, with the 
subsequent yearned-for Second Coming of Christ the Redeemer.
In Nikolai's dream (“The Last Judgment”) that he sees immediately after winding the 
bomb's clock, Apollon Apollonovich is transformed into Saturn:
“-- How is this possible? Who is this?”
“-- Who is this? It is your father...”
“-- And who is my father?”
“-- Saturn...”
“-- How is this possible?”
“-- There is nothing impossible...”477 (268)
“Saturn” is the Roman name for the Greek deity Kronos who is the god of the linear, 
exact and ordered time, or in other words, of historical time. Thus, Nikolai's projected 
assassination of his father is equated with the annihilation of successive time and the end of the 
historical world:
477  -- “Как же это такое? Кто же это такое?”
-- “Кто такое? Отец твой...”
-- “Кто-ж отец мой?”
-- “Сатурн...”
-- “Как же это возможно?”
-- “Нет невозможного!...”
410
And as he once decimated thousands, now he wanted to tear everything apart: to throw a 
bomb at his father; to throw a bomb at running time itself […] It is time itself that 
he desired to blow away; and now all is dying.
-- “Father!”
-- “You wanted to tear me apart; and now all is dying.”
-- “Not you but...”
-- “It is too late: birds, beasts, people, history, the world—all is collapsing: all is falling on
Saturn.478 (269)
The termination of historical time signifies the immediate end of history and therefore of the 
brutal cycles of the pagan gods Apollo and Dionysus that determine its course. The demise of 
Saturn-Kronos is the manifestation of the advent of God's time—Kairos—“the time [the 
historical time] is fulfilled and the kingdom of God has come near” (Mark 1:15). It is the time of 
the fulfillment of God's plan—the Last Judgment followed by the establishment of the Ministry 
of Christ, through whom the ultimate redemption will be achieved and all the divisions will be 
fused together into the flawless wholeness.
Thus, Belyi's protagonist envisions the escape from the clutches of history into Christ by 
triggering the arrival of the Apocalypse through one of the most horrifying “taboo” crimes—
shedding the blood of one's own kin. This introduction of the quintessentially tragic theme of 
parricide appears to be a potential breakthrough into the tragic mode, in which an individual 
action of the hero has a transformative impact upon the world. By exercising his free will, tragic 
478  “... и как некогда он перерезал там тысячи, так он нынче хотел разорвать: бросить бомбу в отца; бросить 
бомбу в самое текущее время. [...] но самое время возжаждал он разорвать; и вот все погибало.
-- “Отец!”
-- “Ты меня хотел разорвать; и от этого все погибает”.
-- “Не тебя, а ...”
-- “Поздно: птицы, звери, люди, история, мир—все рушится: валится на Сатурн....”
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man engages with necessity without being fully determined by it and, while he is not able to 
escape his fate, he is, nevertheless, able to restore order to the perturbed nature of things through 
his tragic demise (sacrifice): “Life does come back, life ends the play, again and again. And the 
fact that life does come back, that its meanings are reaffirmed and restored, after so much 
suffering and after so important a death, has been, quite commonly, the tragic action” (Williams 
54). The tragic catastrophe that brings down the old order in its wake is ultimately purifying, for 
it also brings about the establishment of the new (better?) one. The proto-Oedipus tragic plot, 
however, is constantly subverted and inverted in the metonymical (ironic) space of Belyi's novel. 
Like all the other characters in Petersburg, Nikolai is not an agent endowed with free will
but a helpless puppet of the two forces, the Apollonian and the Dionysian, that he seeks to 
obliterate through parricide. The tragic hero, according to Belyi, has to reconcile the inward 
battle of oppositions (the rational and the irrational) before he can confront the extrinsic war of 
opposites in the field of history. Nikolai's psyche, however, is a space of unremitting conflict 
between the two drives: “Soon without a doubt we will prove to the reader that the soul of 
Nikolai Apollonovich is divided into two independent halves: godlike ice—and simply froglike 
slush. […] But no unitary Ableukhov existed: number one, a god, and number two, a frog”479 
(Peterburg 66). Ableukhov “number one,” godlike, is, obviously, of the Apollonian extraction, 
whereas Ableukhov “number two,” froglike, is of the Dionysian essence. This inner division into 
“a god” and “a frog” is outwardly registered in Nikolai's dual appearance. He is a possessor of 
divine beauty (“a handsome man,” “an ancient Greek mask,” “Apollo of the Belvedere”480) and, 
at the same time, is an ugly monster (“a monster” with “froglike grimaces”; “a spring-heeled 
479 “Скоро мы без сомнения докажем читателю существующую разделенность и души Николая 
Аполлоновича на две самостоятельные величины: богоподобный лед — и прото лягушачья слякоть. […] 
Но не было единого Аблеухова: номер первый, богоподобный, и номер второй, лягушенок.”
480  “красавец”, “античная маска”, “Аполлон Бельведерский”
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puppet with a frozen face”481). This psychic dualism that determines all Nikolai's actions leaves 
no space for the exercise of free will. 
Significantly, the very idea of patricide the realization of which would allegedly trigger 
the Apocalypse and liberate humankind from the oppression of history, is not a product of 
Nikolai's free will. It is one of the impulses, the Apollonian, that plants this in Nikolai's mind and 
drives him into the arms of the Dionysian revolutionaries. The Apollonian impulse inherited from
his father is overdeveloped in Nikolai. It has rigidified to the point where it does not only battle 
against its habitual Dionysian opposite but also turns against one of its own kind who is 
perceived as simply not “godly” enough. The “godliness” in Nikolai Apollonovich has come to 
suppress and repress all natural human emotions. Any expression of the feelings of intimacy 
(with regard to his father or Sofia Likhutina) are associated in Nikolai's split psyche with 
“shameful physiological act” (“pozornyi fiziologicheskii akt”), and thus with the inwardness of 
the body, which is Dionysian. Apollo is the god of the form and all plastic energies and thus of 
the outside of the human body and so it is the outward beauty that is emphatically god-like. All 
the physiological processes (involving the discharge of body fluids and substances) are under the 
domain of Dionysus as the god of fluids. Moreover, these processes are hidden from view (and 
consequently, from Apollo), taking place in the darkness of the inner body, and thus elicit 
associations with the irrational, chaos, and death. 
The godly part of Nikolai viscerally hates the Senator as Apollon Apollonovich 
paradoxically brings the other, Dionysian, part of his son's being to life simply through the fact of
being his father. By wishing the death of the Senator, the Apollonian part largely wishes the 
annihilation of the Dionysian impulse that dwells inside Nikolai's psyche. Through the 
481  “уродище” с “лягушачьими ужимками”, “попрыгунчик с застывшим лицом”
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elimination of the father who is also perceived as unforgivably human, lacking “divinity” in his 
aging body, the Apollonian drive plots to achieve the triumph over its Dionysian opposite. Thus, 
the terror act against Apollon Apollonovich can be viewed essentially (apart from its being a 
political gesture of historical significance) as a terror act over Nikolai's second half of self, the 
Dionysian, which is to be eradicated, again paradoxically, by the Dionysian ritual of sparagmos. 
In this light, there is no escape for Nikolai out of this vicious cycle of the interchange between 
the Apollonian and the Dionysian, for his psyche is as dualistic, mechanistic, and deterministic as
the field of history that it seeks to explode. Being caught in the web of dualities, Nikolai is never 
able to act upon his tragic intention. 
The proto-tragic emplotment is further ironically subverted by the deterministic course of 
history that swallows all tragic scenarios. The world-scale catastrophe envisioned as a tragic 
(cathartic) resolution of the patricidal plot is ultimately averted by what appears as a pure 
accident. While in Nikolai's room, Apollon Apollonovich takes notice of the ticking sardine tin 
and takes it to his study for a closer examination, where it eventually explodes at dawn without 
harming anyone. This accident is nothing more than the vehicle and weapon of history. The 
accident is to history what destiny is to myth. The accident is, so to say, history's “destiny” which
is inescapable, for what appears only as a meaningless accident to the befuddled human 
consciousness is only an unrecognized product of the endless causal chain which, in Belyi's 
fatalistic vision, is modernity's fate. 
The explosion does take place but it is totally stripped of its tragic (cathartic) significance.
As has been pointed out by some of the critics, the timing of the explosion in the novel is rather 
“ironic.” In Mann's words, “... one of the novel's main ironies is the timing of the explosion, 
which occurs after the senator's 'twilight'. The bomb goes off after Nikolai and his fellow 
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revolutionary Dudkin have both renounced their roles in the conspiracy and after Apollon 
Apollonovich has been removed from his post, thanks in part to the negligence and machinations 
of the minor officials” (45). In addition to that, and even more importantly, the explosion takes 
place after the seemingly happy reunion of the dysfunctional family: the unfaithful wife returns 
to husband while the rebellious son makes peace with the father. This reunion has been viewed 
by Maguire and Malmstad as “a fresh start” (xxii). However, this “ironic” timing of the explosion
only accentuates the inescapability of the violent cyclical movement of history lacking any 
progression toward the Absolute, and the impossibility of “fresh starts” and “sincere 
reconciliations” within it. Thus, the deterministic course of history driven by the irreconcilable 
dualities cannot be altered by an individual effort. 
Moreover, not only is en mass redemption denied through the non-arrival of the 
Apocalypse, but the possibility of individual redemption within history through love and 
forgiveness is highly problematized by the closure of the novel as well. Forgiveness as a path to 
redemption is suggested by Belyi through the image of the White Domino, a Jesus figure, who 
appears at the fatal masquerade ball. The White Domino is the only character in the novel who 
does not practice “terrorism”: he is a sacrificial victim but not a terrorist. He refuses to use 
violence in response to violence. Through sincere forgiveness of his enemies and renunciation of 
violence, he exempts himself from the brutality of the battle of the opposites and thus from 
history. The White Domino, a personification of salvation, is in opposition to and an alternative 
to the Bronze Horseman, a personification of history and as such of violence and destruction (“I 
destroy irrevocably”482). Forgiveness is the way of opting out from the savagery of deterministic 
history that he meekly offers to the characters who can still be potentially salvaged (Sofia 
482  “Я гублю без возврата.”
415
Likhutina, Sergei Likhutin, and Nikolai Apollonovich). While forgiveness allows Sofia and 
Sergei Likhutin to mend their deteriorating marriage, it fails to work in the case of Nikolai 
Apollonovich and Apollon Apollonovich.
As it appears, one cannot walk away from history. Once one decides to exit unilaterally 
the brutish cycle of reprisal and retaliation by refusing to practice violence in response to 
violence, history vindictively catches up with and crushes that person, as obviously happened in 
the case of Nikolai Apollonovich and Apollon Apollonovich. The explosion of the bomb undoes 
“the true reconciliation” between father and son (Maguire and Malmstad xxii). The stress wave 
from the explosion hurls (almost literally) the two into the opposite corners of the world, 
separating them for the rest of their lives. Apollon Apollonovich moves north (which is 
associated with the god Apollo) where he dies without seeing his son even once after the bomb 
accident, whereas Nikolai Apollonovich goes to the south, to the Mediterranean (which is 
symbolically linked with the god Dionysus). As it turns out, human forgiveness (due to its lack of
heartfelt sincerity?) has proved too weak a cohesive in the mending of the disjointed historical 
world. 
  The inexorability of history is manifested in the cyclical pattern that underlies the entire
novel which is heavily saturated with the sphere (or circle) imagery. The structure of the novel as 
a whole is also circular, or rather helixical. This pervasive circularity is emblematic of the 
ceaselessness of historical time, which is an ironic (demonic) inversion of the redemptive type of 
circularity symbolized by the divine realm of eternity (originally sought by the Symbolists 
through the creation of a mystery play). As revealed in Nikolai's dream, Saturn's successive flow 
of time continuously closes upon itself in circles/cycles: “But the father was Saturn, the circle of 
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time turned and closed upon itself”483 (Peterburg 269). This paradoxical closure of the linear run 
of the historical (successive) time into a circle repeatedly recurs throughout the novel: 
The bronze-headed giant [the Bronze Horseman] had been galloping through the periods 
of time right up to this very moment, closing the forged circle. […] And in pursuit of him 
[Dudkin], and in pursuit of all thundered the crash of metal, shattering lives: thundered 
the crash of metal in the wasteland and in the countryside; thundered the crash of metal in
the cities; thundered the crash of metal in the trains, on the staircase landings, on the steps
of the staircases enveloped by night. Thundered the periods of time. I have heard this 
thunder. Have you heard it? […] Pursuits are inevitable; and blows are inevitable.484 (349)
This circularity of history is a bad circularity, a suffocating confinement, which seemingly cannot
be broken (“pursuits are inevitable; and blows are inevitable”), for Saturn has the capability of 
healing itself and closing upon itself again and again. 
The feeling of the vicious circularity of history is further enhanced by Belyi's 
employment of Wagnerian leitmotifs: a phrase or a cluster of phrases attached to a particular 
character or phenomenon which recurs each time this character or phenomenon reappears in the 
novel; they can also have a compositional function (the Bronze Horseman, the White Domino, 
bridge over the Neva, etc.). As stated by Bartlett, “Belyj was always particularly enthralled by the
rhythm of Wagner's music [layered by leitmotifs—E.K.], which he linked to the idea of ''Eternal 
Recurrence''” (15). In Belyi's Petersburg, however, as earlier in The Silver Dove, Nietzsche's 
optimistic, life-affirming idea turns into life-denying as it is symbolically associated with the 
483 “Но отец был— Сатурн, круг времени повернулся, замкнулся.” 
484 “Медноглавый гигант прогонял через периоды времени вплоть до этого мига, замыкая кованый круг [...] а 
вдогонку за ним [Дудкин], а вдогонку за всеми, — громыхали удары металла, дробящие жизни: 
громыхали удары металла — в пустырях и в деревне; громыхали они в городах; громыхали они — по 
поездам, площадкам, ступеням полнощных лестниц. Громыхали периоды времени; этот грохот я слышал. 
Ты — слышал ли? […] неизбежны — погони; и — неизбежны удары....” 
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destructive movement of history that has no closure. For Belyi, true life resides exclusively in the
realm of Eternity, and the impossibility of reconciling the human and the divine through the 
tragic action of the heroic individual leads to the eternal perpetuation of the tragism of opposites 
that becomes emblematic of the inescapability of the human condition.  
The metonymical paradigm used by Belyi in his representation of history in Petersburg 
does not permit any closure which would signify the establishment of synthetic unity. The chain 
of causes and effects that relentlessly unfolds into infinity cannot be broken from within by the 
heroic individual, for a human being, as shown by Belyi, is a mere puppet devoid of free will and
buffeted by forces outside his control in the deterministic Universe that holds him captive. 
However, despite this fatalistic philosophy of history, Belyi still leaves for the reader (as well as 
for himself) a fragile hope that one day Saturn's vicious cycle will be transcended and the 
kingdom of Jesus heralding the end of history will eventually be established: 
No, of course, there would be no answer.
Of course, the sad one would give no answer because there could be no answers as of yet. 
But there would be an answer later on—in an hour, in a year, in five years or perhaps even
longer—in a hundred years, in a thousand years but there would be an answer!
[…]
But the day will arrive. 
All of this will change in the twinkling of an eye. And all the passing strangers—those 
who passed each other by (somewhere in a dark alley) in a moment of mortal danger, 
those who spoke of that inexpressible moment with their inexpressible gazes and later 
disappeared in the immensity of the world—all, all of them will meet!
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No one will take away this joy from them.485 (Peterburg 363-364) 
The arrival of this day, however, will not be brought about or even expedited for that 
matter by a human being who has elevated himself to the stature of the tragic hero (Nietzschean 
Übermensch). It will come in accordance with the divine will which appears to be the only power
that can annul the deterministic course of history that has turned each man into a perpetrator of 
horrific crimes and injustices. The titanic tragic action can be accomplished only by the true 
Godman, Christ. Thus, like Solov'ev by the end of his life, Belyi comes to acknowledge the tragic
limitations of humanity. It is not in man's power to unify the metaphysical oppositions, and until 
the divine intervention, the “tragism of opposites” that determines the very nature of the earthly 
will persist. This hope of extrinsic salvation is the only one that retains Belyi from the edge of the
abyss of uncontrollable irony and nihilism that lies at the heart of the deterministic (“Classicist”) 
model of the Universe that he comes in the end to embrace. 
V. In Search of Tragic Catharsis:
Aleksandr Blok's Journey through the “Glass Desert” of Lyricism
 
In 1907, Blok confesses to Belyi: “The drama of my outlook (I have not matured to 
develop a tragic outlook) is that I am a lyricist. To be a lyricist is terrifying and delightful at the 
same time. Behind the terror and delight there lurks an abyss, into which one can fall headlong 
485 “Нет, конечно, не будет ответа. 
Конечно же — ничего не ответит печальный, потому что и не может быть никаких ответов пока; ответ 
будет после — через час, через год, через пять, а пожалуй и более — через сто, через тысячу лет; но ответ
— будет! 
[…] 
Но настанет день. 
Изменится во мгновение ока все это. И все незнакомцы прохожие, — те, которые друг перед другом 
прошли (где-нибудь в закоулке) в минутуе смертельной опасности, те, которые о невыразимом том миге 
сказали невыразимыми взорами и потом отошли в необъятность — все, все они встретятся! 
Этой радости у них не отнимет никто.” 
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and nothing will remain”486 (Belyi, Perepiska 325). In other words, Blok identifies his worldview
as “ontological aestheticism” that defines the very nature of lyricism that the Russian Symbolist 
equates with Romanticism. The danger of ontological aestheticism that Blok comes to realize 
during the crisis of 1905-1907 lies in the Romantic's attitude toward objective reality that 
acquires significance for him only insofar as it supplies occasions on which he can exercise his 
aesthetic imagination. As a result, the objective reality is stripped of its independent (ontological)
existence because it exists for the Romantic subject exclusively as a product of his aesthetic 
fancy. Thus, the object of the Romantic's interest, even if it is supposedly located outside himself,
is, nevertheless, always the same: himself and his emotional states. 
Rather than confronting reality, the Romantic withdraws from it, supplanting it with the 
products of his imagination, that is with his own self. This suspension of the objective reality is 
attained by means of irony. In the words of Carl Schmitt who shared Blok's critical view of early 
German Romanticism as ontological aestheticism: 
The romantic withdraws from reality. He does this ironically, however, and in a spirit of 
intrigue. Irony and intrigue do not constitute the state of mind of a person in flight, but 
rather the activity of a person, who instead of creating new realities, plays one reality off 
against another in order to paralyze the reality that is actually present and limited. He 
ironically avoids the constraints of objectivity and guards himself against committing to 
anything. The reservation of all infinite possibilities lies in irony. In this way, he preserves
his own inner, genial freedom, which consists in not giving up any possibility. (72) 
Creative freedom provided by irony, however, comes at a high cost. The ironic Romantic 
486 “Драма моего созерцания (до трагедии я не дорос) состоит в том, что я — лирик. Быть лириком — жутко и
весело. За жутью и весельем таится бездна, куда можно полететь — и ничего не останется.” 
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consciousness, as Blok comes to realize, loses all moral bearings in the infinite play of its 
aesthetic imagination. By replacing reality with the primacy of unlimited possibilities, irony 
refuses to ascribe any intrinsic (i.e., ontological) significance to values it plays with. As a result, 
Romantic irony does not know the difference between “a mystery play” and “a puppet show.” 
The two are essentially identical within the space of its operation. What was supposed to be a 
mystery play can be easily inverted into the most abject puppet show within the fluid confines of 
ironic subjectivity, because irony equalizes the dimensions of the sacred and the profane by 
conflating one with the other. Ethical relativity followed by the precipitous descent into extreme 
nihilism and despair is the dead end which is ultimately encountered by the ironic Romantic 
subject. 
Therefore, in order to create a genuine mystery play which is the final goal of the 
Symbolist enterprise, the creative subject, according to Blok, needs to be purged of Romantic 
irony by traversing the terrain of tragedy that lies outside the alienated ironic consciousness. A 
mystery play cannot be created through the efforts of the isolated subject. All atempts at such a 
one-sided creation would inevitably lead only to its inversion into a puppet show. The ironic 
Romantic subjectivity that devalues and suspends the finite world of mundane existence can only
produce an endless series of aesthetic phantoms. For a mystery play to become a reality rather 
than a product of literary imagination, the world of objectivity must be reached, and the path 
toward objectivity out of the entrapment of the exaggerated Romantic subjectivity lies for the 
Russian Symbolist in the realm of tragedy. Thus, in one of his letters to Belyi, Blok articulates his
tragic imperative: “It is a lyricist who speaks against lyrical poetry. I am not defining the details 
of the path; it is not given to me. But I am pointing the way which you also acknowledge: out of 
the swamp—towards life, from lyricism—towards tragedy. Otherwise, the rust of the swamps 
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and lyricism will corrode the slender columns and marble of life and tragedy and will flood their 
lights with a rusty wave”487 (Belyi, Perepiska 344). The lyrical debacle in which Blok found 
himself can be surmounted only if the restorative spirit of tragic purgation cleanses the alienated 
consciousness, thereby reintegrating it with the larger cosmic whole. 
Thus, as for Belyi and Ivanov, it is the tragic theater488 that, in Blok's mind, can provide 
the platform for the synthesis of art and life that Romanticism in its absolutisation of art at the 
expense of life failed to bring about: 
More than any other type of art, the theater exposes the sacrilegious emptiness of the 
formula “art for art's sake.” For the theater is the flesh of art itself, that lofty region in 
which “the word becomes flesh.” […] It is in the theater that art is to encounter life itself 
which is invariably melodious, rich, and diverse.489 (SS v 8-mi tt., 5: 270) 
For Blok, the tragic theater will become a mighty transformative force in the realm of life only if 
the Romantic subject, who is nothing else but an exaggerated aesthetic consciousness afflicted 
with irony, chooses to take the path of incarnation (“put' vochelovechivaniia”): 
In order to take part in “life-creation” (this cliche is used in the note authored by the 
editorial board of Works and Days), it is necessary to become incarnate [voplotit'sia], to 
487 “Против лирики говорит лирик. Я не определяю подробностей пути, мне это не дано. Но я указываю 
только устремление, которое и Ты признаешь: из болота — в жизнь, из лирики — к трагедии. Иначе —
ржавчина болот и лирики переест стройные колонны и мрамор жизни и трагедии, зальет ржавой волной 
их огни.”  
488 For a more detailed discussion of Blok's theater, including his aspiration to create a tragedy, see A.V. Fedorov, 
Teatr A. Bloka i dramaturgiia ego vremeni; Iu. K. Gerasimov, “Zhanrovye osobennosti rannei dramaturgii 
Bloka”; P. P. Gromov, Blok, ego predshestvenniki i sovremenniki; P. N. Medvedev, Dramy i poemy Al. Bloka; K. 
Mochul'skii, Aleksandr Blok; T. M. Rodina, Aleksandr Blok i russkii teatr nachala XX veka; A. B. Rubtsov, 
Dramaturgiia Aleksandra Bloka; N. D. Volkov, Aleksandr Blok i teatr; Timothy Westphalen, Lyric Incarnate: 
The Dramas of Aleksandr Blok. 
489 “Более чем какой бы то ни было род искусства, театр изобличает кощунственную бесплотность формулы 
''искусство для искусства.'' Ибо театр — это сама плоть искусства, та высокая область, в которой ''слово 
становится плотью'' […] Именно в театре искусству надлежит столкнуться с самою жизнью, которая 
неизменно певуча, богата, разнообразна.”
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reveal one's sad human face and not the pseudo-face of a non-existent school. We are 
Russians.490 (7: 140) 
The pursuit of incarnation by the Romantic subject, who in the context of Russian history, is 
identified by Blok as a member of the intelligentsia, should ultimately lead to the cathartic 
cleansing of Russia, the fallen beloved, and the exoneration of the intelligentsia in the role of the 
tragic protagonist. By assuming the tragic role and selflessly sacrificing themselves for the sake 
of Russia, the intelligentsia, while being doomed, nevertheless, will escape the deterministic path
of being trampled upon by the wild Gogolian Troyka, the people (narod). 
Therefore, Blok's tragic project is not limited to the restoration of tragedy as an aesthetic 
genre but it is, as for Belyi and Ivanov, a theurgic enterprise as well. His task is to awaken the 
Romantic subject preoccupied with his idle aesthetic fantasies to the imminent threat of the 
objective world with its concrete contradictions that refuse to be aesthetically resolved. The 
objective reality demands a decisive action on the part of the Romantic subject whose mode of 
being, on the other hand, is characterized by aesthetic play and passivity. Thus, by seeking to 
recreate tragedy as a genre in his dramas The Song of Destiny (Pesnia Sud'by, 1907-1908) and 
The Rose and the Cross (Roza i krest, 1912-1913), Blok simultaneously seeks to create a tragic 
role model for the Russian intelligentsia to embody in the realm of life. 
Yet, while Blok succeeds in attaining his ideal in the province of aesthetics by creating a 
Solov'evian “synthetic tragedy,” he finds that his solution to the tragic rupture between the 
intelligentsia that represents alienated Romantic subjectivity and the people who stand for the 
world of objectivity cannot be transposed into the domain of life. Erotic love that Blok poses 
490 “Для того чтобы принимать участие в ''жизнетворчестве'' (это суконное слово упоминается в слове от 
редакции ''Трудов и дней''), надо воплотиться, показать свое печальное человеческое лицо, а не псевдо-
лицо несуществующей школы. Мы — русские.”
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after Solov'ev as a solution to the tragic rift separating the finite and the infinite, art and life, the 
subject and the object cannot fulfill its unifying cosmic function. Unlike Christian love, which is 
actively directed at other people, erotic love for the Beautiful Lady (be she earthly or 
metaphysical), for the sake of whom the Romantic subject is ready to renounce himself, can 
neither heal nor redeem. The Romantic subject remains paradoxically confined within “the glass 
desert” of his individualism even while supposedly experiencing unity with the greater universal 
whole at the moment of his death on the cross of life for the sake of love. The exaltation of 
Romantic consciousness at the moment of its dissolution does not reunite it with the people, who,
for Blok, constitutes the very world of objectivity.  
That the solution Blok worked out within the aesthetic dimension cannot be transferred 
into the sphere of life was proved by historical circumstances. As the Russian Symbolist always 
feared, the intelligentsia, having failed to assume an active, tragic, position on the stage of 
Russian history, was violently swept away by the forces of revolution. Having initially accepted 
the people's revolution as an earthly expression of the cosmic music, gradually Blok comes to the
realization that its purifying force was hijacked and corrupted by the rabble (“golyt'ba”).The 
Romantic subject who used to suspend the world shunning its substantive contradictions finds 
himself crushed by the objective force that refuses to acknowledge the value of his aesthetic play.
The poet is deprived of his aesthetic freedom, being forced instead into the service of the 
authoritarian state. 
The collision of the aesthetic vision and the nakedly brutal reality leaves the Romantic 
subject shattered, making evident the impossibility of the tragic path in real life. This plunges 
Blok into the abyss of fatalism, atheism, and despair as it becomes manifest in his last play 
Ramesses. Unlike Belyi and Solov'ev, who also discover that the tragic division between the 
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finite and the infinite, art and life, the subject and the object cannot be bridged by human effort 
alone, Blok refuses to accept metaphysical consolation. While for Belyi and Solov'ev, the tragic 
breach can still be healed by Christ, for Blok, the rift is eternal. In his pessimistic vision, a human
being will always remain a prisoner within the empirical dimension, a helpless puppet of the 
impersonal forces of history. The utter futility of human existence is Blok's ultimate insight into 
the nature of things. His is the unalleviated tragic vision that will be further developed by late 
Modernism. 
Blok's Lyrical Debacle
Blok's attempt to break away from ironic lyricism into the world of tragic objectivity can 
be traced in his three lyrical dramas that simultaneously represent a triumph and downfall of 
exaggerated Romantic consciousness. In his first theatrical experiments, the Russian Symbolist 
exposes the destructive power of irony that accompanies the Romantic posture and explores the 
limitations of subjective artistic imagination that Romanticism elevates and affirms as the first 
metaphysical principle. Blok seeks to show that behind the narcissistic pleasures of Romantic 
self-contemplation there lurks an abyss of nihilism and self-destruction. To escape the 
irreversible descent into this abyss of demonic non-being, one has to break through the vicious 
circle of solipsistic Romantic subjectivity into the objective world that the Romantic artist 
suspends in the aesthetic play of his imagination. In his lyrical dramas, however, Blok is as yet 
unable to reach the world of objectivity outside the confines of the isolated Romantic ego, as 
attested to by his inability to find a viable tragic hero independent of authorial consciousness.  
Blok's first lyrical drama The Puppet Show (Balaganchik, 1906) marks the initial step in 
his quest toward tragic objectivity. As shown in the earlier discussion of the play (see the first 
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chapter on irony), in The Puppet Show, the Russian Symbolist seeks to lay bare the bankruptcy of
Romantic aesthetic imagination alienated from the world of objectivity. Blok not only exposes 
the destructive negativity coiled at the heart of Romantic irony's playful exuberance and 
optimism but he also directs the spear of that irony against the sancta sanctorum of Romanticism
—the play of subjective imagination, or, in other words, against Romantic lyrical consciousness 
itself. 
This self-immolation, however, does not lead to the desired outcome. While the fictional 
world, a product of exaggerated Romantic subjectivity, is in the end unmasked as theatrical and 
destroyed as a house of cards, the Romantic ego itself, exemplified by the figure of Pierrot, is not
cured of its corrosive lyricism. One of its favorite imaginings that supplanted the suspended 
reality crumbles, but the nature of Romantic aesthetic consciousness, its very mechanism, 
remains intact. At the end of the play, the unhappy lover Pierrot is shown as sublimating his 
sorrow by transposing it into music: “Lost in thought, Pierrot took the pipe out of his pocket and 
played a song about his pale face, about his hard life, and about his bride Colombine”491 (SS v 6-
ti tt., 4: 18). In other words, Pierrot, an alter ego of the author himself, resorts to Romantic 
poeticization of experience as a way of avoiding the objective contradictions and conflicts 
manifest in that experience. In his analysis of Romantic poeticization, Oakes observes:
The process of poeticization begins when the romantic confronts a conflict in the real 
world. He does not attempt to resolve this conflict. He does not even recognize it as a 
substantive conflict between real alternatives. On the contrary, he regards it as a fortunate 
occasion for the evocation of an emotionally satisfying mood, an aesthetic opportunity. 
491 “Пьеро задумчиво вынул из кармана дудочку и заиграл песню о своем бледном лице, о тяжелой жизни и о
невесте своей Коломбине.”  
426
(xxiii) 
Thus, Pierrot, like a true Romantic, hastily retreats into the sphere of aesthetic contemplation by 
translating the conflicted state of affairs into a state of emotional discord that, unlike a real-life 
conflict, can be brought to a higher, aesthetic, harmony: “Poeticization does not resolve the 
conflict, but rather suspends it by incorporating the antithetical factors into a higher harmony” 
(Ibid.).  
As Blok shows in The Puppet Show by stripping Romantic aesthetic consciousness down 
to its bare essence (its mechanism of productivity), the Romantic ego and the tragic action are 
incompatible. The Romantic, in the Russian Symbolist's denunciatory view, refuses to face real-
life contradictions and all possible tragic collisions by reducing them to a ceaseless ironic play of 
aesthetic contrasts. He does not seek to annul reality, for this act of annulment would necessarily 
entail the recognition of the metaphysical validity of the objective world and therefore 
presuppose a possibility of direct confrontation and collision. Instead, the Romantic simply seeks
to suspend reality in the aesthetic play of his imagination. Thus, by the end of the play, the 
objective reality is still “suspended,” for Blok is, as of yet, unable to break through the confines 
of aesthetic imagination. Pierrot is left on the empty stage, whose barrenness is symbolic of 
Blok's inability to see the world of objectivity. The mechanism of Romantic imagination, 
however, is unlikely to leave that space empty for long, as attested to by Pierrot's seeking comfort
in aesthetic pleasures. The Puppet Show simultaneously reveals the bankruptcy and inescapability
of Romantic aestheticism for Blok.  
In his second lyrical drama The King on the Square (Korol' na ploshchadi, 1906), Blok 
makes another step in his attempt to reach the world of objectivity with its tragic dissonances. 
The drama depicts a nameless city in which the people are awaiting the arrival of the ships, a 
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symbol of the Beautiful Lady, that should deliver them from the earthly life of deprivation and 
suffering. The city is allegedly governed by the Old King whose statue is erected in the central 
square. In reality, however, it is the Architect who controls the city, using the statue of the king as
a means to hold the hungry crowds in obedience. The starving masses who are losing faith in  
promised salvation are growing progressively more disaffected and it becomes harder to keep 
them quiescent. The Poet who comes to discover the truth about the Old King—that he is nothing
but a statue made of stone—is too weak to act. The Architect's Daughter, sympathetic to the 
people's plight, seeks to turn the petrified Old King (back?) into a living being but is cruelly 
murdered alongside the poet by the incensed crowd. When the ships arrive at long last, the riot is 
raging in the city and the people consumed by violence cease to care. The play ends with 
violence subsiding and the Architect addressing the subdued crowds. He promises the hungry 
people who become submissive again that they will be fed by the Father. 
 Unlike in The Puppet Show that offers a travestied version of his private life, in The King
on the Square, Blok tentatively gropes for a possibility of presenting a real-life conflict. In his 
second lyrical drama, he introduces, if only indirectly, the tragic theme of Russia, the irreparable 
split between the intelligentsia and the people, that will define the development of his poetic, 
essayistic, and dramatic work for many years to come. In his quest for tragic objectivity, the 
Russian Symbolist, somewhat paradoxically, if viewed in light of his task to surmount the 
phenomenon of Romanticism as such, turns to the conventions of Romantic tragedy, in particular,
to Pushkin's Boris Godunov (which is, in its own turn, modeled on Shakespearean tragedy). The 
lyrical setting of Blok's play is devoid of all geographical and historical specificity, but in the 
conflict that he seeks to stage one cannot help but recognize the broad outline of Pushkin's 
conception of Russian history as a vicious circle, as a series of dead-end collisions between the 
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oppressive state and the elemental force of the people. Into this antagonistic relationship of the 
state and the people depicted by Pushkin, Blok seeks to integrate a third element—the figure of 
the poet, the author's alter ego, who is undoubtedly linked with his later essayistic portrayals of 
the Russian intelligentsia. 
Due to the absence of the historical context, however, all Blok's characters are nothing but
symbols. The conflict that takes place on the stage, directly and indirectly, between the Architect, 
the people, and the Poet/the Architect's Daughter is, as a result, reduced to the abstract collision 
of impersonal universal forces: civilization or the authority of the state (represented by the 
Architect), nature (personified by the people), and culture (exemplified by the figures of the Poet 
and the Architect's Daughter). Thus, in his attempt to break away from Romanticism and its 
exaggerated aesthetic consciousness, Blok, ironically, only produces another lyrical variant of the
archetypal Romantic conflict.
 The character that stands closest to the author is the Poet who like Pierrot, is incapable of
decisive tragic action and falls far short of the heroic stature demanded by the force of 
circumstances. The Architect's Daughter says: “I was looking for a hero in you”492 (52) but the 
Poet, as he himself acutely realizes, is totally inadequate for such a valiant role: “I am weak when
the crowd is raging, / I am weak when your father speaks, / My heart is open only to you— / My 
soul is enslaved by the dark melodies”493 (38). The Poet is too hesitant and divided and does not 
possess the solidity of character which is prerequisite for a heroic action. Throughout the play, he
is always swayed by a stronger, more active personality (the Architect, the Architect's Daughter, 
and the people) who has a clear vision and knows the path towards it. Like the true Romantic that
492  “Я искала в тебе героя.” 
493 “Я слаб, когда бушует толпа, / Я слаб, когда говорит твой отец, / Сердце открыто только тебе — / Темным 
напевам душа предана.”  
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he is, the Poet is beset with yearning for the infinite but he does not know how to attain it. This 
longing for the inexpressible makes him conscious of the falsehood of the actual world around 
him, but the Poet is unwilling to fully admit, even to himself, the “puppet show” nature of the 
city constructed and run by its evil mastermind, the Architect: “Poet: Consciousness frustrates my
life. I know that the life of the city is as illusory as mine. The sea seems to me to be made of glass
while people are nothing but puppets. Architect: You are sick. Poet: It often seems to me that the 
king as well... Architect: You are sick”494  (33). Such an open acknowledgment would require a 
decisive, transformative action, but the Poet is too ineffectual to carry it out. 
The Poet finds himself positioned between two antagonistic forces—the oppressive force 
of civilization represented by the Architect and the destructive force of nature embodied by the 
people. The Poet himself, together with his beloved, the Architect's Daughter, symbolizes the 
element of culture, or, in other words, the power of art, which could potentially serve as a 
unifying link between the state (the rigidity of the civilized order) and the people (the destructive 
forces of chaos). But as the play shows, this link has failed to provide a genuine bond between 
the two antithetical forces poised on the verge of an all-out violent collision. The power of art is 
revealed as ineffectual in its attempts to bring back to life the Old King who used to function as a
living symbol of the universal harmony (the unity of all oppositions). This living unity, if there 
ever was one no longer exists, for the King is first suspected of and later exposed as being just a 
statue made of stone and bereft of life. The Architect who is most likely to have erected the statue
of the Old King in the first place uses it as a mere ploy, a hollow idol, to keep the hungry and 
discontented people in control. “Stone” is thus offered as a substitute for “bread.” In this light, 
494 “Поэт: Сознание мешает мне жить. Я знаю, что жизнь города также призрачна, как моя. Море кажется 
мне стеклянным, люди — куклами. Зодчий: Ты болен. Поэт: Мне часто кажется, что и король... Зодчий: 
Ты болен.” 
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the Old King in Blok's play represents the petrified past (the ossified order of things) that 
oppresses and no longer spiritually nourishes the people who, in their turn, crave for more 
immediate, material goods (“bread”).
The statue of the Old King, however, is losing its authority, for the people no longer have 
faith in it and are growing more restive and violent with each passing day. To impose a 
semblance of order, the Architect offers the disaffected people a new hope of salvation in the 
form of the distant ships, in which he himself believes no more than in the statue of the Old King.
It is the Architect's Daughter who seeks to save the world and restore the shattered unity by 
acting on her ideals that no one else but the Poet seems to share. Representing the power of art, 
the Architect's Daughter, inspired by the old fairytale, attempts to resuscitate the statue of the Old
King, the dead order of things, by turning it back into a source of spiritual nourishment. Her 
naive faith, however, is not sufficient to revive the stone sculpture, thereby reunifying the state 
with the people. Blok shows the fragility and futility of beauty (art) in the face of the unleashed 
savagery of the starving people. The Architect's Daughter, so beloved and respected by the people
in times of relative peace, is mercilessly murdered by them during the outbreak of violence. 
Together with the Poet, she is buried under the rubble of the statue demolished by the maddened 
crowd.  
The bitter irony of the situation portrayed by Blok lies not only in the fact that the 
Architect's Daughter sacrifices herself for the sake of the people at whose hands she suffers a 
violent death but also in the disconcerting realization that her and the Poet's sacrifice is ultimately
meaningless. The catastrophe that leaves a trail of death and devastation in its wake does not 
have a cathartic effect. Destruction and brutality, as Blok shows, do not bring freedom. Even 
those who provoke the massive scale destruction do not believe in its liberating potential: “The 
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Second: Tell me one last thing: do you believe that destruction is liberating? The First: No, I 
don't. The Second: Thank you. I don't believe it either”495 (23). Rather than a new universal order 
of things, the eruption of violence brings about a repetition of the same. The state of slavery, both
external and internal, continues unabated. The Architect only strengthens his power over the 
people, and the people, still starving and disaffected, continue seeking salvation in the false belief
that physical nourishment (“bread”) rather than the spiritual state of freedom (“the ships”) would 
satisfy their needs. Culture (art) turns out to be collateral damage in the intensifying conflict 
between the state (repressive civilization) and the people (the chaos of nature) without being able
to mend the disjointed state of affairs.        
Unable to create an objective tragedy with its sense of cathartic cleansing signifying 
universal rejuvenation, Blok actually communicates the Romantic-Symbolist sense of the tragic 
as the artist's all too human incapacity to bridge the rupture between the finite and the infinite. 
The ever decreasing chance of reunifying the two is emphasized at the end of the play by the 
Architect's erection of a new idol—Christian religion—in place of the wrecked statue of the Old 
King. To pacify the rebellious hungry people who threaten to overturn the established order, the 
Architect evokes the benign authority of the heavenly Father. By putting their hopes of the ever 
deferred salvation into religion, the people should expect consolation and alleviation of their 
sufferings not on earth but in and from heaven. Its yoke, that of an abstract idea, will be even 
harder to overthrow than that of the stone King. Thus, the distance between the finite and the 
infinite is perpetuated and sanctified by means of official religion put in service of the repressive 
state. 
495 “Второй: Скажи мне последнее: веришь ли ты, что разрушение освободительно? Первый: не верю. 
Второй: Спасибо. И я не верю.”  
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There is a pervasive atmosphere of doom and gloom at the end of the play which is 
symbolized by the circularity of its composition. Darkness engulfs the beginning and the end of 
the play. The action begins before the sunrise (in the dark) and ends after the sunset (in the dark). 
In other words, the play traces the revolution of the sun that rises out of darkness and descends 
back into darkness. This twilight that submerges the world is indicative of the absence of a viable
solution to the human condition. Whatever hope for salvation there has ever been (the Architect's 
Daughter's Romantic dream about the rejuvenation of the aged King; the arrival of the ships), it 
no longer exists. There is no exit out of the vicious circle of empirical existence torn apart by the 
ever intensifying conflict of the two oppositions. This whole conflict is senseless, stretched into 
infinity and leading nowhere. For even if, as Blok intimates, the state is overpowered and swept 
away by the elemental fury of the masses at one unguarded moment, the people will not be 
liberated from the slavery and oppression that they associate with the state. True freedom lies 
beyond the realm of the purely physical within which the people seem to be currently enslaved. 
They crave for food (“bread”) but the satisfaction of their physical needs will not bring salvation 
that lies only in the realm of spiritual freedom. Matter can potentially be spiritualized by means 
of art, but in Blok's pessimistic vision, the beauty of art is too fragile: rather than remedying the 
conflicted state of things, it inevitably falls its victim. 
Like Pushkin's Boris Godunov, Blok's The King on the Square stages a downward spiral 
of historical development. The unfolding of history is portrayed as an eternal repetition of the 
same, but this “eternal return” takes a clearly downward trajectory. Instead of the progressive 
cycle of history that labors its way toward the Absolute, there is a distinct sense of degeneration 
and increasing violence in Blok's poetic universe that will also be later in evidence in Belyi's 
novel Petersburg. There is a growing suspicion in Blok that the tragic rupture between the finite 
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and the infinite that Romanticism exposed but failed to heal is in its essence irreparable. Thus, 
the earthly (the material) may never be redeemed and restored to its former unity with the 
spiritual, at least not through the efforts of the poet or Romantic imagination, as embodied by the 
Architect's Daughter, that collapses in its confrontation with the naked reality.  
Despite his conscious attempt in The King on the Square to find a path toward external 
reality by introducing the objective theme of history and violent social conflicts, Blok as a 
playwright remains firmly planted within the circle circumscribed by Romantic lyrical 
consciousness. The play as a whole tends toward an explicit allegory. Blok does not achieve the 
successful blending of realism and symbolism that can be found, for example, in its dramatic 
model, Boris Godunov. The setting is stripped of all historical specificity and all the characters 
are poetic abstractions (“walking ideas”) devoid of individuality. The treatment of the conflict 
itself, as a collision of civilization identified with the power of the state and nature associated 
with the people, comes straight from the Romantic playbook. Moreover, this conflict does not 
take place in the external world but within the symbolic (“fictional”) space of the author's mind: 
“In the romantic, everything—society and history, the cosmos and humanity—serves only the 
productivity of the romantic ego” (Schmitt 75). In the outlines of the cosmic conflict one can 
easily recognize Blok's preoccupation with his private myth: the Beautiful Lady, embodied as the 
Architect's Daughter, and the Poet who falls short of his heroic role. Furthermore, as in The 
Puppet Show, the depicted world of the city is only a fictional product of subjective imagination. 
The theatricality of the space is emphasized through the employment of Romantic irony 
embodied in the figure of the Jester who opens the play with a jocular prologue and interrupts its 
'tragic' course with his pranks. This play of irony, which is, in Schmitt's words, “essentially the 
intellectual expedient of the [Romantic] subject that keeps its distance from objectivity” (Ibid.), 
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does not allow Blok to transcend the confines of the Romantic drama of the mind. 
In comparison with The King on the Square, The Stranger (Neznakomka, 1907) marks a 
step back in terms of the Russian Symbolist's attempt to break through to objective reality 
beyond Romantic subjectivity. The play is centered on the arrival of the Stranger 
(“Neznakomka”), a heavenly star turned earthly woman, who comes down from the firmament in
response to intense longing for her experienced by a number of male characters, the Blue, the 
Astronomer, and the Poet. Yet, all of them fail to recognize the former star in the Stranger who in 
her earthly form yearns for earthly love. In the end, the Stranger is seduced by a certain 
unprincipled Gentleman who abandons her afterwards. Unable to find true love on earth, the star 
returns to the skies. 
In The Stranger Blok reverts to the restaging of his private poetic myth revolving around 
the Divine Feminine. Similar to The Puppet Show, all the male characters (the Blue, the 
Astronomer, the Poet, and the Gentleman) represent different facets of authorial consciousness. 
As in the previous two plays, there is no “hero” in the play who would be able to discern the 
longed-for heavenly star in the Stranger and/or to redeem her fallen nature by means of selfless 
love: the Poet, who seems to be the author's closest incarnation, is a forlorn drunkard who is too 
weak and forgetful; the Astronomer is preoccupied with the star in the skies and his academic 
career; the Blue has spent so much time looking into the sky yearning for the unattainable ideal 
that he is no longer able to reciprocate a woman's desire for love; the Gentleman does not know 
any form of love but the most debased—animalistic, carnal lust. In refutation of Solov'ev's vision
of erotic love serving as a pontifex and his youthful dreams of fulfilling that messianic vision, 
Blok shows the deficiency of human love in all its varieties and the inadequacy of human nature, 
selfish and flawed, even if driven by the highest aspirations. 
435
The impossibility of bridging the tragic gap between the heavenly (the radiant ideal) and 
the earthly (human infirmity) by means of human love is emphasized by the play's circular 
composition. If in the earlier two plays “eternal return” made itself manifest mostly as a theme, in
The Stranger it becomes a fully-fledged formal principle. The third vision mirrors the first, 
signifying the impossibility of escape from the vicious circle of meaninglessness and absurdity of
the unredeemed earthly life. Time in the play runs in circles without any sense of progress or, in 
other words, it is completely stagnant: 
In the play there are three phases of time that do not affect the state of the objective 
world. “The second vision”—the middle part of the play—carries within itself the 
possibility of the development of reality and the potentiality of the movement of life in 
historical time. But the potentiality remains unrealized and time remains immobile. The 
Stranger is a play about “the swamp” of modern life, about the stagnant swamp of 
historical time.496 (Rodina 158) 
This historical time, however, like the cyclical course of history in The King on the 
Square, is still a purely subjective time of Romantic consciousness that seeks a way out of its 
own vicious circularity. For the Romantics, as a result of the conflation of the individual 
consciousness and the Universe (the microcosm=the macrocosm), “the will to reality” resulted in 
“the will to appearance”:
The romantics had attempted to grasp the reality of the world, the entire world at once, the
totality of the cosmos. Instead they obtained projections and reabsorptions, elongations 
496 “В пьесе даны три фазы времени, не оложившиеся никак на состоянии объективного мира. Возможность 
развития действительности несет в себе ''Второе видение'' — среднее звено пьесы, — и в нем заключена 
потенция движения жизни в историческом времени [that is the possibility of redemption through love but the 
Stranger is, ironically, left unrecognized by all of her lovers]. Но потенция не реализуется, и время остается 
неподвижным. ''Незнакомка'' — пьеса о ''болоте'' современной жизни, о стоячем болоте исторического 
времени.”
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and abbreviations. The point, the circle, ellipses, and arabesques, an ensouled—that is, a 
subjectified—cosmic game. They managed to escape the reality of things, and in turn 
things also escaped them. (Schmitt 78)
Blok strives to get back to objective things, to grasp the essence of historical development in 
particular, by reanimating “the will to reality” that got atrophied in the ironic play of Romantic 
imagination. 
Blok's primary preoccupation becomes the history of Russia that he comes to apprehend 
in terms of the potential tragic conflict between two antithetical elements, the intelligentsia 
(equated with the Romantic lyrical subject) and the people (associated with the world of 
objectivity). In his pursuit of the tragic, the Russian Symbolist seeks to find the way out of the 
vicious circle of history perceived as a ceaseless deterministic chain of events. Depending on the 
intelligentsia's choice, history can unfold either in the deterministic (fatalistic) or tragic direction.
Blok envisions his task as awakening the intelligentsia to their tragic duty by reviving tragedy not
only as an aesthetic genre that synthesizes lyrical subjectivity and objectivity but also as a 
potential model for the tragic action in the world of actuality that will cleanse Russia of the 
impurities of its past. 
 Tragic Rupture: The Intelligentsia and the People
In this relentless drive toward “the reality of things,” Blok becomes ever more aware of 
the tragic nature of the encounter between the lyrical subject and the yearned-for world of 
historical objectivity, associated for the poet, in the first place, with historical processes in Russia
as an intensifying tragic conflict between the intelligentsia (identified with the ironic Romantic 
subject) and the people (linked with the world of objectivity). Thus, Blok comes to transfer the 
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fundamental conflict that animates his art onto the wider field of Russian history, apprehending it
in terms of tragedy. The fundamental metaphysical antithesis between the finite and the infinite, 
which is the cornerstone of the Romantic worldview, finds its highest expression in Blok's 
historical thought in the conflict between two antagonistic social classes. With the rupture 
between the two ever accelerating and deepening, the Russian Symbolist is apprehensive of the 
potential outcome of the impending tragic collision. That the intelligentsia is doomed to perish in 
that conflict is not doubted by him. It is the nature of that demise (active/tragic or 
passive/fatalistic) and the aftermath of the tragic collision (cathartic or purely destructive) that 
becomes his major preoccupation. 
Similar to Belyi, for Blok, the two social classes, the intelligentsia and the people, 
represent antithetical symbolic poles that transcend their narrow socio-historical definition. The 
intelligentsia, for Blok, is connected with the West, individualism, excesses of nihilistic irony, 
disease, the urban space, secularization and industrialization while the people in their entirety are 
linked with Russia, cohesive community, health, the earth, the countryside, unmolested nature, 
and ardent religious faith. Unlike for Belyi, however, as it  already becomes clear by looking at 
the terms of both associative chains, the two poles are differently charged for Blok. While 
identifying himself as a member of the Russian intelligentsia, Blok, in contrast to Belyi as the 
author of The Silver Dove, does not entertain even the slightest hope on behalf of the 
intelligentsia in its present, individualistic, state of being, as capable of redeeming Russia. 
Furthermore, while Belyi is highly suspicious of the people, identifying them with the evil, 
purely destructive Dionysian element, for Blok, it is the people who, on the contrary, are healthy, 
being closer to the earth. 
And yet, while, on the surface, the intelligentsia in its current alienated and atomized state
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of being seems to represent a negative pole and the people in their healthy majority a positive 
one, Blok's vision of the two classes is much more complex than that. Each social class, 
according to him, has its own truth, its own historical and metaphysical validity. For the 
intelligentsia, despite being stricken with irony, is still nevertheless the major carrier of culture 
and civilization in Russia, even though civilization for Blok is infinitely the less important of the 
two values. His positive vision of the people as healthy is also complicated by his awareness that 
the body of the people is not uniform. Whereas the largest portion of the people stands for “the 
sacred love” awash in blood, the minor part, which is fundamentally of the people as well, stands 
for the truth of “the knife,” purely wanton destruction (SS v 6-ti tt., 5: 282-283). 
Thus, Blok's historical thought seems to move in the dialectical, Hegelian, fashion, that 
conceives of the movement of history as an ongoing tragic struggle of  antithetical truths until the
cosmic reconciliation of all oppositions. The Russian Symbolist, however, questions the 
schematic rigidity of the Hegelian Spirit's path. For Blok, the complexity of the two antagonistic 
elements, unlike for Hegel, makes the nature of the imminent conflict highly volatile and 
unpredictable. The historical conflict unfolding between the intelligentsia and the people has a 
tragic (cathartic) potential, but whether it will take this purifying course still remains to be seen: 
“We live between the two fires of kindled revenge, between the two hosts. That is why it is so 
terrifying: what kind of fire will erupt from under the ''solidified lava''? Is it going to be like the 
one that devastated Calabria or is it going be a cleansing fire?”497 (283). The underlying danger, 
of which Blok is acutely conscious, is that this long-standing historical conflict can degenerate 
into meaningless violence and mass slaughter of the intelligentsia, perceived as an oppressive 
497 “Между двух костров распалившейся мести, между двух станов мы и живем. Оттого и страшно: каков 
огонь, который вырвется наружу из-под ''очерепевшей лавы''? Такой ли, как тот, который опустошил 
Калабрию, или это — очистительный огонь?” 
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class by the long-suffering people of Russia.   
Thus, the tragic development of history is not a given for Blok, as for Hegel, but, rather, a
task, a sacred duty to be yet accomplished. In his essays written in 1908, “The People and the 
Intelligentsia” (“Narod i intelligentsiia”), “Irony” (“Ironiia”), “The Element and Culture” 
(“Stikhiia i kul'tura”), Blok raises the urgent question as to whether the Russian intelligentsia will
be willing to recognize and, even more importantly, assume the tragic responsibility for the future
of Russia. The intelligentsia, in Blok's vision, is doomed. The troyka of Russia is galloping at the 
intelligentsia at full speed and the catastrophic collision cannot be averted: 
What if the troyka, around which “the torn air is thundering and turning into the wind” 
gallops straight at us? By rushing towards the people, we fling ourselves right under the 
hooves of the furious troyka, condemning ourselves to certain death. Why do the two 
feelings visit us more and more often: the self-oblivion of rapture and the self-oblivion of 
longing, despair, and indifference? There will be no place for other feelings soon. Isn't it 
because darkness reigns around us?.. The darkness comes from the fact that the 
wheeler's shaggy breast hangs over us and his heavy hooves are about to descend upon 
us.498 (268)
Blok sounds an alarm bell seeking to awaken the blithely ignorant intelligentsia, involved in 
endless and mostly useless arguments, to the unfolding of the inexorability of history's force and 
their inevitable demise in the upcoming confrontation with the people.   
For Blok, members of the intelligentsia still have a chance, which is inexorably slipping 
498 “Что, если тройка, вокруг которой ''гремит и становится ветром разорванный воздух,'' — летит прямо на 
нас? Бросаясь к народу, мы бросаемся прямо под ноги бешеной тройке, на верную гибель. Отчего нас 
посещают все чаще два чувства: самозабвение восторга и самозабвение тоски, отчаянья, безразличия? 
Скоро иным чувствам не будет места. Не оттого ли, что вокруг господствует тьма? … тьма происходит 
оттого, что над нами повисла косматая грудь коренника и готовы опуститься тяжелые копыта.”
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away with every passing minute, to make a crucial existential choice before the hooves of the 
wild troyka trample them in its wild gallop. They can either choose to remain stubbornly blind to 
the impending danger and eventually be smitten by the troyka of Russia or they can willingly 
assume their inevitable historical fate (annihilation) by turning it into their triumphant tragic 
destiny. In other words, in Blok's vision of the unfolding of Russian history, the upcoming 
confrontation to the death between the people and the intelligentsia can potentially play out 
according to either the fatalistic or tragic scenario. Blok urges the Russian intelligentsia to come 
to the recognition of their tragic duty to Russia by assuming the role of the tragic protagonist. If 
blood is to be shed and the historical demise of the intelligentsia is predetermined, Blok would 
like to see the restoration of the universal balance, the cathartic rejuvenation of Russia instead of 
the senselessness of brutal violence and devastation emerge in the wake of that murderous 
conflict. The reestablishment of the great moral order through suffering is looked upon by Blok 
as the fate (turned into destiny) that the intelligentsia has to fulfill. 
Thus, according to Blok, the Russian intelligentsia can render the tragic ending of the 
conflict possible by choosing self-willed sacrifice, renunciation, and death. Russia can only be 
cleansed of the impurities of the past if the members of the intelligentsia discern the way to be 
obedient to their deepest values, thereby realizing their own potentialities. For Blok, the deepest 
value that the intelligentsia have to (re)embrace is the value of love—selfless love for Russia.
The sense of fulfillment that would lift the tragic hero above his defeat can only be accomplished
by a member of the Russian intelligentsia if he chooses to overcome his solipsistic isolation by 
renouncing his own ego. Uprooted as he is from the absolute values of kinship, he can reconnect 
to the greater whole of Russia by sacrificing himself out of love for her and her people. He is to 
raise himself to the level of perfect love conceptualized by Blok as a selfless Christian love born 
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of compassion. 
Yet, while posing this tragic solution to the rift separating the intelligentsia and the 
people, Blok is haunted by the misgiving that even though this tragic path is indispensable to the 
future well-being of Russia, it may not be followed by the intelligentsia ensnared within 
solipsistic individualism. The solipstic self, as has been shown in the first chapter, alienated from 
the other, knows only one form of love—infatuation (“vliublennost'”)—which, in contrast to the 
Christian type of love, is laden with corrosive fear, possessiveness, and egoism. Unlike Christian 
love capable of healing and redeeming, infatuation condemns the Romantic subject to absolute 
loneliness and relentless yearning for the union with the beloved that remains forever unfulfilled. 
Blok, who identifies himself with the intelligentsia (or, in other words, the alienated Romantic 
subject), is acutely aware of his own personal incapacity for the Christian type of love demanded 
of the one who is to take the tragic path of suffering and self-sacrifice in the name of the renewed
Russia:  
What would I offer as an objection to a person who was led to suicide by the demands of 
individualism, demonism, aesthetics, or, at long last, by the least abstract and the most 
common demand of despair and longing,—if I am myself fond of aesthetics, 
individualism, and despair, or, to put it briefly, if I am myself a member of the 
intelligentsia? If there is nothing in me that I would love more than my self-infatuation 
[vliublennost'] as an individualist and my longing that constantly and relentlessly follows 
in the wake of such an infatuation like a shadow?499 (267)
499 “Что возражу я человеку, которого привели к самоубийству требования индивидуализма, демонизма, 
эстетики или, наконец, самое неотвлеченное, самое обыденное требованье отчаянья и тоски, — если я 
сам люблю эстетику, индивидуализм и отчаянье, говоря короче — если я сам интеллигент? Если во мне 
самом нет ничего, что любил бы я больше, чем свою влюбленность индивидуалиста и свою тоску, 
которая, как тень, всегда и неотступно следует за такой влюбленностью?”
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In their inability to find spiritual strength for self-renunciation for the sake of Russia, the 
intelligentsia, including Blok himself, therefore, are at risk of forfeiting the tragic path, 
succumbing instead to fate-ridden helplessness. 
Thus, the intelligentsia stand at the crossroads of history, facing the uneasy choice of 
being a free agent of history (re)shaping it through their self-sacrifice, or its passive victim 
crushed under its hoofs. Blok, who is increasingly concerned that the fatalistic scenario will be 
actualized due to the intelligentsia's blindness to danger, seeks to explore the ways that might 
lead the solipsistic Romantic subject out of the isolation of individualism back to Christian love 
(“perfect love”) that can potentially reunite him with the object of his love, Russia. In the next 
few years (1907-1913), Blok will be actively pursuing the tragic project, seeking to create a 
viable tragedy on the model of Solov'ev's “synthetic tragedy.” In his conception, success in this 
enterprise will not only revive tragedy as an aesthetic genre but, more importantly, will create a 
tragic role model for the intelligentsia to follow. 
In other words, the Russian Symbolist envisions his task not only as aesthetic but ethical 
and theurgic as well. For him, successful creation of tragedy will not only mark the overcoming 
of demonic lyricism in the sphere of aesthetics but will also lead to the moral salvation and 
historical validation of the Russian intelligentsia as a social class. Furthermore, since a member 
of the Russian intelligentsia is virtually equated by Blok with excessive Romantic subjectivity, 
the realization of the tragic project (that, as for all Symbolists, merges for Blok with the mystery 
play) will signify the sublation and reintegration of inflated Romantic subjectivity within the 
greater cosmic whole. Thus, the stakes for Blok are very high. Success or failure will determine 
whether a human being can be, at least potentially, a creator of his own destiny or whether he is a
helpless victim buffeted and squashed by the forces of history. 
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The Tragedy of the Pseudo-Christ in The Song of Destiny
The Song of Destiny (Pesnia sud'by, 1907-1908) is a transitional work, in which Blok 
tentatively seeks to work out his own conception of tragedy by clarifying for himself the nature 
of the tragic hero, tragic duty, tragic conflict, as well as the category of fate/destiny. The ideal 
reunion of subjective and objective forces lies for Blok in what Solov'ev defined as a “synthetic 
tragedy” that the Russian Symbolist conceives of as being synonymous with a mystery play. In 
The Song of Destiny, however, Blok is as of yet unable to bring these two elements into unity, for 
he still employs the lyrical method of his earlier dramas that finds itself in conflict with his 
striving for greater objectivity indispensable to the very being of tragedy. This overflowing 
lyricism prevents Blok from creating a character who would be able to travel the path of 
incarnation (“put' vochelovechivaniia”) to become a fully-fledged tragic hero capable of 
transformative action, which would be nothing less than the redemption of the fallen World Soul 
as incarnated by Russia, through perfect love.
In his quest to surmount Romantic lyricism, Blok does not pursue the goal of eliminating 
lyricism altogether. Rather, he looks for ways to bring Solov'ev's idea of “synthetic tragedy” to 
life, for it is this type of tragedy that would be able to reunite the alienated realms of subjectivity 
and objectivity in a new highly complex unity, morphing thereby into a mystery play. In other 
words, Blok seeks to restore the mirror-like relationship between microcosm (individual 
consciousness) and macrocosm (Universe) that, in his view, was distorted and later severed by 
Romanticism. Caught in the play of his imagination, the Romantic comes to confuse and 
subsequently substitute its fictional products for the reality of things, thereby suspending, if not 
removing, the world of objectivity. Blok takes upon himself the task of realigning the two worlds
by showing how the conflicts in individual consciousness reflect the large-scale conflicts of the 
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external world. Thus, one of the distinct features of Blok's dramatic work is his attempt to create 
a tragic character whose individual destiny would be representative of the destiny of Russia that, 
in its own turn, stands for the whole cosmos: 
Blok who sees in this [the crisis of the old way of life and relations] an objective 
phenomenon, nevertheless, represents human consciousness as the source of these 
conflicts in the system of his drama. Therefore, the duty of resolving these conflicts falls 
on the individual. Blok's heroes appropriate the conflicts of the objective world and carry 
them within themselves as their own; as a consequence, they find themselves compelled 
to go through all the chasms of history, through all its darkness, storms, and 
contradictions. The individual, according to Blok, in his personal and social 
manifestations models in himself the development of life as a whole, because for Blok a 
highly developed individual is a potent symbol of the state of the world.500 (Rodina 182) 
In his search for a viable tragic hero who would be able to reunite the infinite and the 
finite by fulfilling his destiny, Blok at first considers the type of heroic individualist, a Titanic 
figure, that was especially favored by Ivanov and Belyi. Thus, in his rough sketch of the dream 
mystery Hyperborean Dionysus (Dionis Giperboreiskii, 1906) that immediately precedes his 
work on The Song of Destiny, Blok depicts the Leader, a highly ambitious and strong-willed man,
who takes his people into desolate mountains in vain pursuit of the ideal. The Leader is 
undoubtedly modeled on Ibsen's Brand (Brand, 1865), a harsh priest with an indomitable spirit, 
500 “Блок, который также видит в этом [кризис старого быта и отношений] явление объективного порядка, 
тем не менее в системе своей драмы источником этих конфликтов представляет человеческое сознание. 
Тем самым и долг их разрешения возлагается на личность. Герои Блока присваивают себе конфликты 
объективного мира, несут их в себе как свои собственные с вытекающей отсюда необходимостью 
внутренне пройти через все пропасти истории, через ее мрак, бури и противоречия. Личность для Блока в 
своем индивидуальном и общественном выражении моделирует собой развитие жизни в целом, 
поскольку для Блока высоко развитая личность есть действенный символ мирового состояния.” 
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who sacrifices his child, wife, and other fellow human beings to his vision of righteous life in 
accordance with God's will. Despite the veneer of moral rigor and excessive religious zeal, Brand
as a heroic character traces his origin back to the god-defying Byronic individualist. 
Yet, Blok's simmering dissatisfaction with this superhuman Ibsenian-Byronic type makes 
itself felt in the fragment in two ways. First, the task that he envisions is not to glorify the hero 
but rather to trace his collapse (“krushenie”): “He is a man of courage, blinded and strong (the 
''hero,''—and this play is about the collapse of the hero)”501 (Zapisnye knizhki 89). Instead of 
celebrating the hero's inexorable will, Blok stresses its tragic futility: “He leaves and with the 
power of his empty will he leads everybody along the winding and from now on endless path 
(without rest)”502 (Ibid.). Second, Blok attempts to sketch out another type of hero who could 
potentially, in his purely human weakness, serve as a counterweight to the inhuman heroism of 
the Ibsenian idealist type. This unheroic “hero” is a young man who falls behind the others, 
unable to cope with the strains of the endless journey upward. Despite (or, rather, owing to?) his 
flawed humanity, the young man's plea for mercy is rewarded, while the merciless Leader's quest 
is exposed as interminable, fruitless, and ultimately meaningless: “And in response to his last 
fading cry there resounds Her deep voice”503 (90). After this line, however, Blok abruptly changes
the tone of his sketch from the tragico-heroic toward the satirico-ironic or, as he himself calls it, 
“humorous.” He ridicules both types of heroes, superhuman (the leader) and too human (the 
young man), showing thereby that the two types, though opposite, are both inadequate. While 
Blok never revisits his sketch, despite his promise to himself, he continues his search for a tragic 
man capable of the messianic task in The Song of Destiny.     
501  “Он — смельчак, ослепленный и сильный («ГЕРОЙ», — а эта пьеса — крушение героя.)”   
502  “Он уходит и силою своей пустой воли уводит за собою всех по извилистому и бесконечному (без 
отдыха) отныне пути.”  
503  “И вот на последний его угасающий крик ответствует ему Ее низкий голос.”  
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In The Song of Destiny, Blok's attempt to find the tragic hero who would be up to the 
challenge of redeeming Russia follows a similar path to that marked out in the fragment 
Hyperborean Dionysus. His vacillation as to the nature of the tragico-heroic in man is reflected in
all the substantial changes that the character of Herman, a tragic hero in the making, undergoes 
throughout the three drafts of the play. The most radical change in Herman's demeanor can be 
traced between the first and second drafts, in which the protagonist evolves from the superhuman
individual back to a fallible human being, who, similar to the young man from the earlier sketch, 
is rather too human. Thus, in the first draft, Herman was portrayed by Blok as a supreme 
individualist, akin to the Ibsenian-Byronic superman, who arrogantly flaunts his heroism and 
asserting his superiority over the rest of humankind: “You, Elena, don't know the passionate 
masculine will, the royal thought. In all ages, kings and heroes have embarked on a journey. […] 
My kingly spirit requires three lives, Elena”504 (Polnoe sobranie, 6. 1: 297); “I feel something 
animalistic within myself: my nostrils are swelling from curiosity. How healthy, strong and 
young I am!”505 (309); “Destiny? You are always there when the hero perishes in the field”506 
(379). As in Hyperborean Dionysus, however, Blok renounces this type of superhero as being 
incapable of the task of selfless sacrificial love that he, after Solov'ev, views as the only possible 
bridge between the finite and the infinite.   
Blok's reason for rejecting Ibsen's type of abstract heroism incarnated in Brand is 
explicitly stated in his later essay “From Ibsen to Strindberg” (“Ot Ibsena k Strindbergu,” 1912): 
Day and night we are looking for roads, falling off and clinging to the rocks again. Here, 
504 “Ты, Елена, не знаешь страстной мужской воли, царственной мысли. Во все века пускались в путь цари и 
герои [...] Мой царственный дух требует трех жизней, Елена.”  
505  “Я чувствую в себе что-то звериное: ноздри раздуваются от любопытства. Какой я здоровый, сильный и 
молодой!” 
506  “Судьба? Всегда ты здесь, когда в поле умирает герой.” 
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at long last, the dells are abloom. A piece of the land long abandoned, on which the grass 
is struggling to sprout. At long last, the earth—after the endless snow, the boundless 
air and fire!— A man, with a bitter crease of suffering under his hard moustache, with a 
courageous look in his gray eyes, is coming out of the dell to meet us. At long last, after 
the eagle visage—a human one! August Strindberg!507 (SS v 6-ti tt., 5: 462) 
Ibsen's hero is not representative of the tragedy of human experience for Blok. The flight of 
Brand's spirit transcends humanity making him not only superhuman but bordering on the 
inhuman (“orlii lik”), and thereby completely removed from the mundane preoccupations, 
failings, compromises, and sufferings of humankind. The Russian Symbolist, on the other hand, 
is intensely interested in humanity and its tragic condition, as attested to by his admiration for 
Strindberg's manly courage that he opposes to the early Ibsen's glorification of heroism of the 
will. Strindberg is of the earth and has “a human visage.” He is a man who has been to the earthly
hell but has not been defeated but rather strengthened by his sufferings. It is through his 
sufferings that he has acquired courage not to flinch from life and its tribulations. Thus, Blok 
embraces life-affirming courage as opposed to the life-denying Titanic heroism privileged by his 
fellow Symbolists. 
In this portrait of the “courageous” Strindberg, Blok presents a rough outline of his ideal 
of the tragic hero as the Man (with a capital “M”) that he will be pursuing in The Song of Destiny 
and beyond. In his 1911 letter to Belyi, Blok defines the path toward the ideal of manly courage 
of being in the world in relation to his own development as an artist: 
507 “Дни и ночи мы ищем путей, обрываясь и вновь цепляясь за скалы. Вот, наконец, зеленеют лощины. 
Кусочек давно оставленной земли, на ней пробивается трава. Наконец, земля — после бесконечного 
снега, безначального воздуха и огня! — Навстречу из лощины выходит человек с горькой складкой 
страданий под жесткими усами, с мужественным взором серых глаз. Наконец, — после орлего лика —
человеческое лицо! Август Стриндберг.”
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From the moment of too bright light—through the necessary swampy forest—toward 
despair, curses, ''retribution'' and …—toward the birth of the new ''social'' man, the artist, 
who courageously looks into the face of the world and who has earned the right to 
study the contours of ''good and evil''—at the price of parting with a portion of the 
soul.508 (Belyi, Perepiska 406) 
These three stages of what appears to be a dialectical process would define for the Russian 
Symbolist the tragic “path of incarnation,” or, literally, “the path of becoming human” (“put' 
vochelovechivaniia”), to be traversed by man seeking to rise to the heights of humanity. The 
tripartite structure of this path of incarnation, however, is only deceptively Hegelian. Blok 
subverts the Hegelian dialectical process by asserting that it is not to be crowned by the final, all-
reconciling synthesis that would signal the resolution of all earthly conflicts and contradictions. 
Rather, the point of destination toward which this path leads, as it becomes apparent in his 
explanation to Belyi, is the courageous acceptance of life's conflicted nature. This insight into the
essentially tragic nature of life so lucidly formulated by Blok in 1911 is only gradually attained 
by him in the process of working on The Song of Destiny. 
Blok's metaphor of the path of incarnation employed in the play is highly multivalent, 
drawing on a wide variety of traditions. In his notebooks, he defines “the secret essence” of his 
epic drama the following way: 
The Promised Land is the path. The secret essence of The Song of Destiny is that which I 
only know—and yet I cannot guess it myself. Rogachevskoye highway, Pokrovskoe,—
Ivlevo,— “From Kharan, where he lived <till old age> and from Ur <,where his youth 
508 “От мгновения слишком яркого света — через необходимый болотистый лес — к отчаянию, проклятиям, 
''возмездию'' и …— к рождению нового человека ''общественного,'' художника, мужественно глядящего в 
лицо миру, получившего право вглядываться в контуры ''добра и зла'' — ценою утраты части души.” 
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flew by”> (Vladimir Solov'ev). “Like a stone from a sling.”—“Until I tell you: stop!”509 
(Zapisnye knizhki 107)
In this entry Blok alludes to Solov'ev's poem recounting an episode from the Bible about 
Abraham who received a command from God to leave the house of his father Terah, so that after 
his long wanderings he could settle in the promised land which would later serve as home to the 
Jewish people. In Solov'ev's rendering, however, this story of the founding father of the Covenant
also becomes an allegory of the wandering soul in search of lost home, and it is in this allegorical
sense that Solov'ev's poem appeals to Blok (Polnoe sobranie, 6.1: 547-548). Further, the 
metaphor of the road is one of the dominant Romantic devices that served as a vehicle for 
presenting the major tenets of Romantic metaphysics in their art (Novalis, Tieck, and early 
Gogol'). In the Romantic imagination the topos of home stands for the lost transcendent 
wholeness; with the loss of his home, man becomes a wanderer on the face of the earth destined 
to travel the path of fragmentation and differentiation before he is able (if at all) to regain a sense 
of belonging again. Above all, in Blok's mind, the path to be taken comes to be closely identified 
with the Way of the Cross traversed by Christ as a suffering man. 
For Blok, the major dilemma examined in The Song of Destiny is whether the path of 
earthly suffering—analogous to Christ's Way of the Cross—can help the protagonist, Herman, a 
Romantic individualist, win a spiritual victory by casting off his egoism that breeds fear and 
enfeebles him and thereby contaminates the purity of his love for Faina, an embodiment of 
debased Russia. This theme of redemptive, Christ-like love is immediately and forcefully 
introduced in the opening of the play through two epigraphs. The first epigraph from John Blok 
509 “Земля обетованная — путь. Тайная сущность ''Песни Судьбы'' — в том, что знаю я один — и сам не 
угадаю. Рогачевское шоссе, Покровское, — Ивлево, — ''От Харрана, где дожил <до поздних седин>, и от 
Ура <, где юные годы текли''> (Вл. Соловьев). ''Как камень из пращи.'' — ''Пока я сам не скажу тебе: 
стой!''” 
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has already referenced in his earlier letter to Belyi: “There is no fear in love; but perfect love 
casteth out fear: because fear hath torment”510 (KJV, John 4:18). And the second is taken from 
Gogol''s lyrical digression in Dead Souls (“Rus'! What do you want from me?”511), in which the 
author, casting himself as a Christ-like figure, addresses Russia as his beloved who looks 
expectantly at him in the hope of salvation. As it is already revealed by the two epigraphs, Blok, 
despite his attempts to find a new, “tragic,” path, is actuated by the same Romantic desire as in 
his earlier poetic work—the desire not only to fashion himself (through his alter ego, Herman) on
the image of Christ but ultimately to supplant the Godman in his task of salvation through love.
Herman's journey towards potential Christhood takes the form of gradual awakening to 
his allegedly destined role as the Saviour. The play opens with Herman's wife, Elenа urging him 
to wake up: “Herman, wake up!”512 (SS v 6-ti tt., 4: 100). Thus, Herman's soul is shown as 
slumbering in his peaceful white house situated in the depth of the countryside away from the 
tragic conflicts of humanity. Prodded by the tale told by a sick monk recuperating in their house 
about the enigmatic beauty Faina, Herman leaves the security of his home, the realm of 
wholeness, carrying out an act of descent into the world of discord and strife: “Herman to [Elena,
his wife]: You told me yourself: wake up. Well, I woke up. Now I need to go to the people”513 
(107). Herman's path takes him to the city, an embodiment of the contradictions and conflicts of 
modernity, where he encounters Faina, a performer kept by a rich old man. Upon hearing Faina's 
performance of “Song of Destiny,” Herman, whose soul is still dormant, is unable to decipher its 
hidden message—yearning for salvation—behind the seemingly frivolous lyrics. He thinks that 
510  “В любви нет страха, но совершенная любовь изгоняет страх, потому что в страхе есть мучение” (1 Ioann
4: 18).
511 “Русь! Чего же ты хочешь от меня? ”
512  “Проснись, Герман!” 
513  “Герман [to Elena, his wife]: Ты сама говорила: проснись. Вот — я проснулся. Мне надо к людям.”  
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the song performed by Faina is nothing but a profanation of genuine culture and a distortion of 
Russia's very essence. It is in his tirade against Faina's supposed defilement of the lofty dream 
that Herman refers to himself as “man” (“chelovek”) for the first time: “Take your mask off. The 
man is standing in front of you”514 (125). This hidden allusion to Christ is brought home to the 
reader through the derisive words of the Friend, a sharp-tongued and cynical character, who is in 
love with Elena and has a contemptuous opinion of Herman: “Behold the man!”515 (KJV, John 
19:5; Ibid.). The Friend in his mocking uses exactly the same words employed by Pontius Pilate 
in reference to Christ.516 The lash of Faina's whip in response to Herman's “deafness” and 
“blindness” brings him further to his senses, signifying another crucial step in his gradual 
awakening to his destiny. 
Herman's connection with Christ is strengthened in the crucial scene of the initial non-
recognition, depicting his encounter with Faina in her dressing room after the ill-fated 
perfromance. Before Herman appears in her room, Faina, who is yearning for a savior, recounts 
her favorite fairytale, in which she draws an explicit comparison between the young woman's 
[her] long-awaited bridegroom and Christ: “I would relate it myself but I can't put it into words. 
And this is such a wonderful fairytale: there was spring time, the wind was weeping, and the 
young woman was waiting on the bank... and there he was floating on a piece of ice, so fair-
haired... as if he were all a flame, all radiance... as if he were Jesus Christ himself”517 (135). After 
completing her fairytale, Faina expresses a wish to get a glimpse of her future bridegroom in the 
514  “Прочь маску! Человек перед тобой.”  
515  “Се, человек” 
516  “Then came Jesus forth, wearing the crown of thorns, and the purple robe. And Pilate saith unto them, Behold 
the man!” (KJV, John 19:5) 
517 “Рассказала бы сама, да словами сказать не умею. А хорошая сказка: как весна была, ветер плакал, а 
молодица на берегу ждала... И плывет на льдине такой светлый... так и горит весь, так и сияет... будто сам 
Иисус Христос.”
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mirror: “Do not deceive me, mirror: whoever's image I will see reflected will be my 
bridegroom.”518 It is at this prophetic moment that she sees Herman's reflection. Faina, however, 
refuses to recognize her Christ-like bridegroom in Herman, for at his core he is still afflicted with
darkness (lack of faith and fear), which is evidenced by his cowardly escape from Faina's 
impassioned pleas and embraces.   
The moment of mutual recognition of each other as the Bride and the Bridegroom takes 
place later, in the open snowy plains of Russia. It is the moment of Herman's transfiguration 
when he, in Faina's eyes, undergoes a profound physical transformation which is reflective of his 
inner change occurring after his realization of his duty: “No, you are not the other one. He was 
black, angry, and pitiful. You are all light, you are fair-haired, and your face is aglow with the 
flame of God”519 (146); “You are the one I was waiting for. The swan is screaming, the trumpet is
summoning! The hour has arrived! Come!”520 (Ibid.). The dramatic transformation of Herman's 
countenance that becomes literally Christ-like, in combination with Faina's invocation “Pridi!” 
that echoes the words addressed to Christ “Priidi!” to expedite his Second Coming, attests to the 
protagonist's complete, if momentary, identification with the Godman. After the reconciliation, 
the two run away in troika to save Faina from her old master.
Caught in a blizzard, however, the fugitives get lost in the icy darkness and Herman turns 
back into a weakling, impotent in the face of adversity, thereby exposing himself as a pseudo-
Christ. Herman is shown as unable to sustain for long the divine light that has illuminated his 
dark earthly countenance for a brief moment. While he is in love with Faina, his love, born of 
egoism and defiled by fear, cannot redeem her. Like the poet(s) in Blok's lyrical dramas, Herman 
518  “Не обмани, зеркало: кого увижу, тот и будет жених.”  
519  “Нет, ты — не тот. Он был черен, зол, и жалок. Ты светел, у тебя — русые волосы, лицо твое горит 
господним огнем.”  
520  “Ты — тот, кого я ждала. Лебедь кричит, труба взывает! Час пробил! Приди!” 
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is too weak, all too human, and therefore incapable of Christ-like self-sacrificial action which 
could deliver Faina from her bondage. Herman himself is painfully aware of his own inadequacy:
“What shall I do, I don't know: you are greater than me. Only at your feet is one to yearn for 
glory. You look at me with unfamiliar, burning eyes; and I am insignificant, I am a stranger, I am 
weak,—and I am not capable of anything... And I don't remember anything... anything at all”521 
(156). By refusing to search for the road to lead Faina out of darkness, Herman proves incapable 
of any action whatsoever. Faina's bitter words also serve as Blok's indictment of himself as well 
as of the whole of the Russian intelligentsia: “I am beating you for your words. You have said a 
lot of beautiful words! But do you know anything else but words?”522 (159). At the moment of 
crisis Herman's response is to fall asleep, to return to the world of dreams, from which he was 
awakened at the beginning of the play. Herman remains too much of a Romantic individualist to 
move beyond words (the aesthetic dimension) into the sphere of transformative action (the 
ethical dimension). 
Blok leaves the play open-ended. Even though Herman seems to have lost his way in the 
icy plains, there is still a glimmer of hope for him and, by extension, for the Russian 
intelligentsia, to prove that he is Faina's true Bridegroom. He is rescued from the imminent icy 
death (eternal sleep) by a peripatetic tradesman, a representative of the people, who points at a 
dim light gleaming in the darkness. Herman cannot see this light and needs guidance while the 
tradesman can, since the people, according to Blok, unlike the alienated members of the 
intelligentsia, can see the light leading to the salvation of Russia. Blok's message appears to be 
that if the members of the intelligentsia follow the people, there is still a ray of hope that they, 
521  “Что мне делать, я не знаю: ты больше меня. Только у ног твоих вздыхать о славе. Ты смотришь на меня 
незнакомым, горящим взором; а я ничтожный, я чужой, я слабый, — и ничего не могу... и ничего не 
помню... ничего....”
522  “Я бью тебя за слова! Много ты сказал красивых слов! Да разве знаешь ты что-нибудь, кроме слов?” 
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despite all the previous failures and betrayals of Russia out of human weakness (Romantic 
individualism or egoism), will eventually find their way back to Faina: “Well, go, go, just don't 
stand still. I will lead you to the nearest lodging, and then—you will go wherever you want”523 
(163). Thus, while the living mystery play that would herald the salvation of Russia is currently 
out of reach, Blok, despite being plagued by doubt, does not seem to completely renounce such a 
possibility on behalf of the Russian intelligentsia.    
Yet, in spite of this faint hope of the future possibility of the realization of the mystery 
play by the intelligentsia in Russia (the realm of life), in The Song of Destiny Blok does not 
succeed in creating synthetic tragedy as a genre (the realm of art). One of the reasons for his lack 
of success is his difficulty in finding a new type of hero that would take him away from the 
lyrical masks that populate his earlier dramas. Both the author and his alter ego, Herman, fail to 
complete the path of incarnation.524 As Evgenii Ivanov commented on Blok's lyrical predicament:
The Song of Destiny is actually not a tragedy and not even a drama, for there are no 
personalities, no creatures, but only personae and words. “All words! Beautiful 
words,”—Faina says to Herman but she herself is nothing but a persona and words. […] 
One of the most profound features of the whole play is a tormenting thirst for incarnation:
words and persona are longing to take on blood and flesh, to become incarnate. Here 
there is some kind of aspiration of the author himself toward the first commandment in 
Genesis: “I am.” 525 (191)
523  “Ну, иди, иди, только на месте не стой. До ближнего места я тебя доведу, а потом — сам пойдешь, куда 
знаешь.”  
524  Herman's failure to complete the process of incarnation is communicated in Faina's desperate appeal to him: 
“Herman: Why are you so cruel? Faina: Because I have waited for so long and waited in vain. Because you were 
only a man when your face was covered in blood! — God! Oh, God! Become a man!” [“Герман: За что ты так 
сурова? Фаина: За то, что ждала и не дождалась! За то, что ты был человеком, пока лицо у тебя было в 
крови! — Господи! Господи! Стань человеком!”]
525 “''Песнь Судьбы'' — есть действительно не трагедия и не драма, ибо нет личностей, нет существ, а есть 
''действующие лица'' и слова. ''Все — слова! Красивые слова,'' — говорит Фаина Герману, но и она тоже 
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While Blok strives for greater objectivity, he fails to break away from the limitations of the 
subjective approach that he developed in his lyrical dramas: “In essence, at this stage Blok not 
entirely justifiably but irresistibly was drawn to the method of the same ''lyrical dramas,'' fighting
with himself and yet being unable to find any new consistent methodology”526 (Rodina 189). 
Blok's inability to restrain Romantic lyricism aligns his intended synthetic tragedy with the 
tradition of the “theater of the mind” established in Romanticism and continued in Modernism 
through Maeterlinck's “theater of the soul.” 
This affinity with the lyrical theatrical tradition that he hoped to surmount in the higher 
unity of his synthetic drama has disruptive repercussions for his tragico-mystical enterprise. 
Thus, the predominance of Romantic lyricism manifest in the dis-embodied 
(“nedovoploshchennyi”) nature of the protagonist subverts Blok's intention of moving modern 
drama away from fatalism toward transformative tragic action that would make the unfolding of 
the living mystery possible. For one of the tasks that Blok pursues in his enterprise of creating a 
viable tragic hero capable of self-fulfillment is to reverse the spread of the so-called tragic vision 
leading to moral passivity, pessimism, and fatalism and epitomized in his eyes above all in 
modern theater by Maeterlinck's drame statique. 
Blok rejects Maeterlinck's type of tragedy because his drama replaces the tragic hero 
resisting the forces of necessity while accomplishing his destiny with a helpless human being 
overtaken by fate: “Maeterlinck robbed western drama of the hero, distorted human voice into a 
hoarse whisper [Blok associates “whisper” with lyricism], turned people into puppets, deprived 
действующее лицо и слова. […] Одна глубочайшая черта проходит черех всю пьесу, это мучительная 
жажда воплощения: слова и ''действующие лица'' жаждут принять кровь и плоть, воплотиться. Тут какое-
то распростирание вперед и самого автора к первой заповеди ''Бытия,'' к ''Аз есмь''.”
526 “В сущности, Блок не вполне оправдано, но непреодолимо для себя на этом этапе тяготел к методу тех же 
''лирических драм,'' борясь с собой, но не обретая еще сколько-нибудь последовательной новой 
методологии.”   
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them of free movement, light, will, and air”527 (SS v 8-mi tt., 5: 195); “Some of these writers' lot 
[a veiled allusion to Maeterlinck and the tradition of static theater that he established] was to rob 
drama of the hero, to deprive it of action... to lower the metal voice of tragedy to the hoarse 
whisper of life”528 (78). In other words, Blok sees Maeterlinck's static drama as the modern(ist) 
apogee of excessive Romantic lyricism that, as it becomes fully evident in his “theater of the 
soul,” culminates in moral apathy and the fatalism of pessimistic despair.  
Blok's battle against Maeterlinck's type of fatalism in The Song of Destiny, leads, 
however, to its very reinstatement. The Russian Symbolist seeks to differentiate “destiny” from 
“fate” and to oppose the concept of destiny that he associates with the realization of the hero's 
potentialities through action to the notion of fate that he came to equate with passivity, moral 
indifference, and fatalism. Destiny, unlike fate, demands a decisive action on the part of the hero 
and involves moral responsibility for that action. To fulfill his destiny the protagonist is expected 
not to succumb as a victim to the forces of necessity but, on the contrary, to appropriate fate by 
defying it and seeking to change the status quo of the seemingly hopeless human condition 
(defeat and death). Only a human being who rises to the heights and descends to the depths of 
human experience by becoming Man can realize his destiny by liberating the beloved Russia. By 
falling asleep in the icy fields of Russia, Herman abandons his tragic duty, giving way to his 
human weakness—selfish fear. This inability of Herman to fulfill his high destiny as the 
Bridegroom of Russia by completing the path of incarnation exposes him as a helpless plaything 
of fate. 
527 “Метерлинк украл у западной драмы героя, превратил человеческий голос в хриплый шепот [Blok 
associates ''whisper'' with lyricism], сделал людей куклами, лишил их свободных движений, света, воли, 
воздуха.”
528 “Иным из этих писателей [a veiled allusion to Maeterlinck and the tradition of static theater that he established]
выпало на долю отнять у драмы героя, лишить ее действия... понизить металический голос трагедии до 
хриплого шепота жизни.”  
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That it is fate in the style of Maeterlinck rather than Destiny presiding over the hero's self-
fulfillment that operates in the dramatic universe of The Song of Destiny was observed and 
censured by the other Symbolists. Furthermore, in their critique they directly disclose the link 
between lyricism and fatalism in Blok's drama. Thus, in his review of The Song of Destiny, 
Briusov directly links Blok's forceful lyrical streak that manifests itself in the abstract nature of 
his characters with the fatalism that pervades the play: “The heroes are all subject to some kind 
of tragic fatum and do not act by virtue of inner passions. That is why their psychology is 
conventional and not life-like”529 (“Aleksandr Blok” 57). Chulkov, on the other hand, 
unequivocally exposes the underlying affinity between Blok's drama with Maeterlinck's “theater 
of the soul,” against whose Romantic lyricism Blok conceived his dramatic work in the first 
place: 
The Blind by Maeterlinck and The Song of Destiny by Aleksandr Blok are truly the world 
devoid of flesh and life, the world of shadows and dreams, the immobile theater foreign to
events. As literary works these lyrical dramas of Blok and Maeterlinck are beautiful, but 
as theater they do not exist. Lyricism is so predominant in these works that they lose their 
dramatic form and, as if being dissolved in poetic moisture, they become amorphous and 
lifeless.530 (51)
Blok does not succeed in creating a synthetic type of tragedy in The Song of Destiny, 
because the subjective force that the playwright seeks to restrain takes over in the end and erodes 
529 “Герои все подчинены некоему трагическому фатуму, а не действуют в силу внутренних страстей. 
Поэтому психология условна, а не жизненна.”  
530 “Les aveugles (“Слепые”) Метерлинка или ''Песня Судьбы'' Александра Блока вот воистину мир, 
лишенный плоти и жизни, мир теней и мечтаний, театр неподвижный, чуждый событиям. Как 
литературные произведения прекрасны эти лирические драмы Блока и Метерлинка, но как театр они не 
существуют. Лирика настолько преобладает в этих пьесах, что они теряют драматургическую форму, как 
бы растворяются в поэтической влаге, становятся аморфными и бездейственными.”
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the world of objectivity. He also fails to create a tragic hero who would be able to unite the 
infinite and the finite, if only for a brief moment, through his selfless love, which, as we will 
come to see in The Rose and the Cross, is to take the ultimate form of self-sacrifice. Instead of 
being a heroic creator of his own and his beloved's destiny, Herman finds himself a plaything of 
the blind fate that he has no inner power to resist in order to make the fate his own and turn it into
his accomplished destiny. He remains too close to the shadowy lyrical masks of Blok's earlier 
dramatic efforts in the fundamental weakness of his character, passivity, and inability to renounce
his self for the sake of the beloved who awaits a heroic, selfless, act on her behalf. 
Thus, instead of staging a mystery play, Blok's The Song of Destiny comes to dramatize a 
different type of tragic action—not the one that leads the hero to the ultimate self-consummation 
but rather the one that leads the hero to self-exposure as an impostor (even though Blok leaves a 
faint glimpse of hope that Herman might still find sufficient strength to fulfill his destiny if he 
follows the lead of the people). In other words, Blok's drama is a Romantic tragedy of a false 
Christ who, in his desire to attain to the heights of the divine, comes to explore the farthest 
reaches of human possibility and, consequently, its inherent tragic limitations. In its intention to 
bridge, The Song of Destiny only reenacts and reinforces the tragedy of the dualistic chasm 
symbolized for Russian Symbolism by Romanticism. 
The Rose and The Cross: In the “Glass Desert” of Romanticism
In his drama The Rose and the Cross (Roza i krest, 1912-1913), Blok continues searching 
for ways to surmount Romantic lyricism which he comes to identify not only broadly with 
exaggerated subjectivity that culminates in nihilistic irony but more narrowly with the excessive 
estrangement of the Russian intelligentsia from the people of Russia. While the Russian subtext 
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appears to be absent in The Rose and the Cross, it is nevertheless uppermost in Blok's creative 
consciousness. For besides seeking to bring into being “synthetic tragedy” as a literary genre, he 
also looks for a practical (ethical) path that could possibly be taken by a member of the Russian 
intelligentsia to bridge the tragic rift separating him from Russia. Blok's solution to the dilemma 
of the Romantic subject, an alienated member of the Russian intelligentsia, is to sacrifice oneself 
for the sake of the beloved out of Christian love for her, as Bertrand does for Isora, without 
expecting anything in return and, least of all, redemption. Yet even in the drama, in which the 
Russian Symbolist ultimately succeeds in restraining rampant lyricism by creating believable 
characters mostly independent of authorial consciousness, he is unable to break away from 
“Romanticism.” For even though Bertrand's sacrificial death alludes to, if it is not directly 
modeled on, Christ's crucifixion, the types of love that the two die for are, however, dissimilar in 
their nature. Whereas Christ sacrifices himself out of love for the whole of humanity (“active 
love”531), Bertrand dies for the sake of sexual, even if Christianized, love, which is a purified 
variant of what Blok himself calls in his early verses “infatuation” (“vliublennost'”). Thus, 
despite the fact Blok succeeds in developing a viable tragic character in accordance with the 
vision of the tragic that he holds at that time, this conception itself reinforces rather than 
surmounts Romanticism.  
The Rose and the Cross is centered on the love that poor knight Bertrand develops for his 
mistress, Isora, a beautiful woman of humble origin, married to Count Archimbaut, the owner of 
a castle in medieval France. Isora, a flirt by nature, is indifferent to the affection of Bertrand, who
is old, unappealing in his looks, and of no distinguished name. Instead, she is captivated by a 
song whose message disturbs her even though she cannot fully grasp it. She heard this song from 
531  “действенная любовь”
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a passing minstrel and now all her thoughts are focused on its mysterious author, known as the 
Wanderer, who, she hopes, will prove the lover of her dreams. She sends off Bertrand on a 
mission to locate and bring the song's author to the castle. The faithful Bertrand, whose heart is 
tortured by bitter jealousy, sets out on a journey and indeed finds the author, Gaetan, who, 
however, turns out to be not a dashing knight full of vigor but a decrepit half-blind old man. 
Bertrand brings Gaetan to the castle. 
At night when Isora tormented by desire and insomnia wanders in the castle garden, she 
chances upon Gaetan who has been left by Bertrand to spend the night in rose bushes. In the 
moonlight she cannot see clearly and mistakes the aged Gaetan for a youthful and handsome 
man. She is taken aback, however, by the black cross, a symbol of his devotion to God (chastity),
on Gaetan's chest and she seeks to hide it behind the black rose, a symbol of her desire, that she 
gives him as a token of her benevolence. In the morning Bertrand discovers the sleeping Gaetan 
with a black rose on his chest that he immediately recognizes as belonging to Isora. He asks 
Gaetan, who believes that what happened at night was just a dream, a temptation sent by the evil 
one, to give him that black rose. There is a minstrel contest in which Gaetan is to take part and 
Isora is impatient to see him in broad daylight. She is extremely disappointed to find out that 
Gaetan is an old man and immediately loses interest in him. Instead, she turns her attention to the
young page, Aliskan, with whom she used to flirt. 
There is an unrest among the poor people in the countryside and Bertrand, though 
sympathetic to their plight, sets out together with the rest to put it down. He battles valiantly and 
saves the count's army from sure defeat. However, he is severely wounded. Isora, who expects 
Aliskan in her bedchamber, asks the mortally wounded Bertrand to stand guard by her window 
and give her a signal if something is amiss. Bertrand is bleeding to death while Isora is engaged 
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in love-making with Aliskan. In his dying moments Bertrand experiences an epiphany. He comes 
to understand the hitherto obscure message of Gaetan's song. The count who is informed of his 
wife's tryst seeks to surprise her but the faithful Bertrand in his last conscious moment throws his
sword on the stone slabs, thereby notifying Isora about the upcoming danger. Aliskan escapes  
and the count finds only Bertrand's body by his wife's window. Upon seeing the dead Bertrand, 
Isora sheds a tear, declaring him to have been a loyal servant.  
The Rose and the Cross marks a further development in Blok's conception of the tragic.  
In his attempt to create a poetic tragedy, Blok strives not only to distance himself from the 
modern conception of fate (tragic vision) as embodied primarily for him in the work of 
Maeterlinck but also from the Ancient Greek notion of Ananke (necessity):  
There must be a kernel to which all the diversity of affairs, images, thoughts, and 
curlicues will be attached; and it must be eternal, unchangeable in all circumstances. I, for
example, arrange in the opera [that will later become a poetic tragedy The Rose and the 
Cross] whatever I am capable of around one: the fate of a loser; at least in the Christian 
epoch of which we are contemporaries this is a constant. If, however, I (or anybody else 
for that matter) begin to arrange all the diversity of my images around the fate and the 
God of the Ancient Greek tragedy, then I will be preoccupied with something unreal if I 
want to show it to others. I myself might (even though it is unlikely) come to comprehend
Ἀνάγκη, Μοῖραι, [and] Olympus, but I will be left all by myself, while the epoch 
indifferent to God will continue to storm around me all the same.532 (164)
532 “Стержень, к которому прикрепляется все многообразие дел, образов, мыслей, завитушек, — должен 
быть; и должен он быть — вечным, неизменяемым при всех обстоятельствах. Я, например, располагаю в 
опере [that will later become a poetic tragedy The Rose and the Cross] все, на что я способен, вокруг одного: 
судьбы неудачника; по крайней мере в христианскую эпоху, которой мы современники, это величина 
постоянная. Если же я (или кто другой) буду располагать все многообразие своих образов вокруг Рока и 
Бога греческой трагедии, то я буду занят чем-то нереальным, если захочу это показать другим. Сам я, 
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Thus, Blok concedes that tragedy in its original form as it existed in Ancient Greece cannot be 
restored, for its worldview involving such concepts as Ἀνάγκη (“necessity”) and presiding 
divinity as they were interpreted by the Greeks, is entirely incomprehensible to modernity 
pervaded with the spirit of Christianity. For Blok, a new type of tragedy representative of the 
modern spirit that bears this enduring impact of Christianity is essentially a tragedy of human 
potentialities (“the fate of a loser”533), as opposed to the tragedy of necessity cultivated by the 
Greeks. 
In his redefinition of tragedy away from the Ancient Greeks, Blok redraws the image of 
the tragic man by proceeding from the conception of man's nature derived from Christianity. 
W.H. Auden, an English-American poet and critic, who was intensely preoccupied with the 
distinctions between the Ancient Greek and Christian types of tragedy,534 locates the paramount 
difference between the two in their radically divergent understanding of human nature: 
The hubris which is the flaw in the Greek hero's character is the illusion of a man who 
knows himself strong and believes that nothing can shake that strength, while the 
corresponding Christian sin of Pride is the illusion of a man who knows himself weak but 
believes he can by his own efforts transcend that weakness and become strong. (143-144)
As a result, what to the Ancient Greeks could only have been a punishment for the hubris that 
inevitably led to the hero's transgression, in Christian tragedy appears as “a temptation to sin,” 
“an opportunity to choose”: “To say that a character is tempted means that it is confronted by 
possibility, that it is not a fixed state but a process of becoming: the possibilities are not infinite 
может быть (мало вероятно), могу проникнуть в Ἀνάγκη, Μοῖραι, Олимп, но я и останусь один, а вокруг 
меня будет по-прежнему бушевать равнодушная к богу эпоха.” 
533  “судьба неудачника”
534  For Auden, Christian tragedy is not limited to tragedies propagating Christian values: “In using the term 
Christian I am not trying to suggest that Melville or Shakespeare or any other author necessarily believed the 
Christian dogmas, but that their conception of man's nature is, historically, derived from them” (144).
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[…] but the possibilities are eternal; the past is irrevocable but always redeemable now” (145). In
other words, while the Ancient Greek hero's fate is predetermined and cannot be averted but only 
appropriated, in Christian tragedy, on the other hand, the tragic man retains the possibility of 
(re)shaping and (re)defining his fate until his last breath. 
Like Auden, Blok also sees the fundamental characteristic of Christian man that sets him 
apart from the Greek tragic hero as being unfettered from the external forces of fate and having 
freedom of choice that allows him to act for good or evil out of his free will. Furthermore, unlike 
the other Symbolists (Ivanov, in the first place), he moves further and further away from the 
larger than life hero, a Titanic individual towering above humankind, focusing instead on the 
destiny of ordinary man: 
No, now in my present state (cruelty, angularity, maturity, and illness) I cannot and have 
no right to speak more than of humanity. My theme is not The Rose and the Cross at all 
for I have no knowledge of the subject. Let it be—the fate of man, a loser.535 (SS v 8-mi tt.,
7: 186). 
Instead of portraying the unyielding character whom even the gods cannot swerve from his 
inflexible purpose, Blok chooses to concentrate on the process of growth of a humble man 
toward the heights of humanity (“chelovechnost'”). By dispensing with tragic (“Ibsenian-
Byronic”) extremism, the Russian Symbolist seeks to replace the path of defiance with the path 
of humility that leads toward moral triumph and salvation in sacrifice, self-renunciation, and 
death.                                                                                                                                                  
This shift away from Titanism already noticeable in the character of Herman in The Song 
535 “Нет, в теперешнем моем состоянии (жестокость, угловатость, взрослость, болезнь) я не умею и я не 
имею права говорить больше, чем о человеческом. Моя тема — совсем не ''Крест и Роза,'' — этим я не 
владею. Пусть будет — судьба человеческая, неудачника.”
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of Destiny becomes significantly more pronounced in Bertrand, who is simply and 
unpretentiously human. Unlike Herman, Bertrand completes the path of incarnation that takes 
him away from selfish love saturated with fear to selfless (in Blok's words, Christian) love 
purified from fear. That at the beginning of The Rose and the Cross Bertrand's love for Isora, 
while devoted, nevertheless, is tinged with egoism is attested to by his inability to understand the 
lines of Gaetan's song that captivate Isora: “The immutable law of the heart— / Joy and Suffering
are one!”536 (SS v 6-ti tt., 4: 166). Being too full of self-pity, for his love for Isora does not have 
the slightest chance of being reciprocated because of his humble origins, age, and physical 
ugliness, Bertrand fails to grasp how suffering born of unrequited love can bring joy at the same 
time: “Oh, love, you are heavy like a shield! / You bring only suffering, / There is no joy in you! 
[…] How can suffering be joy at the same time?”537 (Ibid.). The selfish nature of Bertrand's 
affection is made even more explicit by Blok in the explanatory “Notes Written by Bertrand a 
Few Hours before his Death” (“Zapiski Bertrana, napisannye im za neskol'ko chasov do smerti,” 
1913). Thus, Bertrand confesses that his love for Isora was not originally free from bitter 
jealousy, spiteful gloating, and corrosive fear: 
May the Lord forgive me this sinful feeling but I should not conceal that I have never 
thought of an intimate relationship with the Mistress, knowing well that I am worthy of 
her neither in my station in life nor in age; nevertheless, I secretly rejoiced when she 
removed the young Aliskan from her presence and was secretly afraid of the good looks 
of the new knight that she ordered me to find.538 (436) 
536 “Сердцу закон непреложный — / Радость — Страданье одно!” 
537 “О, любовь, тяжела ты, как щит!/ Одно страданье несешь ты, / Радости в тебе нет никакой! […] Как может
страданье радостью быть?” 
538 “Да простит мне Господь это грешное чувство, но я не должен скрывать, что хотя я никогда не помышлял 
о близости к госпоже, зная, что не достоин ее ни по положению моему, ни по возрасту, тем не менее 
радовался тайно тому, что она отстранила от себя юного Алискана, и тайно боялся красоты того нового 
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His process of ascent toward Christian love starts from the moment he receives the black 
rose that Isora originally gave to Gaetan as a token of her benevolence: “My love has become 
more elevated and purer since the moment the rose became mine”539 (438). This elevation of his 
love to a higher spiritual (Christian) plane, as evidenced by his battle cry “Sancta Rosa,” allows 
Bertrand to renounce his selfish claims and sacrifice his life in the service of frivolous Isora who 
throws herself into a love affair with the page Aliskan. This selfless sacrifice leads in turn to his 
grasping of the meaning of the enigmatic lines that he was not able to comprehend at the 
beginning of the play when he was still in the grip of sexual (selfish) love.  
Blok long hesitated as to the nature of Bertrand's end. In contrast to The Song of Destiny, 
he refused to explicitly link Bertrand's humble destiny with that of Christ the Redeemer or to 
introduce unequivocally mystical overtones:  
In the morning Liuba gave me an idea: Bertrand ends up building the chapel of the Holy 
Rose. Having thought through this proposition I came to the conclusion that I have no 
right to speak of the mystical Rose, which is clear from the simple fact that I don't have  
sufficient spiritual strength to understand the symbols of the Rose and the Cross all 
muddled for the sake of “embellishment,” for the sake of art. I am still unable to envision 
the end of Bertrand's fate.540 (SS v 8-mi tt., 7: 181)
Blok's preoccupation is instead exclusively with the demise (“konets”) of “man Bertrand” which 
he comes to associate with the lines from Tiutchev's poem “Two voices” (“Dva golosa,” 1850) : 
рыцаря, которого она поручила мне отыскать.”
539 “Любовь моя стала выше и чище с той минуты, как роза стала моею.”
540 “Утром Люба подала мне мысль: Бертран кончает тем, что строит капеллу Святой Розы. Обдумав 
мучительно это положение, я пришел к заключению, что не имею права говорить о мистической Розе, что 
явствует из того простого факта, что я не имею достаточной духовной силы для того, чтобы разобраться в 
спутанных ''для красы'' только, только художественно, символах Розы и Креста. Конца судьбы Бертрана я 
продолжаю не знать.”
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“Anxiety and work are only for mortal hearts... / For them there is no victory but only an end.”541 
Thus, Bertrand is denied “victory” that was still hoped for by Herman in his aspiration to the role
of Christ the Redeemer, for the sacrifice by the Knight “Unhappiness” that leads to his death does
not result in the redemption of Isora. Its consequences, according to Blok, are still unclear. His 
renunciation may or may not lead to Isora's inner change: 
Isora's destiny has not yet come to pass, as attested to by her tears over Bertrand's body. It
might very well be that these tears are merely accidental and she will forget about them 
soon; but she might, on the other hand, came closer to the understanding of Joy-Suffering;
it might be, in the end, that her destiny has nothing in common with the destiny of the 
man who loved her with Christian love and died for her as a Christian, opening new ways 
for her through his death.542 (SS v 6-ti tt., 4: 442) 
Yet, while the ultimate “victory” is denied to man and death is man's ultimate “end,” this 
tragic end, according to Blok, is not that of defeat, as in modern tragic vision, but of triumph. 
Even though man is fated to die, it is in his death that he can raise himself to the heights of 
humanity, simultaneously reaffirming and transcending it. It is through his act of self-
renunciation manifested in his sacrificial death for the sake of the fickle Isora that Bertrand 
comes to experience a feeling akin to divine “perfect love” denied to Herman. What was 
supposed to be his ultimate defeat (rejection, humiliation, and death) is transformed through 
Christian love by Bertrand into the moment of his highest glory as a human being. The humble 
Bertrand is not Christ. Neither his love nor his death can redeem but only at best move the fallen 
541 “Тревоги и труд лишь для смертных сердец... / Для них нет победы, для них есть конец.”  
542 “Судьба Изоры еще не свершилась, о чем говорят ее слезы над трупом Бертрана. Может быть, они 
случайны, и она скоро забудет о них; может быть, и она приблизилась к пониманию Радости-Страдания; 
может быть, наконец, ее судьба совсем не сходна с судьбою человека, который любил ее христианской 
любовью и умер за нее как христианин, открыв для нее своей смертью новые пути.”
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beloved to tears. Yet, it is in this selfless act of self-abnegation for her sake, without any hope of 
recompense and least of all of redemption, that Bertrand reaches the highest intensity of feeling 
afforded to man, raising the human capacity for love to the level of Christ-like perfect love that 
unites and fuses the opposites, the heavenly and the earthly, joy and suffering. Thus, perfect love 
that bridges the tragic rupture between the eternal and the temporal is, in Blok's conception, 
inherently tragic in itself, because this is the type of love that can be experienced and manifested 
by a human being only through sacrificial death, like that of Christ on the cross for the sake of 
humankind. 
 The essence of Blok's idea of the tragic is encapsulated in Gaetan's song about joy-
suffering (231-232). The song has a circular structure and opens with the depiction of the tumult 
of the elements (“The hurricane is roaring, / The ocean is singing, / The snow is whirling”543) that
serves as a symbolic representation of the turmoil of phenomenal life. The maelstrom of earthly 
life associated with the ceaseless course of time that relentlessly speeds away (“A fleeting 
century is rushing by”544) is juxtaposed with the tranquility of distant shores that stand for the 
security of the transcendent Absolute (“One is dreaming of the blessed shores”545). The chaos of 
life in which inexorable Time reigns is contrasted with the solidity of the blessed shores where 
Time is annulled. Unlike the rage of the elements that confront the knight as his immediate 
actuality, the blessed shores of the Absolute that beckon him are only “an impossible dream.” The
ocean, a symbol of the disorder and contrariness of life, calls the knight to yield to his yearning 
for the Absolute and to brave the rough waters in its pursuit: “Surrender to the impossible dream. 
Whatever is destined will happen.”546 That he is doomed to perish in his quest for “an impossible 
543 “Ревет ураган, / Поет океан, / Кружится снег.” 
544  “мчится мгновенный век.”  
545  “снится блаженный брег.”  
546  “Сдайся мечте невозможной, / Сбудется, что суждено.”  
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dream” without attaining it is strongly suggested by the imagery revolving around the notion of 
fate: “In the dark clefts of the night / The spinning wheel is buzzing and singing / The invisible 
weaver looks into one's eyes and is spinning destinies”547; “The fiery line of the sunset / looks 
into the knight's eyes / And the starry nights are ablaze over disastrous fate”548; “The raucous 
ocean summons / to embark on the fateful and aimless journey.”549 Thus, the knight's journey will
be full of sorrow and loss (“Your future path is wandering”550; “Trouble and loss are 
everywhere, / What awaits you in the future?”551) and his untimely demise in the tempest of life, 
far away from the shores of the Absolute, is preordained. 
The journey over the rough seas is the knight's cross (homelessness, loss, suffering, and, 
ultimately, death) that he takes willingly upon himself and yet it also stands for the fullness of 
joy, for death in pursuit of the “impossible dream” does not involve a sense of despair or 
defeatism. The knight's ultimate demise is not fatalistic or pessimistic, it is tragic in the highest 
sense of the word. For while, according to Blok, “The meaning of tragedy is the 
HOPELESSNESS of the struggle”552 and definitive victory over fate is denied to man, 
nevertheless, “Here there is no despair, lethargy, [and] defeatism. High initiation is required”553 
(SS v 8-mi tt., 7: 89). The tragic is the sphere of the human because, for Blok, it is the nature of 
life itself which is set in motion by and thrives on conflict and contradiction. Man should not hide
himself in fear from the musical contradictoriness of life but immerse himself into it and brave its
seeming mayhem: 
547  “В темных расселинах ночи / Прялка жужжит и поет. / Пряха незримая в очи / Смотрит и судьбы прядет.”
548  “Смотрит чертой огневою / Рыцарю в очи закат, / Да над судьбой роковою / Звездные ночи горят.”  
549  “В путь роковой и бесцельный / Шумный зовет океан.”  
550  “Путь твой грядущий — скитанье.” 
551  “Всюду — беда и утраты,/ Что тебя ждет впереди?” 
552 “Смысл трагедии — БЕЗНАДЕЖНОСТЬ борьбы.”  
553 “Тут нет отчаянья, вялости, опускания рук. Требуется высокое посвящение.”   
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It is necessary to live and speak in such a way that the resulting life would be а real 
gypsy song, a fusion of harmony and turmoil, of order and disorder. Otherwise, one will 
inevitably perish. My soul imitates the gypsy song, both its turmoil and its harmony, and I
too am singing in some choir which I will never leave.554 (138) 
Thus, the ideal (the realm of permanence and tranquility) and the phenomenal world (the realm 
of transience and contingency) are for Blok two indispensable poles that define the tragic destiny 
of humanity. In this light, the Romantic abyss between the finite and the infinite constitutes the 
very essence of the tragic and therefore of humanity itself. 
Man's ultimate fulfillment lies in his tragic death. It is in the selfless sacrifice of oneself 
for the sake of the unattainable ideal that one comes to experience that mysterious feeling of 
“joy-suffering.” The synthesis of the finite and the infinite cannot be attained through human 
efforts in life but it can be lived, even if for a single moment, only in and through death. Thus, the
ultimate unity, or in other words, the Absolute, can be known, according to Blok, exclusively in 
the form of death. This identification of unity and death is made explicit in his commentary to 
The Rose and the Cross: “Gaetan's song belongs to me but some of its motifs are inspired by 
Breton poetry. It has an echo of the conversation between a child and the druid, in which the 
druid says: ''La Nécessité unique, Ankou père de Douleur, rien avant, rien de plus'' (см. 
Villemarqué, Barzaz-Breiz)”555 (SS v 8-mi tt., 4: 148). This necessary unity, “Ankou,” that cannot 
be grasped and even less achieved in life is granted to man in death because, for a human being, 
the moment of the sought-for merging of the divine and the human is the tragic moment of 
554 “Жить надо и говорить надо так, чтобы равнодействующая жизни была истовая цыганская, соединения 
гармонии и буйства, и порядка и беспорядка. Иначе — пропадешь. Душа моя подражает цыганской, и 
буйству и гармонии ее вместе, и я пою тоже в каком-то хору, из которого не уйду.” 
555 “Песня Гаэтана принадлежит мне, но некоторые мотивы ее навеяны бретонской поэзией. В ней есть 
отголосок разговора ребенка с друидом, где друид говорит: ''La Nécessité unique, Ankou père de Douleur, 
rien avant, rien de plus'' (см. Villemarqué, Barzaz-Breiz).”
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simultaneous fusion and separation, transcendence and disintegration. 
Therefore, the circle of the mystery play so urgently sought by the other Symbolists as an 
embodiment of Godmanhood is not a circle of eternity, for the simple reason, as is attested to by 
the circular composition of Gaetan's song, that this circle is nothing but a relentless circle of life 
(and death), or in other words, Nietzschean eternal return. This temporal circle of empirical life 
cannot be ultimately eliminated and turned into the fullness of Time, as hoped for by Belyi and 
Ivanov. The inescapable fate of all knights who set out on a perilous journey in search of the 
Absolute is to perish without any hope of ever attaining it, for Gaetan's song does not have a 
definitive end, always coiling back on itself as soon as it reaches its provisional end. Yet, unlike 
for the early Blok of lyrical dramas, who similar to Belyi, used to despair at the thought of the 
eternal return of the phenomenal, the Blok of The Rose and the Cross sees this eternal return of 
life as the very essence of the tragic nature of humanity. The Absolute as a definitive synthesis of 
the infinite and the finite cannot be actualized in life but a human being can be elevated to an 
exalted experience of the sought-for unity (“joy-suffering”) in death if he has selflessly devoted 
his life to the pursuit of the “impossible dream.” 
Blok's ultimate insight into the nature of unity is that it is accessible to and attainable by 
man only in death as an act of self-sacrifice in the name of love. Yet, the Russian Symbolist's 
solution to the tragic divide between the finite and the infinite exposed by Romanticism is 
essentially Romantic at its core. In his attempt to surmount Romanticism, synonymous for him 
with the excesses of aesthetic individualism, the Russian playwright in fact reenacts what the 
Romantics themselves viewed as the only way out of the isolation of individuated consciousness
—death as the cancellation of the curse of individuation, as the act of tying together the hitherto 
severed opposites (the infinite and the finite, freedom and necessity, the subject and the object, 
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consciousness and nature, female and male). This idea of death as the ultimate reunifying agent 
already takes hold in early Romanticism and can be found in the works of Hölderlin 
(Empedocles) and Novalis (Heinrich von Ofterdingen). 
The most famous expression of the Romantic idea of attaining unity through death in the 
name of love is given in the works of Wagner, whose influence on Blok is well-established. Blok 
himself attests to Wagnerian music's impact on The Rose and the Cross in his journal: “I 
transposed the last scene [Bertrand's monologue] into verse to the accompaniment of Wagner's 
melody”556 (7: 208). Zhirmunskii specifies this connection by linking Bertrand's death with the 
Liebestod of Tristan and Isolde: “Indeed, the love ecstasy of the bleeding Bertrand that he 
experiences on the threshold of death, this ''union of love and death'' (using the words of Gaston 
Paris) closely resembles the ''love death'' of Tristan and Isolde as portrayed by Wagner”557 
(“Drama Aleksandra Bloka” 257). Hughes further elaborates Zhirmunskii's insight by exploring 
the striking similarities between the two deaths as the consummation of love: “The three stages 
of Bertrand's death and transfiguration (between Joy and Sorrow—his physical suffering—do 
indeed become one) are very like the long dying of Tristan as he awaits the arrival of Isolde,” 
since Tristan's death is also “accomplished in three stages of reminiscence and a final 
transfiguration in which the joy of understanding becomes one with his suffering” (qtd. in 
Bartlett 214). Thus, instead of moving away from Romanticism toward higher objectivity, Blok 
(re)appropriates and (re)plays one of its fundamental insights, Christianized and popularized by 
Wagner—that the Absolute can never be actualized in life but can only be glimpsed on the 
cross(roads) of being and non-being, bodily disintegration and spiritual transfiguration.  
556 “Под напевами Вагнера переложил последнюю сцену [Bertrand's monologue] в стихах.”  
557 “Действительно, предсмертный любовный экстаз истекающего кровью Бертрана, этот ''союз любви и 
смерти'' (говоря словами Гастона Париса), близко напоминает ''любовную смерть'' Тристана и Изольды 
Вагнера.”  
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The Russian Symbolist's inability to move away from aesthetic Romanticism despite his 
best efforts at historical realism was noticed and emphasized by contemporary critics. Ivanov-
Razumnik was particularly keen to discern the ironic continuity between Blok's early works and 
The Rose and the Cross that seeks to find a way out of the “glass desert” of alienated 
consciousness of the Romantic ironist (“a decadent” in Ivanov-Razumnik's terminology558). 
Blok's “tragedy,” according to Ivanov-Razumnik's diagnosis, lies in his persistent lyrical and 
dramatic attempts (including The Rose and the Cross) to surmount the curse of isolated 
“decadent” consciousness by means of erotic love (“vliublennost'”): 
It is in this perennial erotic love [vliublennost'] and in the powerlessness to find an all-
encompassing love [liubov'] that the tragedy of poetry by Aleksandr Blok lies who is 
powerless to break through the confines of his enclosure because erotic love is not the 
way that can save one from loneliness, insanity, and being buried alive.559 (“Roza i Krest 
(Poeziia Aleksandra Bloka)” 19; 21) 
The “rose” of erotic love can only lead to the “cross” of suffering that, according to Ivanov-
Razumnik's analysis, is not to be followed by resurrection as in the case of Christ's sacrifice out 
of love for humanity: “To strive to overcome one's alienation, one's loneliness, to travel for that 
purpose the path of erotic love strewn with roses only to arrive at the cross and death—does not it
mean to be defeated by life?”560 (26). As opposed to Blok, who views The Rose and the Cross as 
a work that celebrates the tragic triumph of life, the critic sees it as a reinforcement of “the 
558  Ivanov-Razumnik's insight into Blok's indelible connection with the German strain of Romanticism lies in his 
comparison of the Russian Symbolist with Zhukovskii: “A. Blok is truly Zhukovskii of the bygone Symbolism” 
[“А. Блок — поистине Жуковский минувшего символизма”] (25). 
559 “В этой вечной влюбленности и в бессилии найти единую любовь — вся трагедия поэзии А. Блока, 
бессильного выйти за пределы своей ограды” because “влюбленность — не тот путь, на котором можно 
спастись от одиночества, от безумия, от погребения заживо.”  
560 “Стремиться преодолеть свою отграниченность, свое одиночество, идти для этого путем ''влюбленности,'' 
усыпанным розами, и подойти ко кресту, к смерти — не значит ли это быть побежденным жизнью?”
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tragedy” of Blok himself being unable to break through to the wider world of life and having to 
be crucified on the cross of the alienated “decadent” consciousness instead.  
In fact, Ivanov-Razumnik exposes in Blok the same underlying Romantic ambition of 
supplanting Christ that makes itself manifest so palpably in Gogol''s and Belyi's works and lives. 
The tragedy of the Romantic resides in his attempt to replace Christ's active love (“deiatel'naia 
liubov'”) with erotic love (“vliublennost'”) that can only in the end lead to defeat and death as 
opposed to a new life promised by Christ. Thus, for the critic, The Rose and the Cross, rather 
than signifying a new stage of Blok's work, a tragic breakthrough to Life, as the Russian 
Symbolist had hoped for, epitomizes his Romantic impasse: 
Each of us is crucified by life in order to resurrect with our soul: this is the essence of 
“tragedy.” But not everyone is brought by this tragedy toward active love, the only one 
that holds the keys of salvation from the world “decadence,” from the vicious circle of 
loneliness. The whole history of Aleksandr Blok's work lies in his hopeless attempts to 
break out of this vicious circle by means of the rose and the cross.561 (26) 
In this light, as convincingly shown by Ivanov-Razumnik, the cross of the Romantic is not the 
cross of Christ and Bertrand's sacrifice, while giving him a glimpse of the original cosmic unity, 
nevertheless is powerless to produce any sort of lasting impact upon the living and even less to 
redeem. In other words, if one pursues Ivanov-Razumnik's line of argument further, even the 
metaphysical unity revealed to the character's dying consciousness that marked such a 
breakthrough for Blok does not spill over the boundaries of that alienated consciousness into the 
world at large. Paradoxically, even in partaking of that absolute unity, the exalted consciousness 
561 “Каждый из нас распинается жизнью для того, чтобы воскреснуть душой: в этом сущность ''трагедии.'' Но
не каждого трагедия эта приводит к действенной любви, в которой лишь спасение от мирового 
''декаденства,'' от заколдованного круга одиночества. Безнадежные попытки розой и крестом разорвать 
заколдованный круг — в этом вся история творчества А. Блока.”
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of the Romantic in its epiphany remains tragically isolated from the rest of humankind. The 
Romantic's highest triumph turns out to be his lowest defeat in disguise, for his elevation to the 
transcendent is an erotic exaltation of solitary consciousness.   
 That for Blok such a critical appraisal linking his latest dramatic effort with his earlier 
work was disconcerting is evidenced by an entry in his journal, in which he reflects on why 
Ivanov-Razumnik cannot be considered a “friend” but a “dear enemy”: 
A person is called a friend if he speaks not about what is or was but about what may and 
must be with another person. An enemy, on the other hand, is one who does not want 
to speak of the future but emphasizes specifically, even on purpose, what is, and most 
importantly, what was... bad (or—what appears bad to him). That is why I am inscribing 
the book which is to be given as a gift to Ivanov-Razumnik: “To my dear enemy.” 562 (SS 
v 8-mi tt., 7: 250)
In other words, while Blok seeks to break away from the ironic aestheticism of Romanticism 
(“his past”) by turning toward the ethical sphere of tragic action (“his future”), Ivanov-Razumnik
stresses the continuity that the Russian Symbolist would rather de-emphasize. The stakes are high
for Blok because Bertrand's tragic death is not just a fictional occurrence (“art”) but is, in the 
Symbolist vein, inherently linked with the realm of life, the sphere of action, itself: 
This is the esoteric which one cannot share with people (some will heckle while others 
will take advantage of it for their own despicable journalistic purposes): art is connected 
with morality. This is “the phrase” that permeates the work (The Rose and the Cross, as I 
562 “Другом называется человек, который говорит не о том, что есть или было, но о том, что может и должно 
быть с другим человеком. Врагом — тот, который не хочет говорить о будущем, но подчеркивает 
особенно, даже нарочно, то, что есть, а главное, что было... дурного (или — что ему кажется дурным). Вот
почему я пишу на книге, даримой Иванову-Разумнику: ''дорогому врагу''.”
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think sometimes).563 (224) 
Devoted as Blok was to the issue of the tragic rupture between the Russian intelligentsia and the 
people, he appears to view Bertrand's sacrifice in the name of love as a potential path open to the 
alienated member of the intelligentsia in his quest for the (re)union with Russia. Blok's vision, as 
it emerges from his poetic tragedy, is that in the hope of saving Russia, the fallen World Soul, one
is to renounce oneself in her name without expecting anything in return. Only by following this 
path of self-sacrifice, is there still a slight hope that the metaphysical fortunes of Russia might be 
reversed. 
Ivanov-Razumnik, on the other hand, emphasizes the futility and barrenness of the tragic 
path that Blok chose in The Rose and the Cross by exposing its darkest roots in Romantic erotic 
aestheticism. Blok's solution is revealed as fictional and Romantic, a product of the sphere of art. 
Despite his call for self-renunciation, he remains a prisoner trapped within “the glass desert” of 
his exaggerated Romantic consciousness. Bertrand's death cannot save Isora because his love, 
even though called by Blok Christian, is still fundamentally erotic. As Ivanov-Razumnik points 
out, the Russian Symbolist is unable to detach himself from the aesthetic eroticism of 
Romanticism and move into the ethical, and even less, into the religious dimension of life that 
remains foreclosed to him. The path of the Romantic Blok is a tragic path of solitary 
consciousness crucified by its own self, yearning for resurrection and yet remaining ever doubtful
of it. The whole work of the Russian Symbolist, as acutely perceived by Razumnik, can be 
symbolized by the following lines:
Christ! The native land is sad.
563 “Вот эсотерическое, чего нельзя говорить людям (одни — заклюют, другие используют для своих 
позорных публицистических целей): искусство связано с нравственностью. Это и есть ''фраза,'' 
проникающая произведение (''Розу и Крест,'' так думаю иногда я).”
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I am languishing on the cross.
Will your boat ever reach
My crucified heights?564 
In these lines is expressed the whole tragedy of the Romantic: his underlying rivalry with 
Christ, his tragic human inability to replace the true Godman in his mission to redeem Russia and
to heal the rupture between the finite and the infinite, his yearning for deliverance from the 
anguish of individuated consciousness, and yet his ever present doubt as to the possibility of 
ultimate redemption. Like Gogol', Blok was never able to surmount his tragic Romanticism. 
  Even though in The Rose and the Cross Blok ultimately succeeded in subordinating 
lyricism in order to create characters largely independent of authorial consciousness, thereby 
bringing to life Solov'ev's ideal of synthetic tragedy, he is nevertheless unable to get away from 
his Romantic mindset. For the plot of the poetic tragedy is nothing else but a replay in a more 
realistic vein of the myth about the valiant knight and the Beautiful Lady that serves as a 
foundation of the Russian Symbolist's art as a whole. Blok's solution to the tragedy of the 
Romantic abyss separating the finite and the infinite turns out to be purely Romantic in nature. 
For him, unity in the end is accessible to and attainable by man only in death as an act of self-
abnegation—self-sacrifice in the name of love. The partaking of the transcendent unity through 
an act of self-renunciation does not solve Blok's dilemma as the alienated Romantic subject, for, 
as Ivanov-Razumnik points out, the type of love through which the Russian Symbolist seeks to 
heal is still an erotic, Romantic, type of love that can lead only to an empty infinity. Bertrand's 
love that Blok seems to hold as an ethical ideal of unselfishness to be followed by a member of 
564 “Христос! Родной простор печален.
Изнемогаю на кресте.
И челн твой будет ли причален
К моей распятой высоте?”
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the Russian intelligentsia is entirely devoid of redemptive potential, because it is not truly 
Christian (“deiatel'naia”). Thus, Blok's attempt to transcend Romantic erotic aestheticism by 
moving into the ethical sphere of tragedy, paradoxically results only in the reassertion of 
Romanticism. Erotic love as a way to bridge the abyss between the finite and the infinite remains 
no more than an aesthetic, purely fictional, solution.  
Ramesses: The Descent into Fatalism and Death of the Romantic Subject 
That the solution offered by Blok in The Rose and the Cross was purely fictional, 
aesthetic, rather than practical as the Russian Symbolist might have apparently hoped was proved
by historical circumstances in the world of actuality. The intelligentsia failed to wake up to its 
tragic duty in relation to Russia and, as Blok predicted, was swept away by the Revolution. Even 
though the tragic action on the part of the intelligentsia did not take place, he was still hoping that
the masses would prove themselves capable of rejuvenating Russia. By embracing the truth of 
the masses (the world of objectivity) and condemning the truth of the intelligentsia (the Romantic
lyrical subject) who fell short of their tragic mission, Blok extinguished the tragic tension that 
existed between the two antithetical elements that animated his art. Furthermore, the truth of the 
masses that Blok espoused turned out not to be the truth he thought it was. As the Russian 
Symbolist himself intuited, the masses are not uniform, and while there is a healthy majority, 
there is also a diseased minority, the rabble (“golyt'ba”). And it was the truth of the rabble, the 
truth of the knife, that came to dominate the historical climate in the post-revolutionary Russia. 
With the spirit of the Revolution hijacked and ultimately smothered by the rabble, the poet found 
himself confronted with the deterministic (fatalistic) nature of history that he sought so hard to 
transform into the cathartic tragic scenario.
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 Blok's descent into absolute fatalism is registered in his last drama, Ramesses (Ramzes, 
1919), that establishes the tyranny of fate in the world deprived of the tragic hero (a symbol of 
freedom and agency) capable of confronting and appropriating it. In the atmosphere of spiritual 
oppression, Blok, suffocating from lack of artistic freedom, postulates the near-complete 
obliteration of subjectivity and the onset of the reign of fatalism. Unlike Belyi, however, he does 
not entertain any hope concerning the possibility of disrupting the vicious self-perpetuating circle
of history, even by means of divine intervention. Humankind is doomed to futility, fate-ridden 
helplessness, and meaningless death without any possibility of cathartic cleansing and even less 
of redemption. Tragic vision (man as a puppet of fate) comes to triumph over the cathartic 
potential of tragedy (man as a free-willed agent engaged in strife with fate) in Blok's worldview, 
thereby striking a note of complete defeat at the end of the Russian Symbolist's life.
Ramesses shows “scenes from the life in ancient Egypt” (SS v 6-ti tt., 4: 248). It opens 
with a scene that shows Psaru, a governor of Thebes, who is scolding his manager, Khamoizit, 
for his various misdeeds, including loose behavior and drunkenness. Later their conversation 
turns to the recent unrest among the builders working on a temple who demand better conditions,
in the first place food. These restive builders later come to Psaru, seeking justice and complaining
of starvation. In order to get rid of them, he sends them off to Khamoizit's house, promising 
bread. A prophet who wanders through the streets of Thebes summons people to turn back to God
and foretells the imminent destruction of the Egyptian civilization for its sins. In the meantime, 
there is an announcement that the pharaoh, Ramesses, together with his retinue, is approaching 
and Psaru is to welcome him to Thebes. Ramesses inquires as to how many provisions Psaru 
succeeded in collecting in the countryside that he needs for the upcoming war, and Psaru assures 
him that he confiscated all bread from the peasants to satisfy the needs of the pharaoh's army. 
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Ramesses rewards Psaru with money and other treasures for his faithful service. Upon the 
departure of the pharaoh, however, Psaru suddenly collapses and dies. The townsfolk decide that 
the cause of Psaru's death was an evil eye put on the governor by the wandering prophet and they
mercilessly lynch him. The play ends with the rise of the star Sirius on the horizon.  
Ramesses (Ramesses II, the third pharaoh of the Nineteenth Dynasty of Egypt, reigned 
1279-1213 BC), after whom Blok's play is named, is often considered the greatest, most 
celebrated and powerful pharaoh of the New Kingdom. While in the history of ancient Egypt the 
reign of Ramesses marks the period of flourishing, in Blok's portrayal of that rule the atmosphere
is charged with a sense of impending disaster. The distortion of historical events, for which Blok 
as playwright was taken to task by Struve, a scholar of ancient Egypt, is by all means intentional, 
because what the Russian Symbolist seeks to expose is that even though the Egyptian Empire is 
at the height of its greatness on the surface, it is rotten at the core and therefore doomed to 
crumble. Blok portrays a tragic disconnect between those who have and those who have not. The 
common people are suffering from starvation while the privileged classes have not even the 
slightest concern about their basic needs. The ambitious pharaoh, who is determined to 
strengthen and expand his empire, has no interest in the sufferings of the people. There is a sense 
of growing discontent among the disenfranchised masses of which the pharaoh is blithely 
unaware. This brewing discontent threatens to brim over and engulf the great kingdom. 
But the tragedy of humanity, as represented by the scenes from the history of ancient 
Egypt that Blok seeks to depict in his drama, is not only social (the conflict between the social 
classes) but also and more importantly metaphysical. The play conveys Blok's increasingly tragic
sense of human history that, as in his earlier lyrical drama, The King on the Square, he comes to 
perceive as the vicious circle of Nietzschean eternal return. Blok's conception of the development
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of human history as depicted in his last work is even more pessimistic, even defeatist, than in his 
earlier drama. Thus, unlike The King on the Square, Ramesses is almost entirely stripped of 
higher ideals (the vision of the Absolute, in the first place) and human agency. While the people 
are shown as disaffected in both plays, the laboring masses in Ramesses are completely deprived 
of the higher dreams (the ships) for the sake of which they would still be willing to starve and 
suffer. They are forced into labor without being provided even the humblest recompense (such as 
bread) for their backbreaking work. Furthermore, if in the earlier play there was a strong sense of
human agency (as manifested in the actions of the Architect, his daughter, and, to a much lesser 
degree, the poet) involved in the development of historical events, it is completely absent in the 
last drama. In The King on the Square, the wicked Architect, who represents the state, still has a 
palpable sense of control over the rage of the discontented masses, even though the retention of 
that control required the sacrifice of his own child. In Ramesses, on the other hand, the pharaoh, 
an embodiment of the state power, is not only detached from his surroundings and lacking all 
awareness of the brewing popular storm but he, as Blok gives the reader to understand, holds no 
real power at all. 
In the notes attached to the play Blok emphasizes that Ramesses is “a foreigner“ in his 
own homeland: “The presence of something strange, abstract and “beautiful” must be highlighted
in him alongside an extremely ugly way of life. It is as if he didn't care much about anything, an 
ancient memory resides within him, and he is an absolute stranger among his subjects”565 (SS v 6-
ti tt., 4: 272). Being a product of beauty, and therefore being concerned only with beauty and 
glory, the pharaoh is not aware of the extent of the sufferings that the people have to endure to 
565 “В нем должно быть подчеркнуто нечто странное, отвлеченное, ''красивое'' — рядом с очень некрасивым 
бытом. Ему как бы ни до чего нет дела, в нем заключено древнее воспоминание, и он — чужой среди 
подданных.”
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construct the architectural wonders that his reign will be famous for. The country is straining and 
cracking under the burden of heavy taxes, endless bloody wars, and pervasive corruption but the 
pharaoh is absolutely unconcerned about the worsening plight of the laboring masses. It is this 
detached attitude, the attitude of a stranger, exhibited by Ramesses and his successors toward 
their subjects that will expose the fissures within the seemingly thriving Egyptian empire and will
ultimately tilt it into the abyss of non-being.
For Blok, however, the pharaoh's unconcerned, if not totally indifferent, attitude toward 
the needs of his people who are growing more and more discontented is not the primary cause 
behind the mighty empire's impending downfall. In the same notes, Blok compares Ramesses to 
the youthful Oedipus who appears among the Thebians after his triumphant defeat of the Sphinx. 
By drawing this comparison with the ancient Greek tragic hero, the Russian playwright not only 
stresses the pharaoh's “foreignness”: “... and he is a stranger among his subjects the same way as 
Oedipus was a stranger among the long-bearded Thebians who never looked into the Sphinx's 
eyes”566 (Ibid.). The comparison also introduces the theme of fatal epistemic blindness. Like 
Oedipus, Ramesses appears in the play at the height of his power, thinking that he has mastered 
the world and solved all the riddles life has to offer without being conscious of the impending 
catastrophe: the kingdom that he is so busy building on other people's bones and blood is cursed 
and doomed to crumble. And, yet, in contrast to Oedipus, Ramesses, despite sharing the tragic 
hero's hamartia (fatal blindness), is not a tragic hero at all because he lacks any agency 
whatsoever. For Blok, the “tragedy” of the whole situation is that the pharaoh, despite his ironic 
identification with the supreme god, is as helpless a puppet of the historical forces as his lowest 
566  “ ... и он — чужой среди подданных, как Эдип с юным лицом был чужестранцем среди долгобородых 
фивян, которые никогда не смотрели в глаза Сфинксу.”
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subject. 
 Ramesses marks Blok's irreversible plunge into fatalism.567 Fluctuations of history, the 
rise and fall of mighty empires, are outside human control. Even the mightiest of the people 
seemingly endowed with absolute power is nothing more but a plaything of the impersonal 
historical forces that run their cyclical course. The end of the Egyptian empire is predetermined. 
It is to be succeeded by the Christian era. And, yet, even though Christianity is on the horizon, 
the future coming of Christ is not to bring about any drastic change in the human condition 
perceived by Blok as an endless series of meaningless sufferings concealed behind the “vanity of 
vanities” of daily life. The deterministic chain of human history will not be broken by the arrival 
of Christ and the promise of redemption associated with the Godman will not extend to the future
generations. The vicious circle of history has not and cannot be broken as attested to by Blok's 
transparent comparison of the imminent disintegration of Egypt with the downfall of the Russian 
empire, swept away by the Revolution. History has neither an inherent purpose nor an in-built 
progression toward the Absolute and its meaningless cyclical run extends itself into eternity. 
Unlike Belyi, Blok does not entertain any hope that the eternal return of history can be brought to
completion by the Second Coming of Christ, for even the first arrival of Godman did not alter its 
inexorable deterministic nature. 
The force of necessity that renders the subject inconsequential is also manifested in the 
almost total absence of the lyrical strain in Ramesses, which is written exclusively in prose. 
Unlike in the previous dramas, where the lyrical (the subjective) always dominated the objective, 
the last drama exhibits the ascendancy of the objective. Authorial consciousness that used to 
567 The Russian Symbolist registers the onset of the fatalistic mood in his journal a year earlier: “[I am] more a 
fatalist ''than ever'' (or — as always)” [“Более фаталист, ''чем когда-нибудь'' (или — как всегда)”] (SS v 8-mi 
tt., 7: 328).
483
pervade and control the workings of the earlier drama is almost completely eliminated from the 
last play. Its residual presence can still be remotely felt in the figure of the prophet who appears 
to be a variation on the character of the Poet in Blok's lyrical dramas. The obliteration of the 
subjective in the world reigned by fate is metaphorically embodied by the violent death of the 
prophet at the hands of the enraged people infuriated by his prophecy of impending doom. The 
demise of the prophet stands symbolically for the death of the lyrical (Romantic) subject whose 
last words helplessly fall on deaf ears without being capable of reaching the hearts of the people 
and changing the predetermined cataclysmic course of historical events. Another glimpse of 
authorial consciousness can be detected in the remark that closes Ramesses: “The evening has 
arrived; enormous Sirius stands on the horizon”568 (Ibid.). Sirius is a star of evil omen, especially 
bringing bad weather or, in other words, the rage of the elements which, in Blok's Romantic 
worldview, has always been associated with the awakening of the people. The last spark of 
authorial consciousness is dissolved in the phrase that signals the absolute triumph of coercive 
objectivity (necessity). 
Thus, in the last play written by Blok the meaning of the tragic drastically changes in 
comparison with the conception of tragedy/the tragic that the Russian Symbolist pursued before 
the outbreak of the October Revolution. In Fedorov's words, “The allegorical meaning of 
Ramesses is very depressing and can be expressed by the formula: vanity of vanities; all is vanity.
There is nothing life-affirming, no search for “the beautiful and bright life.” The play which was 
written in the year before the poet's death is his most pessimistic work for the stage”569 (136-137).
Instead of continuing to believe into the healing power and saving grace of tragedy, Blok comes 
568  “Наступил вечер, на горизонте стоит огромный Сириус.”  
569 “... иносказательный смысл ''Рамзеса'' очень мрачен и может быть выражен формулой: суета сует. Ничего 
жизнеутверждающего, никаких поисков ''жизни прекрасной и светлой.'' Пьеса, написанная в 
предпоследний год жизни поэта, — самое пессимистическое из его произведений для сцены.”
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to renounce its cosmic assurance that man can triumph over fate by appropriating his own 
suffering, thereby making it meaningful. The ultimate radiant fullness offered by tragedy as an 
aesthetic genre comes into conflict with the meaningless brutality of historical events unfolding 
in real life. While tragedy does not allow man to escape the constraints of mortality and 
mutability, it has a powerful cathartic capacity. The fight against the necessity of the objective 
power affirms rather than denies individual freedom. In the fatalistic vision, into which Blok 
descends by the end of his life, the contest between individuality (man) and the power of the 
objective world (fate) that animates tragedy is completely extinguished. Man is deprived of all 
agency, being turned into a helpless puppet of impersonal forces. The realization of the complete 
futility of human existence arouses an intense feeling of despair (akin to Kierkegaardian 
“sickness unto death”) that pervades Blok's last work. 
The chaos of life, as Blok finds in his own experience, resists the imposition of formal 
and moral order provided by tragedy as an aesthetic genre. Reality refuses to be fashioned into 
the complete aesthetic totality that tragedy incarnates. The soothing grace, the peace of cosmic 
reconciliation, that tragedy supplies within the sphere of art proper is missing in the realm of life 
defined by the terrifying chaotic necessities (violence, destruction, futility, and death) 
unconstrained by aesthetic order. The tragic cathartic principle that Blok struggled so hard to 
transpose into life to cleanse it of its wantonly destructive tendencies turns out to be a strictly 
formal feature that exists exclusively in the province of art. Life proper, as an unformed content 
or pure chaos, that exists outside the limited aesthetic dimension, is resistant to the imposition of 
form that in tragedy as a genre served, in Krieger's words, “as a token, a security—something 
given in hand—to guarantee the cosmic order beyond the turbulence it has conquered” (“Tragedy
and the Tragic Vision” 32). Thus, the renewal of the cosmic order after the demise of the tragic 
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hero that brings about the serenity of harmony in its wake is impossible beyond the assurances of
aesthetic form. 
It is this impossibility of translating the aesthetic (tragic) solution into the turbulent realm 
of life that provokes a profound crisis in Blok's Romantic consciousness, hurling him into the 
abyss of the nihilistic (fatalistic) vision that he battled hard to escape throughout the years. Blok's
ultimate insight into the nature of things is that life (the infinite) and art (the finite) cannot be 
synthesized. Life cannot be transformed into the higher unity of the work of art by “the 
theurgist,” who proves to be no more than a fallible and powerless human being. The degree of 
Blok's despair surpasses that of Belyi and Solov'ev, who come to a similar tragic conclusion, 
because, unlike them, he does not believe in the healing power of Christ, who would be able to 
bring about the universal reconciliation. For him, human life will remain not only forever 
unredeemed but will also be forever deprived of the cleansing effect produced by catharsis that 
simultaneously allows the painful contradictions of life to be exposed, absorbed, and reaffirmed. 
Thus, in Blok's pessimistic vision, the tragic metaphysical rupture embodied for Symbolism by 
the debacle of Romanticism will never be remedied, with men being doomed to languish in the 
vicious circle of unalleviated suffering, helplessness, and futility. In other words, in his final 
years Blok comes to embrace what is known as the modern tragic vision born of Romanticism.  
VI. Conclusion
The second generation of Russian Symbolists, Blok and Belyi in particular, turn to 
tragedy mainly in search of remedy for the excesses of Romantic irony that dwells in the breach 
between the finite and the infinite. In the words of August Schlegel, who, unlike his brother 
Friedrich, was suspicious of the workings of Romantic irony: “Where the genuinely tragic 
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begins, all irony certainly ceases”570 (AWS SW 6:198-199). Cathartic cleansing of the world 
sinking in atheism and nihilism by means of tragic art is necessary before the metaphysical 
rupture can be healed and the Solov'evian ideal of Godmanhood can fulfill itself. Yet despite their
efforts, the Symbolists can neither restore tragedy as a viable objective genre that would subsume
excessive lyricism, a legacy of Romanticism, nor transpose the tragic mode of behavior into non-
heroic reality. The Symbolists' inability to reach the religious realm of tragedy that marks the 
penultimate step on the way to the living mystery play of Godmanhood results in the unrestrained
play of irony and the triumph of the fatalistic outlook. 
This descent into ironic determinism, indicative of the impossibility to overcome history 
by closing it off in the circle of eternity, leads to the reassessment of the idea of the tragic. The 
incapacity to surmount the tragic division of Being via human will makes the Symbolists 
confront the metaphysical nature of that split exposed in Romantic thought. They not only come 
to acknowledge their inability to remedy the ontological rupture as “a tragedy of Symbolism” but
also, and more importantly, as a tragedy of art (broadly understood as a totality of human cultural
activity including literature, philosophy, religion, etc.) as a whole. Despite its superhuman 
theurgic ambitions, art is only of human origin and is therefore doomed to fall short of its 
absolute goal—the ultimate reunification of the human and the divine. Thus, the second 
generation of Russian Symbolists eventually arrive at the same painful insight as the late 
Solov'ev and the early German Romantics. The tragedy of Romanticism cannot be “rewritten” 
because it is also the tragedy of the Symbolist movement itself. The painful disjuncture between 
the infinite and the finite is a fundamental human tragedy that can only be resolved by divine 
intervention—the Second Coming of Christ—if at all. 
570  “Wo das eigentlich Tragische eintritt, hört freilich alle Ironie auf.”
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Conclusion
The Symbolist religio-aesthetic utopia that envisioned the fusion of the finite and the 
infinite in the supreme synthesis of Solov'evian Godmanhood through the creative effort of the 
artist-theurgist did not come into being. Despite their at times desperate struggle against the 
Romantic proclamation of the ultimate unattainability of the Absolute, the Russian Symbolists 
did not succeed in abolishing the ontological distinctions between art and life that would bring 
about the desired transfiguration of material reality. Their attempts to erase the metaphysical line 
of demarcation between eternity and temporality in the hope of earthly immortality often led to 
bitter disappointments and personal tragedies. In their impotence to transcend the divide and heal
what they saw as the gaping wound of existence, they came in the end to acknowledge that a 
human being, even endowed with the highest artistic potential, cannot supplant the only Godman 
known to history, Christ, in his role as unifier of the human and the divine. The gulf between the 
enthusiastic vision and its actual fulfillment, between “what is” and “ought to be,” proved 
irreparable or, in the Romantic parlance, “tragic.” As the Russian Symbolists discovered, the 
temporal condition of man is eternal, for neither the medium of art nor the miracle of love offers 
the possibility of breaking through the confines of mortality and mutability. Humanity is doomed 
to inhabit the tragic rift in the Universe of irreconcilables. 
Yet the Symbolist transformative urge was to endure for a long time after the decline of 
the Symbolist movement itself. Their aesthetic ideologies, the theurgic project of life-creation 
(zhiznetvorchestvo) in particular, informed the practices of subsequent artistic movements, 
schools, and tendencies as diverse as the avant-garde and Socialist Realism and even came 
among other factors to shape the new Soviet reality itself.571 The early artistic avant-garde that 
571    For a more detailed discussion of the persistence of the Symbolist conception of life-creation in the subsequent 
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became known as “the Futurists” (Vladimir Maiakovskii, David Burliuk, Benedict Livshits, 
Aleksei Kruchenykh, Mikhail Larionov, and Ilia Zdanevich among others) became a primary 
channel through which the Symbolist theurgic ideal, in its “demystified” and “technologized” 
form, eventually found its way into Soviet aesthetic sensibilities and political vision. Despite the 
Futurists' overtly combative stance against the Symbolist predecessors who were perceived as 
part of the old tradition that must be summarily “thrown overboard from the steamship of 
modernity,” their aesthetic program that aimed at subordinating life to art was heavily indebted to
their “obsolete” mystical antecedents. 
Thus, similar to the younger Symbolists, the Futurists practiced the principle of “life 
creation” by seeking to translate aesthetic concepts into a life strategy. Like the Symbolist 
generation, they enthusiastically engaged in the self-conscious construction of their lives, even 
though their preferred mode of life dramatization was much cruder, more vociferous, and 
scandalous in their quest for self-publicity and the épatage effect. Furthermore, although the 
Futurists ostensibly renounced all metaphysical associations attached to the Symbolist idea(l) of 
life-creation, they nevertheless aspired to nothing less than refashioning the human soul, molding
“a new man” for the new life: “What guided Futurism from the days of its infancy was not the 
creation of new paintings, verses, and prose, but the production of a new human being through 
art, which is one of the tools of such production” (Tretyakov 207). In other words, art, for the 
Futurists, was “a tool” by means of which they hoped to entirely reorganize human behavior and 
the human psyche. 
 In this somewhat demystified and futurized form as “life-building” or “life-construction,”
artistic practices, see in particular Boris Groys' The Total Art of Stalinism and Irina Gutkin's “The Legacy of the 
Symbolist Aesthetic Utopia: From Futurism to Socialist Realism.” 
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the Symbolist idea of life-creation, of the transfiguration of life by means of art, became a 
common property of the artistic avant-garde after the Bolshevik revolution. Thus, the Left Front 
of the Arts (Lef and then Novyi Lef) that included not only the pre-revolutionary Futurists but also
Constructivism and, to a certain extent, Production Art movements were united by their members'
collective striving to actualize a utopian vision of the future by aesthetic means. In contrast to the
Symbolist religious conception of the artist as a Solov'evian theurgist who transfigures matter 
through his Logos-like word, however, the artists of the Left Front (and the representatives of 
Constructivism, in particular), under the influence of the cult of technology that spread in the 
1920's, came to conceive the role of the artist as that of “an engineer,” a supreme craftsman who 
creates new forms of future life and art by “reforging” (perekovka) the old matter. “Central, 
here,” as Groys explicates, “is the radical notion that the subconscious dominates human 
consciousness and can be logically and technically manipulated to construct a new world and a 
new individual” (19). The artist's “engineering” will is to conquer and reorganize cosmos and 
society on a new, technological, basis, thereby bringing the course of human history to an end. 
Therefore, like the younger Symbolists, the avant-gardists are also propelled by an apocalyptic 
vision, by the metaphysical notion of the Absolute that they, however, seek to reinterpret in 
rationalistic, utilitarian, and constructive terms. 
In their quest for the practical realization of the new technological world which was 
envisioned as an embodiment of the internal combustion engine, a new generation of 
experimental artists united under the slogan of “productionism” sought to further radicalize the 
constructivist program (experimentation with material) by laying stress on the functional 
principle of art. Art was to be harnessed in the service of social “expediency” (tselesoobraznost') 
by producing utilitarian objects (furniture, clothes, etc.), thereby not only serving the basic needs 
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of the Soviet people but also reorganizing their everyday life by aesthetic means. In Gutkin's 
words, “[this] turn toward serving the needs of everyday life did, in fact, constitute a watershed 
in the history of life-creating aesthetics [originated in Solov'ev's philosophy and expounded by 
the younger Symbolists]. The aesthetic utopian ideal of art creating life, which took shape at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, was fused with the utilitarian tradition of the 1860's” (181). In
this light, the late avant-garde presents a curious, highly combustible blend of “idealism” and 
“materialism,” in which the idealist vision, though obscured by the materialist parlance, in fact, 
informs and drives their essentially aesthetico-metaphysical project. 
Through the avant-garde's creative appropriation of the Symbolist ideal of life-creation, 
this idea made its way into the Stalinist understanding of art and its overall role in the 
construction of the future life, envisioned first as a triumph of socialism to be followed by the 
inevitable establishment of communism. Unlike the Symbolist vision oriented toward the 
transcendent, the avant-garde project that aspired to organize the social life of the country after 
the October Revolution of 1917 in new, as yet unseen beautiful forms, was not only aesthetic in 
its aspirations but also and essentially political (Groys, Gutkin). The avant-garde's “will to 
power” placed them from the very beginning in a highly ambivalent position, both as 
collaborators of and simultaneously as rivals of the Bolsheviks and later of the Communist party. 
As Gutkin puts it, “After the Bolshevik Revolution the question of who was to have the leading 
role in designing a new life became paramount” (173). The Bolshevik, and subsequently the 
Communist party leadership, that assimilated the avant-garde aesthetics and in many ways 
appropriated their life-builders' project of the total transformation of the world into a perfect 
work of art, came to increasingly resent the avant-gardists' sweeping “dictatorial” ambitions and 
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eventually eliminated the movement in the 1930s572 by liquidating many of its prominent 
representatives. As Groys explains, “There would have been no need to suppress the avant-garde 
if its black squares [Malevich's suprematism] and transrational poetry [by the Futurtist Velimir 
Khlebnikov] had confined themselves to artistic space, but the fact that it was persecuted 
indicates that it was operating on the same territory as the state” (35). 
By concentrating all political power solely in his hands, Stalin as ruler became de facto 
heir to the avant-garde project of the total aesthetic organization of the country which, in its own 
turn, was so heavily indebted to the second generation of Symbolists, Solov'evians, with their 
aspirations for the practical realization of the Absolute via art:
The avant-garde's dream of placing all art under direct party control to implement its 
program of life-building (that is, “socialism in one country” as the true and consummate 
work of collective art) had now come true. The author of this program, however, was not 
Rodchenko or Maiakovskii, but Stalin, whose political power made him the heir to their 
artistic project. (34)
Like the avant-garde, Stalin as “an artist-ruler” was, in essence, preoccupied with the “theurgic” 
construction of the Soviet world—the new reality of socialism which was to triumph in the 
creation of communism as a total work of art. This strikingly “theurgic” nature of the Communist
party's vision and the implementation of that vision, which through the avant-garde's 
constructivist utopianism goes back to the Symbolist notion of life-creation, was commented on 
by Nikolai Valentinov (Vol'skii), a contemporary of the Symbolists and a devout Marxist who did
not embrace the Bolshevik revolution:   
572 The avant-garde, alongside other artistic groups, was ruled out of existence by the decree of the Central 
Committee that came out on April 23, 1932.  
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Strange as it may seem, there is a great deal of commonality between Bely's view on art 
at that time [i.e., 1907] and the current views of the people in the Kremlin. Similar to him,
they repudiate art for art's sake. For them, art is nothing but a means of “transformation of
life” in accordance with that absolutely true philosophy—or, if you will, materialistic 
religion—which they, the Kremlin theurgists, claim to possess. Artists are “engineers of 
souls.” Stalin was the hierophant above the theurgists and his every word had to be 
incarnated in works of art and in life.573 (127)
One of the “tools” by means of which Stalin sought to subjugate reality to his organizing, 
“engineering” will was the imposition of the socialist realist method574 in all art, which was to 
effectively replace the aesthetics of the avant-garde. The paradox of socialist realist art, however, 
as convincingly shown by Groys, is that, despite its seeming opposition to the avant-garde's 
emphasis on formal experimentation, it is in many ways its natural outgrowth, and as a result 
bears some resemblance to Symbolist aesthetics as well. Thus, similarly to the avant-garde, 
Socialist Realist art's task was to shape the consciousnesses of the laboring masses as a way 
toward the realization of the aesthetico-political project of building socialism (and later 
communism), although the form of that consciousness moulding was more narrowly conceived 
as a blunt ideological indoctrination when compared to the Futurist technological “reforging” 
(perekovka) or the Symbolist religious “transfiguration” (preobrazhenie) (Gutkin 195-196). 
Furthermore, the Socialist Realist artist was not expected to faithfully mirror the current 
573 “Сколь это ни странно, между взглядами в это время на искусство Белого и нынешними взглядами людей 
Кремля очень много сходства. Они, как и он, отрицают чистое искусство. Искусство для них только 
средство ''преобразовать жизнь'' в согласии с той абсолютно-верной философией, или, если хотите, 
материалистической религией, которой, по их уверению, обладают они, теурги Кремля. Художники — это
''инженеры душ.'' Сталин был иерофантом над теургами и каждое его слово требовало воплощения в 
произведениях искусства и в жизни.” 
574 This is not to deny that Socialist Realism was a legitimate phenomenon of the time in its own right. Thus, 
Leiderman and Lipovetskii argue that Socialist Realism would not have enjoyed such a lenghy life if there had 
been no receptive soil for the seed (1: 20). 
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(that is phenomenal) reality, with all its unseemly imperfections, as was the case in 19th century 
critical strand of realism, but rather to take an active, “transformative,” stance towards the world 
(aktivnoe otnoshenie k deistvitel'nosti). As Groys points out, Socialist Realist mimesis “is more 
reminiscent of medieval realism” (51), and, one may add, of Russian Symbolism as practiced by 
the Solov'evians,575 that focused not on depicting “deceptive” phenomena but on revealing the 
“true” essence of things. Yet, unlike medieval realism and mystical Symbolism, Socialist Realism
was supposed to “embody” (voploshchat') not divine essences inherent in things but only what 
was determined to be “true” at that particular moment by the Communist party (that replaced 
God). In other words, it was to present reality “as it should be created,” in accordance with the 
party's (Stalin's) “theurgic” vision, as opposed to what it really was or, at least, what appeared to 
an observer: “The mimesis of socialist realism is the mimesis of Stalin's will, the artists' 
emulation of Stalin, the surrender of their artistic egos in exchange for the collective efficacy of 
the [aesthetico-political] project [of constructing the new reality of socialism] in which they 
participate” (53). This orientation toward the ideal future (reality as it ought to be) fashioned by 
the artist's “engineering” will, in contradistinction to the focus on the flawed present, exposes the 
roots of Socialist Realism in the avant-garde's utopian aesthetics and, to some extent, in the 
Symbolist idea of life-creation.    
The theurgic aspirations of the Russian Symbolists for bringing about the Absolute by 
means of art long outlived the movement itself. The deliberate aesthetic organization of Soviet 
reality via the “transformative” aesthetics of Socialist Realism as well as by other ideological 
tools proceeded not only during the Stalin era but well after Stalin's death until the collapse of the
575 Viacheslav Ivanov's famous slogan that reflected the “essence” of Symbolism: “A realibus ad realiora” (“from 
reality toward a higher reality”).  
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Soviet Union in 1991. The engineered work of art envisioned as “[the triumph of] socialism in 
one country” (sotsializm v otdel'no vziatoi strane) proved to be impermanent and unstable like all
things earthly. The relentless march of history, that the “post-historical” Soviet reality was 
supposed to halt, eventually caught up with the manufactured eternity itself and overwhelmed it. 
While the Symbolist generation's attempts to transform life by artistic means resulted primarily in
personal tragedies, the grand “theurgic” experiment known as the Soviet Union claimed millions 
of lives. This abortive historical effort at constructing the living Absolute (“eternity”) that in the 
end led to such calamitous results only illustrates the metaphysical insight glimpsed in the 
Ancient Greek tragic art and embraced by the early German Romantics—that at the very moment
a human being is about to transgress the limits of his/her own humanity, (s)he is bound to further 
reinforce them. It is only in the tragic, not in the Absolute, that art and life, the finite and the 
infinite unite (in order to separate again). 
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